Pehrson, Lennart Vs. Nys Division Of Housing

24CV00826 DEBERT v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ TRIAL DE NOVO – PLANNING ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING BACKGROUND Santa Cruz County issued a citation on 9/14/23 to petitioner DeBert for maintaining real property (Nina Ct. in Boulder Creek)1 with debris and vehicles on it in violation of County Code sections: 1 County asserts there is no situs address; DeBert says her address is 955 Nina Ct., Boulder Creek CA 95006 and it is known to the County and its hearing officer. Page 2 of 5 • 13.10.140(A) (non-compliance with zoning regulations – unpermitted construction); • 13.10.279(B) (use of property declared a public nuisance); • 13.10.683(I) (parking/use of a recreational vehicle on vacant parcel); • 16.22.160(A) (grading without a permit); and • 16.22.160(B) (land clearing without a permit). Petitioner filed her appeal to the County’s administrative hearing officer, who found in favor of County, upheld the citation, ordered County to abate the nuisances, and ordered her to pay enforcement costs of $480 and $10,000 in civil penalties payable within 90 days, and all violations to be remedied within 60 days of the order. The hearing officer’s order was served on petitioner on 2/14/24. (Mendes Declaration, ¶8.) She did not file her notice of appeal within 20 days pursuant to Gov. Code § 53069.4, so this court reviews the appeal pursuant to CCP § 1094.5 and applies an abuse of discretion standard. STANDARD OF REVIEW Cal Code Civ Proc § 1094.5 provides: (a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury. (b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. The Court may issue a writ of administrative mandate only where an agency has (1) acted in excess of its jurisdiction, (2) deprived the petitioner of a fair hearing, or (3) committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (CCP § 1094.5(b).) Abuse of discretion is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in a manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Clark v City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169, citing CCP § 1094.5(b).) “The court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency, nor ‘disturb the agency's choice of penalty absent ‘an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion’ by the administrative agency’ (Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 628 [cit. omitted]), but must uphold the penalty if there is any reasonable basis Page 3 of 5 to sustain it. (Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46 [cit. omitted].).” (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 877.) I. Record Before the Court: The record before the Court in this review includes: Submitted by the County: Exhibit A, the notice of violation; Exhibit B, photos of the site; Exhibit C, Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, 2/5/24; Exhibit D, relevant County Codes; Exhibit E, Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, 5/3/21; Exhibit F, notice of violation, 11/22/19; Exhibit G, 3/1/24 email from petitioner requesting an address change from P.O. Box 1595, Boulder Creek CA 95006 to 955 Nina Ct., Boulder Creek CA 95006; and Exhibit H, petitioner’s Mailing Address Change Authorization form. Submitted by Appellant: None. II. Basis of appeal: Petitioner filed an objection to County’s trial brief but has yet to offer any other evidence. She claims the County’s inspector, Marcus Mendes, did not have a warrant and entered her constitutionally protected property improperly. She claims she was present and he kept himself hidden from her. She argues she had a current logging permit and an exemption applies rendering her grading work not in violation of County Codes. She contends the hearing officer found these matters to be irrelevant, which constitutes error. She claims third parties have illegally logged her property and caused damage to her parcel. She argues that the County engages in selective enforcement since her neighbors violate certain codes without any enforcement, and she was cited for issues on her property that were actually caused by the prior owner. She believes the County was allowing RVs on properties due to the CZU fire without enforcement. She claims she was prevented from appearing at the administrative hearing due to Page 4 of 5 improper notice and her illness, and her plea for a continuance was ignored. She wants the Court to appoint her counsel since she’s subject to enforcement costs and civil penalties which she claims are “a misdemeanor, serious jail time, large sums of money and the loss of [her] property and home, yet all in civil court.” (Objection p. 4.) III. County’s supplemental pleadings: County submits a supplemental trial brief and two declarations from Marcus Mendes and Sheri Thomas. Ms. Thomas, Assessor-Recorder, explains that petitioner changed the mailing address for her property on 3/1/24, which was received by the Assessor’s Office on 3/8/24. Mr. Mendes declares in his supplemental declaration that he did not enter onto petitioner’s property in his inspection and viewed her property from the public right of way from a neighbor’s driveway above petitioner’s property. He explains that in order to legally perform work under the logging permit, petitioner would have first needed to obtain a grading permit, which she did not do. He observed excavations on petitioner’s property that exceeded 100 cubic yards and created a cut slope of greater than five feet in depth, meaning that the exemption identified by petitioner does not apply. Mr. Mendes explains that the County utilizes the official mailing address associated with the property for mailing notices. Petitioner’s address for the notice and hearing order was the P.O. Box, not her street address (which she changed later). He finally clarifies that RVs are not permitted on vacant parcels due to the likelihood of unlawful septic, fire hazards, accumulated trash, and vectors associated with them. IV. Abuse of discretion review – reasonable basis for sustaining the hearing officer’s decision: Based on the record, there appears to be a reasonable basis to sustain the hearing officer’s decision. Evidence exists that petitioner allowed illegal vehicle storage and grading on her property without permits. The 2/4/24 Decision and Order is upheld; the County is awarded its reasonable costs of enforcement, and this appeal is dismissed. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed Page 5 of 5

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 2024CUOE022694: GABRIELLE WHITE vs AEGIS SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES LLC 06/24/2024 in Department 41 Motion for Order Approving the Payment of Penalties Pursuant to The Private Attorney Generals Act of 2004 (PAGA) and for Dismissal of Action Without Prejudice Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Approving Payment of Penalties Pursuant to Private Attorney Generals Act of 2004 (PAGA) and for Dismissal of Action without Prejudice Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Approving Payment of Penalties Pursuant to Private Attorney Generals Act of 2004 (PAGA) and for Dismissal of Action without Prejudice is DENIED, without prejudice. Plaintiff failed to comply with this Court’s May 21, 2024 Order by failing to provide the Court with the information requested by the Court in order to fully evaluate the motion. Plaintiff was ordered to file a supplemental declaration five court days before the continued hearing date of June 24, 2024, which declaration was to include an explanation as to why the settlement should be approved, the basis for the requested 40% attorney’s fees to be paid (with lodestar cross-check), the costs to be deducted, whether plaintiff will receive any enhanced payment, and the qualifications of the administrator to be appointed. Further, a copy of the email from LWDA confirming receipt of the settlement agreement was to be attached to the supplemental declaration. Plaintiff failed to file a supplemental declaration. The Court sets the matter for status conference on September 3, 2024 at 8:35AM.

24CV00826 DEBERT v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ TRIAL DE NOVO – PLANNING ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING BACKGROUND Santa Cruz County issued a citation on 9/14/23 to petitioner DeBert for maintaining real property (Nina Ct. in Boulder Creek)1 with debris and vehicles on it in violation of County Code sections: 1 County asserts there is no situs address; DeBert says her address is 955 Nina Ct., Boulder Creek CA 95006 and it is known to the County and its hearing officer. Page 2 of 5 • 13.10.140(A) (non-compliance with zoning regulations – unpermitted construction); • 13.10.279(B) (use of property declared a public nuisance); • 13.10.683(I) (parking/use of a recreational vehicle on vacant parcel); • 16.22.160(A) (grading without a permit); and • 16.22.160(B) (land clearing without a permit). Petitioner filed her appeal to the County’s administrative hearing officer, who found in favor of County, upheld the citation, ordered County to abate the nuisances, and ordered her to pay enforcement costs of $480 and $10,000 in civil penalties payable within 90 days, and all violations to be remedied within 60 days of the order. The hearing officer’s order was served on petitioner on 2/14/24. (Mendes Declaration, ¶8.) She did not file her notice of appeal within 20 days pursuant to Gov. Code § 53069.4, so this court reviews the appeal pursuant to CCP § 1094.5 and applies an abuse of discretion standard. STANDARD OF REVIEW Cal Code Civ Proc § 1094.5 provides: (a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury. (b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. The Court may issue a writ of administrative mandate only where an agency has (1) acted in excess of its jurisdiction, (2) deprived the petitioner of a fair hearing, or (3) committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (CCP § 1094.5(b).) Abuse of discretion is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in a manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Clark v City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169, citing CCP § 1094.5(b).) “The court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency, nor ‘disturb the agency's choice of penalty absent ‘an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion’ by the administrative agency’ (Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 628 [cit. omitted]), but must uphold the penalty if there is any reasonable basis Page 3 of 5 to sustain it. (Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46 [cit. omitted].).” (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 877.) I. Record Before the Court: The record before the Court in this review includes: Submitted by the County: Exhibit A, the notice of violation; Exhibit B, photos of the site; Exhibit C, Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, 2/5/24; Exhibit D, relevant County Codes; Exhibit E, Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, 5/3/21; Exhibit F, notice of violation, 11/22/19; Exhibit G, 3/1/24 email from petitioner requesting an address change from P.O. Box 1595, Boulder Creek CA 95006 to 955 Nina Ct., Boulder Creek CA 95006; and Exhibit H, petitioner’s Mailing Address Change Authorization form. Submitted by Appellant: None. II. Basis of appeal: Petitioner filed an objection to County’s trial brief but has yet to offer any other evidence. She claims the County’s inspector, Marcus Mendes, did not have a warrant and entered her constitutionally protected property improperly. She claims she was present and he kept himself hidden from her. She argues she had a current logging permit and an exemption applies rendering her grading work not in violation of County Codes. She contends the hearing officer found these matters to be irrelevant, which constitutes error. She claims third parties have illegally logged her property and caused damage to her parcel. She argues that the County engages in selective enforcement since her neighbors violate certain codes without any enforcement, and she was cited for issues on her property that were actually caused by the prior owner. She believes the County was allowing RVs on properties due to the CZU fire without enforcement. She claims she was prevented from appearing at the administrative hearing due to Page 4 of 5 improper notice and her illness, and her plea for a continuance was ignored. She wants the Court to appoint her counsel since she’s subject to enforcement costs and civil penalties which she claims are “a misdemeanor, serious jail time, large sums of money and the loss of [her] property and home, yet all in civil court.” (Objection p. 4.) III. County’s supplemental pleadings: County submits a supplemental trial brief and two declarations from Marcus Mendes and Sheri Thomas. Ms. Thomas, Assessor-Recorder, explains that petitioner changed the mailing address for her property on 3/1/24, which was received by the Assessor’s Office on 3/8/24. Mr. Mendes declares in his supplemental declaration that he did not enter onto petitioner’s property in his inspection and viewed her property from the public right of way from a neighbor’s driveway above petitioner’s property. He explains that in order to legally perform work under the logging permit, petitioner would have first needed to obtain a grading permit, which she did not do. He observed excavations on petitioner’s property that exceeded 100 cubic yards and created a cut slope of greater than five feet in depth, meaning that the exemption identified by petitioner does not apply. Mr. Mendes explains that the County utilizes the official mailing address associated with the property for mailing notices. Petitioner’s address for the notice and hearing order was the P.O. Box, not her street address (which she changed later). He finally clarifies that RVs are not permitted on vacant parcels due to the likelihood of unlawful septic, fire hazards, accumulated trash, and vectors associated with them. IV. Abuse of discretion review – reasonable basis for sustaining the hearing officer’s decision: Based on the record, there appears to be a reasonable basis to sustain the hearing officer’s decision. Evidence exists that petitioner allowed illegal vehicle storage and grading on her property without permits. The 2/4/24 Decision and Order is upheld; the County is awarded its reasonable costs of enforcement, and this appeal is dismissed. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed Page 5 of 5

Case Number: 23STCP02443 Hearing Date: June 28, 2024 Dept: 82 Harlem Chadwick Case No. 23STCP02443 v. Date: June 28, 2024, at 1:30 p.m. Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse City of Compton, et al. Department: 82 Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch [Tentative] Order Denying Petition for Relief from Late Claim NOTICE: The court will be unexpectedly dark on Friday, June 28, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. Therefore, this matter will be called at 1:30 p.m. instead of 9:30 a.m. Petitioner Harlem Chadwick, a minor, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Wonda L. Hale, (Petitioner) seeks leave to file a late tort claim against governmental entity pursuant to Government Code § 946.6 and Code of Civil Procedure section 946.6. On or about May 30, 2020, Petitioners mother was killed during an automobile collision at an intersection that Petitioner alleges was dangerous due to the lack of a controlled left turn device. Government Code section 911.2(a) states that a claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. If written notice of the boards action or inaction (which amounts to a rejection) on the claim is tendered pursuant to section 913, the claimant has six months from the time the written notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file suit against the public entity. (Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(1).) This six-month period expired on November 30, 2021. Petitioner retained counsel on January 7, 2021. If a claimant fails to make a claim within six months, the claimant may make a written application to the board of the public entity for permission to present a late claim within a reasonable time but not to exceed one year from the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code § 911.4(a)-(b).) Petitioner filed applications for permission to file a late claim on May 24, 2021. The County of Los Angeles denied the application on June 14, 2021. The City of Los Angeles denied the application on June 30, 2021. The City of Compton denied the application on July 6, 2021. If the board denies the application to present a late claim, the claimant may then petition the Court for relief. (Gov. Code § 946.6(a).) The petitioner must demonstrate each of the following: (1) that the late claim application made to the board was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for failure to present the claim within six months of the accrual of the cause of action; and (3) the contents of the claim as required by Government Code section 910. The petition shall be filed within six months after the application to the board is denied . . . . (Gov. Code § 946.6(b).) In the instant case, the board denied the claims on June 14, June 30, and July 6, 2021. The petition was filed over two years later, on July 13, 2023. Petitioner did not file a reply brief or address the timeliness of the petition. (See Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is equivalent to a concession].) Instead, Petitioner suggests in her petition that this petition should relate back to petitions for relief from late claim, which were filed be her siblings in Case Numbers 21STCP04249, 21STCP04250, and 21STCP04251. The court grants Respondents request for judicial notice of the orders in these cases. Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that a petition for late claim may relate back to petitions by different petitioners. Regardless, the court (Beckloff, J.) denied each of the petitions. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Exhs. C & D.) Petitioner suggests that this petition is timely because she was a minor. Under Government Code section 946.6, a minor need not present the application to the board until six months of the person turning 18 years old or a year after the claim accrues, whichever occurs first. (Gov. Code § 946.6(c)(3).) The statute states that the minor still must file the petition within six months of the denial of the application. (See Gov. Code § 946.6(b).) Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows: 1. Petitioners petition for relief from the claims requirement is denied. 2. The courts clerk shall provide notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: June 28, 2024 ___________________________ Stephen I. Goorvitch Superior Court Judge

Case Number: 24STCP00373 Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 Dept: 85 Belinda Hijar Orta v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority , 24STCP00373 Tentative decision on petition for leave to present a late claim: denied Petitioner Belinda Hijar Orta (Orta) seeks leave to present a late claim against Respondent Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision. A. Statement of the Case Petitioner Orta commenced this proceeding on February 5, 2024. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows. Orta, who was 62 years old at the relevant time, has a legal claim against the MTA. Pet., ¶1. On or about December 15, 2022, at around 5:15 p.m., she was a passenger on an MTA bus. Pet., ¶1. The bus was under the control of a MTA employee and traveling eastbound on Victory Boulevard at or near Tyrone Avenue. Pet., ¶1. The bus driver suddenly and without due care for his passengers, stopped the bus abruptly. Pet., ¶1. Orta flew out of her bus seat, fell to the ground, and landed on her right knee and elbow, also hitting a bus handrail with her left foot. Pet., ¶1. As a result, she has suffered injuries. Pet., 1. Orta alleges that the MTA is liable for the negligence of its employee. Pet., ¶2. On July 19, 2023, within one year of the incident, Ortas counsel presented to the MTA a claim for damages as well as an application for permission to present a late claim. Pet., ¶3. The application for leave to present a late claim was denied by a Notice ofRejection dated August 7, 2023 and received on August 10, 2023. Pet., 3. The Petition has been timely brought after the MTAs denial pursuant to Govt. Code section 946.6(b) and Orta seeks leave to file suit due to excusable neglect and mistake. Pet., ¶¶ 4-5. B. Applicable Law Under the Government Claims Act (Claims Act), a plaintiff bringing suit for monetary damages against a public entity or employees thereof must first present a claim to the public entity (government claim) which must be acted upon or deemed rejected by the public entity. Government Code [1] §§945.4, 950.2, 950.6(a). To be timely, a government claim for damages must be presented to the public entity within six months of the date the cause of action accrued. §911.2. If a plaintiff fails to file a government claim within the six-month period, he or she may apply to the public entity for permission to file a late claim. §911.4. Such an application must be presented within a reasonable time, and not later than one year after the cause of actions accrual. §911.4(b). If the public entity denies the application for permission to file a late claim, the plaintiff may file a civil petition for relief from section 945.4's requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. §946.6. The petition must be filed within six months after the application to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. §946.6(b). The petition must show: (1) that an application was made to the public entity under section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for failure to timely present the claim to the public entity within the time limit specified in section 911.2; and (3) the information required by section 910. §946.6(b). The court shall grant relief only if it finds that (1) the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim as specified in section 911.4(b), (2) was denied or deemed denied by the public agency pursuant to section 911.6, and (3) one or more of the following is applicable: (a) the failure to timely present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4; (b) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was a minor during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim; (c) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time; or (d) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss died before the expiration of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim. §946.6(c). C. Statement of Facts Orta has filed two declarations from Attorney Ivan Lopez Ventura (Ventura). February 5, 2024 Ventura Declaration in Support of Petition Orta retained Attorney Ventura on or about December 29, 2022, to represent her in a claim for injuries she sustained on or about December 15, 2022. Ventura Decl., ¶2. Orta is still undergoing treatment for the injuries that she sustained giving rise to this claim. Ventura Decl., ¶5. Orta' s reason for the delay in presenting her claim against the County of Los Angeles ( sic. ) is that, due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect, the deadline to file her claim was calendared incorrectly. The claim accrued on December 15, 2022 and Orta retained Venturas office on or about December 29, 2022. Ventura Decl., ¶3. As is the custom and practice in Ventura office, the deadline to file this claim was calendared immediately. Ventura Decl., ¶3. Due to the fact that it was year-end, the deadline was mistakenly calendared as "June 15, 2022" instead of "June 15, 2023". Ventura Decl., ¶4. on or about July 10, 2023, it came to Venturas attention in reviewing the status of Ortas case and following up with her medical treatment plan that a government claim had not been filed. Ventura Decl., ¶5. Investigating further, he searched the calendar to determine what the deadline was and saw that it was June 15, 2022. Ventura Decl., ¶5. He realized that a mistake was made and immediately filed the claim as well as the present application for relief. Ventura Decl., ¶5. This was an honest mistake due to the year changing. Although the right deadline due date was calculated, the year 2022 was inadvertently used instead of the year 2023, as at that time this was the default year. Ventura Decl., ¶6. This claim is presented within about one month from the six-month claim's presentation deadline and, indeed, within one year from the date of the incident. Ventura Decl., ¶8. Orta is still being treated for the injuries she sustained in the incident giving rise to this claim. As such, the government would not have been able to fully evaluate her claim within the six-month deadline. Medical records are continuing to become available as her treatment is ongoing. Ventura Decl., ¶8. Ventura is informed and believes, and thereon states, that no material evidence has been lost due to this delay. Upon request, his office can provide a description of the scene of the incident, copies of all relevant medical records, copy of the MTA Incident Report that was prepared after the incident, and will even go to the location of the incident with a representative of the MTA. Ventura Decl., ¶10. July 14, 2023 Ventura Declaration in Support of Application to MTA for Late Claim Ventura was retained on or about December 29, 2022 by Orta to represent her in a claim for injuries she sustained on or about December 15, 2022. Ventura Decl., ¶2. Orta's reason for the delay in presenting her claim against the County of Los Angeles ( sic. ) is as follows: i. Due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect, the deadline to file this claim was calendared incorrectly. The claim accrued on December 15, 2022. Orta retained Venturas office on or about December 29,2022; ii. As is the custom and practice in Venturas office, the deadline to file this claim was calendared immediately. Due to the fact that it was year-end, the deadline was mistakenly calendared as "June 15, 2022" instead of "June 15, 2023"; iii. Orta is still undergoing treatment for the injuries she sustained giving rise to this claim. Her most recent appointment was on or about July 10, 2023. It came to Venturas attention in reviewing the status of her case following that appointment that the government claim had not been filed. Investigating further, Ventura searched the calendar to determine what the deadline was, saw the deadline was on the calendar as June 15, 2022, realized that a mistake had been made, and immediately filed the claim as well as the application for relief; iv. This was an honest mistake due to the year changing. Although the right deadline due date was calculated, the year 2022 was inadvertently used instead of the year 2023, as at that time this was the default year; v. While the government had a statutory right to receive a timely notice of this claim, the fact is that the government will not be meaningfully prejudiced by this mistake; vi. This claim is presented less than one month from the six-month deadline. Also, Orta is still treating for the injuries she sustained in the incident giving rise to this claim. As such, the government would not have been able to fully evaluate her claim within the six-month deadline. Medical records are continuing to become available as her treatment is ongoing; and vii. Mrs. Orta was seriously injured and respectfully deserves to have her claim heard and decided on the merits despite this year-end calendaring mistake and inadvertence. Ventura Decl., ¶3. D. Analysis Petitioner Orta seeks relief from claim presentation requirements due to excusable neglect. 1. Accrual of the claim A cause of action accrues at the time a claim is complete with all of its elements. Norgart v. Upjohn , (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397. An exception to this usual rule exists where accrual is delayed until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. Id. A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she has reason to at least suspect factual basis for its elements. Id. On or about December 15, 2022, at around 5:15 p.m., she was a passenger on an MTA bus. Pet., ¶1. The bus was under the control of a MTA employee and traveling eastbound on Victory Boulevard at or near Tyrone Avenue. Pet., ¶1. The bus driver suddenly and without due care for his passengers, stopped the bus abruptly. Pet., ¶1. Orta flew out of her bus seat, fell to the ground, and landed on her right knee and elbow, also hitting a bus handrail with her left foot. Pet., ¶1. As a result, she has suffered injuries. Pet., 1. Orta alleges that the MTA is liable for the negligence of its employee. Pet., ¶2. Ortas claim accrued on December 15, 2022 when he was injured while riding an MTA bus. 2. Presentation of the claim Section 911.2 mandates that claims based on causes of action for death and personal injury must be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. To be timely, Dawson was required to present his claim to the Respondents within six months of April 5, 2023, or by October 5, 2023. §911.2. Orta presented her claim to the MTA on July 19, 2023. The claim presentation was due by June 15, 2023 and was untimely by more than a month. 3. The application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim Ortas claim accrued on December 15, 2022. She was required to present her application for leave to file a late claim within a reasonable time and no later than December 15 2023. Her application to present a late claim was presented to the MTA on the same July 19, 2023 date as her claim. The late claim application was made within a year, but the MTA argues that there is no showing that it was presented in a reasonable time. Opp. at 4. The late claim application was made within approximately a month of the six-month claim deadline. As a matter of law, this period is reasonable and no further showing is required. 4. The application was denied or deemed denied by the public agency pursuant to section 911.6 The MTA denied the application for leave to present a late claim by letter on August 7, 2023. Pet., Ex. 3. 5. The petition is timely The petition for leave to file a late claim must be filed with the court within six months after the application to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. §946.6(b). Ortas Petition was filed on February 5, 2024, within six months of the MTAs August 7, 2023 denial of the leave to present a late claim. The MTA argues that Orta provides no explanation why she waited almost six months to file her Petition. Opp. at 2. The short answer is that she is not required to do so as long as it is timely. 6. The failure to timely present the claim was made through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect Orta argues that her failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. The purpose of the Claims Act is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. City of San Jose v. Superior Court , ( City of San Jose ) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455. Timely compliance with claim presentation requirements is a mandatory prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action against a public entity and failure to file a claim is fatal to the claimants cause of action. Pacific Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. County of Riverside , (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 83, 188; San Leandro Police Officers Assoc. v. City of San Leandro , (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 553. Ignorance of the claims filing deadline is no excuse. Harrison v. Count of Del Norte , (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1, 7; Drummond v. County of Fresno , (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1412. Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect applies to the six-month period after the accident and not to the late claim presentation requirement of a reasonable time not to exceed one year period. El Dorado Irrig. Dist. v. Superior Court, (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 57, 62. Excusable neglect is neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances. Ebersol v. Cowan , (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435. Mere failure to discover a fact does not constitute excusable neglect for failing to present a timely claim; the party seeking relief must establish the failure to discover the fact in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Munoz v. State of California , (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783. Excusable neglect is defined as an act or omission that might be expected of a prudent person under similar circumstances. Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court , (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1294. Once a party retains counsel, that attorney must diligently investigate facts, identify possible defendants, and timely file the claim. Ebersol v. Cowan , supra , 35 Cal.3d at 439. A mere mistake of counsel does not provide a basis for granting relief. Tackett v. City of Huntington Beach , (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 60, 64-65. A mere failure to discover a fact does not constitute excusable neglect for failing to present a timely claim; the party seeking relief must establish the failure to discover the fact in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Munoz v. State of California , (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783. A mistake or neglect by an attorney is imputed to the client and may not be offered by the latter as a basis for relief. Mitchell v. Department of Transportation , (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1021. In Flores v. Board of Supervisors , (1970) 13 Cal. App. 3d 480, 483, the plaintiffs contacted counsel about representation for a medical malpractice suit for their childs death, counsel advised them that they only had 18 days left to file suit. Id . at 482. The firm knew that it needed to act quickly to meet this deadline and sought medical records. Id . However, the plaintiffs law firm failed to file a timely claim because it failed to open a file which would have reminded it of the 100-day limitation in effect. Id . Thereafter, the attorneys diligently followed statutory requirements in pressing plaintiffs claim. Id. The court held that this was excusable neglect. Id . at 485. In Renteria v. Juvenile Justice, Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation , ( Renteria ) (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 903, 906, an incarcerated youth claimed that he was bitten by a Department of Corrections dog. In support of a late claim petition, the law firm representing him presented evidence that its secretary had received a letter from the Attorney Generals office concerning the preservation of evidence which made her believe that a paralegal had served the governmental claim. Id . at 907. She therefore removed the six-month deadline from the law firms calendaring system. Id . The court granted late claim relief, noting that generally lawyers who adopt a system or plan by which their duties may be directed to their attention, and who are accustomed to the functioning of that system, should not be held to the same strict accountability when there is a break in that system as those for whom no system has been formed. Id . at 912. The period at issue for excusable neglect is the six-month period from Ortas claim accrual on December 15, 2022 until June 15, 2023. Orta presents evidence that she retained Venturas office on or about December 29, 2022. Ventura Decl., ¶3. As is the custom and practice in Ventura office, the deadline to file this claim was calendared immediately. Ventura Decl., ¶3. Due to the fact that it was year-end, the deadline was mistakenly calendared as "June 15, 2022" instead of "June 15, 2023". Ventura Decl., ¶4. on or about July 10, 2023, it came to Venturas attention in reviewing the status of Ortas case that a government claim had not been filed. Ventura Decl., ¶5. Investigating further, he searched the calendar to determine what the deadline was and saw that it was June 15, 2022. Ventura Decl., ¶5. He realized that a mistake was made and immediately filed the claim as well as the present application for relief. Ventura Decl., ¶5. This was an honest mistake due to the year changing. Although the right deadline due date was calculated, the year 2022 was inadvertently used instead of the year 2023, as at that time this was the default year. Ventura Decl., ¶6. As the MTA argues (Opp. at 4), this evidence is insufficient. While mis-calendaring can be a basis for excusable neglect, it must be supported by a foundation of facts. It is not enough to state that the attorneys office mis-calendared the year. There is no declaration from the employee who made the error. There is no evidence about the calendaring software, who inputs it, how its default works, or if it is periodically checked. In short, there is no evidence about an office system or plan by which Venturas duties may be directed to the deadline and that he was accustomed to functioning within that system. See Renteria , supra, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 906. Although Orta sought counsel almost immediately after her accident, her counsels failure is not excusable neglect. The petition for leave to file a late claim is denied. [1] All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise stated.

Case Number: 24STCP01516 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 82 Charroma Dixon Case No. 24STCP01516 v. Date: July 10, 2024, at 1:30 p.m. Courthouse: Stanley Mosk Courthouse City of Los Angeles, et al. Department: 82 Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch Order Denying Petition for Relief from Late Claim Petitioner Charroma Dixon seeks leave to file a late tort claim against a public entity pursuant to Government Code section 946.6 . Petitioner alleges that on or about December 25, 2022, she was injured after stepping into an open hole or uneven pavement near 7509 South Broadway in Los Angeles, California. Government Code section 911.2(a) states that a claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. If written notice of the rejection or inaction (which amounts to a rejection) on the claim is tendered pursuant to section 913, the claimant has six months from the time the written notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file suit against the public entity. (Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(1).) This six-month period expired on June 25, 2022, and no claim was submitted before the deadline. Petitioner retained counsel on July 27, 2023. If a claimant fails to submit a claim within six months, the claimant may make a written application to the public entity for permission to present a late claim within a reasonable time but not to exceed one year from the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code § 911.4(a)-(b).) Therefore, on December 22, 2023, Petitioners counsel filed an application for leave to present a late claim under Government Code section 911.4. The County denied the application on January 2, 2024, and the City denied the application on January 23, 2024. [1] This petition follows. If an application for leave to present a late claim is denied by the public entity, a petitioner may file a petition before the court. (Gov. Code § 946.6(a).) The petition must demonstrate that the application was made to the public entity and was actually or effectively denied. (Gov. Code § 946.6(b)(1).) Petitioner must articulate the reason(s) for not presenting the claim within the time period. (Gov. Code § 946.6(b)(2).) Finally, the petitioner must include all of the information required by Government Code section 910. (Gov. Code § 946.6(b)(3).) The court shall relieve the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4 if the application was made in a timely manner and was actually or effectively denied if [t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudice in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.5. (Gov. Code § 946.6(c).) [2] Petitioner does not establish good cause, as required by section 946.6(c)(1). Petitioner provides no credible explanation or evidence why she did not file a claim during the six-month time period between December 25, 2022, and June 25, 2023. The petition is not accompanied by a declaration from Petitioner, and the petition itself articulates no reason why Petitioner could not have filed a timely claim. In fact, the petition contains no facts making clear what, if anything, Petitioner did during the six-month period to attempt to submit a claim or making clear why she was unable to do so. In other words, Petitioner does not satisfy her burden of establishing that her mistake was reasonable, and that her neglect was excusable. This is required: Although the statutes refer, as a requirement for relief, to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, only neglect is qualified by the adjective excusable. However, it is uniformly held that for relief on any or all of the stated grounds it must be shown that ones misconception was reasonable, or that it might have been the conduct of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. ( Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529, 539 fn.1, quoting Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598, 601). Instead, the petition makes only a generic argument: Counsel for Plaintiff noted that due to the COVID crises [sic], which was unfolding during the relevant time period, statutes of limitations were extended, governmental attorneys and departments were closed, inaccessible, or otherwise difficulty [sic] to communicate with and obtain information due to the stay home orders and social distancing requirements. (First Amended Petition at 11:16-21.) Generic arguments by counselunsupported by a declaration from Petitionerare insufficient. As discussed, Petitioner identifies no specific facts or circumstances suggesting that the pandemic affected her ability to submit a timely claim between December 25, 2022, and June 25, 2023. Simply, if the court granted this petition on this record, it would effectively have to toll the six-month deadline for every plaintiff who was injured at any point during the existence of Covid-19. Petitioner attempts to rely on the state of emergency declared by the Governor on or about March 4, 2020, and the subsequent Covid-19 emergency orders, like Emergency Rule 9, which tolled statutes of limitations over 180 days from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020. Emergency Rule 9 expired on June 30, 2022, and this accident happened approximately six months later, on December 25, 2022. There is no basis to apply Emergency Rule 9 or any other Covid-related tolling to this case at such a late stage. Petitioners counsel argues that there was an error in submitting the application for relief from late claim, which was submitted on December 22, 2023, and he seeks relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). In fact, the application was submitted within one year of the accrual of the claim and therefore was timely. Rather, the court denies the petition on the merits because Petitioner cannot establish good cause for not having submitted the claim within the six-month period. The court has considered Petitioners arguments and finds none to be persuasive. The court need not reach Respondents arguments that they would be prejudiced if the court granted this petition. Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows: 1. Petitioners petition for relief from the claims requirement is denied. 2. This signed order shall constitute the judgment in this case. 3. The courts clerk shall provide notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: July 10, 2024 ___________________________ Stephen I. Goorvitch Superior Court Judge [1] The remaining defendants have been dismissed. [2] There are other circumstances under which the court shall grant the petition, but none is applicable to this case, as they apply to minors, persons with physical or mental incapacitation, or those who have passed away. (See Gov. Code §§ 946.6(c)(2)-(6).)

24CV00826 DEBERT v. COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ TRIAL DE NOVO – PLANNING ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING BACKGROUND Santa Cruz County issued a citation on 9/14/23 to petitioner DeBert for maintaining real property (Nina Ct. in Boulder Creek)1 with debris and vehicles on it in violation of County Code sections: 1 County asserts there is no situs address; DeBert says her address is 955 Nina Ct., Boulder Creek CA 95006 and it is known to the County and its hearing officer. Page 2 of 5 • 13.10.140(A) (non-compliance with zoning regulations – unpermitted construction); • 13.10.279(B) (use of property declared a public nuisance); • 13.10.683(I) (parking/use of a recreational vehicle on vacant parcel); • 16.22.160(A) (grading without a permit); and • 16.22.160(B) (land clearing without a permit). Petitioner filed her appeal to the County’s administrative hearing officer, who found in favor of County, upheld the citation, ordered County to abate the nuisances, and ordered her to pay enforcement costs of $480 and $10,000 in civil penalties payable within 90 days, and all violations to be remedied within 60 days of the order. The hearing officer’s order was served on petitioner on 2/14/24. (Mendes Declaration, ¶8.) She did not file her notice of appeal within 20 days pursuant to Gov. Code § 53069.4, so this court reviews the appeal pursuant to CCP § 1094.5 and applies an abuse of discretion standard. STANDARD OF REVIEW Cal Code Civ Proc § 1094.5 provides: (a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury. (b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. The Court may issue a writ of administrative mandate only where an agency has (1) acted in excess of its jurisdiction, (2) deprived the petitioner of a fair hearing, or (3) committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (CCP § 1094.5(b).) Abuse of discretion is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in a manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Clark v City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169, citing CCP § 1094.5(b).) “The court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency, nor ‘disturb the agency's choice of penalty absent ‘an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion’ by the administrative agency’ (Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 628 [cit. omitted]), but must uphold the penalty if there is any reasonable basis Page 3 of 5 to sustain it. (Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46 [cit. omitted].).” (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 871, 877.) I. Record Before the Court: The record before the Court in this review includes: Submitted by the County: Exhibit A, the notice of violation; Exhibit B, photos of the site; Exhibit C, Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, 2/5/24; Exhibit D, relevant County Codes; Exhibit E, Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, 5/3/21; Exhibit F, notice of violation, 11/22/19; Exhibit G, 3/1/24 email from petitioner requesting an address change from P.O. Box 1595, Boulder Creek CA 95006 to 955 Nina Ct., Boulder Creek CA 95006; and Exhibit H, petitioner’s Mailing Address Change Authorization form. Submitted by Appellant: None. II. Basis of appeal: Petitioner filed an objection to County’s trial brief but has yet to offer any other evidence. She claims the County’s inspector, Marcus Mendes, did not have a warrant and entered her constitutionally protected property improperly. She claims she was present and he kept himself hidden from her. She argues she had a current logging permit and an exemption applies rendering her grading work not in violation of County Codes. She contends the hearing officer found these matters to be irrelevant, which constitutes error. She claims third parties have illegally logged her property and caused damage to her parcel. She argues that the County engages in selective enforcement since her neighbors violate certain codes without any enforcement, and she was cited for issues on her property that were actually caused by the prior owner. She believes the County was allowing RVs on properties due to the CZU fire without enforcement. She claims she was prevented from appearing at the administrative hearing due to Page 4 of 5 improper notice and her illness, and her plea for a continuance was ignored. She wants the Court to appoint her counsel since she’s subject to enforcement costs and civil penalties which she claims are “a misdemeanor, serious jail time, large sums of money and the loss of [her] property and home, yet all in civil court.” (Objection p. 4.) III. County’s supplemental pleadings: County submits a supplemental trial brief and two declarations from Marcus Mendes and Sheri Thomas. Ms. Thomas, Assessor-Recorder, explains that petitioner changed the mailing address for her property on 3/1/24, which was received by the Assessor’s Office on 3/8/24. Mr. Mendes declares in his supplemental declaration that he did not enter onto petitioner’s property in his inspection and viewed her property from the public right of way from a neighbor’s driveway above petitioner’s property. He explains that in order to legally perform work under the logging permit, petitioner would have first needed to obtain a grading permit, which she did not do. He observed excavations on petitioner’s property that exceeded 100 cubic yards and created a cut slope of greater than five feet in depth, meaning that the exemption identified by petitioner does not apply. Mr. Mendes explains that the County utilizes the official mailing address associated with the property for mailing notices. Petitioner’s address for the notice and hearing order was the P.O. Box, not her street address (which she changed later). He finally clarifies that RVs are not permitted on vacant parcels due to the likelihood of unlawful septic, fire hazards, accumulated trash, and vectors associated with them. IV. Abuse of discretion review – reasonable basis for sustaining the hearing officer’s decision: Based on the record, there appears to be a reasonable basis to sustain the hearing officer’s decision. Evidence exists that petitioner allowed illegal vehicle storage and grading on her property without permits. The 2/4/24 Decision and Order is upheld; the County is awarded its reasonable costs of enforcement, and this appeal is dismissed. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed Page 5 of 5

LEVIK vs CITY OF CATHEDRAL Motion to Continue Hearing on July 18, CVPS2403242 CITY 2024 Tentative Ruling: Denied. Responding party to provide notice pursuant to CCP § 1019.5.