Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb-Vs-11427 S Stewart Ave. Industries Llc,Johnny Hampton,Unknown Owners And Non-Record

Case Number: 21SMCV01459 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The matter is MOOT because an amended answer was filed on July 2, 2024. Had it not been moot, the court would likely have sustained the demurrer, at least in large part.

23CV033241: NIJJAR, et al. vs SODHI, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by Thornton Louis Davidson (Attorney) in Department 520 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Julia Spain The Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel filed by Thornton Louis Davidson on 06/27/2024 is Granted. Thornton Davidson and Thornton Davidson, P.C.’s (“Counsel”) Unopposed Motions to be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiffs Harsimran Singh, Ramandeep Sidhu, Nick Warraich, Gurkirat Singh Nijjar, Vikram Vohra and Vinay Vohra (“Plaintiffs”) is GRANTED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 284; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1133.) Here, Counsel’s declaration indicates that there has been a breakdown of attorney- client relationship. (Davidson Decl. ¶ 2.) A breakdown in the attorney-client relationship is sufficient grounds for allowing the attorney to withdraw. (Estate of Falco v. Decker (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1014.) Papers supporting Counsel’s motion satisfy all statutory requirements and demonstrate that Counsel served the following Plaintiffs each at their respective last-known addresses identified below: Garkirat Singh Nijjar: 699 Lewelling Blvd. # 164 San Leandro, CA 94579 Ramandeep Sidhu: 1935 Lovejoy Avenue Manteca, CA 95337 Nick Warraich: 235 Amberstone Lane San Ramon, CA 94582 Harsimran Singh: 2348 Clarendon Avenue Manteca, CA 95337 Vikram Vohra: 2297 E. Turnberry Avenue Fresno, CA 93730 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV033241: NIJJAR, et al. vs SODHI, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by Thornton Louis Davidson (Attorney) in Department 520 Vinay Vohra: 2297 E. Turnberry Avenue Fresno, CA 93730 (Davidson Decl. ¶ 3; Order ¶ 6; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) The Court will sign the proposed orders which will become effective once Counsel files and serves a Notice of Entry of Order and files a Proof of Service indicating that the Notice of Entry of Order was served on Plaintiffs. NOTICE: This tentative ruling will automatically become the court’s final order on Thursday July 18, 2024 unless, by no later than 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday July 17, 2024, a party to the action notifies BOTH: 1) the court by emailing Dept520@alameda.courts.ca.gov; AND 2) all opposing counsel or self- represented parties (by telephone or email) that the party is contesting this tentative ruling. The subject line (RE:) of the email must state: “Request for CONTESTED HEARING: [the case name], [number].” When a party emails to contest a tentative ruling, the party must identify the specific holding(s) within the ruling they wish to contest via oral argument. The court does not provide court reporters for hearings in civil departments. A party who wants a record of the proceedings must engage a private court reporter. (Local Rule 3.95.) Any privately retained court reporter must also participate via video conference. His/Her email must be provided to the court at the time the Notice of Contest is emailed. ALL CONTESTED LAW AND MOTION HEARINGS ARE CONDUCTED VIA REMOTE VIDEO unless an in person appearance is required by the court. Invitations to participate in the video proceeding will be sent by the court upon receipt of timely notice of contest. A party may give email notice he/she will appear in court in person for the hearing, however all other counsel/parties and the JUDGE MAY APPEAR REMOTELY.

Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on Complaint for Breach of Contract/Warranty SCHUTZER vs ENGSTROM CVPS2303027 (Over $25,000) of ELLIOT A SCHUTZER CONSTRUCTION, INC. by ELLIOT A SCHUTZER, AILEEN P SCHUTZER Tentative Ruling: Denied without prejudice. Defendants to provide notice pursuant to CCP § 1019.5. Plaintiffs Elliot A. Schutzer and Aileen P. Schutzer individually, and as trustees of the Schutzer Trust 2002 dated April 19, 2002 (“Plaintiffs”) are the owner a large residential property located in Rancho Mirage (“Subject Property”). On May 18, 2020, Plaintiffs entered into a written construction contract (“Contract”) with Defendant Engstrom Construction, Inc. (“ECI” or “Defendant”) for a major remodeling project for the Subject Property (“Project”). The Project was to be completed within 12 months and the expected budget was $2,500,000. Plaintiffs allege that ECI repeatedly increased the budget without prior approval and did not complete the Project on time. Plaintiffs assert that ECI submitted nine Applications for Payment without proper accounting or invoices. Plaintiffs allege that ECI paid subcontractors upfront for work that was not performed and ECI took commissions on these payments. According to Plaintiffs, when they demanded an accounting and sought legal advice, ECI’s president/CEO, Defendant Glen Hartley Engstrom (“Glen”) became hostile and threatened to walk off the job. In September 2022, ECI abandoned the Project, which was substantially uncompleted. On June 6, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against ECI and Glen. They assert six causes of action for: (1) Breach of Written Contract; (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Negligent Construction; (4) Financial Elder Abuse; (5) Restitution for Overpayment; and (6) Breach of Fiduciary Relationship. On July 31, 2023, ECI filed a cross-complaint against subcontractors for indemnity and breach of warranty. Several of the subcontractor cross-defendants also filed cross-complaints. Plaintiffs now move for leave to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”) to add a cause of action for unfair business practices under Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. based on newly discovered unsigned change orders and to clarify other portions of the Complaint. Plaintiffs argue that they did not discover the change orders earlier due to Defendants’ delay in producing the discovery. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants will not be prejudiced because the FAC is based on the same facts and does not seek to add new facts or parties. Plaintiffs argue that there is no statute of limitations issue because the new allegations are based on the same set of facts, and therefore relate back to the original Complaint. Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs delayed seeking leave to amend after the documents were produced. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs knew of the allegedly unapproved change orders prior to filing the original Complaint since the Complaint contains allegations of unapproved changes. Defendants argue that the FAC contradicts the original Complaint and is based on a different construction contract. Defendants argue that the new claims are time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations because the construction started in November 2019 and the claims based on the new contract do not relate back. Defendants argue that they will be prejudiced because they will have to conduct additional discovery. In their Reply, Plaintiffs argue that they knew that there were some unapproved changes at the time the Complaint was filed, but did not know the extent until the discovery of the change orders. Plaintiffs repeated the allegations relate back to the original Complaint and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the unsigned change orders were issued beginning in September 2021. Plaintiffs argue that the FAC does not contradict the Complaint, but merely clarifies the contract at issue. Leave to Amend “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §473(a); §576.).) “If discovery and investigation develop factual grounds justifying a timely amendment to a pleading, leave to amend must be liberally, granted.” (Mabie v. Hyatt (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 581, 596.) “The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.” (Howard v. County of San Diego (2010)184 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1428.) Where the proposed amendment would result in little or no prejudice to the opposing party, the “liberal rule of allowance prevails.” (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 558, 564.) However, leave to amend may be denied where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown.” (Magpali v. Farmers Group (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 471, 487; Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 486.) Unwarranted delay alone may be a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend. (Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal. App. 4th 732, 746.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(a)(3).) Additionally, the motion must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and, (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC, Rule 3.1324(b)(1)-(4).) Here, Plaintiffs seek leave to add a new cause of action for violations of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Bus. & Prof. § 17200 et seq. and Bus. & Prof. § 7159, which expressly prohibits unfair business practices in connection with residential construction projects. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated Section 7159 by failing to give Plaintiffs a signed copy of the construction contract before the work started, failing to provide change-orders before commencing work, requiring Plaintiffs to pay excessive deposits in advance of work, failing to provide a schedule of progress and requiring Plaintiffs to pay for work not yet completed and materials not yet delivered. (FAC, ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that the addition of the UCL cause of action is necessary and proper because the UCL provides for additional relief, including restitution of contractors’ fees. (Decl. of Edelstein, ¶ 5.) Counsel asserts that the basis for the new cause of action only became apparent after Defendants produced documents in response to discovery requests. (Id at ¶ 6.) The initial Declaration does not provide the date of this discovery. In their Opposition, Defendants argue without evidence that the discovery responses were provided on October 19, 2023. Thus, it is not clear when the change orders were discovered. Furthermore, counsel makes no effort to explain the effect, necessity or discovery of the other amended allegations, other than to assert that the amendments were merely clarification. It appears that the FAC is based on a different construction contract than the original Complaint. Unless the terms are identical apart from the removal of the arbitration clause, this is a substantive change. Plaintiffs do not explain the differences or the effects of the differences. Since Plaintiffs failed to comply with Rule 3.1324(b), the Motion must be denied. Denied without prejudice.

Case Number: 22CHCV00105 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/15/24 Case #22CHCV00105 DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Demurrer & Motion to Strike filed on 6/12/24. MOVING PARTY: Defendants David Rewers, Precise Die & Finishing, Inc. and Munna Monsour RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Douglas Rewers NOTICE: ok Demurrer is to the entire Second Amended Complaint: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Breach of Contract 3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 4. Fraud In the Inducement ( not included in the body of the SAC ) 5. Accounting ( numbered as the 4 th cause of action in the body of the SAC ) In the demurrer, Defendants also request sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel of record, Larry H. Clough, Law Office of Larry Haakon Clough, in the amount of $7,000 pursuant to CCP 128.5 and 128.7. RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE : An order striking the entire Second Amended Complaint. RULING : Due to the dismissal of the complaint as to Defendant Munna Monsour on 7/1/24, the demurrer and motion to strike are moot as to Defendant Munna Monsour. As to Defendants David Rewers and Precise Die & Finishing, Inc., the demurrer is overruled and the motion to strike is denied. Answer/s from David Rewers and Precise Die & Finishing, Inc. is/are due within 20 days. The request for sanctions is denied. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff Douglas Rewers (Plaintiff) alleges that, prior to 7/31/19, he, Defendant David Rewers (David) and non-party Tuan Nguyen were shareholders in Defendant Precise Die and Finishing, Inc. (PDF). (Second Amended Complaint (SAC) ¶9). Plaintiff alleges that on 7/31/19, David, PDF and Plaintiff entered a written contract whereby David and PDF agreed to purchase the ownership interest of Plaintiff in PDF for $140,000. ( Id . ¶11 and Ex.1 thereto). Plaintiff alleges that while he has performed under the contract defendants, meaning David and PDF, breached the contract. (SAC ¶¶10-12). Plaintiff specifically alleges that he is not making a claim for breach of contract against Monsour or Nguyen. (SAC ¶10). Plaintiff also alleges that PDF breached a separate contract to pay him commissions on certain work he procured for the company. (SAC ¶¶16-23). Plaintiff also makes claims for breach of fiduciary duty against David (SAC ¶¶29) and a claim for accounting against David and PDF. On 2/16/22, Plaintiff filed this action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Fraud in the Inducement, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty and (4) Accounting. On 11/29/23, this Court sustained Monsours demurrer to the complaint with 30 days leave to amend. On 1/2/24, Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract (against David and PDF), (2) Interference With Contract (against Monsour, David, PDF and Doe defendants), (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty (against David, Monsour, PDF and Doe defendants), (4) Fraud In the Inducement/Fraud and Misrepresentation (against David, Monsour, PDF and Doe defendants) and (5) Accounting (against David, Monsour, PDF and Doe defendants). After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues David, PDF and Monsour (collectively, Defendants) had with the First Amended Complaint, on 1/31/23, Defendants filed and served a demurrer to the entire First Amended Complaint and motion to strike the entire complaint and/or the allegations regarding and the prayer for punitive damages. On 4/8/24, this Court sustained the demurrer to the First Amended Complaint with 30 days leave to amend, denied the request to strike the entire First Amended Complaint and otherwise placed the motion to strike off calendar due to the ruling on the demurrer. ( See 4/8/24 Minute Order). On 5/9/24, Plaintiff filed the subject Second Amended Complaint, which was served on 5/8/24. The caption of the Second Amended Complaint lists the causes of action as: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Contract; (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (4) Fraud In the Inducement and (5) Accounting. However, the body of the Second Amended Complaint does not include a cause of action for Fraud In the Inducement and the 4 th cause action is actually for Accounting. After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues Defendants had with the Second Amended Complaint, on 6/12/24, Defendants filed and served the instant demurer to the entire Second Amended Complaint and motion to strike which seeks to strike the entire Second Amended Complaint. On 7/1/24, Plaintiff filed a request to dismiss Munna Monsour without prejudice from the complaint which was entered the same day. Also, on 7/1/24, Plaintiff filed and served oppositions to the demurrer and motion to strike. On 7/8/24, Defendants filed replies to the oppositions. ANALYSIS Procedural Defects (1) As noted above, on 4/8/24, this Court sustained Defendants demurrer to the First Amended Complaint with 30 days leave to amend which made the amended pleading due on or before 5/8/24 (excluding the first day, 4/8/24, and including the last, 5/8/24, 30 days from 4/8/24 is 5/8/24). ( See 4/8/24 Minute Order); CRC 1.10(a). Plaintiff did not file the Second Amended Complaint until 5/9/24. However, the Second Amended Complaint was served on 5/8/24. As such, the Court finds that the late filing of the Second Amended Complaint did not prejudice Defendants. Therefore, Defendants request to strike the Second Amended Complaint because it was filed beyond the deadline set forth in the Courts 4/8/24 Minute Order is denied. (2) Defendants failed to provide proper notice of the alternative request to strike allegations regarding punitive damages from the Second Amended Complaint. CRC 3.1322(a) provides: A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively. Here, the notice of the motion to strike does not quote any portion of the Second Amended Complaint Defendants seek to have stricken and does not even mention that, in the alternative to striking the entire Second Amended Complaint, Defendants seek to have portions of the Second Amended Complaint relating to punitive damages stricken. ( See Motion to Strike, p.1:26-p.2:15). (3) Defendants refer to a Request for Judicial Notice purportedly filed with the Demurrer; however, no Request for Judicial Notice filed by Defendants appears in eCourt. ( See Demurrer, p.8:20-24). Substantive Arguments Due to the dismissal of Monsour, the demurrer and motion to strike as to Monsour is moot. Defendants have demurred to each of the causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that they fail to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action and/or are uncertain. CCP 430.10(e), (f); ( See Notice of Demurrer, p.2:18-p.3:6; Demurrer Memorandum of Points & Authorities, p.3:11-15). 1 st cause of action Breach of Contract Contrary to Defendants assertion, the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges the necessary elements (contract, plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, breach by defendants, and resulting damages) to state a breach of contract claim against David and PDF based on the agreement attached to the Second Amended Complaint as Exhibit 1. The allegations are also sufficiently clear for Defendants to be able to respond to the claim. 2 nd cause of action Breach of Contract Plaintiff has also alleged sufficient facts to state a breach of contract cause of action against PDF for breach of an alleged agreement to pay commissions to Plaintiff. While the Second Amended Complaint does not allege whether the underlying contract was written, oral or implied by conduct, Defendants have not demurred to the cause of action on such ground. See CCP 430.10(g); (Demurrer, generally). Plaintiff has sufficiently set forth the terms of the alleged agreement, his performance, PDFs breach and damages Plaintiff suffered as a result of the breach. Additionally, the Court finds that the addition of this breach of contract claim falls within scope of the order granting Plaintiff leave to amend after the sustaining of the demurrer to the First Amended Complaint as the First Amended Complaint also included allegations regarding PDFs failure to pay commissions owed to Plaintiff. ( See FAC ¶¶3, 15, 18, 21, 26-29, 31-36); Harris (2010) 185 CA4th 1018, 1023. Defendants have also failed to establish as a matter of law that the claims/damages sought in the 2 nd cause of action were released by the agreement which forms the basis of the 1 st cause of action (i.e., that they did occur after the execution of that agreement). 3 rd cause of action Breach of Fiduciary Duty The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) damages. Shopoff & Cavallo LLP (2008) 167 CA4th 1489, 1509; Oasis West Realty, LLC (2011) 51 C4th 811, 820-821; Knutson (2018) 25 CA5th 1075, 1094. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the claim as against David. Plaintiff has alleged that he is making a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against David, as a majority shareholder in PDF, based on his alleged actions to oust Plaintiff from PDF, failure to pay the agreed upon buy-out price and failure to pay commissions earned by Plaintiff. ( See SAC ¶¶24, 29). 4 th cause of action - Accounting The elements of an accounting cause of action are: (1) a relationship between plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting and (2) that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. Teselle (2009) 173 CA4th 156, 179. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for accounting against David and PDF based on the relationship between the parties, the agreement which forms the basis of the 2 nd cause of action and Defendants failure to pay the amounts allegedly owed to Plaintiff under such agreement. Sanctions The Court does not find that Plaintiffs conduct in including Monsour as a defendant and failing to dismiss him until 7/1/24 constitutes sanctionable conduct under CCP 128.5 or CCP 128.7. See CCP 128.5(a), (b); CCP 128.7(b). Even if sanctions were warranted, Defendants failed to properly request the imposition of sanctions under CCP 128.5 or CCP 128.7 (i.e., a separate motion was not filed; the sanctionable conduct is not entirely clear (is it naming Monsour at all or failing to dismiss Monsour earlier); the safe-harbor period was not provided). See CCP 128.5(f)(1)(A), (B); CCP 128.7(c)(1). CONCLUSION The demurrer and motion to strike as to Munna Monsour is placed off calendar as moot due to the dismissal of Monsour from the complaint on 7/1/24. The request to strike the entire Second Amended Complaint because it was untimely filed is denied. The alternative request to strike allegations regarding punitive damages from the Second Complaint is also denied as it was not properly noticed. The demurrer is overruled. Answer/s from David Rewers and Precise Die & Finishing, Inc. are due within 20 days. The request for sanctions is denied.

S-CV-0051818 Navarro, Maria et al vs. Pinedo, Eugenio et al ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Eugenio, Pinedo; Socorro, PInedo

Case Number: 23PSCV00561 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: G Cross-Defendants Rajesh Thakkar and Nidhi Mittals Demurrer to Satish Mahajans First Amended Cross-Complaint Respondent: Cross-Complainants Humble Retailers, Inc. and Satish Mahajan Cross-Defendants Rajesh Thakkar and Nidhi Mittals Demurrer to Humble Retailers, Inc.s First Amended Cross-Complaint Respondent: Cross-Complainants Humble Retailers, Inc. and Satish Mahajan TENTATIVE RULING Cross-Defendants Rajesh Thakkar and Nidhi Mittals Demurrer to Satish Mahajans First Amended Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. Cross-Defendants Rajesh Thakkar and Nidhi Mittals Demurrer to Humble Retailers, Inc.s First Amended Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. BACKGROUND This is a contractual fraud action. In early 2022, Defendants Humble Retailers, Inc. (Humble Retailers), Satish Mahajan, Deepak Gosain, Narayan Singh, Mennu Mahajan, and Nikki Sachdeva sought to sell their liquor store in Azusa to Plaintiffs Rajesh Thakkar and Nidhi Mittal. After Defendants allegedly promised Thakkar and Mittal a turnkey business and failed to disclose the material risks, Thakkar and Mittal signed a business purchase contract on August 30, 2022, and agreed to purchase the liquor store for $375,000. They then made a $55,000 down payment prior to the opening of escrow. Subsequently, when Thakkar and Mittal inspected the liquor store, they found twenty-two different issues that they communicated to Defendants including a defective walk-in cooler, a defective air conditioning system, defective exhaust and ventilation systems, an inadequate electrical load, fire safety violations, food safety violations, dilapidated building conditions, obscured security cameras, and pest infestations. Thakkar and Mittal allege Defendants also failed to transfer the liquor stores ABC license, commercial lease, or business title. While Thakkar and Mittal did not take possession of the business, Defendants allegedly refused to return their down payments. On February 27, 2023, Thakkar and Mittal filed a complaint against Defendants and Does 1-20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) fraud in the inducement, (2) conversion, (3) intentional misrepresentation, (4) negligent misrepresentation, and (5) breach of contract. On July 19, 2023, the Court sustained a demurrer to the Complaint by Humble Retailers with leave to amend. The Court also struck a demurrer by Mennu Mahajan and overruled a demurrer by Satish Mahajan. On August 8, 2023, Thakkar and Mittal filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action. On November 28, 2023, the Court overruled demurrers by Mennu Mahajan, Satish Mahajan, and Humble Retailers. On December 18, 2023, Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajan filed a cross-complaint against Thakkar, Mittal, and Roes 1-25, alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) conversion, (3) specific performance, and (4) declaratory relief. On March 21, 2024, the Court sustained a demurrer to the Cross-Complaint by Thakkar and Mittal with leave to amend. On April 11, 2024, Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajan filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC) against the same cross-defendants alleging the same causes of action. On May 14, 2024, Thakkar and Mittal filed the present demurrers. On June 11, 2024, the Court continued a hearing on the demurrers for parties to further meet and confer. Subsequently, Thakkar and Mittals counsel attempted to telephonically meet and confer with Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajans counsel but was unable to do so. A hearing on the present demurrers and a case management conference is set for July 17, 2024. ANALYSIS Thakkar and Mittal demur to Satish Mahajans second cause of action for conversion and the entire FACC as to Humble Retailers. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS their demurrers in their entirety with leave to amend. Legal Standard A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 ( Hahn ).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. ( Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn , supra , at p. 747.) Breach of Contract (First Cause of Action) Thakkar and Mittal argue Humble Retailers first cause of action for breach of contract fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court agrees. Legal Standard To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. ( Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) If a breach of contract claim is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)¿[T]he vital elements of a cause of action based on contract are mutual assent (usually accomplished through the medium of an offer and acceptance) and consideration. ( Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transportation Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 268, 275.) Discussion In previously sustaining Thakkar and Mittals demurrer to this cause of action, the court found the FACC failed to allege any facts establishing Humble Retailers was a party to the purchase agreement at issue. (3/21/2024 Ruling, p. 2-3.) In demurring to the FACC, Thakkar and Mittal argue the same defects exist. (Humble Demurrer, p. 8:25-9:5.) The FACC attempts to cure this deficiency by adding Humble Retailers name to the list of sellers alleged in the FACC. (FACC, ¶ 7.) But this allegation is insufficient as it contradicts the purchase agreement which only lists Satish Mahajan and Gosain as sellers. (FACC, Ex.1; see Barnett v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [[T]o the extent the factual allegations conflict with the content of the exhibits to the complaint, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleaders allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.].) Because the FACCs conclusory allegation that Humble Retailers was a party the agreement lacks any supporting facts and is contradicted by the purchase agreement, the FACC still fails to establish Humble Retailers standing to sue for breach of a purchase agreement it was not a party to. Accordingly, Thakkar and Mittals demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Conversion (Second Cause of Action) Thakkar and Mittal contend Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajans second cause of action for conversion fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim. The court agrees. Legal Standard Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. ( Burlesci v. Petersen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066.) Conversion is an intentional tort. ( Multani v. Knight (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 837, 853.) Because the act [of conversion] must be knowingly done, neither negligence, active or passive, nor a breach of contract, even though it result in injury to, or loss of, specific property, constitutes a conversion. ( Taylor v. Forte Hotels International (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1119, 1124.) [C]ases recognizing claims for the conversion of money typically involve those who have misappropriated, commingled, or misapplied specific funds held for the benefit of others. ( Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1152, quoting PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 396.) Discussion In previously sustaining Thakkar and Mittals demurrer to this cause of action, the court found Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajan failed to allege how they had a property interest in the Azusa markets profits while Thakkar and Mittal were in possession of the market. (3/21/2024 Ruling, p. 3.) In demurring to the FACC, Thakkar and Mittal contend the same defects exist. (Mahajan Demurrer, p. 8:11-22; Humble Demurrer, p. 10:26-11:6.) The FACC adds the allegation that Thakkar and Mittal assumed control of the market before the close of escrow for ten days and were not the rightful owners because escrow had not closed. (FACC, ¶ 20.) But even so, the FACC fails to establish how Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajan are entitled to Thakkar and Mittals profits. The FACC does not allege Thakkar and Mittal operated the Azusa market without Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajans permission. Nor does it allege facts establishing how Humble Retailers and Satish Mahajan were legally entitled to the profits of the Azusa market before the close of escrow. Instead, the purchase agreement establishes Satish Mahajan was entitled to the costs of inventory at the time of closing and not the additional profits from the sale of such inventory. (FACC, ¶ 8, Ex. 1.) Accordingly, Thakkar and Mittals demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Specific Performance (Third Cause of Action) Thakkar and Mittal maintain Humble Retailers third cause of action for specific performance fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because the FACC fails to adequately allege a cause of action for breach of contract. Thus, for the same reasons noted above with regards to the first cause of action, Thakkar and Mittals demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Declaratory Relief (Fourth Cause of Action) Thakkar and Mittal argue Humble Retailers fourth cause of action for declaratory relief fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim because the FACC fails to establish the existence of an actual controversy. The court agrees. Legal Standard To qualify for declaratory relief, a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the partys rights or obligations. ( Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) The courts do not issue advisory opinions about the rights and duties of the parties under particular agreements, if no actual, justiciable controversy has yet developed. ( Otay Land Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 556, 563.) Discussion In this case, the FACC alleges there is an actual controversy arising between Satish Mahajan, Humble Retailers, Thakkar, and Mittal regarding their obligations pursuant to the purchase agreement for the Azusa market. (FACC, ¶ 28-29.) But, there does not appear to be any actual controversy with regard to Humble Retailers as they have failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract or conversion. Accordingly, Thakkar and Mittals demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Thakkar and Mittals demurrers to FACC are SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.

Case Number: 19SMCV00535 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 EDWIN SOLORZANO, an individual and in the right of and for the benefit of WHOLESALE DIRECT METALS, a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. WHOLESALE DIRECT METALS, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 19SMCV00535 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT EDWIN SOLORZANOS MOTION TO USE A SETTLED STATEMENT BACKGROUND This case arises from a dispute among shareholders of a closely held corporation called Wholesale Direct Metals (WDM). Damon Geller (Mr. Geller) formed WDM. Defendant Niloofar Maashfegh Geller (Mrs. Geller) is Damons wife. WDM sells precious metals in coins and bullion form to the public. It advertises its offerings primarily on the Internet. WDMs orders are typically paid for with wire transfers, checks, or other form of payment by the customers, after which WDM either dropships metals from a distributor directly to the customer or takes possession of gold and silver from customers at the office. In March 2018, Plaintiff Edwin Solorzano invested $100,000 in exchange for 125 shares of WDM, becoming a minority shareholder. Plaintiff became a director of WDM and the President. Plaintiff continues to hold these positions today. Plaintiff (and other WDM shareholders) had a history of disputes with Mr. Geller about his alleged mismanagement of WDM, including the setting and payment of Mr. Gellers compensation. On April 24, 2018, Plaintiff and WDM entered into a Redemption Agreement whereby: (1) Mr. Geller sold all of his shares back to WDM, (2) Mr. Geller paid WDM $170,000 to resolve the disputes regarding his management of WDM and in exchange for the releases granted to him by WDM, and (3) Plaintiff and WDM broadly and fully released Mr. Geller, Mrs. Geller, and their heirs, beneficiaries, and assigns (the Geller Releasors) from any and all claims, whether or not concealed or hidden, from the beginning of time through April 2018. The Redemption Agreement included a waiver under Code Civ. Proc. § 1542. Less than a year after the Redemption Agreement was signed, in March 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Mrs. Geller and others, alleging they embezzled at least $9.65 million. Plaintiff alleges they did so by buying metals for non-existent customers, billing the cost of those metals to the company as promotional, and then physically stealing the metal. Plaintiff also alleges the theft included the payment of unauthorized salaries, unauthorized sham loans, payment of personal expenses with company funds, and other payments to defendants for no ascertainable reason. Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff sought and received a writ of possession, allowing him to enter Mrs. Gellers home and seize gold from her safe. Plaintiff seized 60 one-ounce Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins. The Court ultimately granted a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Redemption Agreement. On September 14, 2023, the Court confirmed the arbitrators Final Award in favor of Adam Gruen, Amanda Gruen, and Mrs. Geller on all claims made against them by Plaintiff and WDM. On October 6, 2023, Mrs. Geller filed a Motion for an Order for Release and Redelivery of Seized Property, for Damages and Interest, and for Attorneys Fees and Costs (the Release Motion). Mrs. Geller argued she was entitled to a release and redelivery and for damages sustained as a result of the seizure because Plaintiff did not recover a judgment against her. Mrs. Geller also sought to recover attorneys fees and costs associated with this motion and her prior motion to quash the writ of possession pursuant to the attorneys fees provision in the Redemption Agreement and Cal. Civ. Code § 1717. Plaintiff filed an opposition to that motion on October 23, 2023, and Mrs. Geller filed a reply on October 27, 2023. On November 3, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Release Motion. The same day, on November 3, 2023, Plaintiff appealed the Courts order on the Release Motion. On December 14, 2023, the Court entered judgment based on the final arbitration award. On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff appealed the judgment. On May 20, 2024, the clerk filed a Notice to Appellant of Proceedings Not Reported or Recorded, notifying the parties that Plaintiffs choice of oral record (i.e., a court reporters transcript) of the hearing on the Release Motion on November 3, 2023, was not available because the Minute Order from that hearing stated that a court reporter was not present at the hearing or trial. Therefore, the Civil Appeals Unit will not notify any court reporter(s) to prepare transcripts for that hearing. On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Appellants Motion to Use a Settled Statement only for the Release Motion hearing on November 3, 2023. On June 14, 2024, the Court issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order Re: Minute Order dated 03/05/2020. On March 5, 2020, the Court entered a minute order stating that no Certified Shorthand Reporter (CSR) was present. The nunc pro tunc order corrected that minute order by striking CSR: None and adding (among other things) CSR: Marie L. Strickland, CSR #4645. However, the Court has not issued any nunc pro tunc order changing its statement that there was no CSR at the Release Motion hearing on November 3, 2023. On July 2, 2024, Mrs. Geller filed her opposition to the motion to use a settled statement for the Release Motion hearing. On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed his reply. MOTION TO USE SETTLED STATEMENT Except as otherwise provided in the California Rules of Court, the record on an appeal in a civil case must contain a record of written documents (rule 8.120(a)) and a record of the oral proceedings (rule 8.120(b)). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120.) If an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings in the form of one of the following: (1) A reporters transcript under rule 8.130; (2) An agreed statement under rule 8.134; or (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.120(b); 8.137(a) [A settled statement is a summary of the superior court proceedings approved by the superior court].) If any portion of the designated proceedings cannot be transcribed, the superior court clerk must so notify the designating party in writing; the notice must show the date it was sent. The party may then substitute an agreed or settled statement for that portion of the designated proceedings by complying with either (A) or (B): (A) Within 10 days after the notice is sent, the party may file in superior court, under rule 8.134, an agreed statement or a stipulation that the parties are attempting to agree on a statement. If the party files a stipulation, within 30 days thereafter the party must file the agreed statement, move to use a settled statement under rule 8.137, or proceed without such a statement; or (B) Within 10 days after the notice is sent, the party may move in superior court to use a settled statement . If the court grants the motion, the statement must be served, filed, and settled as rule 8.137 provides, but the order granting the motion must fix the times for doing so. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.130(h)(1) [emphasis added].) Here, Plaintiff moves to use a settled statement for the Release Motion hearing on November 3, 2023. In opposition, Mrs. Geller argues the motion is procedurally defective because Plaintiff did not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.137. According to Mrs. Geller, that rule required Plaintiff to, among other things, elect in his notice his intent to use a settled statement as the superior courts proceedings. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1) [An appellant may elect in his or her notice designating the record on appeal under rule 8.121 to use a settled statement as the record of the oral proceedings in the superior court without filing a motion under (2) if: ¶ (A) The designated oral proceedings in the superior court were not reported by a court reporter; or ¶ (B) The appellant has an order waiving his or her court fees and costs].) Mrs. Geller further argues that even if Plaintiff had elected to use a settled statement at the time, they were required to serve and file a proposed statement within 30 days of filing the Notices (i.e. by March 28, 2024). (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.137(c)(1) [If the respondent does not file a notice under (b)(4)(A) electing to provide a reporters transcript in lieu of proceeding with a settled statement, the appellant must serve and file a proposed statement in superior court within 30 days after filing its notice under (b)(1) or within 30 days after the superior court clerk sends, or a party serves, an order granting a motion under (b)(2)].) Mrs. Geller is technically correct to suggest that to the extent Plaintiff knew there was no court reporter at the hearing on the Release Motion on November 3, 2023, Plaintiff was required to elect in his notice of appeal his intent to use a settled statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1). Plaintiff did not. Instead, he requested a court reporters transcript of the hearing even though the Courts minute order for that hearing stated: CSR: None. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff argues in their reply, California Rules of Court, rule 8.130(h)(1) (see above) states that (1) if a superior court clerk notifies a party that a portion of a proceeding cannot be transcribed, (2) the clerk must notify the designating party in writing, and (3) within 10 days after that notice is sent, the designating party may move the trial court for an order to use a settled statement. Here, the clerk notified the parties on May 20, 2024, that the hearing on the Release Motion (which took place on November 3, 2023) could not be transcribed because a court reporter was not present at the hearing. Within 10 days of that notice, on May 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to use a settled statement for the Release Motion hearing. Therefore, the motion is timely and proper under rule 8.130(h)(1). Accordingly, the Court finds it proper to grant the motion pursuant to rule 8.130(h)(1). If the court grants the motion, the statement must be served, filed, and settled as rule 8.137 provides, but the order granting the motion must fix the times for doing so. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.130(h)(1)(B).) Accordingly, the Court shall set a time frame for filing the proposed statement and other related documents pursuant to rule 8.137. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Use a Settled Statement. Plaintiff / Appellant Edwin Solorzano shall file a proposed statement within 30 days of this ruling. The contents of the proposed statement must adhere to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(d). Defendant/Respondent Niloofar Maashfegh Geller shall file her response to the proposed statement within 20 days after service of the proposed statement in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(e). All subsequent procedures shall follow California Rules of Court, rule 8.137. DATED: July 18, 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24STCV04536 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 24STCV04536 MOTION Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint MOVING PARTIES Defendant Crystal Bergstrom OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiffs Robert Lindholm and Carolyn Lindholm BACKGROUND Defendant Crystal Bergstrom (Defendant) moves to quash service of summons. Plaintiffs Robert Lindholm and Carolyn Lindholm (Lindholm) (collectively, Plaintiffs) oppose the motion. ANALYSIS A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. ( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439.) Plaintiffs filed a proof of service of summons, which reflects Plaintiffs served Defendant by personal service on March 1, 2024 at 8:05 a.m., at 47 Marseille in Laguna Niguel. (See Proof of Service of Summons, filed May 17, 2024.) However, the proof of service does not indicate the person who made the service was a California registered process server. Therefore, the presumption, pursuant to Evidence Code section 647, service was effectuated does not apply in this instance. Defendant provides her own declaration. She states no one served her, and there is no record of a process server entering her gated community on March 1, 2024. (See Declaration of Crystal Bergstrom.) As such, especially given the presumption of service under Evidence Code section 647 has not attached, Plaintiffs have the burden to prove Plaintiffs properly served Defendant. ( Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) In opposition, Plaintiffs have submitted Lindbloms declaration. Lindblom, who is an attorney representing Plaintiffs in this action, declares the attorney service informed her it could enter the gated community in which Defendant resides by following a resident through the gate. (See Declaration of Carolyn Lindholm.) If offered for the truth of the matter asserted, this is hearsay, and inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Further, this testimony is irrelevant to the issue of whether the process server, on Plaintiffs behalf, did in fact serve Defendant on March 1, 2015. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating Defendant had been served. Accordingly, the motion to quash is granted. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.