Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Vs Timothy A Weber, Lisa M Weber

24CV00800 BURDGE v. AIRSTREAM INC. AIRSTREAM’S MOTION TO STAY The motion to stay is denied. I. BACKGROUND Kathryn Burdge’s (“Burdge’) amended complaint, filed on March 26, 2024, alleges a violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act in relation to her purchase of a 2023 Airstream Atlas RV. She purchased the Airstream in Temecula, California and she resided in Page 6 of 9 Santa Cruz County at the time of the purchase. Burdge asserts various deficiencies/defects with the RV. In connection with the purchase of the Airstream, Burdge signed a Limited Warranty which stated, in part, the following: “LEGAL REMEDIES: EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR DECIDING LEGAL DISPUTES RELATING TO THE ALLEGED BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY NATURE RESTS IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE STATE OF MANUFACTURE, WHICH IS OHIO.” (Ex. B to Dec. of March.) This language is found on the second page of the Limited Warranty and is the second paragraph before the signature line for the purchaser. The sales contract is 6 pages long and signatures were required on each page and, on some pages, multiple signatures on each page. II. MOTION Airstream seeks to stay this action to allow Burdge to re-file the case in Ohio, the forum selection state. Airstream bases its motion on the above-referenced forum selection clause contained in the signed limited warranty. Airstream contends a motion to enforce a forum selection clause is a motion to stay (or dismiss) the action to allow a plaintiff to file in the proper court. Airstream argues the forum selection provision is mandatory and reasonable. Further, Airstream acknowledges Burdge cannot be compelled to waive her rights under Song-Beverly, and thus, it will stipulate to have the Ohio courts apply Song-Beverly in this case. Airstream contends a stay would allow for time to determine if the Ohio courts would apply Song-Beverly. If they will not, then Burdge could bring the case back to Santa Cruz. Burdge opposes the stay. She argues Airstream failed to provide evidence demonstrating she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause. Even though Burdge signed the limited warranty “she had to sign the document even if she did not understand the importance of the forum selection clause.” (Opp at pg. 3.) That is, Burdge was required to sign the acknowledgment of document and that does not prove she waived her rights under Song-Beverly freely and voluntarily. Burdge asserts Airstream failed to provide evidence that the designated forum will not diminish her rights afforded under California law. Specifically, she argues, even if the court finds she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause, Airstream cannot show that Ohio law will not diminish her substantive rights. Burdge contends Airstream’s offer to stipulate to have the Song-Beverly apply in Ohio is insufficient because the choice of law in the Limited Page 7 of 9 Warranty states that Ohio law will govern procedural issues and how the express warranty is construed and interpreted. III. DISCUSSION “Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489; see also Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-79; CCP § 128(a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.”].) "The procedure for enforcing a forum selection clause is a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens." (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1294.) “California law is ‘in accord with the modern trend which favors enforceability of such [mandatory] forum selection clauses. [Citations.] No satisfying reason of public policy has been suggested why enforcement should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered into freely and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's length. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 444-445.) “‘California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents in a way that violates our state's public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 141, 147.) “The party opposing enforcement of a forum selection clause ordinarily ‘bears the substantial burden of proving why it should not be enforced.’ [Citations.] That burden, however, is reversed when the claims at issue are based on unwaivable rights created by California statutes. In that situation, the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause bears the burden to show litigating the claims in the contractually designated forum ‘will not diminish in any way the substantive rights afforded … under California law.’ [Citations.]” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) In this case, while she did sign the limited warranty, the court agrees with Burdge that the warranty was not signed knowingly as to the forum selection clause and that application of the clause would be unreasonable and/or unfair. The clause is buried in the second to the last paragraph and is written in legalese such that a reasonable consumer could not be expected to understand they were acquiescing to file a lawsuit in Ohio. The exclusive jurisdiction section does not adequately inform the consumer that they would need to file suit in Ohio for warranty issues, especially given that Burdge lives in California and purchased the Airstream in Page 8 of 9 California. The court also notes the length of the sales contract and number of signatures required as factors which balance in Burdge’s favor. The court does not find Airstream has carried its burden in demonstrating that Burdge’s substantive rights will not be diminished in any way if the case is brought in Ohio. Despite the offer of Airstream’s counsel to stipulate to apply California law in Ohio, there is no guarantee the Ohio courts will agree to this arrangement; that is, what is the effect of the stipulation in the Ohio courts? Second, Airstream’s proposal would create two pending actions, which does not promote judicial economy. Third, having California courts apply California law simply makes more sense in terms of protecting Burdge’s rights under the Song-Beverly Act and for efficient case management. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 9 of 9

Case Number: 21STCV11734 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Case Name: Deborah K. Ogawa v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Case No.: 21STCV11734 Motion: Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Moving Party: Plaintiff Deborah K. Ogawa Responding Party: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $70,212. As to Plaintiffs costs, Plaintiff must file a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700. I. Background Plaintiff purchased a 2018 Honda Odyssey manufactured and distributed by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle contained or developed defects during the warranty period. Plaintiff alleges that shepresented the vehicle to Defendant for repairs and Defendant was unable to repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to provide her with restitution pursuant to Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on November 8, 2021. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Conditional Settlement on May 3, 2024. II. Legal Standard A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.¿¿(Civ. Code, § 1794,¿subd. (d).) The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. ( Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. ¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him]. ( Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc .¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)¿¿Therefore, if the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America¿ (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)¿¿ ¿¿ A court may reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, noncomplex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.¿¿( Morris v. Hyundai Motor America¿ (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)¿¿It is also appropriate to reduce an award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts. ( Id. ¿at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be reasonably specific and cannot rely on general notions of fairness. ( Kerkeles¿v. City of San Jose¿ (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88,¿102.)¿¿Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyers damages recovery. ( Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.¿ (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) III. Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff and Defendant request judicial notice of court opinions in other Song Beverly cases discussing counsels rates. The request for RJN is granted. IV. Evidentiary Objections Defendants Objections to Shahians Declaration are overruled. Defendants Objections to Castros Declaration are sustained. Plaintiffs Objections to Stuhlbergs Declaration are overruled. IV. Discussion Plaintiff moves for attorneys fees as prevailing party under Civil Code §1794(d) and the parties settlement agreement. Plaintiff obtained a settlement of $82,500 from Defendant after three years of litigation wherein Defendant agreed that Plaintiff would be prevailing party for purposes of a fee motion. (Castro Dec., ¶78, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff argues she is clearly the prevailing party under Civil Code §1794(d) and is entitled to a mandatory fee award in the amount of $129,110.59 based on (1) $84,751.50 in attorneys fees for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (SLP); (2) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement; (3) $11,196.06 in costs and expenses for SLP; and (4) an additional $3,500 for Plaintiffs counsel to review the Opposition, draft the Reply and attend the hearing on the Motion. Plaintiffs attorneys fees are based on 164.6 hours of attorney time. Plaintiffs counsel identifies no fewer than nineteen attorneys who worked on this case. The hourly rates of these attorneys ranged from $350 to $650. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees as prevailing party under Civil Code §1794(d). Defendant argues, however, that when the parties were negotiating settlement, Plaintiff represented that the attorneys fees would range from $40,000 to $50,000. Defendant argues Plaintiffs request for $129,110.59 in fees is excessive. Defendant argues Plaintiff is, at most, entitled to $21,000 for this cookie cutter litigation. Defendant objects to the hourly rate and number of attorneys assigned to the case as excessive. Defendant argues the hourly rate should be set at no more than $350/hr for all attorneys. Defendant objects to the number of hours as excessive given the cookie-cutter nature of Song Beverly litigation. Defendant attached as Exhibit A to the Opposition a table addressing each of the time entries submitted by Plaintiff. Defendant also objects to the costs requested and requests a reduction of $6,023. Number of hours excessive and improper time entries submitted Plaintiff counsel expended 164.6 hours on this litigation, which was pending for approximately three years and was litigated up to the eve of trial. Parties submitted motions in limine and engaged in a last minute mediation before Judge Stern. (Minute Order dated January 4, 2024.) · Improper redactions. Based on a review of Plaintiffs time entries, the entries on the following dates are so heavily redacted that the court cannot determine their reasonableness or the nature of the task performed: (1) 3/15/22, Avelino, .5 hours @ $595/hr for a total of $297.50; (2) 9/29/22, Mkrdech, 7.6 hours @ $350/hr for a total of $2,660; (3) 11/9/22, Carvalho, .7 hours @ $550/hr for a total of $385; (4) 11/10/22, Mkrdech, 1.4 @ $350/hr for a total of $490; (5) 6/28/23, Carvalho and .7 hours @ $570/hr for a total of $399. As such, the requested fee award is reduced by $4,231.50 for failure to provide sufficient detail regarding the work performed. (Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, pp. 1 and 2.) · Unreasonably excessive time entries. Counsel Deleon spent (1) 2.4 hours on 5/10/23 preparing for deposition of Defendants PMQ; (2) 3.4 hours on 5/11/23 preparing for deposition of Defendants PMQ; and (3) 7.8 hours on 5/12/23 preparing and taking the deposition of Defendants PMQ. The billable rate for the task was $575/hr. Counsels entry on 5/12/23 also improperly block billed multiple tasks. (Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, p. 2.) The amount billed for the PMQ deposition totaled $7,820. The amount of billable time for both preparation and taking the deposition is reduced from 13.6 hours @ $575/hr to 8 hours @ $575/hr for a total of $4600, a reduction of $3,220. Counsel Miller indicates that he spent 10 hours preparing for, travel to and attend continued FSC on January 5, 2024. (Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, p. 3.) The Jury Trial/FSC began at 9 a.m. and the settlement was put on the record. (Minute Order dated 1/8/24.) There is nothing indicating that preparation for and attendance at the FSC on 1/5/24 would have required 10 hours. The 1/5/24 entry by Miller for 10 hours @ $595/hr for a total of $5,950 is reduced to 5 hours @ $595/hr for a total $2,975, a reduction of $2,975. · Estimated time for reply prep and hearing attendance . Plaintiffs counsel estimates $3,500 for preparation of the reply and hearing attendance. Counsel does not provide an hourly rate for this estimate. However, using the maximum rate allowed as discussed below ($575/hr), the number of hours spent would be 6 hours @ $575/hr for a total of $3,500. Given the reply, including objections and additional evidence, six hours for opposition review, reply prep and hearing attendance is reasonable. In total, the requested fees are reduced by $10,426.50 due to excessive hours or improperly redacted time entries. This leaves a balance of $72,073.50. Hourly rates The hourly rates to be used in computing the lodestar must be within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work. ( Children's Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta ́ (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work). Particularly where it is difficult to obtain evidence of market based rates for the same type of work, the courts look at fees charged for cases requiring similar skills. ( The Utility Reform Network v. Public Utilities Com. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 522, 536537; Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir.2010) 608 F.3d 446, 454455 (all attorneys in the community engaged in equally complex Federal litigation, no matter the subject matter). In determining the reasonable rate and reasonable hours, the Court looks to that prevailing in the community for similar work. ( PLCM Group, Inc. , supra , 22 Cal.4th at 1095; Ketchum, supra , 24 Cal.4th at 1132 (the lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community). A reasonable trial court might determine that the similar workor comparable legal services related to insurance defense litigation, rather than to civil litigation in general. Were the court to so conclude, it could view the relevant market to be that of insurance defense litigation and litigators, rather than general civil litigation. The market rate for such services might be limited accordingly. Again, we emphasize that such determinations lie within the broad discretion of the trial court. ( Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702703.) The burden is on the fee applicant to produce evidence that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar work. ( ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1019.) Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate. ( Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) The trial court is not required to adopt counsels opinion as to the market rate for services of the type performed. ( Syers Properties III , supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at 702.) The trial court may accept the actual rate charged as the reasonable rate. ( Id. ) Plaintiffs counsel consisted of nineteen attorneys who performed work at hourly rates of $350, $385, $400, $450, $460, $475, $495, $550, $570, $575, $595, $610, $620 and $650. (Shahian Dec., Ex. 20, p. 5.) Counsel Shahian testifies as to his extensive experience in Song Beverly litigation, but he does not seek recovery for his time supervising this matter. ( Id. at ¶¶1-45, 86.) The experience and background of the remaining attorneys is set forth in Shahians declaration. ( Id. at ¶¶46-84.) Based on a review of the attorneys profiles and the market rate charged for similar services based on the courts own experience, the hourly rates charged above $575 are excessive. Those hours billed at $595, $610, $620 and $650 are recalculated at the hourly rate of $575. · Avelino. 7.8 hours @ $595 for a total of $4,641 reduced to $4,485, for total reduction of $156. · Carvalho. .9 hours @ $595 for a total of $535 reduced to $517, for total reduction of $18. · Lunn. 4.9 hours @ $620 and 9.8 @ $650 for a total of $9,408 reduced to $8,452.50, for a total reduction of $955.50. · McCallister and Miller. 34.5 hours @ $595 for a total of $20,527.50 reduced to $19,837.50, for a total reduction of $690. · Vaziri. 1.2 hours @ $610 for a total of $732 reduced to $690, for a total reduction of $42. The adjustment of hourly rates claimed by six of the nineteen attorneys will also address the overstaffing issue raised by Defendant. In total, the requested fee award is reduced by $1,861.50 for excessive hourly rates. Applying this further reduction to the balance of $72,073.50, the total remaining attorneys fees total $70,212. Multiplier Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. ( Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 351.) Perhaps the most common multiplier applied, at least where a plaintiff prevails, is a modifier for the contingent nature of the representation. ( Id. ) The court may not consider the contingent nature of the representation in both setting the lodestar and applying a modifier. ( Id .) Another factor considered by a court in applying a multiplier is the result obtained. The results obtained factor can properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where an exceptional effort produced an exceptional benefit. ( Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp . (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 582.) The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. ( Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.) Plaintiff fails to present any facts that would require a multiplier to compensate counsel for their services at fair market value. The lodestar presented by counsel, as adjusted by the Court, fixes the fee at fair market value. The cases did not involve any novel legal issues. There is no justification to apply a multiplier. Costs Plaintiff includes a request for an award of costs in the amount of $11,196.06. (Shahian, Dec., Ex. 20, pp. 4-5.) Defendant objects to the costs on grounds that no supporting documentation is provided, several entries associated with the demurrer provide no explanation as to the nature of the $896.95 in costs, the basis for $2,837.89 in deposition costs when the deposition only lasted a few hours and $4,614 in unnecessary reporter fees on 1/3/24, 1/8/24 and 1/10/24. Parties stipulated that Defendant would pay Plaintiffs reasonable fees and costs. (Castro Dec., Exs. 2 and 4, ¶2.) Parties also referenced a Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs and stipulated that Plaintiff would be prevailing party for purposes of such a motion. However, there is nothing explicitly stating that Plaintiff would not be required to file a memorandum of costs under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700. Based on the mandatory language of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, Plaintiff must comply with the procedure for recovery of costs under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, which requires submission of a verified memorandum of costs within 15 days of mailing of notice of entry of judgment. Submission of a memorandum of costs would organize the requested costs into categories under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. A memorandum of costs would also trigger Defendants right to tax those costs by noticed motion, with an opportunity to reply to any opposition. Plaintiffs request for fees by noticed motion is denied. Plaintiff must file a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700. Conclusion Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs is GRANTED as to the request for attorneys fees in the amount of $70,212. As to Plaintiffs costs, Plaintiff must file a memorandum of costs pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.

Case Number: 22STCV31468 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 j cellars investments, llc, d/b/a joseph cellars winery , et al.; Plaintiffs , vs. hdi global insurance company , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 22STCV31468 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to interrogatories MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC, d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant HDI Global Insurance Company Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion. DISCUSSION Plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC, d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery (Plaintiff) moves the court for an order (1) compelling defendant HDI Global Insurance Company (Defendant) to serve further responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, numbers 1, 7-12, 28-33, 38-44, 53-56, 62, 64-68, and 74-80, and (2) awarding monetary sanctions in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $14,420. The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 1, 7-8, and 10-11 because the objections to those interrogatories are without merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(3).) The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further response to Special Interrogatory number 9 because Defendant has not met its burden to establish that the information requested is protected from disclosure by Insurance Code section 791.13 since it appears that section 791.13 limits the disclosure of personal or privileged information about an individual, and this interrogatory does not ask for such information. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(3); Ins. Code, §§ 791.13 [An insurance institution, agent, or insurance-support organization shall not disclose any personal or privileged information about an individual ] [emphasis added], 791.02, subd. (i) [Individual means any natural person who is any of the following . . . .] [emphasis added].) The court denies Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 12, 42-43, 53-54, 62-63, 66, 73-75, and 78 because Defendants answers to those interrogatories are not evasive or incomplete. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(1).) The court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendants further responses to Special Interrogatories, numbers 28-33, 38-41, 44, 55-56, 64-65, 67-68, 76-77, and 79-80 because Defendants answers to those interrogatories are evasive and incomplete. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(1).) The court grants Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions against Defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).) The court finds that $8,470 ((12 hours x $700 hourly rate) + $70 motion filing fee) is a reasonable amount of sanctions to impose against Defendant in connection with this motion. (Rogari Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) The court denies Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).) ORDER The court grants in part plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winerys motion to compel further responses to interrogatories as follows. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, the court orders defendant HDI Global Insurance Company to serve further, full and complete answers to plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winerys Special Interrogatories, numbers 1, 7-11, 28-33, 38-41, 44, 55-56, 64-65, 67-68, 76-77, and 79-80, which comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.210-2030.250, within 20 days of the date of this order. The court orders defendant HDI Global Insurance Company to pay monetary sanctions to plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery in the amount of $8,470 within 30 days of the date of this order. The court orders plaintiff J Cellars Investments, LLC d/b/a Joseph Cellars Winery to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 17, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV19069 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 74 People of the State of California v. Ultimate Host, LLC et al. Defendants Counsels Motion to Be Relieved The court denies without prejudice Alton Moores motion filed May 6, 2024, to be relieved as counsel for 5554 Green Oak LLC because the motion does not comply with California Rule of Court 3.1362.

RG18905515: Smith LLP, a California Limited Liability Partnersh VS Patel 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other NOTICE OF MOTION BY JUDGMENT CREDITOR FOR AN ASSIGMENT ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES & DECLARATION OF MATT KEEPERMAN IN SUPPORT THEREOF; filed by The National Collection Agency Inc (Assignee) in Department 22 Tentative Ruling - 07/11/2024 Brad Seligman The Motion for Order Notice of Motion by Judgment Creditor for an Assignment Order filed by The National Collection Agency Inc on 07/03/2024 is Granted. Judgment creditor The National Collection Agency, Inc.’s (“National”) Unopposed Motion for Assignment Order is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.510, subd. (a).) On May 2, 2024, an Acknowledgment of Assignment of Judgment was filed assigning judgment from Plaintiff Smith LLP to National. (Register of Actions (“ROA”).) The current judgment entered against Defendant Mukesh “Mac” Patel (“Defendant”) is $134,891.25. On May 21, 2024, a wage garnishment was served on NextGen Flight Academy (“NextGen”) that is owned by Defendant. (Keeperman Decl. ¶ 2; Exh. A.) NextGen’s Return indicates that Defendant is NextGen’s owner and therefore not on payroll. (Ibid.) National’s unopposed motion for an assignment is therefore granted. The judgment owed by Defendant in the amount of $134,891.25 is hereby assigned to National. (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.510, subd. (a).) HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH eCOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK (dept22@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and all the other SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG18905515: Smith LLP, a California Limited Liability Partnersh VS Patel 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other NOTICE OF MOTION BY JUDGMENT CREDITOR FOR AN ASSIGMENT ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES & DECLARATION OF MATT KEEPERMAN IN SUPPORT THEREOF; filed by The National Collection Agency Inc (Assignee) in Department 22 parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. Notice via BOTH eCourt AND email is required. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no party contests the tentative ruling.

Case Number: 23SMCV02418 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLCs Motion to Compel Defendant Victor Lossis Compliance with the Courts Order, or Alternatively, for Terminating Sanctions, and Request for Sanctions Against Defendant for Failure to Comply with Court Order is DENIED. Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLC to give notice. REASONING Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLC (Plaintiff) moves the Court for an order compelling Defendant Victor Lossi (Lossi) to comply with the Courts order dated February 29, 2024, which granted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant Victor Lossis Verified and Objection-Free Responses to Its Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and ordered Lossi to serve responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, without objections, within 30 days of entry of the Courts order, and order Lossi and defense counsel to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,320 to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel within 30 days of entry of the Courts order. In alternative, Plaintiff seeks terminating sanctions against Lossi, striking his answer and entering default judgment against Lossi. Put simply, the Court cannot issue an order compelling a party to compel with a court order, as it has already done so in issuing the prior order in the first place. As to whether terminating sanctions are proper, if a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose sanctions including terminating, evidence, and monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery also constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The trial court has broad discretion in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for abuse. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes).) [T]wo facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Admrs, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, ellipsis omitted.) A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) While Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Courts prior order, the Court finds that terminating sanctions are not warranted at this juncture. Terminating sanctions are a drastic remedy that the Court is not prepared to impose, particularly where Plaintiff moved for terminating sanctions just over a week after responses were due pursuant to the Courts order. The California discovery statutes provide an incremental approach to discovery sanctions (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992), such that it would be improper for the Court to jump from an order entering an order compelling discovery responses to an order for terminating sanctions, as Plaintiff asks the Court to do, because this does not represent the incremental approach contemplated by California law. Put simply, less severe sanctions [may] produce compliance with the discovery rules, and until the Court has imposed incrementally harsher sanctions to curb Plaintiffs failure to provide discovery responses, the Court declines to impose the ultimate sanction of termination. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) The Court will also not impose additional monetary sanctions, as the Court has already awarded sanctions in the prior order, and it is not inclined to double its award based on the same discovery. Accordingly, Plaintiff Wilshire Quinn Income Fund Reit, LLCs Motion to Compel Defendant Victor Lossis Compliance with the Courts Order, or Alternatively, for Terminating Sanctions, and Request for Sanctions Against Defendant for Failure to Comply with Court Order is DENIED.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Friday, July 19, 2024, Line 1. PLAINTIFF NANCY RYTI's Motion To Strike Or Tax Defendant Solstice Constructions Costs. Plaintiff's motion to tax is granted and denied in part. (The Court's complete tentative ruling has been emailed to the parties.) Friday's Law & Motion Calendar will be called out of Dept. 301. Anyone intending to appear in person should report to Dept. 301. However, anyone intending to appear remotely should use the regular Zoom information for Dept. 302's Law & Motion Calendar for 9:30 a.m. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the defendant is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RCE)

MEMBERS 1ST VS. ESTATE OF SMITH, ET AL. Case Number: CVG21-0000494 This matter is on calendar for review of the case. The Court notes that the matter is on calendar on Monday, July 22, 2024 at 1:30 p.m. in Department 23 for hearing on a Motion to Approve Stipulation for Judgment Entered in Civil Case and Approval of Motion to Affix Attorney’s Fees as an Element of Costs in Civil Judgment. The July 22, 2024 hearing is confirmed. A future review hearing will be calendared on July 22, 2024. Today’s review hearing is dropped from calendar. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.