Zuluaga Vs Melendez

Case Number: 22STCV11951 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: B HEARING DATE : Tues., July 9, 2024 JUDGE /DEPT : Moskowitz/Dept. B CASE NAME : Byron Walker v. Sebastian Huesca, et al.

Case Number: 21STCV37420 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: B SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT FARIBA NOURIAN, Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO: 21STCV37420 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Dept. B 1:30 p.m. July 9, 2024 I. BACKGROUND On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff Fariba Nourian filed a complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, The Gary Michael Glushon and Kristan Ann Glushon Family Trust (the Trust), Gary Michael Glushon, Kristin Ann Glushon, and Gary Michael Glushon and Kristan Ann Glushon as Trustees of the Gary Michael Glushon and Kristin Ann Glushon Family Trust, alleging causes of action for negligence and premises liability, arising out of an alleged trip and fall on an uneven and/or raised and/or deteriorating sidewalk. On May 3, 2024, Defendant the Trust filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. No opposition has been filed. II. LEGAL STANDARD A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438 subd. (c)(1)(B).) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. ( Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) Such motion may be made on the same ground as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e ., that the pleading at issue fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim or defense. ( Ibid. ) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) When a court evaluates a complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable inferences from the facts pled. ( Duval v. Board of Tr. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 902, 906.) In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. ( Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged complaint or be based on facts which the court may judicially notice. (§ 438(d); Tiffany v. Sierra Sands Unified School Dist. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 218, 225.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings normally does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action. ( Ibid. ) In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action. ( Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.) III. DISCUSSION Defendant the Trust argues that the complaint does not state sufficient facts against Defendant as it is not a legal entity and cannot be sued. A trust estate is not a legal entity; it is simply a collection of assets and liabilities. As such, it has no capacity to sue, be sued or defend an action. Any litigation must be maintained by, or against, the executor, administrator or trustee of the estate. ( Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1344.) Here, the complaint names The Gary Michael Glushon and Kristan Ann Glushon Family Trust as a defendant. However, a trust is not a proper defendant. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted without leave to amend. IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend. The complaint against the Trust is DISMISSED. Defendant is ORDERED to give notice. DATED: July 9, 2024 _____________________ Karen Moskowitz Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 21STCV27240 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 76 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to make payments for construction work pursuant to a written agreement. Several cross-complaints for indemnity have been filed. Cross-Defendant Keough Electric Corporation moves to compel further responses to form and special interrogatories and requests for production of documents from Cross-Complainant Good Times Group, LLC, and requests sanctions. TENTATIVE RULING Per the Oppositions, on March 15, 2024, Good Times Group provided supplemental written discovery responses. The parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding these supplemental response and to file a joint supplemental separate statement. The hearing on the motion to compel is CONTINUED to August 30, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Joint supplemental separate statement to be filed by August 20, 2024.

COSSUTO VS. ESTATE OF MICHAEL GARRETT, ET AL Case Number: CVPO21-0196776 Tentative Ruling on Motion to Consolidate: Plaintiff Denise Cossuto moves to consolidate Case No. 196776 with Case No. 200449. Denise Cossuto is the Plaintiff in both matters and represented by the same counsel in both matters. Despite being properly noticed, none of the other parties in this action have filed an opposition. Motions to consolidate have certain pleading requirements that are described in CRC 3.350. Plaintiff has complied with the requirements set forth in CRC 3.350. (a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. CCP § 1048(a). The Court has discretion to order actions consolidated when they involve common questions of law or fact. CCP § 1048. Consolidation is appropriate where economy and convenience would be served by having the matters consolidated. The purpose of uniting separate lawsuits is to enhance trial court efficiency (i.e., to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures); and to avoid the substantial danger of inconsistent adjudications (i.e., different results because tried before different juries, or a judge and jury, etc.). See Todd- Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 976, 978-979. Consolidation is an extension of the liberal rules regarding joinder of parties and claims. The “common question” which justifies consolidation is usually one that would have justified joining the various parties in the same lawsuit at the outset. Where separate lawsuits have been filed, consolidation in effect permits a “joinder” at a later stage of the proceedings. See Petersen v. Bank of America (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 238, 252-253. Under the statute and the case law, there are two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. See Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1127. In these matters, Plaintiffs seek to consolidate the cases for all purposes, i.e., complete consolidation. The decision to either grant or deny a motion to consolidate is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511. In determining whether to order consolidation, courts generally consider the following: 1. Timeliness: Whether consolidation would delay the trial of any of the cases involved, or whether discovery in one or more of the cases has proceeded without all parties present; 2. Complexity: Whether joining the actions involved would make the trial too confusing or complex for a jury; and 3. Prejudice: Whether consolidation would adversely affect the rights of any party. See Weil & Brown et al., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: CIV. PRO. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2018), Ch. 12(I)-E. Consolidation is not proper if a party to the action is prejudiced by virtue of the consolidation. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 428, 431-432. The two matters at issue here involve the same parties and the same set of facts. Neither of these matters are currently set for trial. There is no allegation that one is further along in discovery than the other or that discovery has proceeded without all parties present. Regarding complexity or confusion to a jury, it does not appear that consolidation would result in confusion for the jury. There also does not appear to be prejudice to any Defendant. The Motion to consolidate is GRANTED. Case No. 200449 is consolidated into Case No. 196776 for all purposes. Al future filings will be in Case No. 196776. Plaintiff provided a proposed Order for Case No.196776 but did not provide a proposed Order for 200449. Plaintiff is to prepare the Order for Case No. 200449. The Court confirms the review hearing on Monday, July 22, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63. Plaintiff is to provide notice of the review hearing to all parties. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial.

Case Number: 21STCV23684 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: T Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal Moving Party: Plaintiff Hector Calderon Responding Party: Unopposed Tentative Ruling: Granted BACKGROUND On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff William Andrew Kennedy (Kennedy) filed a Complaint against Defendants Eduardo Martinez (Martinez) and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence; and (2) Negligence Per Se. This action arises from Plaintiff Kennedys vehicle being struck by Defendant Martinezs vehicle, which then caused Plaintiffs Kennedys vehicle to strike an additional vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) On October 12, 2021, Defendant Martinez filed an Answer to the Complaint. On October 20, 2021, Plaintiffs Hector Calderon and Miguel Calderon filed a Complaint against Defendant Martinez in Hector Calderon, et al. v. Eduardo Martinez, LASC Case No. 21STCV38689 (the Calderon Action). On June 1, 2023, the Court deemed the instant action and the Calderon Action as related, which the instant action being deemed the lead case. (06/01/23 Minute Order.) Both cases were assigned to the Honorable Jill Feeney in Department 30 at Spring Street Courthouse for all purposes. (06/01/23 Minute Order.) On June 14, 2023, pursuant to stipulation between the parties, the Court signed an order consolidating the instant action and the Calderon Action. (06/14/23 Order.) The instant action was deemed the lead case. (06/14/23 Order.) On June 22, 2023, a Request for Dismissal was filed in the Calderon Action as to Plaintiff Miguel Calderon and, on June 23, 2023, Plaintiff Miguel Calderon was dismissed from the Complaint in the Calderon Action with prejudice. On June 29, 2023, the Honorable Lynne M. Hobbs, sitting in Department 30 at Spring Street Courthouse, entered an order consolidating the instant action and the Calderon Action, with the instant action being deemed the lead case. (06/29/23 Minute Order.) On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff Kennedy filed a Request for Dismissal as to the entire action and all parties with prejudice. On April 3, 2024, the Court dismissed this action pursuant to the Request for Dismissal. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff Hector Calderon (Calderon) filed and served the instant unopposed Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal. The motion is unopposed. Any opposition to the motion was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. (CCP § 1005(b).) MOVING PARTY POSITION Plaintiff Calderon argues that the law and public policy strongly favor the resolution of matters on their merits, and that the dismissal was filed by separate co-counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy should not have been entered as to Plaintiff Calderon. No opposition was filed. ANALYSIS I. Legal Standard/Applicable Law It is well recognized that all courts have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory authority. (First State Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 324, 333.) The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Section 473 permits the trial court to relieve a party . . . from judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 232-33.) A motion seeking such relief lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial courts discretion will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 233) Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. (Ibid.) It is well settled that appellate courts have always been and are favorably disposed toward such action upon the part of the trial courts as will permit, rather than prevent, the adjudication of legal controversies upon their merits. (Benjamin v. Dalmo Mfg. Co. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 523, 525.) II. Setting Aside the Dismissal Here, counsel for Plaintiff Calderon, Christoper Mesaros (Mesaros), provides a declaration in support of the motion. According to counsel, on March 29, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy filed a request for dismissal with the Court. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) The request for dismissal was for the entire action, which included all parties and all causes of action. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy did not and does not represent Plaintiff Calderon. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy had no authority to dismiss the action on behalf of Plaintiff Calderon. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Mesaros states that he believes that counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy simply made a mistake by filing a dismissal on behalf of all [p]arties when the dismissal should only have been filed as to Plaintiff Kennedy. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Calderons case has not been resolved and he requests that the order of dismissal be set aside. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court finds that the dismissal should be set aside. Counsel for Plaintiff Calderon has attested to the fact that counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy mistakenly dismissed the entire action. Plaintiff Calderon has presented evidence that counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy had no authority to dismiss the action on behalf of Plaintiff Calderon. As such, the Court finds that the April 3, 2024 order of dismissal should be set aside. RULING Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Calderons Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal is GRANTED.

Case Number: 20STCV33913 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 9, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Choi, et al. v. Marchino CASE NO.: 20STCV33913 MOTION TO SEAL AND/OR REDACT RECORDS MOVING PARTY : Defendant Filippo Marchino RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiffs Ik Hoon Choi and Hannah Choi SERVICE: OK. Filed/served June 6, 2024. OPPOSITION: Unopposed; nine court days prior, via email. (CCP 1010.6(a)(3)(B) requires 2 additional court days for email; often disregarded by counsel w/ no objection from OP.) REPLY: Unopposed; five court days prior, via email. (Same CPCP 1010.6 error, no objection.) RELIEF REQUESTED Defendant Filippo Marchino moves to seal and/or redact pleadings, trial exhibits, and portions of trial transcripts containing any personal address formerly affiliated with Defendant. (Mot., 1:25-28.) BACKGROUND This is a dog bite case. Plaintiffs Ik Hoon Choi and Hannah Choi sued defendant Filippo Marchino on September 4, 2020, asserting a single cause of action for negligence. The case was tried to a jury; the jury returned a verdict on May 6, 2024, finding that Defendants dog did not bite plaintiff Ik Soon Choi as alleged. (05-06-2024 Minute Order, p. 2.) The Court entered judgment for Defendant against plaintiff Ik Soon Choi on June 7, 2024, and amended its judgment to include plaintiff Hannah Choi on June 21, 2024. On June 6, 2024, after the verdict but before judgment was entered, Defendant filed the instant motion to seal or redact references to his address that appear in the record. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs opposed Defendants motion, and on July 1, 2024, Defendant replied. TENTATIVE RULING The motion is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to the public.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).)¿In order to seal court records, a party must first obtain a court order via noticed motion. ( Id. , Rule 2.511(a), (b)(1).) In order to issue such an order, the court must find: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. ( Id. , Rule 2.550(d); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (Locke) (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.) DISCUSSION Defendant has not made the showing necessary for the Court to order records sealed or redacted. Defendant argues disclosure of his (former) personal address violates his right to privacy. The Court is not convinced it does; regardless, Defendants right to privacy does not, by itself, override the publics right of access to Court records. Defendant attests he has been followed, harassed, had websites put up about [him], stalked, and robbed, and [g]oons were sent to [his] house as a result of some of his work as a consumer rights litigator. (Marcino Decl., ¶ 2.) This brief conclusory testimony does not demonstrate a substantial probability that his safety will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed. Defendant has also not proposed specific, narrowly tailored redactions. He seeks an order sealing the entire trial transcript and multiple pages of twenty-five (25) other filings, as well as seven deposition records and audio recordings in their entirety. The proposal is not narrowly tailored, nor has Defendant demonstrated it is the least restrictive means of achieving his objective. Finally, perhaps most importantly: Defendant had the opportunity to seek a protective order or to move for an order sealing this information from public view at a prior time. [T]here is no justification for sealing records that contain only facts already known or available to the public. ( H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe ¿(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 898.) Defendants motion is denied. CONCLUSION Defendants motion is denied. Moving party to give notice. Dated: July 9, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR MANU VS JOE'S LOGISTICS, CVRI2400967 AUTO (OVER $35,000) OF MANU INC. PUPUATU MANU MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT ON MANU VS JOE'S LOGISTICS, CVRI2400967 COMPLAINT FOR AUTO (OVER INC. $35,000) OF MANU PUPUATU MANU Tentative Ruling: Hearing is continued to 9/25/24. CMC is reset to 9/25/24. Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. CCP § 430.41; see CCP § 430.41(a). The § 430.41 meet and confer must take place at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. CCP § 430.41(a)(2). If the parties cannot meet and confer by the deadline, the demurring party is granted an automatic 30-day extension of time to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving a declaration, on or before the date the responsive pleading is due, stating that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining why the parties could not meet and confer. CCP § 430.41(a)(2). Defendant states that she sent a letter to Plaintiff requesting to request a meet and confer regarding the deficiencies in the complaint. (Mesrobian Decl. ¶3). This is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of CCP § 430.41(a). Defendant is ordered to meet and confer with Plaintiff by telephone for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections raised in the demurrer. As part of the meet and confer process, Defendant shall identify with legal support the basis of the alleged deficiencies in the subject pleadings. Plaintiff shall provide legal support for his position that the pleadings are legally sufficient or, in the alternative, how they may be further amended to cure any legal insufficiencies. After meeting and conferring, Defendant shall, 7 days before the continued hearing date set forth above, do one of the following: (1) Vacate the hearing on the demurrer; (2) File with the Court a declaration stating the parties have agreed that Plaintiff will file an amended pleading before the date set forth above; or (3) File with the Court a declaration stating the means by which the parties met and conferred and identifying the specific objections in the demurrer, and supporting memorandum of points and authorities that the parties were unable to resolve. The Court will not accept further briefing.

S-CV-0052402 Tierney, Ainsley vs. Raddigan, Ryann Elizabeth et al No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/07/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Raddigan, Jared; Raddigan Ryann Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Raddigan, Jared; Raddigan Ryann Per Local Rule 20.1.7 D. If a party or attorney has a conflict with future hearing dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, or opposes the future dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, the party or attorney must appear at the Case Management Conference. That attorney or party must provide at least 7 days’ notice to all other parties in the case of their intent to appear at the Case Management Conference. [Effective 1/1/19] 07/15/2024 CMC in Dept. 6 at 3 PM Calendar Notes