C R Of Northfield In Vs Brown Lucius

S-CV-0052461 Winokur, William et al vs. Alioto, Frank J. et al No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/21/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Alioto, Frank; Great Leaves 11, LLC Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Great Leaves 11, LLC

JONES, ET AL. VS. TAYLOR Case Number: 22CV-0201290 This matter is on calendar trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan III case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. Plaintiffs have posted jury fees but Defendant has not. Defendant is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Friday, July 19, 2024, line 5, PLAINTIFF OSCAR ANTONIO MENDEZ ESQUIVEL , AN INDIVIDUAL NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET TWO (PART 4 OF 4) Request No. 20, is entitled to the same ruling as No. 15 above, GRANTING the motion to compel further response and production of documents. The motion to compel re Request No. 21 is GRANTED. If there are any such Field Review Comm. reports re the SD definition, they should be produced. If defendant cannot link any reports to the SD definition, it should so respond. The Court has no idea what "customer concerns" re SD means, in plaintiff's Request No. 26. For that reason, the motion is DENIED. Finally, reaching Request No. 31, the defendant's objections are a classic example of a blunderbuss reply. The motion to compel is GRANTED, but the defendant need only respond if a search for the emails is possible and then, if so, what results were obtained. The contested merits of plaintiff's motion to compel, and defendant's objections thereto are such that no sanctions either way are awardable. Any such requests are DENIED. Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare a form of proposed order consistent with the foregoing and, in compliance with Rule 3.1312 of the Rules of Court, submit the form order to defense counsel. Then the proposed order should be forwarded to psw@hassard.com for review and signature. For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 302 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 302. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to psw@hassard.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. = (302/JPT) (End of tentative ruling part 4 of 4) = (302/JPT)

23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Karin Schwartz The Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt on 03/08/2024 is Denied. Defendant Parthesh Brahmbhatt’s motion to challenge determination of good faith settlement is DENIED. BACKGROUND As to Defendant Kimberly White (“White”), Plaintiff Dipak Patel dba Pramukh Financial Services’ (“Plaintiff”) operative Second Amended Complaint alleges Negligent Misrepresentation and Professional Negligence. On February 13, 2024, Defendant Kimberly White (“White) filed a notice of conditional settlement and application for determination of good faith settlement. White and Plaintiff have agreed to settle Plaintiff’s claims as to White for $362,500. Defendant Parthesh Brahmbhatt (“Brahmbhatt”) moved to challenge the determination of good faith settlement on March 8, 2024. Although there is no proof of service as to the motion to challenge determination of good faith settlement, both Plaintiff and White have filed oppositions to the motion; as such, arguments regarding defective service are waived. On July 8, 2024, Brahmbhatt filed a cross-complaint, against Defendant Jonathan Wynn, White, and Plaintiff. As to White, Brahmbhatt alleges negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, equitable indemnification, contribution and declaratory relief. There is no proof of service on file indicating service of the Cross-Complaint on the Cross-Defendants. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, a court’s finding that a settlement between a claimant and one or more joint tortfeasors was entered into in good faith operates to discharge the settling defendant’s obligations to any remaining defendants for contribution or equitable indemnity. (See Civ. Proc. Code, § 877.6, subds. (a), (c).) The challenging party bears the burden of proving that the settlement was not in good faith. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 877.6, subd. (d); see also N. County Contractor’s Ass’n v. Touchstone Ins. Servs. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091.) The dual equitable goals of section 877.6 are the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault and the encouragement of settlements. (Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 865, 872.) The intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceedings among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. (Id.) The determination as to whether a settlement is in good faith is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) Section 877.6 and Tech- Bilt require an evidentiary showing, through expert declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith. (Id. at 1351.) DISCUSSION The Cross-Complaint is Procedurally Defective Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 428.50 subdivision (a), a party shall file a cross-complaint against a party who has filed a complaint against as the same time as the answer to the complaint. Under subdivision (b) of that section, any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a trial date. Subdivision (c) of section 428.50 requires a party to obtain leave of the court to file any cross-complaint. Brahmbhatt’s cross-complaint is procedurally defective. Brahmbhatt filed a demurrer on May 6, 2024, in response to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint filed on April 9, 2024. Thus, his cross-complaint naming Plaintiff as a cross-defendant should have been filed as the same time as his demurrer. Further, Brahmbhatt failed to obtain leave of court prior to filing his cross- complaint on July 8, 2024. Brahmbhatt appeared to be aware of the requirement, as he stated his intention to move for leave to file a cross-complaint in the instant motion on March 8, 2024. (Motion at pp. 4,7; Brahmbhatt Dec. ¶ 5.) Brahmbhatt also failed to file a proof of service of his cross-complaint; it is unclear if any of the named cross-defendants have any notice of the cross- complaint brought against them. As Brahmbhatt has failed to obtain the court’s permission to file his cross-complaint, and service does not appear to have been affected on the cross-defendants, Brahmbhatt’s cross-complaint is not properly before the Court at this juncture and will be the subject of an OSC. Rough Approximation of Plaintiffs’ Total Recovery and Settlor’s Proportionate Liability Brahmbhatt argues that White’s settlement of $362,500 is disproportionate in light of the rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery and White’s proportionate liability. Brahmbhatt argues that Plaintiff issued a recent demand for $2,500,000, but the details regarding the timing and recipient(s) of the demand are omitted. Brahmbhatt further argues that the parties reasonably relied upon White’s appraisals, the accuracy of which is relevant to Plaintiff’s misrepresentation SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 claims. White argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claims against Brahmbhatt are unrelated to those made against White. White contends that her involvement in this matter was limited to the appraisal report which was issued to a third party, not to any parties in this action. White acknowledges receipt of a policy limits demand from Plaintiff in the early stages of litigation. However, since that time, the parties have engaged in discovery and depositions, which has allowed the parties to assess the matter for prelitigation settlement. White also notes the absence of any cross-complaint and equitable indemnity claims against White. White provides sufficient evidence to weigh this factor in favor of good faith. Damages are often speculative, and probability of legal liability is often uncertain or remote. (Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 231, 238.) A plaintiff’s asserted damages are not determinative. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 964.) Thus, the $362,500 settlement is proportionate in light of the rough approximation of Plaintiff’s total recovery and White’s proportionate liability. Financial Condition and Insurance Brahmbhatt argues that the settlement is premature because he has been unable to conduct discovery as to White’s financial condition and insurance. Brahmbhatt further argues that White has not set forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate if she has the ability to pay settlement in excess of the insurance policy limits. White states that Brahmbhatt has had sufficient time to conduct discovery as Plaintiff initiated this action in September 2022, Brahmbhatt answered in March 2023, and Brahmbhatt was represented by counsel until November 2023. She argues that Brahmbhatt has not served discovery in this action, nor did Brahmbhatt choose to participate in mediation in January 2024 with the other parties. Thus, any issues regarding lack of discovery on White’s financial condition and insurance policy coverage are due to Brahmbhatt’s lack of diligence. Neither White nor Plaintiff provide any representations regarding White’s insurance policy limit or White’s financial condition. However, the lack of this information does not support a finding that the settlement was not made in good faith. Brahmbhatt provides no authority requiring a party to provide this information in an application for determination of good faith settlement. Further, it is well established that a settlor should pay less in settlement than after trial. (Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1685, 1704.) Evidence of Collusion, Fraud, or Tortious Conduct Both White and Plaintiff state that the settlement was reached in good faith at a private mediation in January 2024. There is no evidence of collusion, fraud, or other tortious conduct by the settling parties aimed to injure the interest of the non-settling parties. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 Settling Defendant’s Potential Liability Compared to Non-Settling Defendants As noted above, there are no cross-complaints alleging equitable indemnity against White. Thus, White’s potential liability to the non-settling defendants is not a factor to consider in reaching a determination of good faith settlement, as there are no claims made against her. CONCLUSION Pursuant to foregoing, Brahmbhatt’s motion to challenge determination of good faith settlement is DENIED. The Court finds that the settlement entered between Plaintiff and White is made in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 877.76. All claims against White for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault are barred by the finding that the settlement is in good faith. (C.C.P. § 877.6(c).) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: DISMISSAL OF CROSS-COMPLAINT Brahmbhatt is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why his cross-complaint should not be dismissed for failure to obtain leave of court to file the cross-complaint pursuant to C.C.P. §428.50. A response to this Order to Show Cause must be filed and served at least 15 calendar days before the hearing. Failure to timely file and serve a response and/or appear at the hearing will provide additional grounds for dismissal for failure to comply with a Court order. The Court SETS this matter for an Order to Show Cause why Brahmbhatt’s 7/8/24 cross- complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to C.C.P. § 428.50 for October 3, 2024 at 2:30 PM in Department 20. If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV051444: PATEL vs SRINIVASAN, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Challenge the Good Faith of a Settlement (CCP 877.6) filed by Parthesh Brahmbhatt (Defendant) in Department 20 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.

Matter on calendar for Wednesday, July 17, 2024, Line 6, PLAINTIFF JOSE CALLES, JOSE CASTILLO PEREZ's Motion To Compel Further Responses To Plaintiffs Request For Production Of Documents, Set One. The matter is continued to August 15, 2024 on the court's motion. =(302/JPT).

CV-23-000051 – TOVAR, ARMANDO vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Expenses – GRANTED, in the reduced total amount of $39,389.69. Judicial Notice is DENIED on all state court cases cited. The Court is uncertain if state court judgments are permitted in this context; they are generally not permitted to be cited, but this is primarily for a factual rather than legal purpose. Assuming they are permitted, for probative value, the Court would need to know what percentage of fee requests were denied, which is not information which was provided to the Court. The Court has concerns about Defendant’s claim that Ms. Anvar was a paralegal. The Court does not view that as careful pleading. The Court makes the following fee reductions: Two hours at $350 for the discovery request. ($700.) Ten hours at $350 for the Motion to Compel Further RFP responses ($3,500) The Court reduces fees for the instant motion to $2,300. The Court further reduces attorney Julian Moore’s fees to $475 per hour based on prevailing rates in Stanislaus County. This results in a $940 reduction in fees. Plaintiff argues that $350 per hour is reasonable for attorneys Kowalski and Kornely, but some billing for Kornely was above that rate. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s implied concession that the amount above $350 is excessive. Unfortunately, Defendant’s calculations as to the compensable fees is incorrect - $350 x 10.5 is not under $3,000. Further, the ability to calculate this excess is limited either by the failure of the Court to find a summary page or the failure of either party to include such. The Court reduces the total amount by $500. The Court does note that fees are to be commensurate with the local standards in Stanislaus County, which has lower fees than Los Angeles, but is also not a very small county. $350 per hour for somewhat experienced attorneys is reasonable. The Court makes no reduction in costs. Under these circumstances, the Court declines to find any portion of the litigation was so unnecessary as to obviate the need for costs. Therefore, the total fees outside of this motion are: $32,219.50, plus $4,870.14 in costs and $2,300 for the fee motion, for a total of $39,389.69.

HAUGEN VS AMERICAN CVRI2305148 HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A MOTION TO COMPEL CALIFORNIA CORPORATION Tentative Ruling: GRANT. Defendant to produce a qualified PMK for deposition within 60 days of the date of this order. No Sanctions.

23CV02998 DIARRA v. KELLY et al MOTION FOR AN ORDER DECLARING CARSON KELLEY’S JUDGMENT DEBT TO MARIAM DIARRA TO BE A COMMUNITY PROPERTY DEBT The motion is denied without prejudice. Diarra obtained a default judgment against Carson Kelly and Humanize Global, US, Inc. in the amount of $40,718.24. The underlying complaint alleged Labor Code violations, breach of contract, promise without intent to perform, and violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200. Carson Kelly is alleged to be the managing agent of Humanize Global. Diarra worked for or was contracted by Carson Kelly and Humanize Global. Diarra, now as judgment creditor, moves the court to declare that the debt of Carson Kelly is a debt of the marital community of Carson Kelly and his wife Shannon Kelly, to declare the wages of Shannon Kelly be subject to garnishment to satisfy Diarra’s judgment against Carson Kelly, and to authorize that a writ of execution issue in her name. Family Code section 902 defines debt as “an obligation incurred by a married person before or during marriage, whether based on contract, tort, or otherwise.” Family Code section 910, subdivision (a) states that “[e]xcept as expressly provided by statute, the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regardless of which spouse has the management and control of the property and regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or the judgment for debt.” Page 3 of 4 Diarra has not made a sufficient showing in this motion as follows: 1. Evidence of a marriage between Shannon and Carson Kelly, including the date Carson and Shannon married. The only evidence are the vague statements from counsel and Diarra in their declarations. 2. Evidence that Humanize Global US, Inc. was community property, rather than the separate property of Carson Kelly. In light of the above deficiencies, the court need not reach the merits of the motion. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 4 of 4