Related Content
in Clark County
Ruling
Mary White, deceased et al. vs Melodie A. Ramsey
Jul 15, 2024 |
STK-CV-UPI-2022-0003430
The court having read and considered the unopposed motion of Antoinette White to be deemed Mary White's Successor in Interest filed June 6, 2024 and good cause appearing, the Motion is GRANTED. Antoinette White is deemed the Successor in Interest to decedent, Mary White. Hon. George J. Abdallah, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
WILHELMINA QUISMUNDO VS SON THE VAN
Jul 18, 2024 |
23PSCV00745
Case Number:
23PSCV00745
Hearing Date:
July 18, 2024
Dept:
6
CASE NAME:
Wilhelmina Quismundo v. Son The Van
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production
TENTATIVE RULING
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.
BACKGROUND
This is an auto accident case. On March 14, 2023, plaintiff Wilhelmina Quismundo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Son B Van (erroneously sued as Son The Van) (Defendant) and Does 1 through 26, alleging one cause of action for negligence.
On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff moved to compel responses to written discovery. The motion is unopposed.
LEGAL STANDARD
When a party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling a response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (
Id.
, § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (
Id.
, § 2030.290, subd. (c).)
When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a).) [T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (
Id
., § 2031.300, subd. (c).)
DISCUSSION
Meet and Confer
Although meeting and conferring is not required before bringing motions to compel, (
Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404), the Court appreciates Plaintiffs meet-and-confer efforts. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.)
Analysis
Plaintiff indicates having served Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production, Set One, on Defendant on November 15, 2023. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 3.) Despite having been granted multiple extensions, Defendant failed to respond. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.) Defendant has not responded as of the filing of the motion. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 13.) The Court finds Plaintiff has shown it is entitled to responses from Defendant.
However, the Court notes that Plaintiffs motion contains no proof of service, nor is any proof of service on file with the Court evidencing that Plaintiff served this motion on Defendant. Such proof of service should have been filed by July 11, 2024, per Rule 3.1300, subdivision (c), of the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (c) [Proof of service of the moving papers must be filed no later than five court days before the time appointed for the hearing.]) Accordingly, it is unclear to the Court if Defendant was ever properly served with this motion.
The Court also notes that Plaintiff combined all three sets of discovery requests into one motion. Each set of discovery requests requires its own motion and a separate filing fee. There is nothing here indicating that Plaintiff paid three separate motion filing fees.
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice.
The Court also denies Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice.
Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.
Ruling
ANDREW CRUZ ALDACO VS RICHARD R. VAZQUEZ, ET AL.
Jul 18, 2024 |
24NWCV00190
Case Number:
24NWCV00190
Hearing Date:
July 18, 2024
Dept:
C
ALDACO v. VAZQUEZ
CASE NO.: 24NWCV00190
HEARING: 07/18/24
#10
I.
Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACOs Demurrer to Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VAZQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZs Cross-Complaint is
OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT
.
II.
Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACOs Motion to Strike Portions of Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VAZQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZs Cross-Complaint is
OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT
.
Opposing Party to give notice.
This action was filed on January 18, 2024 by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACO (Cross-Defendant).
On March 12, 2024, Defendants/Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VASQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZ (collectively Cross-Complainants) filed the subject Cross-Complaint.
A party may amend its pleading once without leave of court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard
if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike
. (emphasis added.) (CCP §472.)
The hearing on this Demurrer and Motion to Strike is set for July 18, 2024. The Opposition was due no later than July 5, 2024. (CCP §1005(b).)
The First Amended Cross-Complaint was timely filed on July 5, 2024the date the Opposition was due.
The Demurrer and Motion to Strike are placed OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT.
Ruling
Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc.
Jul 18, 2024 |
Civil Unlimited (Other Personal Injury/Propert...) |
RG20061971
RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc.
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management,
LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518
Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Victoria Kolakowski
The Motion to Reclassify filed by ESA Management, LLC, Extended Stay America, Inc. on
06/13/2024 is Denied.
I. Background
Nahum Morales sued Extended Stay America, Inc. and ESA Management, LLC (“Defendants”),
among others, for injuries allegedly sustained after being bit by bedbugs after staying an
Extended Stay America hotel in Union City, California. (Compl. ¶ 1, May 11, 2020.) In his
complaint—filed as an unlimited civil action—Morales requested to recover an unspecified
amount of general, specific, and punitive damages, among other claims for relief. (Id. § 7.)
Defendants filed an answer generally denying the allegations and asserting several affirmative
defenses. (Answer, Feb. 16, 2021.)
Following Morales’s responses to Defendants’ discovery requests and testimony from his
deposition about his medical expenses and property damage, Defendants moved to reclassify the
action as a limited civil action. (Mot., June 13, 2024.) Defendants argued Morales’s known
medical expenses were under the $35,000.00 threshold and that Morales lacked evidence to
support his property damage claim. (Id. 7:4–9:23, 10:19–11:13; see also Reply Mem. 2:4–11
(noting SB-71 (enacted October 13, 2023, raised amount in controversy to $35,000.00).)
Morales opposed. (Opp’n Mem., July 3, 2024.) Morales noted that he sought $250,000.00 in
general damages along with his claim for special damages for his medical expenses. (Id. 3:15–
4:9.)
II. Legal Standard
“[A] defendant . . . may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to
respond to the initial pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 403.040(a).) “If a party files a motion for
reclassification after the time for that party . . . to respond to a complaint . . . , the court shall
grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions
are satisfied: [¶] [t]he case is incorrectly classified[] [¶] [t]he moving party shows good cause for
not seeking reclassification earlier.” (§ 403.040(b)(1), (2).) “The court shall grant the motion and
enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been
classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.” (§ 403.040(a); see also Ytuarte v. Super.
Ct. (Kashani) (2005) 129 Cal. App. 4th 266, 277 (“[A] matter may be reclassified as a limited
civil action ‘when (i) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint,
petition, or related documents, or (ii) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that
the matter will “necessarily” result in a verdict below the superior court’s jurisdictional amount .
. . .”) (quoting Walker v. Super. Ct. (Slaton), 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262).) “This standard involves an
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc.
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management,
LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518
evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not an adjudication of the merits of the claim, and
according to Walker, requires a ‘high level of certainty that [the] damage award will not exceed
$[3]5,000.’” (Id. (quoting Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 269.)
III. Discussion
The Court finds that Morales’s action does not necessarily involve less than $35,000.00.
Defendants did not carry their burden of showing that the damage award cannot exceed the
monetary threshold. Accordingly, the Court will not reclassify this action as a limited civil case.
IV. Order
The motion is DENIED.
PLEASE NOTE: Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, subdivision (a)(1), this tentative
ruling will become the order of the Court unless it is contested before 4:00 PM on the court day
preceding the noticed hearing.
To contest a tentative ruling, a party should do the following:
First, the party must notify Department 518, by email at Dept518@alameda.courts.ca.gov and
copy all counsel of record and self-represented parties. The contesting party must state in the
subject line of the email the case name, case number and motion.
Second, the party shall log into the eCourt Public Portal, search for this case (e.g., by case
number), select the case name, select the "Tentative Rulings" tab, click the "Click to Contest this
Ruling" button, enter the party's name and a brief statement of the party's reason for contesting
the tentative, and click "Proceed."
Parties may appear via videoconference, using the Zoom.com website or application.
TO CONNECT TO ZOOM:
Department 518 is inviting you to a scheduled ZoomGov meeting.
Topic: Department 518's Personal Meeting Room
Join ZoomGov Meeting
https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16054307984
Meeting ID: 160 5430 7984
One tap mobile
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc.
07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management,
LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518
+16692545252,,16054307984# US (San Jose)
+14154494000,,16054307984# US (US Spanish Line)
---
Dial by your location
• +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose)
Ruling
ALBERTA CHILDRESS VS WATTS HEALTHCARE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 16, 2024 |
20STCV00666
Case Number:
20STCV00666
Hearing Date:
July 16, 2024
Dept:
A
20STCV00666 Tinisha Clay v. Watts Healthcare, et al.
Tuesday, July 16, 2024
[TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER TO THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT, ALEXANDER STEIN, M.D.
i.
BACKGROUND
The fourth amended complaint (4AC) alleges claims for medical negligence arising from the alleged failure to care and treat Alberta Childress for lung and breast cancer. Decedent died on December 14, 2019.Tinisha Clay, decedents daughter, alleged a survival action on behalf of decedents estate, wrongful death, and breach of informed consent.
II.
ARGUMENTS
Defendant, Alexander Stein, M.D. (Dr. Stein or Defendant) demurs to the third cause of action for breach of informed consent allegedly arising from Dr. Steins failure to inform decedent of alternative, non-surgical treatment of lung cancer. Dr. Stein argues the claim is duplicative of the medical negligence claim, is unnecessary, superfluous and adds nothing to alleged claims.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that a claim for lack of informed consent is different from medical negligence, the latter of which arises from Defendants alleged failure to meet the applicable standard of care. The claim for lack of informed consent arises from a defendants duty to disclose material information which is a breach of fiduciary duty.
If the court sustains demurrer, Plaintiff asks for leave to amend.
In reply, Defendant contends that the opposition refers to pleadings no longer at issue, identifies other defendants who have not demurred, and is otherwise confusing and replete with errors. Plaintiff cannot split a negligence cause of action into two claims.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The bases for demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained for failure to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (
Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10
). A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. (
Schmidt v. Foundation Health
(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706). The court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. (
Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (
Moore v. Conliffe
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.)
A demurrer reaches defects that appear on the face of the complaint. The court does not go beyond the four corners of the pleading. The court considers the allegations and matters that are subject to judicial notice. All facts are accepted as true. (
Saunders v. Superior Court
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4
th
832, 838.) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their truth, the Plaintiffs ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof. (
Id.
at 840.)
IV.
DISCUSSION
A claim based on lack of informed consent, which sounds in negligence, arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives.
(
Saxena v. Goffney
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324
.)
To support a claim for medical negligence, Plaintiff must establish (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.' (
Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606
.)
The claim for lack of informed consent is not duplicative of the first cause of action for negligence. The negligence claim alleges that Dr. Stein and a co-defendant did not perform lung resection surgery until nine months after detection, when the tumors had spread. (4AC ¶ 30.) The 4Ac alleges that the standard of care required Defendants to perform a different radiotherapy for patients with inoperable cancer. (4AC, ¶ 31.
In contrast, the claim for lack of informed consent, which also arises from Defendants failure to properly perform the resection surgery, additionally alleges that Defendant concealed important potential results of alternatives to the resection surgery and the aortic valve replacement surgery. (4AC ¶ 59.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Stein deliberately did not disclose alternative treatments with which he was familiar and that were in effect. (F4AC, ¶ 61.) Each claim arises from a different set of alleged facts.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the fourth amended complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant Dr. Stein is ordered to file an answer forthwith.
Ruling
GANN vs MCDONALD'S CORPORATION
Jul 15, 2024 |
CVSW2308763
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO
GANN VS MCDONALD'S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET
CVSW2308763
CORPORATION ONE; REQUEST FOR MONETARY
SANCTIONS BY ELISABETH GANN
Tentative Ruling:
If verified responses have been provided by the hearing date, the Motions are MOOT. If
verified responses have not been provided by the hearing date, the Motions are
GRANTED and responses without objections are due within 20 days. In either case,
responses would not have been produced if the motions were not brought. Accordingly,
sanctions are appropriate. However, in that the Motions are substantively the same, a
more reasonable sanction of $735.00 per motion is imposed and due in 30 days.
5.
MOTION FOR ORDER DEEMING
ADMITTED TRUTH OF FACTS AND
GANN VS MCDONALD'S
CVSW2308763 GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS AND
CORPORATION IMPOSING MONETARY SANCTIONS
ON DEFENDANT BY ELISABETH GANN
Tentative Ruling:
See 4.
Ruling
Kimmie L. Bui, M.D. vs. Northbay Healthcare Group, Inc.
Jul 18, 2024 |
CU24-01421
CU24-01421
Demurrer and Motion for Protective Order
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants NORTHBAY HEALTHCARE GROUP INC. and NORTHBAY HEALTHCARE
FOUNDATION demur to Plaintiff KIMMIE L. BUI, M.D.’s complaint alleging loss of
consortium. Summarized, the complaint alleges that Dr. Saad Ismail, Plaintiff’s
husband, was employed by Defendants in various leadership roles from 2009 to 2022.
Defendants terminated Dr. Ismail’s employment on March 17, 2022, causing stress on
the couple.
Defendants simultaneously move for a protective order against discovery Plaintiff has
propounded on topics relating to Dr. Ismail’s experiences working for Defendants.
Legal Standard on Demurrer. “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of
the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish every
element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than
evidentiary facts, but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case
Page 2 of 5
“with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant
with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace
Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.)
Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007)
42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [ultimate facts sufficient].) The Court “assume[s] the truth of
the allegations in the complaint, but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)
Loss of Consortium. To plead a cause of action for loss of consortium a plaintiff must
allege (1) a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and an injured person at the
time of injury, (2) a tortious injury to the spouse, (3) loss of consortium suffered by the
plaintiff, and (4) that the loss was proximately caused by the defendant’s act. (Hahn v.
Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 746, fn. 2 (Hahn).) A loss of consortium claim is
separate and distinct from the spouse’s cause of action for injury; it is not merely
derivative or collateral to the spouse’s cause of action. (Gapusan v. Jay (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 734, 742.) Nonetheless, as a loss of consortium claim is necessarily
triggered by the tortious injury to the spouse, the claim stands or falls based on whether
the spouse has suffered an actionable tortious injury. (Hahn at p. 746.) Where the
spouse has no sufficiently stated cause of action a plaintiff asserting loss of consortium
also lacks a sufficiently stated cause of action. (Id. at pp. 746, 751; Blain v. Doctor’s
Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1067.)
A loss of consortium claim does not require physical injury to the spouse. (Ledger v.
Tippitt (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 625, 633.) Certain psychological injuries, such as
traumatically induced psychosis, neurosis, chronic depression, or phobia, can be
equally severe and debilitating enough to cause injury to the martial relationship that is
more than superficial or temporary. (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27
Cal.3d 916, 932-933 (Molien).)
Plaintiff alleges a lawful marriage between herself and Dr. Ismail at all relevant times.
(Complaint at ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a tortious injury to her husband. Her counsel argues
in opposition that the complaint alleges a number of legally cognizable injuries but none
are borne out in the text.
Plaintiff alleges it was the March 17, 2022 termination of Dr. Ismail’s employment that
caused her injury but she does not allege how it is that the termination was wrongful as
she never alleges that Dr. Ismail engaged in a protected activity or belonged to a
protected class and that there was a causal nexus between that protected status and
adverse employment action on Defendants’ part. (Complaint at ¶¶ 59, 73 [termination
allegedly caused injury]; St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 314
[elements of wrongful termination].) The complaint only alleges that Dr. Ismail was
terminated on the stated basis of failure to maintain workplace relationships and that his
Page 3 of 5
coworkers were nonetheless displeased with his departure. (Complaint at ¶¶ 59-72.)
Plaintiff does not state any form of wrongful termination.
The complaint does not state intentional infliction of emotional distress where there are
no facts pled to support that Defendants meant to cause Dr. Ismail emotional distress or
acted outrageously. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) Negligent infliction
of emotional distress is no better supported where there is no alleged predicate
negligent injury. (Ess v. Eskaton Properties (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 126.) Both
distress claims also find no sufficiently severe alleged distress as Dr. Ismail has merely
experienced “significant stress” from losing employment. (Complaint at ¶ 73.) There is
no description of what contract Dr. Ismail was under or how Defendants denied him the
benefit thereof and thus no sufficient statement of breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. (Hedayati v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 833, 843.)
Counsel’s assertion that negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention could support
Plaintiff’s loss of consortium claim is puzzling. (Opposition at 11:6-7.) Negligent hiring,
supervision, and/or retention is a theory of liability that holds an employer liable for
retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit for his position and through that
unfitness causes another injury. (Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 790, 815.) The complaint, focused on Dr. Ismail’s work history with
Defendants, contains no such allegations.
Plaintiff also does not allege a legally cognizable loss of consortium. A loss of
consortium is damage to the marital relationship that is more than temporary or
superficial. (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 932-933.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ismail
“experience[d] significant stress” and the couple “worried” about their finances after the
termination of his employment. (Complaint at ¶ 73.) It otherwise alleges in conclusory
terms that Plaintiff has lost Dr. Ismail’s physical and moral support and that the couple’s
sense of love and companionship “took a significant toll.” (Ibid.) This does not
sufficiently allege that Dr. Ismail was effectively incapacitated such that he could no
longer provide love, affection, society, comfort, and sexual relations, or that the damage
to the marital relationship is more than superficial and/or temporary. (Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 400.)
Leave to Amend. Leave to amend is proper where identified defects are amenable to
cure. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) It is the pleading party’s
burden to show the trial court that a reasonable possibility exists that amendment can
cure identified defects in that party’s pleading. (Murphy v. Twitter, Inc. (2018) 60
Cal.App.5th 12, 42.) Plaintiff offers only a request for leave to amend that lacks any
demonstration of potential merit in amendment.
Motion for Protective Order. The motion for protective order is moot in light of the
ruling on demurrer.
Page 4 of 5
Conclusion. Defendants’ demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The motion
for protective order is denied as moot.
Ruling
CORNELIUS MURPHY ET AL VS. 3M COMPANY ET AL
Jul 16, 2024 |
CGC23277169
On Asbestos Law and Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 16, 2024, in Department 301, Line 5. Plaintiff's Motion to Set a Preferential Trial Date Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 36(a) is DENIED without prejudice. Opposition filed. The Court does not find that Plaintiff's health is such that preference is necessary to avoid prejudicing her interest in the litigation. Specifically, the moving papers and counsel's declaration do not include a medical diagnosis and prognosis. Plaintiff may re-file their motion should circumstances change. The moving party shall lodge with the clerk in Department 301 by the time set for this hearing a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling. Any party wishing to contest the tentative ruling must email contestasbestostr@sftc.org by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing and state their intention to contest. If a hearing is requested, it will be on July 16, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. Attorneys may appear in person or remotely via zoom: Meeting ID 160 757 8308; Passcode: 485029. Face coverings are optional. The Court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law and Motion department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: Their name, CSR and telephone number, and their individual work email address. There will be only one official record. If the parties cannot agree, the Court will designate a qualified court reporter to provide the official transcript for the matter, and the party or parties will bear the cost. =(301/RCE)