Wells Fargo Bank, Na, Plaintiff(S) Vs. Lynn Allen, Defendant(S)

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.

Matter on calendar for Tuesday, July 16, 2024, Line 4, PLAINTIFF CITIBANK, N.A.'s Motion For Order That Matters In Request For Admission Of Truth Of Facts Bk Deemed Admitted. The matter is continued to August 13, 2024, on the court's motion. =(302/JPT).

SIERRA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION VS. BOWEN Case Number: 23CVG-00603 This matter is on calendar for confirmation of Judgment. The Court’s June 5, 2024 Ruling after trial ordered Defendant to submit a proposed judgment for the Court’s signature. No proposed judgment has been filed. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 24STCP00598 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 25 Hearing Date: Tuesday, July 16, 2024 Case Name: Juan Recalde v. Adolfo Landeros Case No.: 24STCP00598 Motion: Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment Moving Party: Defendant Adolfo Landeros Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: IMPROPER as the Labor Commissioners Office was not served with the instant motion Tentative Ruling: The Hearing on Defendants Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment Entered on 02/26/2024 is CONTINUED to AUGUST 21, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 25 of the Spring Street Courthouse. Defendant is ordered to electronically file proper proof of service of the Motion upon the Labor Commissioner, as well as proof of service of the continued hearing date at least 10 court days prior to the continued hearing date. BACKGROUND On July 25, 2022, the Labor Commissioners Office heard claim number WC-CM-816672 (the Claim) regarding the alleged employment of Plaintiff Juan Recalde (Plaintiff). (Landeros Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff sought to recover 57.75 hours of unpaid wages from August 5, 2020 to September 2, 2020, at the rate of $50.00 per hour from 3-D Engineering & Manufacturing Inc. (3-D Engineering) and Adolfo Landeros (Defendant). (Landeros Decl., ¶ 2.) After the hearing, the Labor Commissioner ordered 3-D Engineering and Defendant to pay Plaintiff the total amount of $15,231.14. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. A.) According to the Order, Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff the sum of $11,255.85 of the total amount awarded. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. A.) In March of 2023, Defendant caused his attorney to communicate with Plaintiff regarding settlement of the Claim and a settlement was reached. (Landeros Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Exs. B and C.) Plaintiff agreed to release the Claim with prejudice in consideration of payment of $15,231.14 from Defendant and 3-D Engineering. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 6; Ex. C.) A cashiers check was sent to Plaintiff by Defendants former counsel on March 16, 2023, for direct payment to Plaintiff in the amount of the Labor Commissioners award. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 7; Ex. D.) Plaintiff received and cashed the check and Defendant understood that the Claim was fully resolved and dismissed between the parties pursuant to the settlement. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 8.) Defendant states that his former counsel made a mistake in not delivering the actual cashiers check directly to the Office of the Labor Commissioner and instead delivered the payment directly to Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the release. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant contends that the Labor Commissioner requesting that judgment for the full amount of the award plus post-hearing interest and filing fees was based on mistake as this matter should have long been dismissed. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 10.) Defendant states that the subject judgment was obtained through mistake, excusable neglect, and inadvertence of his prior counsel as the payment was not mailed directly to the Labor Commissioners Office. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 11.) On February 26, 2024, the Labor Commissioner of the State of California (the Labor Commissioner) filed a Request That the Clerk Enter Judgment and Judgment on Final Order, Decision or Award of the Labor Commissioner. The Labor Commissioner sought a total judgment of $11,776.40 against Defendant. On February 26, 2024, the Court entered judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $11,776.40. On May 22, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment. Defendant seeks an order setting aside and vacating the judgment entered against him on February 26, 2024. Plaintiff did not oppose the instant motion; however, the Labor Commissioner was not served with the motion. Given that the Labor Commissioner requested entry of judgment and judgment was entered pursuant to such request, the Labor Commissioner should have been given notice of the instant motion. MOVING PARTY POSITION Defendant argues that he entered into a settlement agreement and release with Plaintiff but sent payment of the award, by mistake, directly to Plaintiff instead of to the Labor Commissioner. OPPOSITION No opposition has been filed as of July 12, 2024. REPLY No reply has been filed as of July 12, 2024. ANALYSIS I. Setting Aside the Judgment A. Legal Standard The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Relief under CCP § 473(b) is mandatory when based on an attorney affidavit of fault; otherwise, it is discretionary. Ibid . B. Discussion The Court references its recitation of the Declaration of Defendant from above and incorporates it herein. Defendants counsel declares that he sent a demand for satisfaction of judgment to Plaintiff on behalf of 3-D Engineering in LASC Case No. 24STCP00522 and Plaintiff informed counsel that he would submit an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment in such case. (Yurcich Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Ex. B.) Initially, the Court fails to see the relevance of Defendants counsel demanding satisfaction of judgment in a separate action to which Defendant is not a party. The Court finds that Defendant has shown a basis to set aside the judgment on grounds of mistake and inadvertence. However, as stated above, although the motion is unopposed, the Labor Commissioner should have been given notice of the motion. While the Labor Commissioner is not a party to this action, given that it did request judgment against Defendant and judgment was entered pursuant to such request, the Labor Commissioner should have been afforded the opportunity to oppose the instant motion. II. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court CONTINUES the hearing on Defendants AMENDED Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment Entered on 02/26/2024 to Wednesday, August 21, 2024, at 10:00 AM in this department, so that the Labor Commissioner can be served with the motion. Defendant is ordered to electronically file proper proof of service of the Motion upon the Labor Commissioner, as well as proof of service of the continued hearing date at least 10 court days prior to the continued hearing date. The Moving party is ordered to give notice of this Courts Ruling and to attach a copy of the Court's Tentative Ruling, as exhibit A to said notice.

For Plaintiff Partners Personnel Management Services, LLC.: Cheryl A. Canty For Defendant Powdercoat Services, LLC: David Bland RULING For all reasons discussed herein, plaintiff Partners Personnel Management Services, LLC’s motion to enter judgment pursuant to defendants’ default under settlement and release agreement is GRANTED. The court will sign the proposed order submitted by plaintiff. Background: This action commenced on January 8, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Partners Personnel Management Services, LLC (“plaintiff”) against defendant Powdercoat Services, LLC, (“defendant”) for breach of contract, nonpayment on an open book account, and nonpayment on an account stated. As alleged in the complaint: In July 2017, defendant entered into a written agreement with plaintiff for the provision of staffing services. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Between October 2023, and December 2023, defendant utilized plaintiff’s temporary labor and plaintiff paid the wages, taxes, benefits, and workers’ compensation premiums for the labor utilized by defendant. (Id., ¶ 7.) Despite demands for payment, defendant has not paid plaintiff, as agreed, between October 2023, and December 2023. (Id., at ¶ 9.) If defendant was served with the summons and complaint, plaintiff did not file proof of service of the same. On March 1, 2024, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement providing for the payment of $100,000.00, in equal payments made over a twelve-month period beginning on March 28, 2024. (Canty Dec., ¶ 3 & Exh. A.) The parties also executed a “Stipulation for Entry of Order Re: Court’s Retention of Jurisdiction Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6.” (Id., at ¶ 4 & Exh. B.) Defendant defaulted and, as of the date of the filing of the present motion, has failed to cure the default or make any payment. (Id., at ¶ 5.) The settlement agreement provides that in the event of default, plaintiff could recover interest from the date of default at the rate of ten percent plus costs and attorney’s fees. (Id., at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff seeks the balance owed pursuant to the agreement of $100,000.00, $40.00 for motion fees, interest of $2,000.00 and attorney’s fees of $5,050.00, for a total of $107,090.00. Plaintiff now moves to enter judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, including agreed upon costs, attorney’s fees, and interest. No opposition or other responsive documents have been filed by defendant. Analysis Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides: “(a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following: “(1) The party. “(2) An attorney who represents the party. “(3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer’s behalf. (c) Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subdivision (b) do not apply in a civil harassment action, an action brought pursuant to the Family Code, an action brought pursuant to the Probate Code, or a matter that is being adjudicated in a juvenile court or a dependency court. (d) In addition to any available civil remedies, an attorney who signs a writing on behalf of a party pursuant to subdivision (b) without the party’s express authorization shall, absent good cause, be subject to professional discipline.” “A court ruling on a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.) “If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Id.) A court hearing a motion brought under section 664.6 may “receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment”, but may not “create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810.) “A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.” (Ibid.) “In order for acceptance of a proposal to result in the formation of a contract, the proposal “ ‘must be sufficiently definite, or must call for such definite terms in the acceptance, that the performance promised is reasonably certain.’ ” [Citation.] A proposal “ ‘cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain. [¶] The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining . . . the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.’ ” [Citation.] If, by contrast, a supposed “ ‘contract’ ” does not provide a basis for determining what obligations the parties have agreed to, and hence does not make possible a determination of whether those agreed obligations have been breached, there is no contract. (See, e.g., 1 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 1990, Lord) § 4:18, p. 414 [“It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding, must be sufficiently definite to enable the courts to give it an exact meaning.”]; see also Civ. Code § 3390, subd. 5 [a contract is not specifically enforceable unless the terms are “ ‘sufficiently certain to make the precise act which is to be done clearly ascertainable.’ ”] )” (Id. at pp. 811-812.) The parties entered into a valid and enforceable contract, with reasonably certain terms, and have agreed that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. As noted above, the parties executed and filed a “Stipulation for Entry of Order Re: Court’s Retention of Jurisdiction Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6.” “A written stipulation between attorneys recognizing jurisdiction of the court over the parties constitutes a General appearance by defendant.” (General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 449, 453.) The motion will be granted. The court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by plaintiff and will sign it as drafted.

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Monday, Jul-15-2024, Line 3, PLAINTIFFS YULONG ECO-MATERIALS LTD, and EV BIOLOGICS CORP.'S, FORMERLY KNOWN AS YULONG, Motion To Compel Further Responses By Ridgway Smith And For Monetary Sanctions. Continued to August, 6, 2024, on the court's motion. No JPT available. (D302)

S-CV-0051866 Grassy Sprain Group, Inc. vs. Brock, Brian ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Brock, Brian; Brock, William Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Brock, Brian; Brock, William

MOTION FOR ORDER TO DEEM BANK OF AMERICA N.A. vs MATTERS ADMITTED TO DEEM RFAS CVMV2401467 CHAVEZ ADMITTED BY BANK OF AMERICA N.A. Tentative Ruling: Motions are granted.