Parkside Funding Group Llc V. Az Facility Solutions Llc, Imelda Sparkle Cleaning Services, Llc, A&Amp;R Events, Llc, Imy'S Jcxa Building Services Llc, Rita Imelda Contreras

Case Number: 21STCV12444 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California ¿ County of Los Angeles ¿ Department 78 ¿ ¿ ENCINO NEWCASTLE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION , Plaintiff (s) , vs. DEL SOL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC. , et al., Defendant ( s ) .¿ Case No.:¿ 21STCV12444 Hearing Date:¿ July 11 , 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING TRIAL CONTINUANCE I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 1, 2021 , p laintiff Encino Newcastle Homeowners Association (Plaintiff) initiated this action against defendant s Del Sol Property Management, Inc. ( Del Sol ) , Lara Sinitsin , and Does 1 through 100 (collectively, Defendants) for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting , conversion and theft, fraud , specific performance for return of Plaintiffs books and records, and declaratory relief . On September 22, 2021 , Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint against Defendants. On September 28, 2022, Del Sol filed its cross-complaint against cross-defendants Encino Newcastle Homeowners Association, Kourosh Yaghoobian , Giv Bastanielahhabadi , and Allen Tabibi . On November 1, 2022, Encino Newcastle Homeowners Association, Kourosh Yaghoobian , Giv Bastanielahhabadi , and Allen Tabibi filed their Answers to Del Sols cross-complaint. The t rial date is currently set for July 11, 2024 . Cross-Defendants Kourosh Yaghoobian and Giv Bastanielahhabadi (collectively, Cross-Defendants) request the Court to continue the trial date and all related dates by approximately six months to January 29, 2025 , or a date thereafter, in order for its motion for terminating sanctions to be heard, and for it to be able to file its MSJ prior to the current trial date. Del Sol did not file an opposition to the motion to continue trial, but the Court notes that it did file an opposition to the ex parte application for a trial continuance on the grounds that Cross-Defendants have not named any specific discovery that would require a continuance, and that Cross-Defendants have not been diligent in terms of the desire to file a motion for summary judgment. II. LEGAL STANDARD Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits . (CRC Rule 3.1332(c).) The Court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance . (CRC Rule 3.1332(c).) The Court may look to the following factors in determining whether a trial continuance is warranted: (1) proximity of the trial date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance of trial due to any party; (3) the length of the continuance requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion; (5) the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; and (6) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial. (See generally, CRC Rule 3.1332(d)(1)-(11).) Additional factors for the Court to consider include: a partys excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; and any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (CRC Rule 3.1332(c), (d).) III. DISCUSSION Here, the Court notes that there is a hearing on a motion to quash subpoena for business records, a motion for terminating sanctions, and a motion to compel discovery all set to be heard after the current trial date. Further, the Court recently continued Del Sols Motion For An Order To Show Cause Re: Contempt to the same date and time as the motion to quash due to the relationship between the motions. Based on the number of motions currently set after the hearing date, and the circumstance of this case matters recent reassignment effective July 5, 2024, the Court finds good cause to briefly continue the trial date by six months in order for all matters currently set to be heard, and to provide this Court sufficient time to familiarize itself with the issues. However, t he Court notes that this action , filed on April 1, 2021, has been fully at issue since November 2022, and there have been numerous continuance s . Given the age and extensive history of this matter , the parties are on notice that the Court will not grant any further requests for a trial continuance . IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendants motion to continue the trial date by approximately six months is GRANTED . The July 29, 2024 trial date is continued to ______________ at 9 :30 a.m. in Department 31 of the Spring Street Courthouse. The July 16, 2024 Final Status Conference is continued to _______________ at 8 : 3 0 a.m. in Department 31. All discovery and expert cutoff dates are continued to reflect the new trial date. The parties must plan all discovery and trial preparation accordingly. Moving Party is ordered to give notice . DATED: July 10 , 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim ¿ Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting . " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.

FOULKE, ET AL. VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: CVCV21-0197638 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the hearing on April 8, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the only issue that remains pending in Federal Court is attorney fees. No status report was filied informing the Court of the status of attorney fees and no Request for Dismissal has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 21STCV07347 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., Plaintiff, v. ADDITION BUILDING & DESIGN, INC., MICHAEL ROSS aka MICHAEL EDWARD ROSS dba GREEN BUILD DESIGN LA, and DOES 1 through 10, Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV07347 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Trial Date: November 12, 2024 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc.s Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Striking Defendant Addition Building & Design, Inc.s Answer and Entering Default On February 25, 2021, Plaintiff CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC . (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants ADDITION BUILDING & DESIGN, INC. ( Addition B&D) MICHAEL ROSS aka MICHAEL EDWARD ROSS dba GREEN BUILD DESIGN LA (Green BD), and DOES 1 through 10 (collectively, Defendants). The Complaint asserts the following causes of action against all Defendants: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Open Book Account 3. Account Stated 4. Reasonable Value Plaintiff now brings a Motion for Terminating Sanctions, which Defendant Addition B&D has not opposed. The motion includes a proof of service on Defendants counsel by mail and email on May 21, 2024. After review, the Court GRANTS the Motion because Plaintiff has established Defendant Addition B&D has engaged in a pervasive and consistent pattern of misuse of the discovery process. Background Allegations This action involves a written agreement between State Compensation Insurance Fraud (Plaintiffs Assignor) and Defendants, wherein Plaintiffs Assignor agreed to provide Defendants with a workers compensation insurance policy in exchange for payment of premiums covering the period of January 11, 2018 through January 11, 2019. (Compl., ¶¶1, 11.) On or about May 26, 2020, Defendants breached the policy requiring payment of premiums. ( Id. at ¶14.) Defendants owes $296,480.20 with ten percent interest per annum and has failed to pay it despite a demand for payment made by Plaintiff. ( Id. at ¶¶2, 14.) Motion for Terminating Sanctions Legal Standard : Code of Civil Procedure Section 2023.030, states in pertinent part: To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose&[monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating] sanctions against anyone engaging in the misuse of the discovery process&. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subds. (a)-(d); see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290(c), 2031.320(c).) Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to&(d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery&(g) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010.) Nevertheless, absent unusual circumstances, such as repeated and egregious discovery abuses, two facts are generally prerequisite to the imposition of a nonmonetary sanction. There must be a failure to comply with a court order and the failure must be willful. ( Lee v. Lee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1559.) Even where nonmonetary sanctions are called for, they & should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery. [Citations] &[¶] The sanctions the court may impose are such as are suitable and necessary to enable the party seeking discovery to obtain the objects of the discovery he seeks, but the court may not impose sanctions which are designed not to accomplish the objects of discovery but to impose punishment. [Citations.] ( Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) A trial court has broad discretion when imposing a discovery sanction. ( Lee , supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at 1559.) In exercising this discretion [for nonmonetary sanctions], a variety of factors may be relevant, including, 1) the time which has elapsed since [the discovery requests] were served, 2) whether the party served was previously given a voluntary extension of time, 3) the number of [the discovery requests] propounded, 4) whether the unanswered questions sought information which was difficult to obtain, 5) whether the answers supplied were evasive and incomplete, 6) the number of questions which remained unanswered, 7) whether the questions which remained unanswered are material to a particular claim or defense, 8) whether the answering party has acted in good faith, and with reasonable diligence, 9) the existence of prior orders compelling discovery and the answering partys response thereto, 10) whether the party was unable to comply with the previous order of the court, 11) whether an order allowing more time to answer would enable the answering party to supply the necessary information, and 12) whether a sanction short of dismissal or default would be appropriate to the dereliction. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 796-97.) Here, Defendant Addition B&D was ordered to provide further responses to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories, Set Two and Request for Admissions, and pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,578.35 within 30 days of the March 1, 2023 order. (Frischer Decl., ¶¶2-3, Ex. 1.) The ordered sanctions were amended in a subsequent Nunc Pro Tunc Order on March 7, 2023 as against Defendant Addition B&D and current defense counsel of record, Gary Schwartz only. ( Id. at ¶4, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff contends although Defendant Addition B&D paid the ordered sanctions, it has still failed to provide any further proper and meaningful responses in compliance with the March 1 and 7, 2023 orders. ( Id. at ¶5.) Furthermore, Defendant Addition B&D has not filed an opposition, thus provides no rebuttal response to this contention. This Court previously denied a motion for terminating sanctions, noting in May 2023 that noncompliance with previous orders did not justify terminating sanctions at the time, but specifically warning that should such conduct continued, it could justify an eventual order of termination. Unfortunately, it did continue. On May 10, 2023, when the Court denied the terminating sanctions, Defendant Addition B&D was ordered to pay $3,490.62 in monetary sanctions for noncompliance with the March 1 and 7, 2023 orders. (Frischer Decl., ¶¶6-7, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Addition B&D and its counsel have failed to pay these ordered sanctions. ( Id. at ¶9.) Moreover, this Court heard and granted Plaintiffs motions to compel responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Three; Special Interrogatories, Set Three; Demand for Production of Documents, Set Three; and Request for Admission, Set Three. (Frischer Decl., ¶¶10-20, Exs. 5-9.) This Court also ordered sanctions in an amount totaling $9,681.55 for all four motions. ( Id .) Defendant Addition B&D has now also failed to provide responses and produce documents in accordance with the January 23, 2024, January 29, 2024, and February 5, 2024 orders. ( Id. ) Likewise, Defendant Addition B&D has failed to pay the ordered sanctions. ( Id. ) As such, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Defendant Addition B&D is engaging in a pervasive and consistent pattern of misuse of the discovery process. Additionally, the issuance of monetary sanctions has not produced compliance. Last, Defendant Addition B&D has not shown it is interested in defending against this lawsuit since no opposition has been filed attesting to any substantial justification or other circumstances that would make imposing terminating sanctions unjust. Therefore, Defendant Addition B&Ds conduct in violating multiple court orders for discovery and failure to respond to this motion warrants terminating sanctions and monetary sanctions for the reasonable expense of bringing this motion. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc.s Motion for Terminating Sanctions is GRANTED. Defendant Addition Building & Design, Inc.s Answer to Complaint is stricken and default is entered against it. Sanctions in the amount of $2,579.15 for the reasonable fees and costs of bringing this motion is granted. Plaintiff is to file a default judgment package within 30 days of this order.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 11, 2024 line 3. DEFENDANT EMPORIUM MALL LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILTY COMPANY, S.F. CENTRE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, A DELAWARE MOTION OF DEFENDANTS EMPORIUM MALL LLC AND S.F. CENTRE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP FOR ORDER STAYING LITIGATION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES is continued to July 15, 2024 per July 10, 2024 ex-parte order. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

S-CV-0051757 The North River Insurance Co vs. Haverson, Raymond Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Haverson, Raymond

MOTION TO STRIKE 2ND AMENDED CVSW2302172 MADRID VS SINGLETON COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling: Technically, the moving party is correct as to the lateness of the amendment. However, the law abhors rulings on technicalities and with the matter fully briefed, no resulting prejudice is seen by the delay in the amendment. Punitive Damages are correctly stricken until the 3COA and 5COA are perfected. Again, the Attorney’s Fees is an interpretation of contract issue at the close of litigation. As such, it is not ripe. 3. MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY CVSW2309240 SPENCER VS ALVARADO JUDGMENT OF PARTITION AND APPOINTMENT OF REFEREE Tentative Ruling: With the pending MX to set aside the default set for August 1, 2024, this current hearing is continued until that date.

PROCEDURAL/FACTUAL BACKGROUND Currently before the Court is a Motion to Compel related to lemon law litigation. As alleged, in March 2019, Plaintiff Salvador Monroy-Bautista (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) purchased a 2019 Honda Civic (hereinafter, “Subject Vehicle”) that was covered by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s (hereinafter, “Defendant” or “Honda”) warranties. (Compl. ¶¶9-10.) Plaintiff alleges the Subject Vehicle was delivered defective and, after its purchase, showed defects in its electrical and transmission systems. (Id. at ¶11.) On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Honda and co-defendant Ontario Automotive LLC d/b/a Penske Honda Ontario (“Penske Honda Ontario,” and collectively, with Honda, “Defendants”). The Complaint pleads four causes of action: (1) Violation of the Song— Beverly Act — Breach of Express Warranty (against Honda); (2) Violation of the Song—Beverly Act — Breach of Implied Warranty (against Honda); (3) Violation of the Song—Beverly Act section 1793.2, subdivision (b) (against Honda); and (4) Negligent Repair (against Penske Honda Ontario). Defendant answered on August 14, 2023. 2 On October 11, 2023, the parties entered into a protective order governing discovery. 1 On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, which was noticed for February 14, 2024. On January 12, this Court held a Trial Setting Conference, in which it set an Informal Discovery Conference for March 8 and continued the hearing for the motion to compel until March 27. (Jan. 12, 2024 Min. Order.) Honda did not appear at the March 8 discovery conference, and the Court set another one for May 17, continuing the hearing on the motion to compel to May 30. (Mar. 8, 2024 Min. Order.) On March 29, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel, seeking further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set Two. Plaintiffs’ motion seeks to compel further responses to their requests for production (hereinafter, “RFPs”) 10, 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47. In support of their motion, Plaintiff also filed a proposed order, declaration of counsel, and separate statement. On May 17, the parties met for an informal discovery conference, and the Court vacated the hearing date for May 30, which was set to rule on Plaintiff’s first motion to compel. In the minute order, the Court stated: Parties agree that the only Request for productions that remain at issue are No.’s 10, 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47. The only document in contention is the Honda “Quality Improvement Sheet(s)”, otherwise, all documents responsive to these request[s] for production[] have been produced. Honda’s opposition to the motion will focus on its refusal to produce the Quality Improvement Sheet(s). (May 17, 2024 Min. Order.) The RFPs referenced above correspond to the RFPs at issue in the current motion to compel, however, despite what is written in the May 17 Minute Order, Honda’s 1 This protective order was filed with the Court on October 17, 2023, but based on a review of Odyssey, it does not appear to be signed by the Court. 3 opposition does not just “focus on its refusal to produce the Quality Improvement Sheet(s).” (Ibid.) It, instead, addresses all of Plaintiff’s motion. On July 8, Plaintiff filed his reply. This motion is currently scheduled to be heard Monday, July 15, 2024. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard. a. The Parameters of Discovery. Under California’s Civil Discovery Act, “parties may conduct discovery ‘regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action … if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” (Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1351, fn.12 (citing Code Civ. Proc., §2017.010).) “Thus, for discovery purposes, information is relevant to the ‘subject matter’ of an action if the information might reasonably assist a party in evaluating a case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.” (Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711-712.) With respect to whether a request will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, “[i]nformation is relevant if its discovery will tend to promote settlement or assist in preparation for trial” and the party seeking discovery is entitled to substantial leeway, with doubts resolved in favor of allowing discovery. (Norton v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1760-1761.) Although trial courts have “wide discretion” to allow or prohibit discovery, “trial courts issuing discovery orders and appellate courts reviewing those orders should do so with the pro- discovery policies of the statutory scheme firmly in mind. A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature’s preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery, may not use its discretion to extend the limits on discovery beyond 4 those authorized by the Legislature, and should prefer partial to outright denials of discovery.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.) b. Motions to Compel. A party who deems a statement of compliance with a document demand as incomplete, or the representation of inability to comply as inadequate, incomplete, or evasion, or an objection to a document demand as without merit or too general can move to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (a).) In ruling on the motion, courts may consider the relationship of the information sought to the issues framed in the pleadings; the likelihood that disclosure will be of practical benefit to the party seeking discovery; and the burden or expense likely to be encountered by the responding party in furnishing the information sought. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide (TRG 2013), Civil Procedure Before Trial, §8:1180-8:1181.) The motion to compel must be noticed within 45 days of receipt of the responses (plus the additional time if not personally served). (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (c).) The motion to compel must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§2031.310, subd. (b)(2), 2016.040.) Additionally, the moving party must set forth facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) Motions to compel must also be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, verbatim, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) The separate statement must be complete in itself; no extrinsic materials may be incorporated by reference. (Id., rule 3.1345(c).) A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, 5 evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) A motion to compel further responses “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(1).) Unverified discovery responses are tantamount to no response at all, and are subject to a motion to compel responses (rather than a motion to compel further responses). (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635-36.) However, objections to interrogatories and demands for production are not required to be verified because “objections are legal conclusions interposed by counsel, not factual assertions by a party.” (Blue Ridge Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 339, 345.) The standard of review for discovery orders in general is abuse of discretion. (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) The determination whether a privilege applies likewise is subject to the abuse of discretion standard. (Kirchmeyer v. Phillips (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402.) II. Analysis. In Plaintiff’s motion he seeks further responses to eight specific RFPs (10, 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47), all of which seek documents, including emails, relating to “field technical reports”. Each of the eight RFPs relate to slightly different topics, and are analyzed below. a. Meet and Confer Requirement Procedurally, Plaintiff is required to file “a meet and confer declaration,” that states “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented,” along with its motion to compel. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040; 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) Along with his motion, Plaintiff filed the declaration of counsel Chris Grigoryan, which stated that counsel sent two separate meet and confer letters, in good faith, prior to filing this motion. (C. 6 Grigoryan ¶¶19-20.) Although Honda argues that Plaintiff did not attempt to meet and confer after the May discovery conference as was requested by the Court, the meet and confer requirement has technically been met. As such, the Court will rule on the merits to avoid further delays. b. RFP 10: Structural Defects Plaintiffs seek further responses to RFP 10, which seeks “field technical reports … with information relating to warranty parts replacement trends relating to the STRUCTURAL DEFECTS in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle.” (Pl.’s Sep. Statement at 16 (emphasis in original).) To this request, Honda objects, but then also states that it “has made a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply with this request and has no field technical reports directed to warranty parts replacement trends and no responsive documents have ever existed.” (Id. at 17.) Defendant’s response that it made a diligent search, reasonable inquiry and no document exists is code-compliant and the Court cannot order Honda to produce records it states do not exist. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) To the extent Honda is interpreting the request too narrowly and responsive documents do exist, Honda is correct that the documents sought by RFP 10 are irrelevant and beyond the scope of discovery in this case. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges problems with electrical and transmission defects, but RFP 10 seeks documents related to “structural defects.” In his motion, Plaintiff goes through the repair history of the Subject Vehicle (Mem. at 3), and none of those repairs deal with the Subject Vehicle’s structure. As such, RFP 10 is beyond the scope of discovery. The Court denies the motion to compel as to RFP 10. c. RFPs relating to Transmission and Electrical Defects (14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, 47). 7 Plaintiff seeks further responses to seven RFPs that seek “field technical reports” related to “common parts failures,” (RFPs 14, 37) “commonly observed problems,” (RFP 23), “repeat repair failures,” (RFP 24, 47), warranty parts replacements (RFP 33), and “suggested repair procedures” (RFP 46) relating to electrical or transmission defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. To these requests, Honda objects but then also states that it “has made a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply with this request and has no field technical reports…and no responsive documents have ever existed.” (Pl.’s Sep. Statement at 19-27.) Defendant’s response that it made a diligent search, reasonable inquiry and no document exists is code-compliant and the Court cannot order Honda to produce records it states do not exist. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) As Honda has noted, Plaintiff did not define “field technical reports,” in its RFPs, and if Honda has no documents under this title, it cannot be expected to produce anything responsive to these requests. It may be, however, that at the informal discovery conference, the parties came to an understanding that these RFPs are actually seeking “Quality Improvement Sheet(s),” related to the specific topics. (May 17, 2024 Min. Order.) To the extent the parties do have an understanding that these RFPs seek “Quality Improvement Sheet(s)” and these documents do exist, they are relevant to the litigation and should be produced. Discovery is relevant if it is admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., §2017.010.) “In the context of discovery, evidence is ‘relevant’ if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. (Glenfed Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court (National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Norton v. Superior Court (Ein) (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 8 1750, 1760.) Case law allows the discovery of other vehicles having the same defects as the at- issue vehicle. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 973-74 (the court allowed the discovery of all warranty complaints received on vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the plaintiff’s vehicle); Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152-532 (the Court of Appeal recognized that submitted evidence concerning the same make and model vehicle that showed the same non-conformities, as the subject vehicle, was evidence the expert properly relied upon to show the defendant failed to conform the subject vehicle to its warranty).) Plaintiff cites several cases to illustrate that it is common practice to allow production of internal emails, bulletins, and database searches related to similarly situated vehicles of the involved in litigation. For example, in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 340- 347, the Court of Appeal noted that internal e-mails demonstrated that Chrysler was aware of the problem with the Totally Integrated Power Module, which affected the plaintiff’s vehicle, and this ultimately led the Santana Court to conclude the jury could infer from the emails that the manufacturer intentionally chose not to fully honor the express warranty, which was sufficient to support a civil penalty under section 1794, subdivision (c). Honda argues these RFPs are entirely too broad, and, even if narrowed, do not seek information allowed pursuant to the case law cited by Plaintiff. Defendant essentially argues this action is for one vehicle hence these requests exceed the scope of relevant discovery. For support to limit the discovery, Defendant relies on Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (Thiem Industries, Inc.) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224-225 (Calcor Space Facility) and distinguishes 2 In Velasco v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (C.D.Cal. 2019) 2019 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 222387, at *3, the Central District Court of Appeal indicates Donlen is superseded by statute. But the Velasco court is referring to revisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Ibid.) This Court relies on California law, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the holding of Velasco is irrelevant. 9 Plaintiff’s relied on cases Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 (Doppes) and Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138 (Donlen). In Calcor Space Facility (cited by Defendant), the Court of Appeal, Fourth District vacated a trial court order compelling discovery, where it found Plaintiff had been allowed to proceed with a “fishing expedition,” because the plaintiff’s requests failed to “bear any relationship to the manner in which [defendant] Calcor maintains its records. The burden is sought to be imposed on Calcor to search its extensive files, at many locations, to see what it can find to fit [plaintiff’s] definitions, instructions and categories.” (Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 222.) Plaintiff’s RFPs, however, do bear a relationship to the claims at issue and given that they are tailored to issues named in the complaint and related to the same make and model of the Subject Vehicle, they seem sufficiently narrowly tailored. While neither Doppes nor Donlen is directly on point, they do establish a consensus that discovery associated with complaints and defects in similar vehicles can be relevant under the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, particularly, in assisting on whether Honda was aware of the defects. Also, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (c), provides that if a buyer establishes the defendant willfully failed to comply with its obligation, he is entitled to recover a civil penalty. However, if the manufacturer’s failure to repurchase or replace was based on good faith and reasonable belief the statutory obligation did not exist, then willfulness cannot be found. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051; Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.) Nevertheless, “[a] decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.” (Lukather v. General Motors, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1051.) 10 Applying this here, these RFPs seek documents discussing common part failures, observed problems, warranty parts replacements, suggested repair procedures, and repeat repair failures relating to electrical and transmission defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. They thus go to Honda’s knowledge of the issues and/or ability to fix/repair the defects present in the Subject Vehicle that were specifically plead in the Plaintiff’s complaint. These RFPs also relate to the issue of Honda’s duty to replace or repurchase under the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. As such, if Plaintiff’s RFPs 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47 are seeking “Quality Improvement Sheet(s),” a document familiar to Honda, and related to electrical and transmission defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle, the Court grants the motion to compel. But if the parties do not have an understanding as to what specific documents these requests are seeking, Plaintiff is given leave to amend the requests. CONCLUSIONS Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court Grants, in part, and Denies, in part, Plaintiff s Motion to Compel Further Responses: (1) Denies the Motion as to RFP 10; and (2) Grants the Motion to Compel and orders Defendant to further respond to RFPs 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47 if the parties have an understanding as to what title or category of documents Plaintiff is seeking, given that repair reports related of vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle relating to electric or transmission defects are relevant. If the parties do not have an understanding of the specific type of document Plaintiff is seeking, Plaintiff is given leave to amend the requests to define “field technical reports”. Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to provide notice. 11 12

Case Number: 23STCV09536 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles California Credits Group, LLC, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23STCV09536 vs. Tentative Ruling Foster Poultry Farms, LLC f/k/a Foster Poultry Farms, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Motion To Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents Moving Party : Plaintiff California Credits Group, LLC Responding Party : Defendant Foster Poultry Farms, LLC T/R : THE MOTION IS GRANTED IN PART. PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND Plaintiff California Credits Group, LLC sued defendants Foster Poultry Farms, LLC and Foster Farms, LLC on April 28, 2023 for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As alleged in its complaint, Plaintiff provides tax credit services with a primary focus on California Enterprise Zone credits. (Compl., ¶ 9.) Defendant Foster Poultry was one of Plaintiffs clients; Defendant Foster Farms acquired Foster Poultry in June 2022. ( Id. , ¶¶ 11-13.) Under the contract, Plaintiff would locate employees for Foster Poultry who, once employed, would generate tax credits for Foster Poultry based on Enterprise Zone economic incentives. ( Ibid. ) Foster Poultry agreed to pay Plaintiff a portion of the credits generated when the credits were utilized, that is, when they were actually applied to reduce Foster Poultrys tax obligations. ( Id. , ¶ 14-15, Exhs. A-B [initial 2005 and amended 2007 contracts].) The Contract anticipated the possibility that Foster Poultry might be acquired, and there may be tax credits that had been generated by Plaintiffs recommended hires, but not yet utilized . ( Id. , ¶ 20.) Those credits utility might be cut off by an acquisition. ( Id. , ¶¶ 21-22.) In that case, the contract required that all pending credits be deemed utilized, and Plaintiff paid for their use, upon Foster Poultrys acquisition. ( Id. , ¶ 22.) The private equity firm Atlas Holdings, Inc. acquired Foster Poultry in June 2022. ( Id. , ¶¶ 4-5.) The transaction was structured so that Foster Poultrys co-defendant, Foster Farms, acquired Foster Poultry, and Atlas in turn acquired Foster Farms. ( Id. , ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that when Atlas acquired Foster Poultry, it cut off $70 million in outstanding, unutilized tax credits generated by Plaintiff. ( Id. , ¶ 30.) On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further responses to its Requests for Production (Set One) propounded on Foster Poultry. ANALYSIS Plaintiff moves for further responses to its Requests for Production (RPDs) Nos. 9-11 and 40. Plaintiff frames these as requests for communications relating to the June 2022 reorganizing transactions that suspended the tax credits allocated by [Plaintiff]. (MPA, 4:22-23.) Plaintiff contends these documents must be produced because they are critical to understanding the scope and significance of the June 2022 transactions and determining whether they constitute a Reorganization under the parties Agreements. ( Id. , 26-28.) Defendant argues that communications involving the June 2022 transactions are irrelevant to whether the transaction was a Reorganization for purposes of the parties contract. Defendant contends that all Plaintiff needs are the documents governing the transactions namely, the June 2022 Purchase Agreement (2022 Agreement). Defendant already has produced the 2022 Agreement. Defendant also objects that the requests are unduly burdensome, Plaintiff has not properly met and conferred about them, and, to the extent some portion of the materials might be relevant, Plaintiffs Requests should be narrowed after Plaintiff obtains its still-outstanding, more reasonable discovery. Defendant has produced to Plaintiff excerpts of the 2022 Agreement that Plaintiff contends triggered the reorganization provisions of the Contract. Defendant contends this satisfies Plaintiffs asserted need to evaluate whether Defendants reorganization triggered the Contract. Defendant cannot unilaterally identify what evidence Plaintiff needs. For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. [Citation.] ... [T]he scope of discovery extends to any information that reasonably might lead to other evidence that would be admissible at trial. Thus, the scope of permissible discovery is one of reason, logic and common sense. ( Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 16111612, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 341.) Communications surrounding the execution of the 2022 Agreement may lead to admissible evidence about how its execution was expected to impact the terms of the Contract. Plaintiff may explore evidence of how the 2022 Agreement was executed, and whether those facts are relevant to the alleged breach. Defendants have not shown undue burden. Some of the phrasing of Plaintiffs requests is overbroad; the Court will sustain Defendants objections in part: The Court grants Plaintiffs motion and orders Defendant to provide Code-compliant responses to all the disputed requests within thirty (30) days of this ruling, except: 1. Defendant need only produce documents created between June 1, 2021 and the filing of the complaint, and 2. The terms in connection with and in connection with or following are narrowed to as a result of for purposes of this order. The Court finds Defendant was substantially justified in opposing Plaintiffs motion. The Court awards no sanctions.