Familias Addams Por Un Mejor Futuro Vs. City Of Fresno

Re: TD Bank, N.A. v. Singh Superior Court Case No. 21CECG01521 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 503) Motion: by plaintiff for Judgment on the Pleadings Tentative Ruling: To continue the motion to Thursday, August 15, 2024, at 3:30 p.m., in Department 503, in order to allow the parties to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference, as required. If this resolves the issues, plaintiff’s counsel shall call the court to take the motions off calendar. If it does not resolve the issues, plaintiff’s counsel shall file a declaration, on or before Thursday, August 8, 2024, at 5:00 p.m., stating the efforts made. Explanation: Plaintiff did not satisfy the requirement to meet and confer prior to filing the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Code of Civil Procedure section 439 makes it very clear that meet and confer must be conducted in person, by telephone, or by video conference prior to filing the motion. While the parties may utilize written correspondence to help supplement the meet and confer process, the moving party is not excused from the requirement to do so in person, by telephone, or by video conference, unless it shows that the defendant failed to respond to the meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(3)(B).) The evidence did not show a bad faith refusal to meet and confer on defendant’s part that would excuse plaintiff from complying with the statute. The parties must engage in good faith meet and confer, in person, by telephone, or by video conference, as set forth in the statute. The court’s normal practice in such instances is to take the motion off calendar, subject to being re-calendared once the parties have met and conferred. However, given the extreme congestion in the court’s calendar currently, the court will instead continue the hearing to allow the parties to meet and confer, and only if efforts are unsuccessful will it rule on the merits. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: jyh on 7/8/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: Mary Manning v. Valerie Snow Superior Court Case No. 23CECG01038 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: by Plaintiff for Reconsideration Tentative Ruling: To deny. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) Explanation: Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, the losing party may bring a motion to reconsider, and a different order may be entered, if, subject to the following conditions, the motion is: (1) brought before the same judge that made the order; (2) made within 10 days after service upon the party of notice of the entry of the order; (3) based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law; and (4) made and decided before entry of judgment. Code of Civil Procedure section1008 is jurisdictional. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1499.) A party requesting the court reconsider its prior orders must provide new evidence and a satisfactory explanation for why the evidence was not previously presented. (Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.) The burden has been compared to “that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.” (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) Here, plaintiff has not addressed any of these requirements in her motion for reconsideration. As such, the motion to reconsider is denied. It appears that counsel has filed this motion in an effort to gain insight into court procedures regarding plaintiff’s application for default judgment. Plaintiff’s application for default judgment was denied on March 18, 2024, for the following reasons: 1) failure to correctly identify the defendant(s) in Judicial Council Form CIV-100 item 1(d); 2) failure to address plaintiff’s claim that she is a putative spouse; 3) whether financial contributions were gifts as opposed to consideration; 4) failure to sufficiently address the validity of an oral contract alleged to have manifested over the course of several months; and 5) failure to sufficiently plead a constructive trust where plaintiff does not seek recovery of property. Upon review of the documents presented in this motion to reconsider, plaintiff has still failed to address the following: 1) failure to correctly identify the defendant(s) in Judicial Council Form CIV-100 item 1(d); 2) failure to address plaintiff’s claim that she is a putative spouse; 3) failure to sufficiently address the validity of an oral contract alleged to have manifested over the course of several months; and 4) failure to sufficiently plead a constructive trust where plaintiff does not seek recovery of property. The denial of plaintiff’s request for default judgment was without prejudice. Nothing prevents plaintiff from submitting a new default judgment package addressing all of the court’s concerns. Additionally, nothing prevents plaintiff from filing an amended complaint in order to sufficiently plead causes of action relating to the oral contract and/or constructive trust. The court would note that an overwhelming number of requests for default judgment have created a backlog for this court in processing default judgments. It is not this court’s policy to ensure any pending request for default judgment is processed prior to any scheduled Case Management Conference. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: Clark v. Prichard, Sr., et al. Superior Court Case No. 21CECG03472 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 503) Motion: Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion for summary judgment on behalf of all defendants. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Within five days of service of the order defendants shall submit to this court a proposed judgment consistent with this summary judgment ruling. Explanation: The First Amended Complaint alleges that on or about November 6, 2020, Plaintiff, a minor, was a guest at the home of defendants Jason Mengior Pritchard Sr., Jason M. Pritchard II (“Jason II”), David Garrett and Desiree Garrett. Defendants allegedly gave alcoholic beverages to plaintiff and provided more alcohol after plaintiff was obviously intoxicated. Plaintiff left the location, apparently on foot, and was struck by a car. The parties are all in agreement that plaintiff’s negligence claim relies on applicability of the exception of Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (d), to the social host immunity set forth in section 1714.1 Plaintiff must plead and prove as to each defendant that: (1) defendant is a parent, guardian, or another adult; (2) defendant knowingly furnished alcoholic beverages; (3) at defendant’s residence; (4) to a person defendant knew or should have known was under 21 years of age; and (5) defendant’s furnishing of alcoholic beverages to the minor was a proximate cause of injury to the underage person. (See, Civ. Code § 1714, subd. (d)(1).) A moving defendant “has two means by which to shift the burden of proof under subdivision (o)(2) of section 437c to the plaintiff to produce evidence creating a triable issue of fact. The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses by the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the cause of action sued upon. Alternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true technique of negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1592, 1598, citations omitted.) Defendants take both approaches. The court need not address the arguments relating to plaintiff’s allegedly factually devoid discovery responses, as the end result would be that “the burden of production [is] shifted to [plaintiff] once defendants move for summary judgment and properly present plaintiff[’s] factually devoid discovery responses.” (Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 106–107.) 1Defendants show, and plaintiff does not dispute, that Business and Professions Code section 25658 does not create any civil liability in social hosts who provide alcohol to those under 21. (Bass v. Pratt (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 129, 134.) Defendants already succeed in shifting the burden of production to plaintiff through their declarations. The motion is supported by a declaration from each defendant, negating one or more required elements of the social host immunity. According to the declarations, (a) none of them provided alcohol to plaintiff, (b) Jason Sr., David, and Desiree were not present at the subject property on November 5-6, 2020, and (d) the subject property was not the residence of the one defendant on the property at the time of the party, Jason II. The declarations alone, to which there is no objection, are sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff. Plaintiff presents evidence that he was under the age of 21 on November 6, 2020. (See Estrada Decl.) In the opposition filed after being granted a continence to conduct discovery, plaintiff submits no evidence supporting liability of any defendant except Jason II. However, plaintiff fails to show the existence of a triable issue of material facts as to one element. Jason II states that on the dates in question, the Subject Premises, E. Dakota Avenue, was not his residence. He also states that he did not furnish plaintiff with alcohol on those dates. Evidence submitted with the opposition shows that Jason II lived at 6 E. Dakota Avenue address. (Exhibit Z, Jason Pritchard II Depo., 13:13-16.) Plaintiff’s UMF mischaracterizes this evidence as Jason II testifying that he “purposefully opened up his residence to provide a location for minors to consume alcoholic beverages.” The testimony cited says nothing of minors or the ages of the “friends”, or even that plaintiff was one of the friends Jason Pritchard II invited. In any case, it is unclear why Jason II would state in his declaration that the Subject Premises was not his residence, as he stated in a verified discovery response that it was. (See Plaintiff’s Exh. P.) There is clearly a triable issue on this element. But plaintiff also has the burden of proving that each defendant knowingly “furnished” alcoholic beverages to plaintiff. (See Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (d)(1).) Jason II negates this element by stating in his declaration, “On November 5th and 6th, 2020, I never furnished, provided, sold, or gave alcohol at the Subject Premises to Plaintiff ISAAC AARON CLARK.” (Jason II Decl., ¶ 6.) While Jason II testified that he had friends over on that occasion so they could drink, plaintiff does not produce evidence that Jason II personally “furnished” alcoholic beverages to plaintiff. Jason II stated in response to plaintiff’s discovery that plaintiff and his friends brought and drank their own alcohol (Exh. Y, p. 7). Plaintiff submits no evidence to the contrary. Defendants can meet their burden of showing a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action “cannot be established.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Inasmuch as Jason II submits evidence negating the “furnishes” element, and plaintiff offers no contradictory evidence, the motion should be granted as to all defendants, including Jason II. There is no need to consider the additional evidence submitted by defendants with the reply, as the opposition fails to raise a triable issue of material fact as to this element. It is unnecessary to rule on plaintiff’s objections to defendants’ evidence, as the court does not rely on any of the evidence to which plaintiff objects. The court sustains the objection to paragraph 13 of the Meislin Declaration. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: jyh on 7/8/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: Ruben Perez v. Adrian Perez Superior Court Case No. 23CECG01147 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: by Defendant to Dismiss and Expunge Lis Pendens Tentative Ruling: To continue the matter to Tuesday, August 6, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Department 501 in order for defendant to perfect proof of service. Defendant is to file an amended proof of service no later than July 15, 2024, demonstrating that plaintiff has been properly served. The court intends to order plaintiff, plaintiff’s counsel, and defendant to appear at the continued hearing date. Explanation: The Proof of Service of the motion is defective. A proof of service shall include the name and address of the person making the service. (Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 1, § 1008, subd. (a).) It shall also identify the name and address where service was accomplished and the method of service. (Ibid.) The proof of service does not state the method of service or where service was made. It may be that the motion was properly served, but that cannot be determined on the face of the proof of service. The court is therefore continuing the matter so that defendant can address the proof of service issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: Tpine Leasing Capital L.P. v. Jarnail Multani Superior Court Case No. 23CECG03197 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: by Defendant to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion to set aside default and default judgment without prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Explanation: No Copy of Proposed Pleading Application for relief from a judgment or court order must be filed timely (within six months of the judgment or order) and must be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other proposed pleading to be filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 subd. (b).) Here, defendant’s default was taken October 19, 2023, and judgment was entered against him on March 21, 2024. Defendant filed this motion on April 22, 2024. Defendant’s application was timely. However, defendant did not provide a proposed responsive pleading pursuant to code. No Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise or Excusable Neglect A judgment may be vacated and so may the entry of default that preceded it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473 subd. (b).) The court is empowered to relieve a party “upon any terms as may be just … from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Id.) This decision lies in the discretion of the court, and can only be exercised if the moving party establishes a proper ground for relief, by the proper procedure, and within the time limits. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.) Here, defendant did not demonstrate that his failure to respond was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. He stated that he learned of the default entered against him but “was not aware of the nature of any pending litigation.” (Multani Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant incorrectly stated that the default should be “set aside due to his mistake…in not responding to the lawsuit.” (Id.) He described no specific mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect that led to him not responding. Defendant briefly stated that he was improperly served, however did not establish it as a valid reason for not responding to the Complaint. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: Sandeep Sekhon as Trustee of the 3S Trust Dated February 14, 2014 v. Darlene Perez Superior Court Case No. 22CECG02770 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: by Plaintiff to Deem Requests for Admissions to be Admitted, and for Monetary Sanctions Tentative Ruling: To deny the motions by plaintiff trustees Sandeep Sekhon and Ramanpreet Sekhon to deem requests for admissions admitted. To grant monetary sanctions against defendants Juan Jose Perez and Darlene Antoinette Perez, jointly and severally, in the amount of $570.00, to be paid within 20 calendar days from the date of service of the minute order by the clerk. Explanation: Untimely Service of Motion Waived Noticed motions must be served and filed 16 court days before the hearing date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) This time may be extended to accommodate time for mailing or other methods of delayed delivery. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1013.) There is not an extension for personally served documents. However, it is well settled that “the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion.” (Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 7, quoting Lacey v. Bertone (1949) 33 Cal.2d 649, 651; Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.) Here, plaintiffs filed and served these motions on defendants personally on June 17, 2024. The hearing date is set for July 10, 2024. Service of the motion was not timely pursuant to code. However, the oppositions were filed timely and address the merits of the motion, thus waiving the defective notice. Motion to Deem Matters Admitted A propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) Failure to timely respond to requests for admissions results in a waiver of all objections to the requests. (Id., subd. (a).) However, the court may relieve the responding party of this waiver if (1) substantially compliant responses have been served, and (2) the failure to serve timely responses was the result of a mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Id.) the time to respond is extended two days when service is by overnight delivery or e-mail. (Code. Civ. Proc., §§ 1013 subd. (c), 1010.6 subd. (a)(3)(B).) The discovery requests were served via overnight courier and electronic mail on May 13, 2024 to defendants, who were in pro per at the time. Responses were not received by the deadline to respond, so plaintiffs brought these motions. Defendants filed opposition to the motions and concurrently served on plaintiffs their responses to discovery. A proof of service for these responses was filed on July 2, 2024. There was no reply filed by plaintiffs raising any objection as to the substantial compliance of the responses; thus, seeing as how defendant filed a proper proof of service, the motions are denied. Monetary Sanctions Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, subdivision (c), it is mandatory to impose a monetary sanction on the party (or attorney) whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion requiring the court to issue an order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Although delayed responses may defeat a motion to compel, they will not avoid monetary sanctions. Plaintiffs were within their rights to bring this motion because responses were not received within the established timeframe. Therefore, they are entitled to sanctions. However, the sanctions amount can be reduced. Both motions are fairly straightforward and virtually identical. Counsel does not need to spend time preparing for and attending the hearing. The court finds it reasonable to allow 1.5 hours for preparation of all the motion documents billed at $300.00 an hour, and $60.00 for each of the two motions, totaling a sanctions award of $570.00. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: Correia v. General Motors, LLC Case No. 22CECG03491 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 503) Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Tentative Ruling: To grant plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $55,510.00 and costs in the amount of $3,268.21. Defendant shall pay fees and costs to plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days of the date of service of this order. Explanation: Under the Song-Beverly Act, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Here, it is clear that plaintiff prevailed in the underlying action, as she reached a settlement from defendant in which defendant paid her $130,000, which was greater than the total purchase price of the vehicle. In addition, she was allowed to keep the vehicle. Thus, it is clear that plaintiff obtained a significant monetary recovery and achieved her primary objective in the litigation. Therefore, the court intends to find that plaintiff is the prevailing party and that she is entitled to an award of fees, costs, and expenses. Defendant does not deny that plaintiff is the prevailing party in the litigation, or that she is entitled to an award of her attorney’s fees and costs. However, defendant contends that the time incurred by plaintiff’s counsel and hourly rates they charged are not reasonable and should be reduced. They also contend that some of the requested costs are not recoverable and should be stricken from the memo of costs. “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.’ ‘[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]’” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154, internal citations omitted.) Also, the prevailing plaintiff’s fees in a Song-Beverly Act case are not limited to a percentage of the plaintiff’s total recovery. Instead, the plaintiff is entitled to recover all fees reasonably incurred, regardless of the amount of damages recovered in the case. (Graciano, supra, at p. 164.) Nor should a prevailing party’s fees be reduced simply because they did not prevail on all of their claims. (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-274.) “The plain wording of the [Song-Beverly Act] requires the trial court to base the fee award upon actual time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably incurred - both from the standpoint of time spent and the amount charged. … In the situation of a contingency fee arrangement, the court in Nightingale stated, ‘for purposes of section 1794, subdivision (d), a prevailing buyer represented by counsel is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his or her attorney.’ In either case, a prevailing party has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817–818, internal citations omitted, emphasis in original.) Section 1794, subdivision (d), “requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved. If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. A prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were “allowable,” were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.” ’ ” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) Here, plaintiffs’ counsel has submitted declarations regarding the amount of time spent on the case and the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case, as well as a survey of rates charged by other consumer law attorneys, and copies of orders in other cases where counsel was awarded fees under the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiffs’ counsel also contends that the case required specialized knowledge and expertise, and that defense counsel’s aggressive litigation tactics required a considerable amount of work by plaintiffs’ attorneys before the case settled. However, defendant contends that plaintiff’s counsel billed excessive hours on a number of tasks, and that the court should reduce the amount of time awarded to a more reasonable amount. “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) Here, defendant takes issue with several specific billing entries, which are summarized on pages 11 and 12 of the opposition brief. However, defendant has failed to meet its burden of showing that any of the cited hours were excessively billed. Indeed, reviewing the billings submitted with plaintiff’s counsel’s motion, most of the hours incurred appear to be very reasonable, and often lower than what one might expect for similar work in other cases. (Exhibit 7 to Barry decl.) While defendant complains that many of the tasks were completed using templates, and that the pleadings, motions, and discovery requests and responses in the present case are identical to the documents plaintiff’s counsel has prepared in other lemon law cases, it appears that plaintiff’s counsel has been using templates in an efficient manner to save time and money. It is unclear why defendant believes that counsel’s billings are excessive or unreasonable here. Considering the amount of work that needed to be done to litigate the case and prepare for trial, it appears that counsel’s hours were extremely reasonable. “By and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case; after all, he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.” (Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1112.) Also, “[a] defendant ‘ “cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.” ’ ” (International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Los Angeles Export Terminal, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 287, 304.) Therefore, the court does not intend to cut any of counsel’s requested hours. On the other hand, the court does intend to reduce the billing rates for plaintiff’s counsel to more reasonable hourly rates. Counsel seeks an award of fees based on billing rates of $350 to $675. However, these billing rates are quite high in comparison to the rates charged by attorneys in the Fresno area. While plaintiff’s counsel cites to several court decisions in other counties upholding some of their billing rates and fees requests, none of those decisions were out of Fresno County and most of the cases were out of Southern California or the Bay Area, where billing rates are higher than in the Central Valley. Also, plaintiff’s counsel has not provided any evidence that Fresno rates are comparable to their requested rates. In addition, counsel has not presented any evidence that plaintiffs could not have hired competent counsel in Fresno County that would have likely charged a lower rate for their services. Where a party is seeking out- of-town rates, he or she is required to make a “sufficient showing…that hiring local counsel was impractical.” (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1244.) Plaintiff has made no showing of any attempt to seek local counsel. There are local attorneys who handle similar cases. Local rates are therefore appropriate and the court intends to reduce the hourly rates for plaintiffs’ counsel to amounts that are more consistent with the rates charged by local Fresno counsel. Examining recent fee awards in other, similar cases in Fresno County, the court has approved an hourly fee of $400 for Mr. Romano, $375 for Mr. Whelan, and $325 for Ms. Valitskaya in Dalitian v. FCA US LLC, Fresno Superior Court Case No. 18CECG00412. (See Minute Order dated November 14, 2019.) The court also awarded an hourly fee of $400 for Mr. Romano, $375 for Mr. Whelan, and $325 for Ms. Valitskaya in Kermani v. FCA US LLC, Fresno Superior Court Case No. 19CECG01719. (See Minute Order dated March 5, 2020.) The court also awarded hourly fees of $500 for Mr. Romano, $425 for Mr. Whelan, and $400 for Ms. Valitskaya in Ramirez v FCA US LLC, Fresno Superior Court Case No. 18CECG00309. (See Minute Order dated June 23, 2020.) In the present case, Mr. Barry, who has been practicing law for almost 23 years, is seeking an hourly rate of $675 per hour, which is much higher than the rates charged by Fresno attorneys of similar experience. The court will set his hourly rate at $500 per hour to be more consistent with Fresno area rates. Mr. Hayes has been practicing law for over eight years. He seeks an hourly rate of $500. However, this rate is much higher than Fresno attorneys of similar background, education, and experience. The court will award fees based on an hourly rate of $400. Mr. Matera, who has been practicing for over six years, seeks an hourly rate of $500 per hour. Again, his rate is much higher than attorneys in the Fresno area with similar experience. The court will award fees based on a rate of $375. Mr. Pascal, who has been practicing law for five years, claims a billing rate of $400 per hour. Once again, his rate is much higher than attorneys of similar experience in the Fresno area. The court will set his rate at $325 per hour to match Fresno area rates for other attorneys of similar skill and experience. Mr. Lara has been an attorney since January of 2023. He seeks an hourly rate of $350. Again, Mr. Lara’s rate is high compared to attorneys in the Fresno area with similar education, background, and experience. Therefore, the court will set his rate at $300 per hour to match Fresno rates for associates. After all reductions in hourly rates, the court will award fees in the amount of $55,510.00. Finally, plaintiffs have requested an award of costs in the amount of $3,268.12. It appears that the requested costs were reasonably incurred and therefore the court will grant the costs in their entirety. While some of the costs are not necessarily expressly permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, they would may be allowed as “expenses” reasonably and necessarily incurred in the prosecution of the action under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (See Jensen v. BMW of North America (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138 [finding an award of expert witness fees as expenses under section 1794(d) may be permitted if the fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred].) Therefore, the court intends to grant the requested costs. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: jyh on 7/10/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: In re: Jocelyn Gomez Superior Court Case No. 24CECG02524 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 503) Motion: Petition to Approve Compromise of Disputed Claim of Minor Tentative Ruling: To deny without prejudice. Petitioner must file an amended petition, with appropriate supporting papers and proposed orders. Explanation: Petitioner has marked item 8.a., indicating that claimant has fully recovered from her injuries. The most recent medical record provided, however, does not appear to substantiate this and no physician’s report stating that claimant has fully recovered has been provided. Also, though the petition and order to deposit provide that petitioner is claimant’s parent, the proposed order approving the compromise has, at item 2, boxes marked indicating that petitioner is claimant’s parent, guardian ad litem, guardian, and grandmother. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: jyh on 7/10/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Re: Mora v. City of Fresno et al. Superior Court Case No. 21CECG00602 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 503) Motion: By Defendant Eusenia Blanco for Terminating Sanctions Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion for terminating sanctions. To grant the alternative relief of evidentiary sanctions. Defendant Eusenia Blanco is directed to file a proposed order within five days of service of this order by the clerk. Explanation: Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivision (g) makes “[d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery” a “misuse of the discovery process,” but sanctions are only authorized to the extent permitted by each discovery procedure. Once a motion to compel answers is granted, continued failure to respond or inadequate answers may result in more severe sanctions, including evidence, issue or terminating sanctions, or further monetary sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290, subd. (c).) Sanctions for failure to comply with a court order are allowed only where the failure was willful. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) If there has been a willful failure to comply with a discovery order, the court may strike out the offending party’s pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings by that party until the order is obeyed, dismiss that party’s action, or render default judgment against that party. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Generally, before imposing a terminating (“doomsday”) sanction, trial courts should usually grant lesser sanctions first, such as orders staying the action until the plaintiff complies, or declaring the matters admitted if answers are not received by a specific date. (E.g., Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 796.) It is only when a party persists in disobeying the court’s orders that sanctions such as dismissing an action are justified. The imposition of terminating sanctions is a drastic consequence, one that should not lightly be imposed, or requested. (Ruvalcaba v. Government Employees Ins. Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1579, 1581.) Terminating sanctions in the first instance may be an appropriate sanction if the abuse of the discovery process is particularly egregious. (R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496 [finding that terminating sanctions were warranted due to forgery and spoliation of evidence].) However, where lesser sanctions have been ordered, such as an order compelling compliance with discovery requests, and the party persists in disobeying, the party does so “at his own risk, knowing that such a refusal provided the court with statutory authority to impose other sanctions” such as dismissing the action. (Id. at p. 1583; see also Todd v. Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 986.) Here, on March 6, 2024, the court order plaintiff Jorge Luis Mora (“Plaintiff”) to served verified responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents within 10 days of the court’s order to defendant Eusenia Blanco (“Defendant”). The court’s order was served on Plaintiff on March 6, 2024. It appears that Plaintiff never served verified responses to any of the discovery requests to date. From the above however, there is no clear demonstration of egregious behavior, or any noted interaction between Defendant and Plaintiff since the entry of the order in question. Relatedly, there are no clear demonstrations of multiple acts of disobeying or ignoring a court order. The court will not issue terminating sanctions in the first instance. However, in light of the present situation, the court finds that evidence sanctions are warranted for failure to comply with the order on discovery, which constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (c); id., §§ 2030.300, subd. (e), 2031.310, subd. (i).) Defendant is directed to submit a proposed order imposing evidentiary sanctions related to the interrogatories and requests for production of documents that were the subject of the March 5, 2024, order of the court. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: jyh on 7/9/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)