Consumers Pipe & Supply Co. Vs. American Cooling Tower, Inc.

Case Number: 23CHCV00264 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/11/24 Case #23CHCV00264 MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS ADMITTED Motion filed on 4/4/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Rock Creek Capital, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Norma S. Carcamo NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order deeming the truth of matters specified in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions served on Defendant Norma S. Carcamo. RULING : The motion is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION & PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 1/30/23, Plaintiff Rock Creek Capital, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Norma S. Carcamo (Defendant) for breach of contract. On 4/4/23, Defendant, representing herself, filed an answer to the complaint. On 2/2/24, Plaintiff served Defendant, by U.S. Mail, with Requests for Admissions, Set 1. (Aguirre Decl., Ex.1). Defendant failed to serve responses. (Aguirre Decl.). Therefore, on 4/4/24, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion seeking an order deeming the truth of matters specified in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions served on Defendant. Defendant has not opposed or otherwise responded to the motion. ANALYSIS Due to Defendants failure to respond to the Requests for Admissions, Plaintiff is entitled to an order deeming the matters admitted. CCP 2033.280(b), (c). CONCLUSION The motion is granted.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 201700491367CUOR: Sherwood Valley HOA vs New Mission 07/09/2024 in Department 21 Motion to Quash Specially Appearing Non-Party Amy Levan's Notice of Motion and Motion to Quash Service of Motion to Amend Judgment to Add Judgment Debtor The morning calendar in courtroom 21 will normally begin between 8:30 and 8:45 a.m. Please arrive at the courtroom no later than 8:30 a.m. The door will be opened before the calendar is called. The Court allows appearances by CourtCall but is not equipped for Zoom. If appearing by CourtCall, call in no later than 8:15 a.m. If you intend to appear by CourtCall, you must make arrangements with CourtCall by 4:00 p.m. the day before your scheduled hearing. Requests for approval of a CourtCall appearance made on the morning of the hearing will not be granted. No exceptions will be made. With respect to the tentative ruling below, no notice of intent to appear is required. If you wish to submit on the tentative ruling you can fax notice to Judge Riley's secretary, Ms. Sedillos at 805-289-8705, stating that you submit on the tentative. You may also email the Court at: Courtroom21@ventura.courts.ca.gov with all counsel copied on the email. Do not call in lieu of sending a fax or email. If you submit on the tentative without appearing and the opposing party appears, the hearing will be conducted in your absence. If you are the moving party and do not communicate to the Court that you submit on the tentative or you do not appear at the hearing, the Court may deny your motion irrespective of the tentative. Unless stated otherwise at the hearing, if a formal order is not signed at the hearing, the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with the court. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized. Tentative Ruling GRANTS nonparty Amy LeVan’s motion to quash Plaintiff Sherwood Valley Homeowners Association’s service of its motion to amend judgment to add judgment debtors. Although the law regarding what type of service is required for Plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment is not entirely clear (compare Favila v. Pasquarella (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 934, 947, fn. 10, with Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 14, 58), the Court concludes that for the purposes of Plaintiff’s motion to amend the more “suitable process…most conformable to the spirit of [the Code of Civil Procedure]” (see Code of Civil Procedure §187) is that Plaintiff be required to serve LeVan with its moving papers in the same manner as required for service of summons. As a result, the Court finds Plaintiff’s service of its motion to amend the judgment by mail on LeVan insufficient and quashes such service. 201700491367CUOR: Sherwood Valley HOA vs New Mission Based on the above, the Court continues the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment, presently set for July 11, 2024, to August 15, 2024, to give Plaintiff sufficient time to effect service of its moving papers on LeVan in the manner required for service of process at least 16 court days prior to the August 15, 2024 hearing, and to file and serve proof of such service with the Court. The motion to amend the judgment is already fully briefed, and no additional briefing is authorized at this time. Analysis The Association’s motion to amend the judgment to add additional judgment debtors is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §187. Section 187 provides that: “When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” Because a motion to amend a judgment to add alter egos is not a “proceeding …specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute,” the Court may employ “any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” Stated differently, the procedural rules governing the Association’s motion to amend the judgment are not specified by statute, and therefore the Court must determine what procedural rules are appropriate (“most conformable to the spirit of this Code”) for such a proceeding. The Court notes that a motion to amend the judgment to add an alter ego as a judgment debtor is viewed by the courts as an equitable procedure pursuant to which the Court is not adding a new defendant, but merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant. (See Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 419.) However, LeVan persuasively argues that unless and until the Court adjudicates that LeVan is an alter ego of the judgment debtor, New Mission, LLC (“New Mission”), LeVan is legally a separate person from New Mission and therefore the Court needs to acquire jurisdiction over LeVan in an appropriate manner to rule on the merits of the alter ego allegations. There is appellate authority standing for the procedure that a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to §187 must be a noticed motion. (See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Weinberg (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [Stating that: “Code of Civil Procedure section 187 contemplates a noticed motion.”].) However, there appears to be a dearth of authority directly addressing the issue of how a nonparty alleged alter ego should be served with notice of such a motion and the moving papers. There is authority suggesting – without explicitly holding –that the Association’s moving papers in support of the motion should have been personally served on LeVan, because such service is in the spirit of the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure regarding initiating a lawsuit against 201700491367CUOR: Sherwood Valley HOA vs New Mission a party. For example, the 2nd District Court of Appeal stated the following with respect to service of a motion to amend a judgment on the person allegedly the alter ego of the judgment debtor: “As discussed, the Estate personally served the motion to amend on Pasquarella, at the time no longer a party in the Get Flipped litigation, and not her counsel of record in the Moofly Productions litigation—a procedure that was entirely proper, although perhaps not a model of professional courtesy. (Cf. §§ 415.10 [requiring personal service of papers initiating a lawsuit], 684.020, subd. (a) [requiring postjudgment papers be served on postjudgment debtor, not debtor's counsel, absent a request on file with the court].) (Pasquarella was also served as the registered agent for judgment debtor Moofly Productions.)” (Favila v. Pasquarella (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 934, 947, fn. 10.) There is 2nd District Court of Appeal authority suggesting that service of a motion to amend judgment is affected by the presence or lack thereof of evidence regarding alter ego status. “As Ms. Cainong necessarily concedes, the service at issue here is not the service of a summons and complaint, and she offers no authority for her contention that the motion to amend the judgment was ‘akin’ to service of a summons and complaint. In the absence of any such authority, we see no reason to treat Cooper's motion to amend the judgment as subject to different procedural requirements than any other motion. Particularly is this so given the court's findings in phase one of the trial that the evidence established Michaels used the three trusts as extensions of himself.” (emphasis added) (Reliant Life Shares, LLC v. Cooper (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 14, 58 [“Reliant”].) Here, unlike in Reliant, the Association fails to submit any evidence that this Court made any findings at or prior to trial that any of the third parties the Association seeks to add to the judgment “used [New Mission] as extensions of [themselves].” The very limited case law on the issue does not provide a clear answer as to what kind of service of the present motion to amend the judgment is required with respect to LeVan. The Court adopts the more conservative approach approved of in Favila v. Pasquarella, and requires the Association to serve LeVan personally with the moving papers, as this is more likely to avoid potential jurisdictional issues with any amended judgment against LeVan. The Court will require the Association to serve LeVan with its moving papers in the same manner as required for service of process. In her Reply Brief, LeVan argues that Court lacks the discretion to continue the hearing because it does not presently have jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties. The Court rejects LeVan’s argument because, inter alia, in her May 16, 2024 ex parte application LeVan previously requested an order continuing the hearing on the Association’s motion to amend the judgment, which request was granted in part, and therefore she will not be heard to argue that the Court lacks either the jurisdiction or power to continue the hearing. 201700491367CUOR: Sherwood Valley HOA vs New Mission The hearing on the Association’s motion to amend the judgment is presently set for July 11, 2024. The Court will continue the hearing on the motion for approximately five weeks to August 15, 2024, to give the Association sufficient time to effect service of its moving papers on LeVan in the manner required for service of process at least 16 court days prior to the August 15, 2024 hearing, and to file and serve proof of such service. The Court does not authorize any additional briefing on the motion for leave to amend, as the matter has already been fully briefed.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 2024CUEN023875: BENEFITS SYSTEMS INC vs GOLD COAST SECURITIES INC. 07/09/2024 in Department 21 Motion to Vacate Sister State Judgment or Alternatively, to Stay Enforcement of Judgment The morning calendar in courtroom 21 will normally begin between 8:30 and 8:45 a.m. Please arrive at the courtroom no later than 8:30 a.m. The door will be opened before the calendar is called. The Court allows appearances by CourtCall but is not equipped for Zoom. If appearing by CourtCall, call in no later than 8:15 a.m. If you intend to appear by CourtCall, you must make arrangements with CourtCall by 4:00 p.m. the day before your scheduled hearing. Requests for approval of a CourtCall appearance made on the morning of the hearing will not be granted. No exceptions will be made. With respect to the tentative ruling below, no notice of intent to appear is required. If you wish to submit on the tentative ruling you can fax notice to Judge Riley's secretary, Ms. Sedillos at 805-289-8705, stating that you submit on the tentative. You may also email the Court at: Courtroom21@ventura.courts.ca.gov with all counsel copied on the email. Do not call in lieu of sending a fax or email. If you submit on the tentative without appearing and the opposing party appears, the hearing will be conducted in your absence. If you are the moving party and do not communicate to the Court that you submit on the tentative or you do not appear at the hearing, the Court may deny your motion irrespective of the tentative. Unless stated otherwise at the hearing, if a formal order is not signed at the hearing, the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with the court. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized. Tentative Ruling The Court DENIES the request to vacate the Judgment because GCSI’s only argument in support of its request to vacate the Judgment is based on §473.5, and because §473.5 does not apply to a judgment entered on a sister-state judgment such as the Judgment entered by this Court on April 22, 2024. The Court also DENIES GCSI’s request for a stay of enforcement of the Judgment. Analysis Defendant’s Request for an Order Vacating the Judgment GCSI’s sole stated ground for vacating the Judgment is that GCSI lacked actual notice of the Texas action in time to defend, and therefore it entitled to relief from the Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §473.5. 2024CUEN023875: BENEFITS SYSTEMS INC vs GOLD COAST SECURITIES INC. However, it is well-established that the Court cannot grant relief from the Judgment pursuant to §473.5, because §473.5 is not applicable to a judgment entered on a sister-state judgment: “Judgment debtors contend the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the sister state judgment pursuant to section 473.5. We disagree because section 473.5 is inapplicable to a sister state judgment entered under the SSFMJA.1 ‘When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.’ (§ 473.5, subd. (a).) “Judgment debtors contend their motion to vacate judgment was timely under section 473.5, subdivision (a) because it was made within 180 days after entry of the sister state judgment. They contend the court should have vacated the sister state judgment under section 473.5, subdivision (a) because their failure to offer a defense in the Indiana action arose from the absence of service of process and their lack of actual notice. The fatal fallacy of their position lies in their failure to recognize that section 473.5 is not applicable to a judgment entered pursuant to the SSFMJA. “In Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 203 [106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854] the court explained, ‘Section 473.5 is addressed to motions to set aside a default or default judgment … . Section 473.5 is a procedural remedy by which a default or default judgment may be set aside …; and is inapplicable to a sister state judgment entered pursuant to the SSFMJA because it is not a default or default judgment.” (Conseco Marketing, LLC v. IFA & Ins. Services, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 831, 844.) Defendant’s Request for a Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment Code of Civil Procedure Section 1710.50(a) provides that: “(a) The court shall grant a stay of enforcement where: (1) An appeal from the sister state judgment is pending or may be taken in the state which originally rendered the judgment. Under this paragraph, enforcement shall be stayed until the proceedings on appeal have been concluded or the time for appeal has expired…[¶¶] (5) Any other circumstance exists where the interests of justice require a stay of enforcement.” 2024CUEN023875: BENEFITS SYSTEMS INC vs GOLD COAST SECURITIES INC. With respect to a stay of enforcement under §1710.50(a)(1), GCSI does not submit any evidence that an appeal is pending from the Texas judgment. Instead, GCSI’s Chief Executive Officer Tae Ho merely states in his declaration that he intends to file a “Bill for Review.” (See Ho Decl., ¶4.) However, GCSI fails to cite to any authority or submit any evidence indicating that it is still able to file a timely appeal of the Texas judgment. And under Texas law, a Bill for Review does not appear to constitute an appeal at all, but rather a separate equitable proceeding to challenge a judgment that may no longer be appealed. (See In re Tex. Real Estate Comm'n (Tex.Ct.App. 2018) 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 672, at *6-7.) Section 1710.50(a)(1) only provides for a stay of enforcement for appeals. Accordingly, GCSI fails to establish it is entitled to a stay of enforcement under §1710.50(a)(1). With respect to §1710.50(a)(5), GCSI contends that it would be in the “interests of justice” to stay enforcement of the Judgment “due to the lack of notice resulting in…the denial of due process by the default judgment….” GCSI’s argument regarding a denial of due process lacks merit, as “…[D]ue process of law does not require actual notice, only a method reasonably certain to accomplish that end. [Citation.] ‘Mullane makes it clear that due process of law does not require actual notice, but only a method reasonably certain to accomplish that end. [Citations.] “If the form of substituted service is reasonably calculated to give an interested party actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.”’ [Citation.] (Rasooly v. City of Oakley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 348, 357.) Here, there appear to have been reasonable attempts by the Texas Secretary of State to serve GCSI with a Citation , which is apparently the Texas equivalent of a summons, and the complaint in the Texas action. (See Decl. of Adraian Ciechanowicz, ¶¶4-8.) GCSI fails to make any argument – much less submit any evidence – that these efforts were constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, GCSI fails to show that it has been denied due process. It also is unclear what staying enforcement of the Judgment for an indefinite period would achieve, as GCSI fails to submit any evidence indicating that it may still timely appeal the Texas judgment and – in the absence of such evidence – fails to submit any evidence that it will be able to overturn the Texas judgment. In the absence of such evidence, a stay of enforcement of the Judgment would not be in the interests of justice.

S-CV-0052368 American Express National Bank vs. Conway, Scott No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/07/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Conway, Scott Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Conway, Scott

Case Number: 23STCV07247 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 SURENDRA BHAVNANI DBA LAXMI IMPEX, Plaintiff, v. GREENLEAF DIAMONDS, LLC, ANDRE SENGUL DBA GREENLEAF DIAMONDS, and DOES 1 through 20, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV07247 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant Andre Sengul dba Greenleaf Diamonds, LLCs Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff SURENDRA BHAVNANI DBA LAXMI IMPEX (Plaintiff) filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants GREENLEAF DIAMONDS, LLC (GDL) , ANDRE SENGUL DBA GREELEAF DIAMONDS (Sengul), and DOES 1 through 20 (collectively, Defendants). The FAC asserts the following causes of action against all Defendants: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Book Account 3. Goods Sold and Delivered On June 28, 2023, default was entered against Defendant Sengul. Subsequently, default judgment was entered against Defendant Sengul in the amount of $101,364.86 on October 20, 2023. Defendant Sengul now brings a Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment, which Plaintiff has not opposed. A proof of service is attached to the motion showing service on Plaintiffs counsel at the address on the Judgment entered 10/20/23. After review, the Court GRANTS the Motion because Defendant Sengul has shown he did not have actual notice of the action in time to defend on the merits. Background Allegations This action involves seven written contractual agreements between Plaintiff and Defendant Sengul for the sale of certain diamonds to Defendants in the amounts of $394.00, $30,294.00, $5,680.00, $17,769.00, $14,650.00, $3,300.00, and $285.00. (Compl., ¶9, Ex. 1.) Each agreement was to be paid in full within 120 days from the date of each memorandum. ( Id. ) Defendant Sengul failed to make any payments on the seven agreements resulting in a balance owed of $72,372.00. ( Id. at ¶10.) Plaintiff made a demand for payment on the balance due and Defendant Sengul has refused to pay it. ( Id. at ¶11.) Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment Legal Standard : When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i)¿two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii)¿180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5(a).)¿¿ ¿ A notice of motion to set aside a default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action shall designate as the time for making the motion a date prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005, and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that the partys lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5(b).) ¿ Upon a finding by the court that the motion was made within the period permitted by subdivision (a) and that his or her lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it may set aside the default or default judgment on whatever terms as may be just and allow the party to defend the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5(c).) Here, Defendant Sengul contends he has been living in Maui, Hawaii for the past ten years and working at his business Greenleaf Diamonds in Maui at the time the purported service of process was rendered. (Sengul Decl., ¶¶2-3, 7, Exs. 1-2.) Defendant Sengul further contends that the 4220 Mesa Drive, La Canada, Flintridge, CA property where the purported service of process was effectuated is his investment Airbnb property that was being rented out by third-party guests during the time service was rendered. ( Id. at ¶¶4-5, Exs. 3-4.) Moreover, Defendant Sengul asserts he became aware of this pending case in early March of this year, when he received a notice letter from his California bank that a deposition subpoena for his bank records had been issued by Plaintiffs counsel Timothy Krantz. ( Id. at ¶¶6, 13.) Defendant Sengul has provided photographic evidence that he was not physically present in California when the alleged personal service was effectuated. Defendant Sengul has also produced evidence that the property where service was effectuated was occupied by Airbnb guests at the time when service was rendered. Additionally, Defendant Sengul has submitted a proposed Answer with the instant motion. Lastly, Plaintiff has not opposed the present motion as to contest the arguments and evidence raised therein. Therefore, Defendant Sengul presents sufficient grounds for discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473.5. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Defendant Andre Sengul dba Greenleaf Diamonds, LLCs Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant Sengul is ordered to file his Answer within 20 days of this order.

Case Number: 23STCP04480 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 51 Tentative Ruling Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51 HEARING DATE: July 11, 2024 CASE NAME: Ace Funding Source LLC v. Azizi Imports Inc. d/b/a Azizi Imports, et al. CASE NO .: 23STCP04480 MOTION TO AMEND SISTER STATE JUDGMENT DUE TO CLERICAL ERROR UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 473(d) MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Ace Funding Source LLC RESPONDING PARTY(S): None as of July 8, 2024 REQUESTED RELIEF: 1. An Order amending the sister state judgment entered against Azizi Imports Inc. d/b/a Azizi Imports; Flyby Auto Transport LLC d/b/a Flyby Auto Transport; Oversight, LLC d/b/a Oversight; Flyby Auto Transport LLC; and Jonathan Azizi. TENTATIVE RULING: 1. Motion to Amend Sister-State Judgment due to Clerical Error is GRANTED. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff Ace Funding Source LLC (Plaintiff) filed an Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment (Application) against Defendants Azizi Imports Inc. d/b/a Azizi Imports; Flyby Auto Transport LLC d/b/a Flyby Auto Transport; Overight, LLC d/b/a Oversight; and Jonathan Azizi (Defendants). On December 12, 2023, the Clerk entered judgment. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed notice of motion to amend the Sister-State Judgment. On May 13, 2024, the court continued the hearing on Plaintiffs motion to amend. On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of points and authorities and a declaration in support of its motion to amend the Sister-State Judgment. LEGAL STANDARD: Courts have inherent powers to correct judgments by a nunc pro tunc order where there has been a clerical error by clerk or by the judge himself, or where some provision of, or omission from, order or judgment was due to inadvertence, or mistake of court. ( Lane v. Superior Court of Siskiyou County (1950) 98 Cal App 2d 165, 219; Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) This includes clerical errors when made by an attorney who drafts the judgment. ( See In re Marriage of Kaufman (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 147, 151.) However, while a trial court may correct clerical errors and misprisions in a judgment, it cannot amend a judgment once entered, if the error to be corrected is a judicial one, for instance if it embodies an intentional action of the court even though legally erroneous. ( Kamper v. Mark Hopkins, Inc. (1947) 78 Cal App 2d 885.) ANALYSIS : Plaintiff contends that Defendants Flyby Auto Transport LLC d/b/a Flyby Auto Transport, Oversight, LLC d/b/a Oversight, and Flyby Auto Transport LLC were not added to the courts docket due to a clerical error. Plaintiff further contends that these Defendants were listed in the Sister-State Judgment packet documents. Plaintiff seeks to have these Defendants added to the docket. Here, the court agrees there is a clerical error. The Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment entered on December 12, 2023 identify all Defendants. However, the courts docket only includes Defendants Azizi Imports Inc. d/b/a Azizi Imports and Jonathan Azizi. While Plaintiff does not seek revision of the documents themselves, Plaintiffs request is still proper because it is clearly a clerical error that the docket does not accurately reflect the entered Judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 183(3).) Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to amend. CONCLUSION: For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows: 1. Motion to Amend Sister-State Judgment due to Clerical Error is GRANTED. Moving party is to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 11, 2024 __________________________________ Upinder S. Kalra Judge of the Superior Court

23CV-01524 LVNV Funding, LLC v. Esther Canal Court Trial Appearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance.

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.