Dominic Amaechi, Md , Et Al. Vs. Joseph Lin, Md , Et Al.

COSSUTO VS. ESTATE OF MICHAEL GARRETT, ET AL Case Number: CVPO21-0196776 Tentative Ruling on Motion to Consolidate: Plaintiff Denise Cossuto moves to consolidate Case No. 196776 with Case No. 200449. Denise Cossuto is the Plaintiff in both matters and represented by the same counsel in both matters. Despite being properly noticed, none of the other parties in this action have filed an opposition. Motions to consolidate have certain pleading requirements that are described in CRC 3.350. Plaintiff has complied with the requirements set forth in CRC 3.350. (a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. CCP § 1048(a). The Court has discretion to order actions consolidated when they involve common questions of law or fact. CCP § 1048. Consolidation is appropriate where economy and convenience would be served by having the matters consolidated. The purpose of uniting separate lawsuits is to enhance trial court efficiency (i.e., to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures); and to avoid the substantial danger of inconsistent adjudications (i.e., different results because tried before different juries, or a judge and jury, etc.). See Todd- Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 976, 978-979. Consolidation is an extension of the liberal rules regarding joinder of parties and claims. The “common question” which justifies consolidation is usually one that would have justified joining the various parties in the same lawsuit at the outset. Where separate lawsuits have been filed, consolidation in effect permits a “joinder” at a later stage of the proceedings. See Petersen v. Bank of America (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 238, 252-253. Under the statute and the case law, there are two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. See Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1127. In these matters, Plaintiffs seek to consolidate the cases for all purposes, i.e., complete consolidation. The decision to either grant or deny a motion to consolidate is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511. In determining whether to order consolidation, courts generally consider the following: 1. Timeliness: Whether consolidation would delay the trial of any of the cases involved, or whether discovery in one or more of the cases has proceeded without all parties present; 2. Complexity: Whether joining the actions involved would make the trial too confusing or complex for a jury; and 3. Prejudice: Whether consolidation would adversely affect the rights of any party. See Weil & Brown et al., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: CIV. PRO. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2018), Ch. 12(I)-E. Consolidation is not proper if a party to the action is prejudiced by virtue of the consolidation. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 428, 431-432. The two matters at issue here involve the same parties and the same set of facts. Neither of these matters are currently set for trial. There is no allegation that one is further along in discovery than the other or that discovery has proceeded without all parties present. Regarding complexity or confusion to a jury, it does not appear that consolidation would result in confusion for the jury. There also does not appear to be prejudice to any Defendant. The Motion to consolidate is GRANTED. Case No. 200449 is consolidated into Case No. 196776 for all purposes. Al future filings will be in Case No. 196776. Plaintiff provided a proposed Order for Case No.196776 but did not provide a proposed Order for 200449. Plaintiff is to prepare the Order for Case No. 200449. The Court confirms the review hearing on Monday, July 22, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63. Plaintiff is to provide notice of the review hearing to all parties. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial.

Case Number: 19STCV12193 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING GABRIEL GUZMAN, Plaintiff, v. GLORIA MORENO, Defendant. Case No: 19STCV12193 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Calendar Number: 11 Plaintiff Gabriel Guzman (Plaintiff) moves for terminating sanctions against Defendant Gloria Moreno (Defendant). Plaintiff additionally seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,110.00. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for terminating sanctions. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion for monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,110.00. This amount is in addition to previous sanctions. Defendant shall pay this amount to Plaintiffs counsel within 30 days of the issuance of this order. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to comply with the Courts August 15, 2023 order. Defendant shall provide responses to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories General (Set No. One) and pay the sanctions set forth in the August 15, 2023 order of $875.00 to Plaintiffs counsel within 30 days of the issuance of this order. If Defendant fails to do so, the Court will consider granting heightened sanctions against Defendant. Background Plaintiff filed this action on April 8, 2019. The operative complaint is now the First Amended Complaint (FAC), which raises claims for (1) civil assault; (2) civil battery; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); (4) negligent and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligence per se; (6) slander; and (7) slander per se. On August 15, 2023, the Court ordered Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories General (Set No. One) and to pay sanctions of $875.00 (the August 15 Order). Defendant has not provided the discovery responses as ordered or paid the sanctions. (Vartanian Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff filed this motion for terminating sanctions on May 28, 2024. Defendant did not file an opposition. Legal Standard Where a party misuses the discovery process, courts have discretion to impose terminating, issue, evidence, or monetary sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(g), 2030.290(c); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495.) Misuse of the discovery process includes failure to respond to an authorized method of discovery or disobeying a court order to provide discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010(d), (g).) Monetary sanctions may be imposed ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct&unless [the Court] finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code of Civ. Proc. , § 2030.030 , subd. (a).) Issue sanctions may be imposed ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. (Code of Civ. Proc. , § 2030.030 , subd. (b).) Evidence sanctions may be imposed by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence. (Code of Civ. Proc. , § 2030.030 , subd. (c).) I n more extreme cases, the Court may also impose terminating sanctions by striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings, staying further proceedings, dismissing the action, or any part of the action, or rending a judgment by default against the party misusing the discovery process. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(d).) The court should look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether terminating sanctions are appropriate. ( Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77¿Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.) Ultimate discovery sanctions are justified where there is a willful discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence showing that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules. ( Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.) [A] penalty as severe as dismissal or default is not authorized where noncompliance with discovery is caused by an inability to comply rather than willfulness or bad faith. ( Brown v. Sup. Ct. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 701, 707.) Further, preventing parties from presenting their cases on the merits is a drastic measure; terminating sanctions should only be ordered when there has been previous noncompliance with a rule or order, and it appears a less severe sanction would not be effective. ( Link v. Cater (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326.) Before any sanctions may be imposed the court must make an express finding that there has been a willful failure of the party to serve the required answers. ( Fairfield v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 113, 118.) Lack of diligence may be deemed willful where the party understood its obligation, had the ability to comply, and failed to comply. ( Deyo v. Killbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 787.) The party who failed to comply with discovery obligations has the burden of showing that the failure was not willful. ( Id . at 788.) Discussion Terminating Sanctions As discussed above, terminating sanctions are justified where there is a willful discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence showing that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules. ( Van Sickle v. Gilbert , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516.) Furthermore, terminating sanctions should only be ordered when there has been previous noncompliance with a rule or order, and it appears a less severe sanction would not be effective. ( Link v. Cater , supra , 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326.) [T]he trial court may impose terminating sanctions as a first measure in extreme cases, or where the record shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. ( Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 191192.) In Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell , the trial court found that [plaintiffs] willful, repeated and egregious misuses of the discovery process permeated nearly every single significant issue in this case to an extent that threatened the integrity of the judicial process and made it implausible that defendants could ever receive a fair trial. ( Id . at 197 [internal quotations omitted].) Defendant has failed to comply with a discovery order, and sanctions are therefore warranted. Here, however, there has been no previous noncompliance with a rule or order. This is not the kind of willful, repeated and egregious misuses of the discovery process permeat[ing] every single significant issue in this case to which terminating sanctions are intended to respond. ( Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at 197.) The Court therefore denies terminating sanctions. However, if Defendant continues to abuse the discovery process, the Court would consider heightened sanctions such as evidentiary, issue, or terminating sanctions, depending on the conduct in question. Monetary Sanctions Monetary sanctions are appropriate due to Defendants failure to comply with a discovery order. Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $350.00 for Varand Vartanian. The Court finds this rate to be reasonable based on Vartanians 14 years of experience. Plaintiff requests 3.0 hours of time for Vartanian. The Court finds this time expenditure to be reasonable. The Court awards $1,050. Plaintiff requests $60.00 for the filing fee for this motion. The Court finds this request reasonable. The Court awards a total of $1,110.00 in new sanctions.

Case Number: 24STCV01173 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING BRENDA OWEN, Plaintiff, v. 365 CALIFORNIA BLVD, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No: 24STCV01173 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Calendar Number: 13 Plaintiff Brenda Owen (Plaintiff) moves for an order setting this case for trial preference. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion. Background This is a landlord-tenant case. Plaintiff, Jeff Owen (Owen), and Lawrence OBrien (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action non January 17, 2024, raising claims for (1) harassment in violation of Pasadena Municipal Code, section 1806, subd. (g); (2) retaliation in violation of Pasadena Municipal Code, section 1806, subd. (h); (3) negligence; (4) negligent hiring and supervision; (5) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (6) tortious breach of implied warranty of habitability; (7) breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (8) elder abuse; (9) retaliation under Civil Code, section 1942.5; (10) willful interruption of services under Civil Code, section 789.3; (11) violation of Civil Code, section 1940.2; (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); and (13) unfair business practices. Owen and OBrien have resolved their claims and will be dismissing their claims, leaving Plaintiff Brenda Owen as the only remaining Plaintiff. Plaintiff moved for trial preference on May 31, 2024. No party filed an opposition. Legal Standard Actions can be set for trial preference under several circumstances. First, [a] party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings: (1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole. (2) The health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party's interest in the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (a).) Second, [a] civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. A civil action subject to subdivision (a) shall be given preference over a case subject to this subdivision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (b).) Third, [i]n its discretion, the court may also grant a motion for preference that is accompanied by clear and convincing medical documentation that concludes that one of the parties suffers from an illness or condition raising substantial medical doubt of survival of that party beyond six months, and that satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting the preference. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (d).) Fourth, [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may in its discretion grant a motion for preference that is supported by a showing that satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting this preference. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (e).) When a court grants a request for a preference, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from the date and there shall be no continuance beyond 120 days, barring specified circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc. § 36, subd. (f).) Discussion Plaintiff seeks a setting of preference under the first statutory ground. Plaintiff is over 70 years of age. (Owen Decl. ¶ 2.) As the remaining Plaintiff, she has a substantial interest in the case as a whole. Plaintiff alleges that she has been injured by Defendants alleged failure to maintain Plaintiffs unit at a property that is owned and managed by Defendants and by Defendants alleged ongoing harassment of Plaintiff. Plaintiffs health has declined significantly over the past year and a half. Plaintiff has experienced a sustained increase in her blood pressure as well as blood pressure spikes. (Owen Decl. ¶ 13; Reid Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16.) Plaintiffs consistently elevated blood pressure has led to Plaintiffs hospitalization in February 2023. (Owen Decl. ¶¶ 7, 13.) These health changes have been debilitating due to Plaintiffs age and have led to an overall decline in health. (Owen Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.) The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs health is such that a setting of trial preference is necessary in order to protect her interest in this litigation. Every Defendant has appeared and answered. Having found that the statutory requirements are met, the Court grants Plaintiffs request for a setting of trial preference.

Case Number: 23NWCV02507 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: C DEL CID v. FOOD 4 LESS OF CALIFORNIA, INC. CASE NO.: 23NWCV02507 HEARING: 07/11/24 #9 Plaintiff IDALIA ESPINOZA DEL CIDs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal under CCP §473(b) is DENIED without prejudice . Moving Party to give notice. No Opposition filed as of July 9, 2024. This premises liability action was filed by Plaintiff on August 7, 2023. On March 26, 2024, Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed without prejudice due to Plaintiffs Counsels failure to appear for a Case Management Conference and OSC Re: Dismissal of the Entire Action for Plaintiffs Failure to Appear on 02/27/2024. (See 03/26/24 M.O.) Plaintiff moves to set aside the dismissal under CCP §473(b). On June 13, 2024, this matter was CONTINUED due to Plaintiffs failure to attach a copy of a proposed pleading or amended complaint as required by CCP §473(b). Plaintiff was given leave to file an amended Motion. The Amended Motion filed on June 17, 2024 still does not have attached to it a proposed pleading or a copy of Plaintiffs proposed amended complaint. The Court notes that Exhibit B to the Motion does not state that it is a Proposed First Amended Complaint. The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted &. (emphasis added.) (CCP §473(b).) The Motion is DENIED without prejudice for failure to comply with the express terms of CCP §473(b). The Motion is DENIED without prejudice due to Plaintiffs failure to attach a copy of a pleading proposed to be filed therein as required by CCP §473(b). The terms of the code are mandatory; compliance is not optional.

Case Number: 23STLC01390 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 25 PROCEEDINGS : MOTION FOR AN ORDER SEEKING LEAVE OF THE COURT TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendant/Cross-Complainant Abbie L. Lill RESP. PARTY : None MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND (CCP § 473(a)) TENTATIVE RULING : Defendant/Cross-Complainant Abbie L. Lills request for leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint is CONTINUED TO ____ at _____ a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendant Lill must file and serve supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied. SERVICE : [ X ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK [ X ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK [ ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) NO (location) OPPOSITION : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None REPLY : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None ANALYSIS: I. Background On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed an action against Defendants Abbie L. Lill; Emily Salinas; Miguel Fuentes; Does I through V. Defendant Lill filed an Answer on June 7, 2023. Defendant Lill filed the instant Motion for an Order Seeking Leave of the Court to File a Cross-Complaint (the Motion) on June 14, 2024. No opposition has been filed. II. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group ( 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) III. Discussion Defendant Lill seeks leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint seeking equitable indemnity and declaratory relief against Emily Salinas and Miguel Fuentes. (Mot., p. 3.) The Motion, however, does not comply with all requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324. Specifically, Motion does not identify the pages and line numbers where allegations would be added, deleted, or modified. Defendant Lills counsels supporting declaration also does not state when he discovered the information, the effect, or why it is necessary. As a final note, the Motion fails to provide a courthouse address. Thus, the Notice is defective. Thus, the hearing will be CONTINUED so that Defendant Lill may correct these errors. IV. Conclusion & Order For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Lills request for leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint is CONTINUED TO ____ at _____ a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendant Lill must file and serve supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23SMCV05929 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Travelers Commercial Insurance Co. v. Luckenbacher, Case No. 23SMCV05929 Hearing date July 11, 2024 Travelers Motions for Orders Compelling Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatives, and Demand for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions In this uninsured motorist case, plaintiff moves to compel defendants responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and demand for production of documents and requests sanctions. No opposition, which would have been due nine court days prior to the hearing (Code Civ. Proc. §1005(b)) was filed. If a party to whom interrogatories or an inspection demand were directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses without objections. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(b), 2031.300(b). Moreover, failure to timely serve responses waives objections to the requests. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(a), 2031.300(a). Failure to verify a response is equivalent to no response at all. Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636. If a party unsuccessfully made or opposed such a motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(c), 2031.300(c). Sanctions may be awarded even though no opposition was filed or the requested discovery was provided after the motion was filed. CRC Rule 3.1348(a). Defendant failed to respond. See generally Volk decls. All objections to the requests are waived. Monetary sanctions are warranted. Plaintiffs counsel requests $841.65 for each motion, representing 4 hours of work (2 hours to draft and 2 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing) at counsels hourly rate of $195, plus filing fee of $61.65. The request for sanctions is granted in a reduced amount because the three motions are virtually identical and are unopposed. The court awards a total of 6 hours (5 hours to draft, 1 hour for hearing) at $195/hour, plus filing fees of $184.95 for three motions. GRANTED. Defendant to serve complete, verified responses, without objection, within 20 days of this order. The request for sanctions is GRANTED in the total amount of $1,365, plus $184.95 in filing fees, payable within 30 days.

Case Number: 22SMCV02350 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Woods Second Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Evidentiary Sanctions, and/or Issue Preclusion as Against Plaintiff is DENIED. Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Wood to give notice. REASONING Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Wood (Defendants) moves the Court for an order imposing terminating sanctions against Plaintiff Marcelino Arcos (Plaintiff) in the form of dismissing Plaintiffs case against Defendants for failing to provide code-compliant responses, without objections, and pay sanctions as ordered by the Court on August 8, 2023. If a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose sanctions including terminating, evidence, and monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery also constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The trial court has broad discretion in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for abuse. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes).) [T]wo facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Admrs, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, ellipsis omitted.) A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) While Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Courts prior order, the Court finds that terminating sanctions are not warranted at this juncture. Notably, the Court considered an almost identical motion by Defendants on January 3, 2024, and denied it on the ground that it would be improper to jump from an order entering an order compelling discovery responses to an order for terminating sanctions because this did not represent the incremental approach contemplated by California law. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [the California discovery statutes provide an incremental approach to discovery sanctions].) The Court further noted that Defendants provided no proof of meeting and conferring with Plaintiff or attempts to contact Plaintiff to obtain the subject responses, less severe sanctions [may] produce compliance with the discovery rules, and until the Court had imposed incrementally harsher sanctions to curb Plaintiffs failure to provide discovery responses, the Court declined to impose the ultimate sanction of termination. (See ibid.) As to an alternative remedy of evidentiary or issue sanctions, Defendants had provided no argument for the same, such that the Court had no basis to determine whether those requested remedies were proper. Defendants have renewed their motion here, but it is more of a motion for reconsideration given that little more has happened since the Court issued its order on January 3, 2024. Plaintiff failed to appear before the Court on three dates, on December 5, 2023, January 3, 2024, and on May 9, 2024, and Plaintiff has not yet provided the same discovery responses, but failure to appear at court hearings is not a basis for ordering terminating sanctions, and the Court previously stated that the failure to provide that discovery alone would not warrant terminating sanctions. Defendants again provide no argument as to the alternative remedies of evidentiary or issue sanctions. Accordingly, Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Woods Second Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Evidentiary Sanctions, and/or Issue Preclusion as Against Plaintiff is DENIED.

S-CV-0051766 Grek, Andrey et al vs. Slinkard, William Dean ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged NOTE: No party has paid advance jury fees pursuant to CCP § 631. Trial Date & Length: 11/17/25 3 day Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 11/07/25 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 10/31/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7.