State Of New York V. Kelci Margiasso

Case Number: 22AHCV00270 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 18, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: FRANCESCO CAMELI, an individual, v. FAKK LLC, a limited liability company; ALEXANDRE CAILLAT, an individual; KIAN FARIN, an individual, JAMIE MITCHELL, an individual, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. CASE NO.: 22AHCV00270 MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD MOVING PARTY : Petitioner Francesco Cameli RESPONDING PARTY : None SERVICE: Filed June 25, 2024 OPPOSITION: None REPLY: None RELIEF REQUESTED Petitioner requests the Court confirm the arbitration award. BACKGROUND This case arises out of complaints involving the operation of FAKK LLC, doing business as Zen Drive Co., (FAKK). Plaintiff alleges that he, along with Alexandre Caillat (Caillat), Karim Hamza (Hamza), and Kian Farin (Farin) founded FAKK to set up a shop to provide diving equipment, lessons, and merchandise. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jamie Mitchell (Mitchell) was added as a member of FAKK. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly conducted business by failing to properly authorize and inspect breathing gas cylinders and improperly storing cylinders. Plaintiff alleges that when he raised these concerns, Hamza. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants acted to improperly exclude him from FAKK. Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 10, 2022, alleging nine causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) fiduciary duty of care, (3) accounting, (4) constructive trust, (5) unfair competition and unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., (6) violation of California Corporations Code section 17704.10 et seq. (7) civil assault, (8) defamation, and (9) declaratory relief. TENTATIVE RULING The motion to confirm arbitration award is GRANTED. LEGAL STANDARD Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. The petition shall name as respondents all parties to the arbitration and may name as respondents any other persons bound by the arbitration award. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1285 .) A petition under this chapter shall: (a) Set forth the substance of or have attached a copy of the agreement to arbitrate unless the petitioner denies the existence of such an agreement. (b) Set forth the names of the arbitrators. (c) Set forth or have attached a copy of the award and the written opinion of the arbitrators, if any. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.4 .) If a petition or response under this chapter is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made&unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1286 .) Any response to the petition is required to be filed and served within 10 days after service of the petition. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.6 .) The Court finds that Petitioner has established that the procedural requirements have been met. There being no response, the Court finds that the arbitration award is proper to confirm. If [an] award is confirmed, judgment must be entered in conformity therewith. ( Jones v. Kvistad (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 836, 840 .) CONCLUSION The motion to confirm arbitration award is GRANTED. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July 18, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 20STCV42130 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 20STCV42130 MOTION Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint Motion to Strike Portions of Second Amended Complaint MOVING PARTY Defendants Fire Dragon Investment, LLC, Lynn Tran, Victor Le, M.D., Westminster Villa, Inc., and water Dragon Investment, LLC OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Shuo Wang, M.D. MOTION Plaintiff Shuo Wang, M.D. (Plaintiff) sued Defendants Fire Dragon Investments, LLC (Fire Dragon), Lynn Tran (Tran), Westminster Villa, Inc., Water Dragon Investment, LLC, and Victor Le, M.D. (Le) (collectively, Defendants) and contends Plaintiff agreed with Defendants Le and Tran to form Fire Dragon to invest in a residential care facility for the elderly. Plaintiff alleges she purchased Les and Trans ownership interests, is now Fire Dragons sole owner, Tran retains operational control of Fire Dragon, and Tran represents Fire Dragon is no longer profitable. Defendants demur to the fourth, seventh, and ninth causes of action in Plaintiffs operative second amended complaint. Defendants also move to strike portions of the second amended complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motions. ANALYSIS It is black letter law that a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In ruling on a demurrer, the court must liberally construe[] the complaints allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) This rule of liberal construction means the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. ( Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) Plaintiffs seventh cause of action is for fraud by concealment. Plaintiff must allege fraud with particularity. This means: (1) general pleading of the legal conclusion of fraud is insufficient; and (2) every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically, and the policy of liberal construction of pleading will not usually be invoked to sustain a pleading that is defective in any material respect. ( Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331.) There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.] ( LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges Tran and Le represented to Plaintiff he should invest additional funds in Fire Dragon, but Tran and Le misappropriated those funds. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 113-118.) Plaintiff does not allege specific facts to show that Defendants concealed pertinent facts from Plaintiff. Instead, Plaintiff alleges Tran and Le did not reveal their intentions to him. Plaintiffs claim is thus one for promissory fraud, not fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff must amend. Plaintiffs fourth and ninth causes of action are for conversion. Money cannot be the subject of a cause of action for conversion unless Plaintiff alleges Defendants converted a specific, identifiable sum. ( PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395, 397.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants wrongfully used Plaintiffs investment of $440,000 in funds, which Plaintiff intended for use in the operation of a residential care facility, and instead converted those funds for their own use. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 93, 130 .) For pleading purposes, Plaintiffs allegations suffice. Defendants may obtain further information in discovery. ( Khoury v. Malys of Cal., Inc . (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) The demurrer to the fourth and ninth causes of action is overruled. Defendants argue Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this action in Plaintiffs individual capacity, as it is properly a shareholder derivative action. [T]he action is derivative, i.e., in the corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stock and property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or it seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets. ( Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co . (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 106, internal quotations and citations omitted.) In this case, Plaintiffs claims are based on the misappropriation of [Fire Dragons] funds . . . by Le and Tran. (See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 77.) As such, Plaintiffs claims are derivative in nature. However, in corporations with few shareholders, direct shareholder actions are permissible when equitable. (See Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1253-1260 ( Jara ).) Plaintiff alleges he is Fire Dragons sole remaining shareholder. As the Court in Jara explained, the traditional justification for requiring a derivative action is that it is designed to prevent a multiplicity of actions by each individual shareholder and a preference of some more diligent shareholders over others . . . , along with other purposes such as shielding the corporation from meritless lawsuits by requiring the plaintiffs to have contemporaneous stockownership and by giving the defendants the right to move the court for an order requiring a bond and encouraging the intracorporate resolution of disputes and protecting managerial freedom. ( Id. , at pp. 1258-1259, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Because Plaintiff is Fire Dragons only shareholder, [t]hese policies find little or no application in the present case. ( Id . at p. 1259.) Therefore, Plaintiff may maintain this action as an individual action. Motion to Strike Defendants move to strike allegations Defendants contend that are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleges Le issued an altered check to Plaintiff on July 23, 2015. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 32, fn. 1.) Defendants argue Plaintiff was aware of his claims against Defendants as of that date and, therefore, the statute of limitations accrued at that time. When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a cause of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or, in this case, the allegations in the complaint and facts properly subject to judicial notice) can support only one reasonable conclusion. ( Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc . (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 193.) In this case, Plaintiff does not allege he knew the check Le issued to him was altered as of July 23, 2015. Accordingly, the court cannot determine, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs claims accrued at that time. Likewise, the court cannot say Plaintiffs claim for treble damages accrued when Plaintiff learned of Les resignation from Fire Dragon on June 13, 2018. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 55.) Plaintiff was not necessarily aware of Defendants misconduct because Plaintiff learned of Les resignation. The accrual of the statute of limitations in this case is an issue of fact, which the court cannot decide on a motion to strike. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants demurrer is otherwise overruled. Defendants motion to strike is denied. Plaintiff is to file an amended complaint within 10 days. Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.

GIMENEZ vs FCA US LLC, A Motion for Attorney's Fees by JESSE CVPS2301644 DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY GIMENEZ, MARIO GIMENEZ COMPANY Tentative Ruling: Granted. Attorney fees granted in reduced, but reasonable amount of $21,491.50 payable to Plaintiff’s counsel and separate costs in the amount of $2,332.85 for a total amount of $23,824.35. Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP § 1019.5. This is a lemon law case. Suit filed April 6, 2023. Notice of Settlement filed April 2, 2024. Declaration of Michael Saeedian, Esq. counsel for Plaintiff sets forth the terms of the settlement agreement, including Plaintiff’s right to petition for reasonable fees, costs if they could not agree (Decl. p. 1) No opposition filed. Song Beverly Attorney Fees and Costs Under Civil Code § 1794(d) (Song-Beverly Act), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Ibid.) In determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees, the court first determines a lodestar figure. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242; see also, Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.) Lodestar is calculated by assessing the reasonable rate for comparable services in the local community, multiplied by the reasonable number of hours spent on the case. (Ibid; see also, Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1320.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court and may make his or her own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. (Id. at 1096.) The prevailing buyer in a Song Beverly Act action has the initial burden of showing the fees incurred were allowable and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (Goglin, supra, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 470.) Once the initial burden is met, the burden of proof is on the opposing party to show by admissible evidence that the fees requested were unreasonable, either by the number of hours, the hourly rate, or both. (Maughan v. Google Technology (2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1261.) In this court’s experience, the hourly rates of Plaintiff's counsel do not appear to be reasonable for Riverside County, especially for this subject matter (See, EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 [the court may rely on its own experience in determining whether the hourly rate sought or hours spent in the matter are reasonable].) Plaintiff made no showing that she could not obtain local counsel, and therefore, is entitled to out-of-town rates. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615-619 [plaintiffs were entitled to Santa Monica rates for counsel when they proved they could not obtain local counsel].) Accordingly, the Court reduces the rates, and the total amount billed, as follows - $695.00 hourly rate reduced to $595.00 and $100 for law clerk hours (no authority in support thereof). Total attorney fees are thus reduced to $21,491.50. Costs As to costs, Plaintiff claims $2,332.85. These costs requested in Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs appear to be proper. Since Defendant did not raise any objections, Plaintiff is awarded their requested amount.

24CV079312: WING, et al. vs ALPINESTARS USA, INC., AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 07/16/2024 Complex Determination Hearing in Department 21 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Noël Wise COMPLEX DETERMINATION The Court designates this case as complex pursuant to Rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court. Counsel are advised to be familiar with the Alameda County Local Rules concerning complex litigation, including Rule 3.250 et seq. An order assigning the case to a judge and an initial case management order will be issued. COMPLEX CASE FEES Pursuant to Government Code section 70616, any non-exempt party who has appeared in the action but has not paid the complex case fee is required to pay the fee within ten days of the filing of this order. The complex case fee is $1,000 for each plaintiff or group of plaintiffs appearing together and $1,000 PER PARTY for each defendant, intervenor, respondent or other adverse party, whether filing separately or jointly, up to a maximum of $18,000 for all adverse parties. All payments must identify on whose behalf the fee is submitted. Please submit payment to the attention of the Complex Litigation Clerk located in the Civil Division at the Rene C. Davidson Courthouse, 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland, CA 94612. Please make check(s) payable to the Clerk of the Superior Court. Documents may continue to be filed as allowed under Local Rule 1.9. Note that for those admitted pro hac vice, there is also an annual fee. (Gov't Code section 70617.) PROCEDURES Calendar information, filings, and tentative rulings are available to the public at http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/. All counsel are expected to be familiar and to comply with pertinent provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the California Rules of Court, the Alameda County Superior Court Local Rules and the procedures outlined on the domain web page of the assigned department. SERVICE OF THIS ORDER Counsel for plaintiff(s) shall have a continuing obligation to serve a copy of this order on newly joined parties defendant not listed on the proof of service of this order and file proof of service. Each party defendant joining any third party cross-defendant shall have a continuing duty to serve a copy of this order on newly joined cross-defendants and to file proof of service. Pursuant to Government Code Sections 70616(a) and 70616(b), a single complex fee of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) must be paid on behalf of all plaintiffs. For defendants, a complex fee of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) must be paid for each defendant, intervenor, respondent or adverse party, not to exceed, for each separate case number, a total of eighteen thousand SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 24CV079312: WING, et al. vs ALPINESTARS USA, INC., AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 07/16/2024 Complex Determination Hearing in Department 21 dollars ($18,000.00), collected from all defendants, intervenors, respondents, or adverse parties. All such fees are ordered to be paid to Alameda Superior Court, within 10 days of service of this order. Order has been filed. The Initial Case Management Conference scheduled for 10/09/2024 is continued to 07/21/2025 at 01:30 PM in Department 21 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . Plaintiff must file a motion for class certification prior to the July 21, 2025 hearing. The parties shall, no later than 15 calendar days before the next case management hearing, file a joint case management statement on pleading paper. Clerk is directed to serve copies of this order, with proof of service, to counsel and to self- represented parties of record. PLEASE NOTE: This tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if uncontested by 04:00pm the day before your hearing. If you wish to contest the tentative ruling, then both notify opposing counsel directly and the court at the eCourt portal found on the court’s website: www.alameda.courts.ca.gov. If you have contested the tentative ruling or your tentative ruling reads, “parties to appear,” please use the following link to access your hearing at the appropriate date and time: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/department21 . If no party has contested the tentative ruling, then no appearance is necessary.

BROCKMAN VS. FCA US, LLC, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0201145 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. At the most recent review hearing on April 15, 2024, the Court was informed that parties were working toward finalizing a settlement agreement. No updated information has been provided. No Notice of Settlement has been filed. No Request for Dismissal has been filed. The Court is in receipt of “Notice of Removal of Action to United States District Court” filed in the Shasta County Superior Court on May 8, 2023. Pursuant to that notice, this Court’s jurisdiction is automatically suspended. 28 USC §1446(d); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 670. All future hearing dates were therefore vacated. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds this case is exempt from the case disposition time goals under California Rule of Court §3.714(c)(1) and the case is hereby Administratively Closed unless and until it is remanded. No further appearances are required by the parties, including at today’s Review Hearing.

S-CV-0051023 Maringer, Perry vs. Tran, David et al Dropped. Default entered on 06/12/24. Default prove-up hearing is set for 9/16/24 at 1:00 pm in Dept. 6.

16CV02814 BARTEL v. CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF BARTEL’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS Given the parties representation that they are finalizing a stipulation, no tentative will be posted. Page 3 of 3

Case Number: 23STCV05092 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 anthony brown ; Plaintiff , vs. pablo davila , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 23STCV05092 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: plaintiffs request for court judgment by default MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Anthony Brown RESPONDING PARTY: n/a Request for Court Judgment by Default Plaintiff Anthony Brown (Plaintiff) requests that the court enter default judgment in his favor and against defendant Pablo Davila (Defendant). As a threshold matter, the court notes that Plaintiff has requested inconsistent relief in his supporting papers. On the mandatory Request for Entry of Default Judicial Council form, Plaintiff has requested that the court enter default judgment in the amount of $40,000. (CIV-100, ¶ 2, subd. (a).) However, in the supporting memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiff requests that the court enter default judgment in the total amount of $52,416.13, consisting of $40,000 in damages, $11,738.16 in interest, and $675 in costs. (Memo. filed June 18, 2024, p. 1:18-20.) The requests for interest and costs should have been included on the mandatory Judicial Council form. (CIV-100, ¶¶ 2, subds. (c), (d), 7.) The court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiffs application for default judgment notwithstanding this error. First, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the maximum amount of $40,000 because Plaintiff (1) prayed for $40,000 in damages in the Complaint (Compl., p. 7, Prayer, ¶ 1), and (2) has proven that he suffered damages in the total amount of $52,835 consisting of (i) the loss of Plaintiffs 50 percent interest in the aircraft, totaling $30,000 (Brown Decl., ¶ 5), (ii) the $7,490 paid to recover the aircraft and to bring it to Los Angeles (Brown Decl., Ex. D [$7,490 invoice]), and (iii) a total of $15,345 expended by Plaintiff in storage fees for the period of 31 months at the monthly rate of $495 (Brown Decl., ¶ 5 [Plaintiff incurred storage fees from November 2021 to June 2024, i.e., 31 months]; Brown Decl., Ex. E) [1] . (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a) [The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint . . . .]; CSAA Ins. Exchange v. Hodroj (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 272, 276 [elements of breach of contract]; ONeal v. Stanislaus County Employees Retirement Assn. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1215 [elements of breach of fiduciary duty].) Second, the court finds that Plaintiffs request for interest is supported by the interest calculations of his counsel. (Civ. Code, § 3289; Biggins Decl., ¶ 2.) Third, the court finds that the costs requested are permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subds. (a)(1), (a)(4); Biggins Decl., ¶ 3.) The court therefore grants Plaintiffs request for default judgment against Defendant in the total amount of total amount of $52,416.13. The court will modify, sign, and file the Court Judgment by Default (Judicial Council form JUD-100) consistent with this order. The court directs the clerk to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 18, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court [1] The court notes that Plaintiff states that he has paid $510 per month in storage fees. (Brown Decl., ¶ 5.) However, the invoice attached to his declaration instead establishes that the monthly rental charge for the airport hanger space is $495. (Brown Decl., Ex. E [listing charges on April 1, 2024 and May 1, 2024 to be $495].)