Sandrena Lee, Plaintiff(S) Vs. Juan Agraz Cisneros, Defendant(S)

The court having read and considered the unopposed motion of Antoinette White to be deemed Mary White's Successor in Interest filed June 6, 2024 and good cause appearing, the Motion is GRANTED. Antoinette White is deemed the Successor in Interest to decedent, Mary White. Hon. George J. Abdallah, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23PSCV00745 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Wilhelmina Quismundo v. Son The Van Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production TENTATIVE RULING The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is an auto accident case. On March 14, 2023, plaintiff Wilhelmina Quismundo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Son B Van (erroneously sued as Son The Van) (Defendant) and Does 1 through 26, alleging one cause of action for negligence. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff moved to compel responses to written discovery. The motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD When a party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling a response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id. , § 2030.290, subd. (c).) When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a).) [T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id ., § 2031.300, subd. (c).) DISCUSSION Meet and Confer Although meeting and conferring is not required before bringing motions to compel, ( Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404), the Court appreciates Plaintiffs meet-and-confer efforts. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.) Analysis Plaintiff indicates having served Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production, Set One, on Defendant on November 15, 2023. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 3.) Despite having been granted multiple extensions, Defendant failed to respond. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.) Defendant has not responded as of the filing of the motion. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 13.) The Court finds Plaintiff has shown it is entitled to responses from Defendant. However, the Court notes that Plaintiffs motion contains no proof of service, nor is any proof of service on file with the Court evidencing that Plaintiff served this motion on Defendant. Such proof of service should have been filed by July 11, 2024, per Rule 3.1300, subdivision (c), of the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (c) [Proof of service of the moving papers must be filed no later than five court days before the time appointed for the hearing.]) Accordingly, it is unclear to the Court if Defendant was ever properly served with this motion. The Court also notes that Plaintiff combined all three sets of discovery requests into one motion. Each set of discovery requests requires its own motion and a separate filing fee. There is nothing here indicating that Plaintiff paid three separate motion filing fees. Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice. The Court also denies Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.

Case Number: 24NWCV00190 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: C ALDACO v. VAZQUEZ CASE NO.: 24NWCV00190 HEARING: 07/18/24 #10 I. Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACOs Demurrer to Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VAZQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZs Cross-Complaint is OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT . II. Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACOs Motion to Strike Portions of Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VAZQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZs Cross-Complaint is OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT . Opposing Party to give notice. This action was filed on January 18, 2024 by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACO (Cross-Defendant). On March 12, 2024, Defendants/Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VASQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZ (collectively Cross-Complainants) filed the subject Cross-Complaint. A party may amend its pleading once without leave of court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike . (emphasis added.) (CCP §472.) The hearing on this Demurrer and Motion to Strike is set for July 18, 2024. The Opposition was due no later than July 5, 2024. (CCP §1005(b).) The First Amended Cross-Complaint was timely filed on July 5, 2024the date the Opposition was due. The Demurrer and Motion to Strike are placed OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT.

RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management, LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Victoria Kolakowski The Motion to Reclassify filed by ESA Management, LLC, Extended Stay America, Inc. on 06/13/2024 is Denied. I. Background Nahum Morales sued Extended Stay America, Inc. and ESA Management, LLC (“Defendants”), among others, for injuries allegedly sustained after being bit by bedbugs after staying an Extended Stay America hotel in Union City, California. (Compl. ¶ 1, May 11, 2020.) In his complaint—filed as an unlimited civil action—Morales requested to recover an unspecified amount of general, specific, and punitive damages, among other claims for relief. (Id. § 7.) Defendants filed an answer generally denying the allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses. (Answer, Feb. 16, 2021.) Following Morales’s responses to Defendants’ discovery requests and testimony from his deposition about his medical expenses and property damage, Defendants moved to reclassify the action as a limited civil action. (Mot., June 13, 2024.) Defendants argued Morales’s known medical expenses were under the $35,000.00 threshold and that Morales lacked evidence to support his property damage claim. (Id. 7:4–9:23, 10:19–11:13; see also Reply Mem. 2:4–11 (noting SB-71 (enacted October 13, 2023, raised amount in controversy to $35,000.00).) Morales opposed. (Opp’n Mem., July 3, 2024.) Morales noted that he sought $250,000.00 in general damages along with his claim for special damages for his medical expenses. (Id. 3:15– 4:9.) II. Legal Standard “[A] defendant . . . may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 403.040(a).) “If a party files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party . . . to respond to a complaint . . . , the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied: [¶] [t]he case is incorrectly classified[] [¶] [t]he moving party shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.” (§ 403.040(b)(1), (2).) “The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.” (§ 403.040(a); see also Ytuarte v. Super. Ct. (Kashani) (2005) 129 Cal. App. 4th 266, 277 (“[A] matter may be reclassified as a limited civil action ‘when (i) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint, petition, or related documents, or (ii) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will “necessarily” result in a verdict below the superior court’s jurisdictional amount . . . .”) (quoting Walker v. Super. Ct. (Slaton), 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262).) “This standard involves an SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management, LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518 evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not an adjudication of the merits of the claim, and according to Walker, requires a ‘high level of certainty that [the] damage award will not exceed $[3]5,000.’” (Id. (quoting Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 269.) III. Discussion The Court finds that Morales’s action does not necessarily involve less than $35,000.00. Defendants did not carry their burden of showing that the damage award cannot exceed the monetary threshold. Accordingly, the Court will not reclassify this action as a limited civil case. IV. Order The motion is DENIED. PLEASE NOTE: Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, subdivision (a)(1), this tentative ruling will become the order of the Court unless it is contested before 4:00 PM on the court day preceding the noticed hearing. To contest a tentative ruling, a party should do the following: First, the party must notify Department 518, by email at Dept518@alameda.courts.ca.gov and copy all counsel of record and self-represented parties. The contesting party must state in the subject line of the email the case name, case number and motion. Second, the party shall log into the eCourt Public Portal, search for this case (e.g., by case number), select the case name, select the "Tentative Rulings" tab, click the "Click to Contest this Ruling" button, enter the party's name and a brief statement of the party's reason for contesting the tentative, and click "Proceed." Parties may appear via videoconference, using the Zoom.com website or application. TO CONNECT TO ZOOM: Department 518 is inviting you to a scheduled ZoomGov meeting. Topic: Department 518's Personal Meeting Room Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16054307984 Meeting ID: 160 5430 7984 One tap mobile SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management, LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518 +16692545252,,16054307984# US (San Jose) +14154494000,,16054307984# US (US Spanish Line) --- Dial by your location • +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose)

Case Number: 20STCV00666 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: A 20STCV00666 Tinisha Clay v. Watts Healthcare, et al. Tuesday, July 16, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEMURRER TO THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT, ALEXANDER STEIN, M.D. i. BACKGROUND The fourth amended complaint (4AC) alleges claims for medical negligence arising from the alleged failure to care and treat Alberta Childress for lung and breast cancer. Decedent died on December 14, 2019.Tinisha Clay, decedents daughter, alleged a survival action on behalf of decedents estate, wrongful death, and breach of informed consent. II. ARGUMENTS Defendant, Alexander Stein, M.D. (Dr. Stein or Defendant) demurs to the third cause of action for breach of informed consent allegedly arising from Dr. Steins failure to inform decedent of alternative, non-surgical treatment of lung cancer. Dr. Stein argues the claim is duplicative of the medical negligence claim, is unnecessary, superfluous and adds nothing to alleged claims. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that a claim for lack of informed consent is different from medical negligence, the latter of which arises from Defendants alleged failure to meet the applicable standard of care. The claim for lack of informed consent arises from a defendants duty to disclose material information which is a breach of fiduciary duty. If the court sustains demurrer, Plaintiff asks for leave to amend. In reply, Defendant contends that the opposition refers to pleadings no longer at issue, identifies other defendants who have not demurred, and is otherwise confusing and replete with errors. Plaintiff cannot split a negligence cause of action into two claims. III. LEGAL STANDARDS The bases for demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained for failure to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10 ). A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706). The court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.) A demurrer reaches defects that appear on the face of the complaint. The court does not go beyond the four corners of the pleading. The court considers the allegations and matters that are subject to judicial notice. All facts are accepted as true. ( Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4 th 832, 838.) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations. It does not test their truth, the Plaintiffs ability to prove them, or the possible difficulty in making such proof. ( Id. at 840.) IV. DISCUSSION A claim based on lack of informed consent, which sounds in negligence, arises when the doctor performs a procedure without first adequately disclosing the risks and alternatives. ( Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 324 .) To support a claim for medical negligence, Plaintiff must establish (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.' ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606 .) The claim for lack of informed consent is not duplicative of the first cause of action for negligence. The negligence claim alleges that Dr. Stein and a co-defendant did not perform lung resection surgery until nine months after detection, when the tumors had spread. (4AC ¶ 30.) The 4Ac alleges that the standard of care required Defendants to perform a different radiotherapy for patients with inoperable cancer. (4AC, ¶ 31. In contrast, the claim for lack of informed consent, which also arises from Defendants failure to properly perform the resection surgery, additionally alleges that Defendant concealed important potential results of alternatives to the resection surgery and the aortic valve replacement surgery. (4AC ¶ 59.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Stein deliberately did not disclose alternative treatments with which he was familiar and that were in effect. (F4AC, ¶ 61.) Each claim arises from a different set of alleged facts. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the fourth amended complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant Dr. Stein is ordered to file an answer forthwith.

MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO GANN VS MCDONALD'S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET CVSW2308763 CORPORATION ONE; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS BY ELISABETH GANN Tentative Ruling: If verified responses have been provided by the hearing date, the Motions are MOOT. If verified responses have not been provided by the hearing date, the Motions are GRANTED and responses without objections are due within 20 days. In either case, responses would not have been produced if the motions were not brought. Accordingly, sanctions are appropriate. However, in that the Motions are substantively the same, a more reasonable sanction of $735.00 per motion is imposed and due in 30 days. 5. MOTION FOR ORDER DEEMING ADMITTED TRUTH OF FACTS AND GANN VS MCDONALD'S CVSW2308763 GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS AND CORPORATION IMPOSING MONETARY SANCTIONS ON DEFENDANT BY ELISABETH GANN Tentative Ruling: See 4.

CU24-01421 Demurrer and Motion for Protective Order TENTATIVE RULING Defendants NORTHBAY HEALTHCARE GROUP INC. and NORTHBAY HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION demur to Plaintiff KIMMIE L. BUI, M.D.’s complaint alleging loss of consortium. Summarized, the complaint alleges that Dr. Saad Ismail, Plaintiff’s husband, was employed by Defendants in various leadership roles from 2009 to 2022. Defendants terminated Dr. Ismail’s employment on March 17, 2022, causing stress on the couple. Defendants simultaneously move for a protective order against discovery Plaintiff has propounded on topics relating to Dr. Ismail’s experiences working for Defendants. Legal Standard on Demurrer. “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts, but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case Page 2 of 5 “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.) Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [ultimate facts sufficient].) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) Loss of Consortium. To plead a cause of action for loss of consortium a plaintiff must allege (1) a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and an injured person at the time of injury, (2) a tortious injury to the spouse, (3) loss of consortium suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) that the loss was proximately caused by the defendant’s act. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 746, fn. 2 (Hahn).) A loss of consortium claim is separate and distinct from the spouse’s cause of action for injury; it is not merely derivative or collateral to the spouse’s cause of action. (Gapusan v. Jay (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 734, 742.) Nonetheless, as a loss of consortium claim is necessarily triggered by the tortious injury to the spouse, the claim stands or falls based on whether the spouse has suffered an actionable tortious injury. (Hahn at p. 746.) Where the spouse has no sufficiently stated cause of action a plaintiff asserting loss of consortium also lacks a sufficiently stated cause of action. (Id. at pp. 746, 751; Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1067.) A loss of consortium claim does not require physical injury to the spouse. (Ledger v. Tippitt (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 625, 633.) Certain psychological injuries, such as traumatically induced psychosis, neurosis, chronic depression, or phobia, can be equally severe and debilitating enough to cause injury to the martial relationship that is more than superficial or temporary. (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 932-933 (Molien).) Plaintiff alleges a lawful marriage between herself and Dr. Ismail at all relevant times. (Complaint at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a tortious injury to her husband. Her counsel argues in opposition that the complaint alleges a number of legally cognizable injuries but none are borne out in the text. Plaintiff alleges it was the March 17, 2022 termination of Dr. Ismail’s employment that caused her injury but she does not allege how it is that the termination was wrongful as she never alleges that Dr. Ismail engaged in a protected activity or belonged to a protected class and that there was a causal nexus between that protected status and adverse employment action on Defendants’ part. (Complaint at ¶¶ 59, 73 [termination allegedly caused injury]; St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 314 [elements of wrongful termination].) The complaint only alleges that Dr. Ismail was terminated on the stated basis of failure to maintain workplace relationships and that his Page 3 of 5 coworkers were nonetheless displeased with his departure. (Complaint at ¶¶ 59-72.) Plaintiff does not state any form of wrongful termination. The complaint does not state intentional infliction of emotional distress where there are no facts pled to support that Defendants meant to cause Dr. Ismail emotional distress or acted outrageously. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) Negligent infliction of emotional distress is no better supported where there is no alleged predicate negligent injury. (Ess v. Eskaton Properties (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 126.) Both distress claims also find no sufficiently severe alleged distress as Dr. Ismail has merely experienced “significant stress” from losing employment. (Complaint at ¶ 73.) There is no description of what contract Dr. Ismail was under or how Defendants denied him the benefit thereof and thus no sufficient statement of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Hedayati v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 833, 843.) Counsel’s assertion that negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention could support Plaintiff’s loss of consortium claim is puzzling. (Opposition at 11:6-7.) Negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention is a theory of liability that holds an employer liable for retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit for his position and through that unfitness causes another injury. (Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 815.) The complaint, focused on Dr. Ismail’s work history with Defendants, contains no such allegations. Plaintiff also does not allege a legally cognizable loss of consortium. A loss of consortium is damage to the marital relationship that is more than temporary or superficial. (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 932-933.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Ismail “experience[d] significant stress” and the couple “worried” about their finances after the termination of his employment. (Complaint at ¶ 73.) It otherwise alleges in conclusory terms that Plaintiff has lost Dr. Ismail’s physical and moral support and that the couple’s sense of love and companionship “took a significant toll.” (Ibid.) This does not sufficiently allege that Dr. Ismail was effectively incapacitated such that he could no longer provide love, affection, society, comfort, and sexual relations, or that the damage to the marital relationship is more than superficial and/or temporary. (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 400.) Leave to Amend. Leave to amend is proper where identified defects are amenable to cure. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) It is the pleading party’s burden to show the trial court that a reasonable possibility exists that amendment can cure identified defects in that party’s pleading. (Murphy v. Twitter, Inc. (2018) 60 Cal.App.5th 12, 42.) Plaintiff offers only a request for leave to amend that lacks any demonstration of potential merit in amendment. Motion for Protective Order. The motion for protective order is moot in light of the ruling on demurrer. Page 4 of 5 Conclusion. Defendants’ demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The motion for protective order is denied as moot.

On Asbestos Law and Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 16, 2024, in Department 301, Line 5. Plaintiff's Motion to Set a Preferential Trial Date Pursuant to C.C.P. Section 36(a) is DENIED without prejudice. Opposition filed. The Court does not find that Plaintiff's health is such that preference is necessary to avoid prejudicing her interest in the litigation. Specifically, the moving papers and counsel's declaration do not include a medical diagnosis and prognosis. Plaintiff may re-file their motion should circumstances change. The moving party shall lodge with the clerk in Department 301 by the time set for this hearing a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling. Any party wishing to contest the tentative ruling must email contestasbestostr@sftc.org by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing and state their intention to contest. If a hearing is requested, it will be on July 16, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. Attorneys may appear in person or remotely via zoom: Meeting ID 160 757 8308; Passcode: 485029. Face coverings are optional. The Court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law and Motion department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: Their name, CSR and telephone number, and their individual work email address. There will be only one official record. If the parties cannot agree, the Court will designate a qualified court reporter to provide the official transcript for the matter, and the party or parties will bear the cost. =(301/RCE)