Ruling
RAYMOND GUTIERREZ VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 12, 2024 |
21STCV07199
Case Number:
21STCV07199
Hearing Date:
July 12, 2024
Dept:
52
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Raymond Gutierrez,
Plaintiff,
v.
Ford Motor Company, et al.
Defendants.
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Case No. 21STCV07199
[TENTATIVE] ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Date: July 12, 2024
Plaintiff Raymond Gutierrez moves for $91,748.54 in attorney fees and other costs from defendant Ford Motor Company.
Requests for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff requests judicial notice of 17 exhibits.
All 17 requests are
denied
.
Lodestar
Plaintiff seeks attorney fees based on the following hours and rates:
Timekeeper
Rate
Hours
Billed
Aslaadi (rate 1)
$350
0.2
$
70.00
Aslaadi (rate 2)
$375
17.5
$
6,562.50
Baker
$595
8.6
$
5,117.00
Butala
$460
6.5
$
2,990.00
Campbell
$495
11
$
5,445.00
Carvalho (rate 1)
$450
0.4
$
180.00
Carvalho (rate 2)
$550
2.1
$
1,155.00
Carvalho (rate 3)
$570
5.1
$
2,907.00
Coombs
$325
8.2
$
2,665.00
DeLeon
$575
15.6
$
8,970.00
Doddy
$595
1.2
$
714.00
Law (rate 1)
$425
20
$
8,500.00
Law (rate 2)
$440
4.3
$
1,892.00
Littles
$595
2.7
$
1,606.50
Lunn
$620
2.3
$
1,426.00
Pardo
$390
1.9
$
741.00
Ryu
$385
2.2
$
847.00
Sanaia (rate 1)
$385
1.3
$
500.50
Sanaia (rate 2)
$425
11.3
$
4,802.50
Singh Malik
$350
0.6
$
210.00
Tracy
$475
10.7
$
5,082.50
Subtotal
133.7
$
62,383.50
1.35 Multiplier
$
21,834.23
Other Costs
$
4,030.81
Anticipated Fees
$
3,500.00
Total
$
91,748.54
Hourly Rates
For hourly rates, the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys.
(
569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc
. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436.)
Courts may rely on their own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases. (
Id
. at p. 437, citations omitted.)
The court finds plaintiff claims excessive hourly rates for one law clerk and three attorneys.
Kris Coombs, Jr. is a law clerk, not a licensed attorney.
(Shahian Decl., ¶ 52.)
The court finds Coombss reasonable hourly rate is $200.
Plaintiff presents insufficient evidence of the qualifications and experience of attorneys Angel Baker, Jami Littles, and Matthew Pardo.
Plaintiffs billing records state Bakers rate was $595, tied with Littles for the second highest rate among the 16 timekeepers.
(
Id.
, Ex. 18, p. 4.)
But plaintiffs counsels declaration about the attorneys experience and qualifications does not mention Baker whatsoever.
Plaintiffs billing records claim $390 hourly for Pardo.
(
Id.
, Ex. 18, p. 5.)
As with Baker, plaintiffs supporting declaration does not state Pardos qualifications.
For Littles, plaintiff states only, Jami Littles is a former associate attorney at SLP who was admitted to the California State bar in 1998.
At SLP, Ms. Fox [sic] focused on lemon law and consumer warranty matters.
(
Id.
, ¶ 62.)
The court will reduce Bakers hourly rate to $450, Littless hourly rate to $525, and Pardos hourly rate to $300.
Based on its knowledge of the legal market, its review of the credentials and experience of plaintiffs attorneys, and the particular tasks performed by counsel, the court finds the other rates claimed by plaintiffs counsel are reasonable.
Hours
In calculating the lodestar, the court must determine whether the tasks performed by an attorney were necessary and whether the amount of time billed for each task was reasonable.
(
Baxter v. Bock
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 775, 793.)
The moving party has the burden of proof on these issues.
(
Ibid.
)
The number of hours billed may be unreasonable if the case is overstaffed with too many lawyers, resulting in redundant or unnecessary work.
(
Hensley v. Eckerhart
(1983) 461 U.S. 424, 434.)
A reduced award is justified when a case is overlitigated and the bills are padded.
(
Morris v. Hyundai Motor America
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38 (
Morris
).)
For a voluminous fee application, courts may make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure.
(
Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc.
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41 (
Warren
); accord
Morris
,
supra
, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 40 [The court could properly have made an across-the-board reduction of 30 percent].)
After reviewing the billing records (Shahian Decl., Ex. 18), the court finds
many hours of plaintiffs counsels work were unreasonable and inefficient.
The evidence in this case is similar to the record in
Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240 (
Mikhaeilpoor
), where the same law firm represented the plaintiff/appellant.
The Court of Appeal stated:
[T]he record demonstrates the highly inefficient manner in which plaintiff litigated her case.
Plaintiffs trial counsel claims extensive experience with claims brought under the Song-Beverly [Act].
Payam Shahian, the senior attorney among plaintiffs trial counsel, supervises the other attorneys in his firm, but does not materially get involved
unless they involve complex legal issues
, reach significant stages of litigation, or require [his] assistance.
&
Shahian did not bill time to this case, confirming the case did not involve complex legal issues.
Yet, despite counsels experience litigating hundreds of automotive defect cases involving Californias consumer protection statutes, including Song-Beverly, an astonishing array of 10 different attorneys litigated this case, with multiple attorneys staffed at different times.
Further, counsels billing entries demonstrate a lack of efficiency in litigating the case and a lack of clarity in tasks performed.
This evidence supports the trial courts finding that plaintiffs counsel failed to act efficiently.
(
Mikhaeilpoor, supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 255-256, italics in original.)
Plaintiffs counsel similarly overstaffed this case with 16 lawyers.
Doing so resulted in inefficient and duplicative work.
Plaintiffs counsel used numerous attorneys to perform related tasks that one attorney could have done more efficiently.
For example, on defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings on the initial complaint, Daniel Law billed 0.7 hours to meet and confer, then Michael Tracy billed 2.5 hours to draft the opposition, then Law billed another 1.8 hours to revised and finalize the opposition.
(Shahian Decl., Ex. 18, p. 2.)
When defendant demurred to the first amended complaint on similar grounds as the prior motion, another attorney, Christopher Campbell, billed 11 hours to draft the opposition.
(
Ibid.
)
Meanwhile, David Lunn billed 2.3 hours to prepare for and appear at the hearing.
(
Ibid.
)
That was the only task Lunn billed on this case.
Using one attorney to perform all these related tasks would have been considerably more efficient.
Similarly, plaintiff used multiple attorneys to work on discovery.
Neal Butala drafted discovery requests (Shahian Decl., Ex. 18, p. 1), Tionna Carvalho revised them (
ibid.
), and Daniel Law worked on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 26 disclosure report while the case was in federal court (
ibid.
).
Nadine Aslaadi then reviewed defendants discovery response while Kris Coombs drafted a motion to compel further responses.
(
Id.
, pp. 1-2.)
In another example, on December 1, 2022, Joy DeLeon billed 2.3 hours to prepare for and attend the telephonic post-mediation status conference. (Shahian Decl., Ex. 18, p. 2.)
The conference lasted only a few minutes.
Plaintiffs counsel could have used an attorney who was familiar with the case and needed significantly less time to prepare for the status conference.
Plaintiff also billed an excessive number of hours for several tasks.
The bills for this motion illustrate the problem.
Plaintiff billed 8.6 hours to draft this motion and claimed another $3,500 in fees (amounting to another 5.9 hours at the $595 hourly rate billed for the initial 8.6 hours) anticipated to draft the reply brief and attend the hearing.
The declaration in support of plaintiffs reply brief states a different attorney spent 10.6 hours drafting it.
(Castro Decl., ¶ 5.)
This motion is relatively simple.
It is like many other motions plaintiffs counsel has filed.
In some places, plaintiff did not properly modify the papers from prior versions filed in other cases.
As discussed above, Payam Shahians declaration in support of this motion omits the qualifications and experience of attorneys Angel Baker and Matthew Pardo, who billed for work on the case.
Shahians declaration also attests to the hourly rates and qualifications of four attorneys who did not bill for any work on this case: Jaclyn Laing (Shahian Decl., ¶¶ 58-59), Ian McCallister (¶¶ 66-67), Tyson Smith (¶¶ 74-75), and Anna Weiser (¶¶ 78-79).
Given plaintiffs counsels extensive experience in similar cases and with similar motions, the motion did not reasonably require close to 18 hours of work.
Finally, plaintiffs counsel billed at attorney or law clerk rates for tasks that were clerical or could have been done by a paralegal.
Nino Sanaia billed 0.4 hours at $385 hourly to Draft Ps notice of CMC and 0.4 hours to Draft Ps CMS and notice of posting jury fees.
(Shahian Decl., Ex. 18, p. 1.)
Kris Coombs billed 0.3 hours at $375 hourly to Draft Ps notice of CMC.
(
Ibid.
)
Nadine Aslaadi billed 0.2 hours at $350 hourly to Draft and finalize Ps CMS.
(
Ibid.
)
Tionna Carvalho billed 0.2 hours at $570 hourly to Review and finalize NOS.
(
Id.
, p. 3.)
With the reply brief, plaintiff submitted a table including a column for Plaintiffs Response to each billing entry defendant challenged.
(Castro Decl., Ex. 2.)
In the rows for these tasks, that column is empty.
(
Ibid.
)
After reviewing all billing records, the court exercises its discretion to cut plaintiffs hours claimed by 25 percent across the board.
Multiplier
Plaintiff moves for a 1.35 multiplier to the lodestar.
A multiplier is not warranted.
Multipliers may be awarded based on factors including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.
(
Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
This case did not involve novel or difficult questions.
Plaintiffs counsel did not demonstrate exceptional skill in litigating the case.
Counsels hourly rates adequately account for representation on contingency.
(See
Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.)
Other Costs
Plaintiff claims $4,030.81 in other costs.
The court will award all expenses claimed.
Defendant argues expert witness fees and some other items are not authorized as recoverable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5.
The Song-Beverly Act, however, expands the costs a prevailing plaintiff may recover.
[I]n enacting Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) the Legislature intended the phrase costs and expenses to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of costs set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5.
(
Warren, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 42.)
Plaintiff presents adequate evidence supporting the $4,030.81 in expenses she claims.
Even if not expressly permitted as a recoverable cost, each item was reasonably necessary to the litigation.
DISPOSITION
Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees is granted in part.
After accounting for the reductions described above, the court calculates the award as follows:
Timekeeper
Rate Awarded
Hours Awarded
Amount
Aslaadi (rate 1)
$350
0.15
$
52.50
Aslaadi (rate 2)
$375
13.125
$
4,921.88
Baker
$450
6.45
$
2,902.50
Butala
$460
4.875
$
2,242.50
Campbell
$495
8.25
$
4,083.75
Carvalho (rate 1)
$450
0.3
$
135.00
Carvalho (rate 2)
$550
1.6
$
866.25
Carvalho (rate 3)
$570
3.8
$
2,180.25
Coombs
$200
6.15
$
1,230.00
DeLeon
$575
11.7
$
6,727.50
Doddy
$595
0.9
$
535.50
Law (rate 1)
$425
15
$
6,375.00
Law (rate 2)
$440
3.225
$
1,419.00
Littles
$525
2.025
$
1,063.13
Lunn
$620
1.725
$
1,069.50
Pardo
$300
1.425
$
427.50
Ryu
$385
1.65
$
635.25
Sanaia (rate 1)
$385
1.0
$
375.38
Sanaia (rate 2)
$425
8.5
$
3,601.88
Singh Malik
$350
0.5
$
157.50
Tracy
$475
8.025
$
3,811.88
Subtotal
100.275
$ 44,813.63
Multiplier
None
Costs
$
4,030.81
Anticipated Fees (reduced)
$
2,625.00
Total
$ 51,469.44
Plaintiff Raymond Gutierrez shall recover $51,469.44 in attorney fees and other expenses from defendant Ford Motor Company.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Date:
July 12, 2024
Ruling
MAYRA SANDOVAL VS LA CELEBRATIONS, LLC
Jul 11, 2024 |
22STCV13054
Case Number:
22STCV13054
Hearing Date:
July 11, 2024
Dept:
57
Plaintiff Mayra Sandoval dba Ilusiones (Plaintiff) sued Defendant LA Celebrations, LLC (Defendant) over an alleged agreement through which Plaintiff would rent a party hall from Defendant to use on several days in 2022.
In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for (1) breach of contract; (2) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (3) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; and (4) declaratory relief.
Pending before the Court is Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 438 as to all of the claims in Plaintiffs complaint (the Motion).
The Court is granting the Motion with leave to amend.
Plaintiff is directed to file and serve an amended complaint by August 8, 2024.
The Court will assess the state of the pleadings at the further status conference, which is scheduled for October 24, 2024.
TIMELINESS OF THE MOTION
Plaintiffs contention that the Motion is untimely is mistaken
The time limitation for filing a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings under Section 438 is as follows: the motion cannot be made after entry of a pretrial conference order pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits.
(Section 438(e); see
Tung v. Chicago Title Co
. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 757.)
The pretrial conference order mentioned in Section 438(e) refers to the case management order.
The case management order in this action was entered on January 12, 2023, following a case management conference that day.
At the case management conference, the Court initially set the action for trial on September 9, 2024.
(The trial date subsequently was moved to February 24, 2025.)
Thirty days prior to September 9, 2024 is August 9, 2024.
The Motion was filed on June 10, 2024, which is not within 30 days of the initial trial date of September 9, 2024.
Accordingly, the Motion was timely.
SUBSTANCE OF THE MOTION
1.
Breach of Contract
To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.
(Maxwell v. Dolezal
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-88.)
To establish the existence of a contract, a party must attach the contract to the complaint, set forth the terms of the contract in the complaint, or plead the operative effect of the contract within the complaint.
(
Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 401-402.)
Here, Plaintiff did none of the above.
The complaint simply asserts there was an agreement for the use of a party hall, and that is it.
This is insufficient.
Accordingly, the Court is granting the Motion as to the breach of contract claim with leave to amend.
2.
Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relations
A common element of the complaints second claim for intentional interference with prospective economic relations and third claim for negligent interference with prospective economic relations is an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party.
(Gaab & Reese, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial Claims and Defenses (The Rutter Group, 2023) ¶ 3:152.)
Here, for both claims, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff had enjoyed continued success with the location and goodwill and that Defendant knew of these continued relationships with customers. (Compl., ¶¶ 13-14, 19-20.) Because the complaint does not identify a specific third party with whom Plaintiff had an economic relationship, both the second and third claims fail.
Plaintiffs opposition to the Motion mounts no defense on this point.
Accordingly, the Court is granting the Motion as to the second and third claims with leave to amend.
3.
Declaratory Relief
For the declaratory relief claim, Plaintiff requests that this court issue a declaration mandating defendant to comply with the contracts for the events to take place at their respective dates and issue an order accordingly. (Compl., ¶ 24.) The fourth claim fails for the reason the first claim fails: the complaint does not sufficiently plead the contracts on which both claims are based.
The Court thus grants the Motion as to the fourth claim with leave to amend.
