Benjamin Smith, Et Al. Vs. April Williams

ECKELMAN, ET AL. VS. OLCO, INC Case Number: 23CV-0202690 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case and trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than January 22, 2025. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

GA&TV INC VS LEV RIC1905065 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INVESTMENTS LLC Tentative Ruling: Deny Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees. In their motion, Defendants seek to recover attorney fees based on the attorney fee provision in the Loan Restructuring Agreement (“Agreement”) between Lev and non-party Lake Elsinore Diamond Road. (See Lindemann Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B [“One of the defendants, had a loan document that provided for attorney’s fees pursuant to ¶ 4(k), p. 2.”] [emphasis added].) Paragraph 4(k) of the Agreement, however, provides that “[e]ach of the parties shall bear their own attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement.” (Id.) The Agreement also included an Unconditional Guaranty of Payment and Performance (“Guaranty”), which provides in relevant part: “In addition to the amounts guaranteed under this Guaranty, [RV] agree[s] to pay (i) all of [Lev’s] attorney’s fees and other costs and expenses which may be incurred by [Lev] in the enforcement of this Guaranty . . . .” (Id. [emphasis added].) Defendants do not rely on this provision for their motion for attorney fees. In any event, to the extent Defendants attempt to rely on this provision to recover attorney fees from RV, that attempt must fail. First, the Agreement proffered by Defendants as the basis for their attorney fees claim is unrelated to any of RV’s claims against Defendants in this action. (See FAC ¶¶ 1–22, 37–47, 54– 66.) All of RV’s claims against Defendants pertain to a foreclosure on property it owned in Coachella. More importantly, pursuant to the Guaranty, RV agreed to pay all of Lev’s attorney’s fees and other costs “which may be incurred by [Lev] in the enforcement of this Guaranty . . . .” Lindemann Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B [emphasis added[.) As RV argues, there is no “enforcement” of the Guaranty in this action. (See Civ. Code § 1717 [section 1717 allows recovery of attorney fees “which are incurred to enforce th[e] contract” that has the attorney fee provision].) Thus, Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement nor the Guaranty. RV further argues that the Agreement provided by Defendants was a proposed deal that never closed. (Burgee Decl. ¶ 4.) It argues that after RV transmitted its signed Guaranty to Defendants in advance of closing, the parties changed the deal and the loan restructuring contemplated by the Agreement was abandoned. (Id.) “Before section 1717 comes into play, it is necessary to determine whether the parties entered an agreement for the payment of attorney fees and, if so, the scope of the attorney fee agreement.” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 752 [emphasis added].) Because the Agreement relied on by Defendants never happened, it cannot be the basis for their claim for attorney fees against RV. Based on the above, Defendants have failed to show any contract that supports their claim for attorney fees in this action. Even if they are entitled to attorney fees under the Agreement/Guaranty, Defendants fail to provide support for the attorney fees sought. It is well settled that the party seeking fees has the burden of proving sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine that the fees sought were reasonably incurred. (Gorman Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) This includes demonstrating both the reasonableness of the time spent by counsel and the reasonableness of the hourly compensation sought for that time. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4thc 1122, 1131–32 [attorney fees must be “based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case’”].) Although the submission of time records is not necessarily required (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698–99), a fee request ““‘ordinarily should be documented in great detail.’”” (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324.) “‘The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.’” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486–87.) Here, Defendants submitted their counsel’s declaration, in which counsel stated that the firm incurred 542.2 hours of time at $550.00 in preparation for trial, appearances, filings, and research, for a total amount of $298,210.00. (Lindemann Decl. ¶ 8.) This evidence, however, is not sufficient to support an award of reasonable fees. Counsel provides no information about himself or other attorneys involved, making it impossible for the Court to determine whether the rate of $550.00 is in line with prevailing rates for similar attorneys in the area. Similarly, counsel provides no information about the nature of the work performed in connection with this case, other than stating that they were spent on trial preparation, appearances, filings, and research. The Court thus is without sufficient evidence on which to base a determination that the time spent (542.2 hours) was reasonable. Defendants also seek following fees incurred by other law firms in defending “related” cases and other proceedings: • $35,733.29 incurred by Greenberg & Bass, LLP • $41,772.50 incurred by Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Golubchik LLP (Id. at ¶¶ 6–7, Exs. C & D.) But as RV points out, fees sought by Greenberg & Bass, LLP in the amount $35,733.29 were incurred in another case (i.e., “v. Ruvin Feygenberg et al.). (Id. at ¶ 6, Ex. C.) Moreover, fees sought by Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Golubchik LLP in the amount of $41,772.50 were incurred in a bankruptcy proceeding. Defendants have failed to show that these fees were reasonably necessary to the instant action. (See Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816 [party seeking attorney fees has the “burden of showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount’”].) Thus, Defendants are not entitled to fees incurred in other proceedings. Defendants finally seek costs in the amount of $6,658.13. (Lindemann Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendants, however, have not filed a memorandum of costs, which is required by CRC Rule 3.1700. (See Neeble-Diamond v. Hotel California By the Sea, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“The established procedure for recovering the costs . . . is to file a cost of memorandum, supported by a verified statement of counsel.”] [emphasis added].) Thus, Defendants are not entitled to costs. Finally, Defendants seek attorney fees incurred during this litigation without allocation between GA&TV and RV. Thus, the evidence presented is insufficient to enable the Court to determine the amount of reasonable fees Defendants incurred in defending RV’s claims against them.

Case Number: 23STCV08814 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 55 NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS : Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees BACKGROUND Plaintiff Mojgan Yamini sued defendant Operation Bootstrap on April 20, 2023 for breach of written contract and specific performance. On May 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a proof of personal service on Defendant that same date. Defendant filed no answer. On June 13, 2023, the clerk entered Defendants default. On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff submitted his default prove-up materials. The request for entry of default judgment did not include a request for attorneys fees. On November 28, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs request for judgment and entered default judgment against Defendant. On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys fees. DISCUSSION A plaintiff who obtains default judgment cannot thereafter obtain fees by post-judgment motion. (See Garcia v. Politis (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479 [[A] party seeking entry of a default judgment must apply for all of the relief sought including attorney fees when application is made for entry of default..] (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff obtained default judgment. He did not request his fees at the time of default, and the Court cannot award them now, months after entry of default judgment. The motion is denied.

Case Number: 24NWCV00960 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Hernandez v. Lopez, et al., Case No. 24NWCV00960 This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendants Daniel Lopez and Nidelvia Yah move ex parte to vacate and set aside the default and default judgment entered against them on June 17, 2024, quash any writ, and stay the execution in the instant case. On April 11, 2024, Defendants demurred to the complaint. On May 31, 2024, Defendants answered. On June 4, 2024, the Court overruled Defendants demurrer. Because Defendants both demurred and answered, the motion for default is vacated and the ex parte motion is MOOT.

Re: Lina Gil v. Juan Ventura Superior Court Case No. 20CECG02627 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: by Defendant Juan Ventura for Orders Compelling Plaintiff Lina Gil to Provide Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Set One; Request for Production of Documents, Set One; Deeming Matters in Requests for Admissions Admitted, Set One; and Imposing Monetary Sanctions. Tentative Ruling: To grant defendant Juan Ventura’s motions to compel initial responses to form and special interrogatories, and request for production. Within 20 days of service of this order by the clerk, plaintiff Lina Gil shall serve objection-free responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Set One; and Request for Production, Set One. To grant defendant Juan Ventura’s motion to deem matters admitted unless plaintiff serves, before the hearing, proposed responses to the requests for admissions that is in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) To grant sanctions against plaintiff Lina Gill in the amount of $1,140.00, to be paid within 20 calendar days from the date of service of the minute order by the clerk. Explanation: Defendant served discovery requests on plaintiff via mail on April 11, 2024, consisting of (1) Form Interrogatories, Set One; (2) Special Interrogatories, Set One; (3) Request for Production of Documents, Set One, and (4) Request for Admissions. Responses were due within 35 days after service which was even extended seven business days by defense counsel. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.260, 2031.260, 2033.280, 1013 subd. (a).) Plaintiff did not provide responses to defendant and did not file opposition to these motions. Therefore, the motions are granted. Plaintiff’s failure to provide responses to defendant’s propounded discovery subjects her to sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The court may award sanctions in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even if no opposition to the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) Thus, defendant is entitled to monetary sanctions. However, the amount of sanctions sought by defendant’s counsel is excessive, as he seeks a total sanction amount of $3,240.00 for working on the motions filed, even though the four motions are fairly straightforward and virtually identical. The court will instead impose sanctions in the amount of $1,140.00, comprised of three hours of preparation on all four motions billed at an hourly rate of $300.00, also to include the $60.00 filing fees for each motion. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. VS. SELLS Case Number: 22CV-0200669 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal: An Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal (hereinafter “OSC”) issued May 31, 2024, to Plaintiff’s Counsel for failure to submit a proposed judgment as ordered on September 25, 2023. Counsel has submitted a response to the OSC Re: Dismissal, and a Request to Vacate an Order of Sanctions that was made by Judge Boeckman on May 28, 2024. The Court declines to vacate its May 31, 2024 Order imposing sanctions. That issue is not properly before the Court. That order was issued by another judge and Counsel failed to appear at the hearing on that matter. A proposed judgment was lodged with the Court on June 24, 2024. However, the Court notes that the proposed judgment identifies two street addresses for the subject property, each of which are different from the street address identified in the Request for Court Judgment by Default. The Court needs further clarification as to the correct address. The ‘correctness’ of the judgment is not at issue in the instant OSC. Only the failure to timely provide the Court with a proposed judgment is at issue in this hearing. Having reviewed counsel’s declaration, the Court finds good cause to vacate the instant OSCThe Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m. ****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings ******************************************************************************

Case Number: 23STCV28088 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 39 May 20 July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV28088 MOTION : Motion for Attorneys Fees MOVING PARTY: Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC OPPOSING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC MOTIONS Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC (Plaintiffs) dismissed their claims against Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC (Defendant). Now, Defendant seeks attorney fees . Plaintiff opposes the motion. ANALYSIS The parties disagree as to whether this case is a contract or tort action. In a contract action, [w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed . . . , there shall be no prevailing party . . . . (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2).) Plaintiffs complaint in this action is for unlawful detainer. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint on February 21, 2024. As such, Plaintiffs argue Defendant is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to attorney fees. However, Plaintiffs claims do not constitute an action on the contract. [T]he unlawful detainer statute encompasses breach of lease (arguably contract-type matters) and holdover possession after expiration of the lease (arguably a noncontract issue). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp . (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074.) In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims are based on Defendants holdover possession and are, therefore, noncontractual. Plaintiffs claim Defendant failed to surrender the premises after Plaintiffs served Defendant with a notice to quit. The 30-day notice to quit attached to the complaint does not identify any breach of the lease, rather it informs Defendant the month-to-month tenancy is terminated, and Defendant is required to quit and surrender possession of the premises. (See Complaint, filed November 13, 2023, Exhibit 2.) As such, Plaintiffs claims did not sound in contract. Thus, the prohibition on an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1777 for the voluntary dismissal of the complaint does not apply. The court determines Defendant is a prevailing party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1077.) The prevailing party must seek an award of attorney fees through the filing of a noticed motion and bears the burden of proof to justify the amount sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5)(A).) Defendant seeks an award of $50,000 in attorney fees. Defendant has not, however, advanced any billing records to support this amount. The court considers a request for attorney fees based on careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 626, fn. 6, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Without such evidence, the court cannot grant Defendants request for attorney fees. Defendant cites Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, which is not on point. In that case, the Court of Appeal stated, An attorney's testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. ( Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.) The court also noted the attorneys declaration in that case included detailed evidence of hours spent, tasks concluded, and billing rates. ( Ibid. ) In the instant case, Defendant does not present any evidence of the number of hours Defendants attorneys billed on the matter, the specific nature of the services they provided, or the specific tasks that were completed. Defendant advances a declaration of its attorney, Navi Signh Dhillon (Dhillon) who simply states, I reviewed the billing records for this matter and I am confident that the number of hours billed are commensurate with the tasks performed. (Declaration of Navi Singh Dhillon, ¶ 7.) Dhillon does not aver to the number of hours he and/or any other attorney worked on this case nor the specific tasks that were performed. Although Dhillon suggests he has discounted the number of hours worked by as much as a half of the hours expended in the case and is, therefore, seeking only $50,000 for 50 hours of work at $1,000 an hour, that is not a sufficient accounting. Moreover, he has not established a billing rate of $1000 an hour in an unlawful detainer action is a reasonable hourly rate that is in keeping with the industry standard in Los Angeles. Defendant fails to present evidence to support the requested fees. Accordingly, the motion for attorney fees is denied without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 12, 2024 line 3. PLAINTIFF TING LO MOTION / Notice Of Motion And Motion is denied as to the portions of the motion seeking monetary sanctions, a partition order and an order for fees and costs. No sanctions is awarded against defendant Vivian Yuk Yung Lo because plaintiff has not shown that Ms. Lo failed to comply with any applicable rules, which is required for sanctions per CRC 2.30. The portions of the motion seeking a partition order and an order for fees and costs are not available on a pre-trial motion absent the parties' stipulation. The statement in Ms. Lo's CMC statement that "All parties agree to sell the property" is insufficient to support any of the relief sought by this motion because it does not address the necessary terms and logistics of the sale, the disposition of the proceeds of the sale, or payment of fees and costs. The portion of the motion seeking a meet and confer is misguided because CRC 3.724 is intended to require meet and confer regarding case management issues before the initial case management conference. However, review of the parties filings shows that the parties appear to desire and clearly need the assistance of a person experienced in assisting parties reach a settlement and thus the Court treats the portion of the motion regarding meet and confer as a request for a mandatory settlement conference and grants that request. The parties are required to participate in a mandatory settlement conference before the Honorable Jeffrey Ross. To facilitate the scheduling of that conference, no later than July 15 counsel for each side must send an email to Judge Ross at jross@sftc.org stating the name and number of this case, who they represent, and their cell phone numbers. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.