Maritza Guzman V. Juan R Solano-Rodriguez

SIERRA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION VS. BOWEN Case Number: 23CVG-00603 This matter is on calendar for confirmation of Judgment. The Court’s June 5, 2024 Ruling after trial ordered Defendant to submit a proposed judgment for the Court’s signature. No proposed judgment has been filed. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 24NWCV00662 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: C SOCAL LIEN SOLUTIONS LLC v. GOODMAN SANTA FE SPRINGS SPE LLC CASE NO.: 24NWCV00662 HEARING: 07/11/24 #6 Defendant GOODMAN SANTA FE SPRINGS SPE LLCs Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is CONTINUED to Thursday, August 15, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C . Moving Party to give notice. Defendant GOODMAN SANTA FE SPRINGS SPE LLC generally demurs to each cause of action contained in Plaintiffs Complaint. On June 26, 2024, before Plaintiffs Opposition to this Demurrer was due, Plaintiff filed and served a Notice of Errata intended to augment inadvertent errors in its complaint at Exhibit D. (Ntc. of Errata, 06/26/24.) It appears that this new Exhibit D intends to amend the initial pleading. A party may amend its pleading once without leave of court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike. (emphasis added.) (CCP §472.) Although Plaintiff did not file, serve, or move for leave to file an amended pleading, it is well-settled that California recognizes a general rule of&liberal allowance of amendments& ( Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) In the interests of judicial efficiency and in light of the liberal policy concerning amendments, the Court utilizes its discretion to grant Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complaint incorporating the new exhibit attached as Exhibit D to Plaintiffs Notice of Errata. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file and serve a First Amended Complaint within 5 days from the date of the Courts issuance of this Order. If the FAC is timely filed and served, the subject Demurrer will be taken off-calendar as MOOT on the continued hearing date. If the FAC is not timely filed and served, the Court will issue a ruling on this subject Demurrer, on the merits.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Thursday, July 11, 2024, Line 13. PLAINTIFF MARTHE SCHREIBER's Motion To Set Aside The Judgment. Ordered off calendar as untimely filed. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Case Number: BC682984 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING MASSACHUSETTS EDUCATIONAL FINANCING AUTHORITY , vs. ALEXANDER . Case No.: BC682984 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Plaintiff Massachusetts Educational Financing Authoritys unopposed motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement is granted. Plaintiff is to submit a judgment to this Court within 10 days of this ruling. Plaintiff Massachusetts Education Financing Authority (MEFA) (Plaintiff) moves unopposed for an order to enter judgment because Defendant Alexander L Ross (Ross) (Defendant) defaulted on the terms and conditions of the parties settlement stipulation. (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; C.C.P. §664.6.) Background On November 09, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court for damages in the amount of $25,149.19 to recover the unpaid balance on a credit card account. (Decl. of Rohan ¶2.) On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant executed a settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement), with the Court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. (Decl. of Rohan ¶3, Exh. A.) Pursuant to ¶10 of the agreement, if Defendant defaulted under the Settlement Agreement, then Plaintiff could obtain a judgment for the outstanding balance, pre-judgment interest and costs through declaration and order. ( See Decl. of Rohan ¶¶3-4, Exh. A at ¶10.) On February 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed by Defendant. Motion to Enforce Settlement Legal Standard C.C.P. §664.6 provides, as follows: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (C.C.P. §664.6(a).) Disputes regarding the terms of the settlement (or other disputed facts) may be adjudicated on a C.C.P. §664.6 motion on the basis of declarations or other evidence. ( Malouf Brothers v. Dixon (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 280, 284; Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 795-796 [stating court may resolve reasonable disputes over terms of settlement agreement but may not modify terms from what was agreed to by parties].) Discussion Plaintiff submitted evidence that Plaintiff and Defendant executed a Settlement Agreement that is signed by the parties and contains a provision authorizing this Court to retain jurisdiction under C.C.P. §664.6. (Decl. of Rohan ¶2 , Exh. A.) Accordingly, Plaintiff submitted evidence of the existence of a valid settlement agreement and is therefore entitled to an order enforcing the settlement. Plaintiffs counsel declares Defendant last made a payment on September 9, 2014. (Decl. of Rohan ¶4.) Plaintiffs counsel declares that on March 16, 2023, he last sent a cure letter to Defendant, stating that Defendant had ten days to cure the defect. (Decl. of Rohan ¶6.) Plaintiffs counsel declares Defendant did not cure the defect and Defendant has not made any other payments pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (Decl. of Rohan ¶¶6-7.) Plaintiffs counsel declares the principal outstanding balance on Defendants account is $10,552.09. (Decl. of Rohan ¶8.) Plaintiff requests a judgment against Defendant in the amount of $11,073.93, reflecting a principal balance of $25,149.19, less $14,075.26 in credits for payments made, and $0.00 in costs. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and enter judgment against Defendant in the amount of $11,073.93, reflecting a principal balance of $25,149.19, less $14,075.26 in credits for payments made, and $0.00 in costs is granted. Conclusion Plaintiffs unopposed motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and enter judgment against Defendant in the amount of $11,073.93, reflecting a principal balance of $25,149.19, less $14,075.26 in credits for payments made, and $0.00 in costs is granted. Plaintiff is to submit a judgment to the Court within 10 days of this ruling. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

23CV-01524 LVNV Funding, LLC v. Esther Canal Court Trial Appearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.

Case Number: 22AHCV00898 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT DIMERCO EXPRESS USA CORP. , Plaintiff(s), vs. CONCORD DISPLAYS, LLC, et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 22AHCV00898 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 12 , 2024 ) Plaintiff Dimerco Express USA Corp. (Plaintiff) requests a default judgment against defendant Concord Displays, LLC (Defendant) in the amount of $24,630.97. On May 23, 2042, Plaintiff filed a declaration of counsel attaching a settlement agreement which provides for the entry of a stipulated judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. In light of this agreement, Plaintiffs attempt to secure a default judgment is procedurally incorrect. Plaintiff should be moving for entry of a judgment pursuant to stipulation and submit a proposed judgment that reflects its stipulated nature. Accordingly, the hearing on the default prove-up is vacated and the Court sets an OSC re: Dismissal for _____________ in order to allow Plaintiff time to file a noticed motion. Dated this 12th day of July , 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 2024CUEN023875: BENEFITS SYSTEMS INC vs GOLD COAST SECURITIES INC. 07/09/2024 in Department 21 Motion to Vacate Sister State Judgment or Alternatively, to Stay Enforcement of Judgment The morning calendar in courtroom 21 will normally begin between 8:30 and 8:45 a.m. Please arrive at the courtroom no later than 8:30 a.m. The door will be opened before the calendar is called. The Court allows appearances by CourtCall but is not equipped for Zoom. If appearing by CourtCall, call in no later than 8:15 a.m. If you intend to appear by CourtCall, you must make arrangements with CourtCall by 4:00 p.m. the day before your scheduled hearing. Requests for approval of a CourtCall appearance made on the morning of the hearing will not be granted. No exceptions will be made. With respect to the tentative ruling below, no notice of intent to appear is required. If you wish to submit on the tentative ruling you can fax notice to Judge Riley's secretary, Ms. Sedillos at 805-289-8705, stating that you submit on the tentative. You may also email the Court at: Courtroom21@ventura.courts.ca.gov with all counsel copied on the email. Do not call in lieu of sending a fax or email. If you submit on the tentative without appearing and the opposing party appears, the hearing will be conducted in your absence. If you are the moving party and do not communicate to the Court that you submit on the tentative or you do not appear at the hearing, the Court may deny your motion irrespective of the tentative. Unless stated otherwise at the hearing, if a formal order is not signed at the hearing, the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with the court. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized. Tentative Ruling The Court DENIES the request to vacate the Judgment because GCSI’s only argument in support of its request to vacate the Judgment is based on §473.5, and because §473.5 does not apply to a judgment entered on a sister-state judgment such as the Judgment entered by this Court on April 22, 2024. The Court also DENIES GCSI’s request for a stay of enforcement of the Judgment. Analysis Defendant’s Request for an Order Vacating the Judgment GCSI’s sole stated ground for vacating the Judgment is that GCSI lacked actual notice of the Texas action in time to defend, and therefore it entitled to relief from the Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §473.5. 2024CUEN023875: BENEFITS SYSTEMS INC vs GOLD COAST SECURITIES INC. However, it is well-established that the Court cannot grant relief from the Judgment pursuant to §473.5, because §473.5 is not applicable to a judgment entered on a sister-state judgment: “Judgment debtors contend the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the sister state judgment pursuant to section 473.5. We disagree because section 473.5 is inapplicable to a sister state judgment entered under the SSFMJA.1 ‘When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.’ (§ 473.5, subd. (a).) “Judgment debtors contend their motion to vacate judgment was timely under section 473.5, subdivision (a) because it was made within 180 days after entry of the sister state judgment. They contend the court should have vacated the sister state judgment under section 473.5, subdivision (a) because their failure to offer a defense in the Indiana action arose from the absence of service of process and their lack of actual notice. The fatal fallacy of their position lies in their failure to recognize that section 473.5 is not applicable to a judgment entered pursuant to the SSFMJA. “In Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 203 [106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854] the court explained, ‘Section 473.5 is addressed to motions to set aside a default or default judgment … . Section 473.5 is a procedural remedy by which a default or default judgment may be set aside …; and is inapplicable to a sister state judgment entered pursuant to the SSFMJA because it is not a default or default judgment.” (Conseco Marketing, LLC v. IFA & Ins. Services, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 831, 844.) Defendant’s Request for a Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment Code of Civil Procedure Section 1710.50(a) provides that: “(a) The court shall grant a stay of enforcement where: (1) An appeal from the sister state judgment is pending or may be taken in the state which originally rendered the judgment. Under this paragraph, enforcement shall be stayed until the proceedings on appeal have been concluded or the time for appeal has expired…[¶¶] (5) Any other circumstance exists where the interests of justice require a stay of enforcement.” 2024CUEN023875: BENEFITS SYSTEMS INC vs GOLD COAST SECURITIES INC. With respect to a stay of enforcement under §1710.50(a)(1), GCSI does not submit any evidence that an appeal is pending from the Texas judgment. Instead, GCSI’s Chief Executive Officer Tae Ho merely states in his declaration that he intends to file a “Bill for Review.” (See Ho Decl., ¶4.) However, GCSI fails to cite to any authority or submit any evidence indicating that it is still able to file a timely appeal of the Texas judgment. And under Texas law, a Bill for Review does not appear to constitute an appeal at all, but rather a separate equitable proceeding to challenge a judgment that may no longer be appealed. (See In re Tex. Real Estate Comm'n (Tex.Ct.App. 2018) 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 672, at *6-7.) Section 1710.50(a)(1) only provides for a stay of enforcement for appeals. Accordingly, GCSI fails to establish it is entitled to a stay of enforcement under §1710.50(a)(1). With respect to §1710.50(a)(5), GCSI contends that it would be in the “interests of justice” to stay enforcement of the Judgment “due to the lack of notice resulting in…the denial of due process by the default judgment….” GCSI’s argument regarding a denial of due process lacks merit, as “…[D]ue process of law does not require actual notice, only a method reasonably certain to accomplish that end. [Citation.] ‘Mullane makes it clear that due process of law does not require actual notice, but only a method reasonably certain to accomplish that end. [Citations.] “If the form of substituted service is reasonably calculated to give an interested party actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.”’ [Citation.] (Rasooly v. City of Oakley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 348, 357.) Here, there appear to have been reasonable attempts by the Texas Secretary of State to serve GCSI with a Citation , which is apparently the Texas equivalent of a summons, and the complaint in the Texas action. (See Decl. of Adraian Ciechanowicz, ¶¶4-8.) GCSI fails to make any argument – much less submit any evidence – that these efforts were constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, GCSI fails to show that it has been denied due process. It also is unclear what staying enforcement of the Judgment for an indefinite period would achieve, as GCSI fails to submit any evidence indicating that it may still timely appeal the Texas judgment and – in the absence of such evidence – fails to submit any evidence that it will be able to overturn the Texas judgment. In the absence of such evidence, a stay of enforcement of the Judgment would not be in the interests of justice.