Brighton Lakes Community Association, Inc. Vs. Lin, Chang Y

Case Number: 22STCV23623 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Case Name: Sanaz Afsar, et al. v. Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association, et al. Case No.: 22STCV23623 Motion: (1) Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement (2) Motion to Seal Moving Party: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc. (PWTS) Responding Party: None as of July 15, 2024 (PWTS filed Notice of Non-Opposition on 7/11/24) Tentative Ruling: Defendant Pacific Water Tank Services, Inc.s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED. Defendants Motion to Seal is also GRANTED. I. Background Plaintiff owns Unit 2301 in the Bunker Hill Tower high-rise in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiff alleges that on April 13, 2022, Defendants Bunker Hill Tower Condominium Association (BHTCA) and Pacific Water Tank Services Inc. (PWTS) discharged 2000 or more gallons of dirty water directly into Plaintiffs unit, causing extensive property damage. On July 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against BHTCA and PWTS for (1) negligence and (2) trespass. On October 14, 2022, Defendant BHTCA filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff, Saied Kashani, PWTS, VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; (3) equitable indemnity; (4) apportionment and/or contribution; (5) declaratory relief and (6) declaratory relief. BHTCA dismissed Plaintiff and Saied Kashani from its cross-complaint on Jun 29, 2023. On November 30, 2022, Defendant PWTS filed a cross-complaint against BHTC and VNH Enterprises, Inc. alleging (1) equitable indemnity; (2) contribution; (3) apportionment; and (4) declaratory relief. This is the motion by PWTS for determination of good faith settlement, and also a motion to seal the settlement documents by the settlement amount. The motions are unopposed. II. Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement A. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 states, in pertinent part: (a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of good faith or a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors . . . [para.] (c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasors from any further claims against the settling tortfeasors for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. [para.] (d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue. In determining whether a settlement is in good faith, our Supreme Court stated that the trial court should inquire into, among other things, ...whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasors proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiffs injuries. ( Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of facts be taken into account (i.e. the Tech-Bilt factors) including: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs total recovery and the settlors proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among defendants; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interest of the nonsettling defendants. A defendants settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendants liability to be. The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (d).) The party asserting lack of good faith should demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the objective of section 877.6. ( Tech-Bilt at pp. 500-501.) A determination that the settlement was in good faith would bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, subd. (c).) Any existing cross-complaints for such claims would be subject to dismissal. While an unopposed application for good faith settlement may be granted on bare bones facts, an opposed application requires the Court to consider the settlement based on the Tech-Bilt factors. ( City of Grand Terrace (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) This requires the settlor to provide the Court with sufficient evidentiary basis to enable the court to consider and evaluate the various aspects of the settlement. ( Id. at p. 1263.) Because Tech-Bilt mandates a rough approximation of the settling defendant's proportionate liability and consideration of all other defendants' proportionate liability and consideration of all other factors that might affect the fairness of the settlement as respects non-settling defendants, the affidavits, declarations or other evidence should provide the court with the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the factors contemplated by Tech-Bilt . Without the facts, in a contested hearing, it is impossible for a court to exercise its discretion in an appropriate fashion. ( Ibid. ) B. Application to Facts 1. Settling parties: (1) Plaintiff Sanaz Afsar (2) Defendant PWTS 2. Terms of settlement: In consideration for a release of the settling parties by each of the settlement parties, and a dismissal of the action against PWTS, PWTS will pay Plaintiff a sum in settlement. [1] The settlement will result in dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint and BHTCA and Seabreeze Management Company, Incs cross-complaint against PWTS. 3. Rough Approximation of Plaintiffs Total Recovery and Settlors Proportionate Liability: Substantial evidence (e.g., factual declarations) showing the nature and extent of the settling defendant's liability is required for a good-faith determination. Without such evidence, a good faith determination is an abuse of discretion. ( Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co . (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348 (questionable assumptions in moving party's memorandum of points and authorities insufficient to show settlement was reasonable); Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834 (attorney's declaration re settling defendant's liability insufficient where he failed to provide specific supporting facts or expert opinion). The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor's liability to be. ( City of Grand Terrace vs. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal App.3d 1251, 1262.) When a trial court considers the good faith of a settlement, it must determine each tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. The trial court's good faith determination must also take into account the settling tortfeasor's potential liability for indemnity to a cotortfeasor, as well as the settling tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff. In so doing, a trial court must consider each of the plaintiff's claims and possible recoveries and the potential liability of the joint tortfeasors. ( Cal-Jones Properties v. Evans Pacific Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 324, 328.) PWTS maintains its liability for the incident is minimal at best. PWTSs only involvement in this action is as the entity hired by BHTCA to service a water tank on the premises. (Motion, Carpenter Dec., ¶3.) PWTS argues the water intrusion was not the result of its conduct. ( Id. at ¶3.) PWTS maintains the tank was already drained when it arrived, and it was at all times BHTCAs responsibility to drain the tank. ( Id. at ¶4.) PWTS establishes its proportionate liability is likely zero. No oppositions have been filed to this motion. For this reason, PWTSs failure to provide any information regarding Plaintiffs approximate recovery is immaterial. 4. Allocation: In the typical one-plaintiff, multiple-defendants, personal injury action each tortfeasor is potentially liable for the same injury to the plaintiff. Therefore the full settlement by one defendant will offset a judgment against other tortfeasors; no allocation of the settlement is required. But many lawsuits and many settlements do not fit this pattern. In some, the amount of the offset is uncertain because one settlement covers multiple plaintiffs or causes of action with different damages, or because a sliding scale settlement is used and payments by the settling defendant are contingent upon the degree of plaintiff's success against the remaining defendants. In others, the amount of the offset is clouded by injection of noncash consideration into the settlement or, as here, by settling claims for separate injuries not all of which would be attributable to conduct of the remaining defendants. ( Alcal Roofing & Insulation v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1124-1125.) In a situation where the cash amount of the settlement does not dictate the amount of the offset, the settling parties must include an allocation or a valuation in their agreement. A natural tension will exist between plaintiff, who benefits by undervaluing the settlement in order to permit greater recovery against the remaining defendants, and the settling defendant, who would want the settlement value high enough to be approved in order to relieve settling defendant from liability for comparative indemnity or contribution. Requiring a joint valuation by the plaintiff and the settling defendant should generally produce a reasonable valuation. ( Id. ) No allocation of the settlement proceeds is required. There is a single Plaintiff and the causes of action allege the same damages. There is also no noncash consideration in the settlement. 5. Fraud, Collusion and Tortious Conduct: Based on the record, there is no evidence of fraud, collusion or tortious conduct indicating that the settlement was entered into to injure Defendant BHTC or other remaining defendants or cross-defendants. 6. Recognition that settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial: PWTSs settlement is less than if it were found liable at trial. PWTS maintains, however, that its liability is zero. 7. Financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants: The settlement is not disproportionately low. As such, PWTSs financial conditions and insurance policy limits are immaterial. ( L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 749-750 (request for discovery into defendants financial condition for purposes of determining good faith settlement denied; financial condition of settling defendant only relevant where settlement is disproportionately low).) III. Motion to Seal Documents Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to the public. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (c).) Therefore, pleadings, motions, discovery documents, and other papers may not be filed under seal merely by stipulation of the parties. The parties' agreement that certain documents be filed under seal is improper and insufficient. ( Savaglio v. WalMart Stores, Inc . (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 600.) A prior court order must be obtained. (California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subd. (a); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 888.) At a minimum, a party seeking to seal documents must come forward with a specific list of facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them. ( Id. at 894.) Before substantive courtroom proceedings are closed or transcripts are ordered sealed, a trial court must hold a hearing and expressly find that (i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. ( NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.) PWTS moves to seal the Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement and the declaration of Elizabeth J. Carpenter. PWTS submitted a public redacted version of the documents it the settlement amount redacted and it lodged an unredacted version with the Court, as required under California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, subdivision (b)(5). PWTS moves to seal these documents to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement amount. The settlement agreement contains a confidentiality provision. (Motion to Seal, Carpenter Dec., ¶2.) There is no overriding public interest in the settlement amount agreed to between Plaintiff and PWTS. No oppositions have been filed to the Motion to Seal. The motion to seal is granted. PWTS demonstrates an overriding interest in sealing the settlement amount, namely preservation of the confidentiality of the settlement as agreed to by the parties. The parties willingness to settle and their interest in maintaining the settlements confidentiality can only be served by the very limited redactions of the papers. PWTS establishes that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this overriding interest. [1] The Court has reviewed this sum, but, in light of the ruling on the motion to seal, does not disclose it here.

Case Number: 21STCV13812 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 55 I. Tentative Ruling Defendants Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED. II. Background Plaintiffs Mi Young Kim and Yoo S. Kim (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against The Jing Wang (Defendant) related to alleged problems in the property Plaintiff leased from Defendant. Defendant filed a demurrer and Plaintiff failed to file an opposition. The Court therefore sustained the demurrer with 20 days leave to amend on 8/15/23. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. The Court sustained Defendants demurrer to the FAC with leave to amend but Plaintiffs never filed and served a further amended complaint. Thus, on March 27, 2024, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice. On April 12, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for attorneys fees. No opposition has been filed. III. Analysis In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. (Civ. Code §1717(a).) Prevailing party includes & a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., §1032(a)(4).) Defendant seeks attorneys fees pursuant to the lease at issue, which contains a provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party (Section 41). The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs case with prejudice on March 27, 2024, thereby establishing Defendant as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure §1032(a)(4). Section 41 states: ln any action or proceeding arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs from the non-prevailing Landlord or Tenant except as provided in paragraph 35A. Plaintiffs do not oppose this motion. The Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party and is entitled to attorneys fees. [T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys fee award. ( PLCM Grp. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal 4th 1084, 1095.) The reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate for similar work in the community. ( Ibid. ) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Ibid.) After the lodestar is determined, the court in its discretion may, but is not required to, apply a fee enhancement or multiplier. Defendant claims he has incurred $10,625.50 in attorneys fees and $845.93 in costs to date, with an anticipated additional $3,002.00 in attorneys fees and $21.78 in costs related to this motion for attorneys fees. Defendants counsel John A. S. Baik provides a declaration to support the request. In his declaration, Baik states that he has extensive experience in civil litigation, particularly in the Los Angeles Superior Court, Central District. His firms customary hourly billing rate is $450.00, but for the current case, it was discounted to $395.00 per hour. He claims these rates are competitive with other Los Angeles area firms handling similar matters (Baik Decl. ¶3.) Baik attaches the lease at issue in this case as Exhibit 1 and explains that Plaintiffs filed the action to compel Defendant to make repairs to the leased property, alleging breach of the lease and other related torts. He clarifies that Plaintiffs did not demand mediation before filing, so Section 35A of the lease, which precludes recovery of attorneys fees without mediation, does not apply to Defendant. (Baik Decl. ¶4.) Baik includes the billing records as Exhibit 2, documenting time spent on the case from March 2023 to present. As the custodian of records, he attests to their accuracy, noting that these records are based on contemporaneous time sheets detailing the date, task, and time expended. (Baik Decl. ¶5.) He reports expending 26.9 hours and $845.93 in costs since March 2023 on various motions, including the demurrer to the original complaint and FAC, and the motion to dismiss. (Baik Decl. ¶6.) Baik anticipates an additional 7.6 hours ($3,002.00) and $21.78 in costs for the motion for attorneys fees, detailing the expected tasks and associated hours. (Baik Decl. ¶7.) Thus, Defendant requests the court award $13,627.50 in attorneys fees and $867.49 in costs against the Plaintiffs, as detailed in his declaration and accompanying exhibits. First, the Court finds the rate to be reasonable and well supported by Baiks declaration. Second, the Court reviews the billing records and also finds the hours spent to be reasonable. Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs are represented parties and received adequate notice for this motion. IV. Conclusion Defendants Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED. Defendant may submit a proposed judgment including the fees and the costs set forth in the unopposed memorandum of costs. Defendant must, however, serve the proposed judgment on Plaintiffs.

Case Number: 23STCV17316 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING LESBIA LUCRECIA MONTOYA, Plaintiff, v. HORACIO F. MONTOYA; et al., Defendants. Case No: 23STCV17316 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Calendar Number: 3 Defendant Horacio F. Montoya moves for relief from the Courts November 16, 2023 order for the partition of the property located at 854-645 1/2 East 50th Street, Los Angeles, California 90011 (the Property), which Defendant and Plaintiff Lesbia Lucrecia Montoya (Plaintiff) own as joint tenants. The Court DENIES Defendants motion. Background Plaintiff and Defendant each own a 50 percent share of the Property as joint tenants. On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action, stating claims for (1) partition; (2) accounting; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) unjust enrichment. The complaint was verified. On November 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion for partition of the Property pursuant to the stipulation of the parties (the November 16 Order). On January 24, 2024, the Court entered an interlocutory judgment of partition of the Property and appointed Blake C. Alsbrook (the Referee) as referee to complete the partition sale of the Property. On June 28, 2024, the Court granted the Referees ex parte application for an order directing the Clerk of the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Referee and against Defendant and all occupants residing at the Property (the June 28 Order). On June 25, 2024, Defendant filed this motion, which is styled as an appeal and seeks relief from the November 26 Order. Discussion Defendants motion is called in different parts of the motion an appeal and as a motion to strike the sale of the Property. The motion states that it seeks relief under Code of Civil Procedure, section 904.1 the statute governing grounds for appeal on the basis that the Courts November 16 Order was wrong. To the Courts knowledge, Defendant has not followed the procedures for filing an appeal and in any event, the Court is not able to consider appeals of its own judgments. Defendants motion could be characterized as a motion for reconsideration, and the Court will consider it as such. Within ten days of service of an order, a party may move for reconsideration based on new facts, circumstances, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); see also Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342.) The moving party shall state by affidavit what application was made before, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd .(a).) [T]he party seeking reconsideration must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time. ( Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.) The legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. ( Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) If those requirements have been met to the satisfaction of the court but the court is not persuaded the earlier ruling was erroneous, the proper course is to grant reconsideration and to reaffirm the earlier ruling. ( Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 202.) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (c).) Defendant argues that the November 16 was wrong because (1) the property has many repairs to be made which would increase its market value if completed; (2) the property has a mortgage of $497,840.00, for which Defendant is solely responsible; and (3) the property has been on the market for more than three months and has not sold. None of these arguments provide a basis for reconsideration. Knowledge of the mortgage was available to Defendant at the time of the order in fact, Defendant first informed the referee of the mortgage shortly after the order and refused to provide the Referee with financial information about it. (Alsbrook Declaration in Support of Ex Parte Application for Writ of Possession (Alsbrook Decl.) ¶ 9.) The Referee also learned shortly after his appointment that Defendant was occupying the Property which would give him access to knowledge of any defects in need of repair. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 4.) Finally, the Referee has received an offer to buy the Property. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 12.) The Referee represented in his ex parte brief that the offer was for a purchase price of $660,000.00. (Ex Parte Application for Writ of Possession at p. 2:19-25.) The Referee declared that it was Defendants continued residence at the Property that was delaying the sale. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants first two arguments could have been presented at the original hearing for the motion, and are therefore not new facts. The delay in the sale of the Property appears to be a result of Defendants own conduct, and not a result of an inability to find a buyer. The Court therefore denies Defendants motion.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 15, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT A-NHI LE INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE QU YAN KUANG AND A-NHI LE REVOCABLE TRUST Notice Of Motion And Motion To (1) Reopen Discovery For The Limited Purpose Of Compelling Plaintiffs Deposition; And (2) Compel Plaintiffs Deposition Request For Sanctions Of $10,495.00 Against Plaintiff Enkhdul Batsukh And Her Attorneys Of Record, Thomas W. J. Purtell, Esq. And The Law Offices Of Thomas W.J. Purtell; Memorandum Of Points And Authorities is granted in part. Plaintiff's deposition shall occur on a mutually agreeable date no later than July 19, 2024. Defendants are awarded sanctions against plaintiff and her attorney in the amount of $3,137.50, consisting of ten hours or reasonable attorney time at the reasonable rate of $225 per hour plus .3 hours of reasonable attorney time at the reasonable rate of $275 per hour plus costs of $805. Plaintiff's request in her conditional non-opposition papers for affirmative discovery relief is not considered in connection with defendants' motion because it was not properly raised in opposition papers and, in all events, now appears to be the subject of a separate noticed motion to be heard on August 1, 2024. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. VS. SELLS Case Number: 22CV-0200669 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal: An Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal (hereinafter “OSC”) issued May 31, 2024, to Plaintiff’s Counsel for failure to submit a proposed judgment as ordered on September 25, 2023. Counsel has submitted a response to the OSC Re: Dismissal, and a Request to Vacate an Order of Sanctions that was made by Judge Boeckman on May 28, 2024. The Court declines to vacate its May 31, 2024 Order imposing sanctions. That issue is not properly before the Court. That order was issued by another judge and Counsel failed to appear at the hearing on that matter. A proposed judgment was lodged with the Court on June 24, 2024. However, the Court notes that the proposed judgment identifies two street addresses for the subject property, each of which are different from the street address identified in the Request for Court Judgment by Default. The Court needs further clarification as to the correct address. The ‘correctness’ of the judgment is not at issue in the instant OSC. Only the failure to timely provide the Court with a proposed judgment is at issue in this hearing. Having reviewed counsel’s declaration, the Court finds good cause to vacate the instant OSCThe Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m. ****************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. Review Hearings ******************************************************************************

CV-23-002213 – LEGGETT, JANAE vs KEMP, HIRAM – Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Court Order, Failure to Provide Discovery, and Failure to Pay Sanctions – DENIED. According to the proof of service, the motion papers were only served via email. Plaintiff is self-represented. Electronic service on an unrepresented party requires express consent that is established either by “[s]erving a notice on all parties and filing the notice with the court”; or (ii) “[m]anifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6(c)(3)(i-ii).) It appears that neither of these conditions applies in this case. Furthermore, the notice of motion and motion fail to state the code section(s) under which Defendant is moving for dismissal. In the supporting memorandum, Defendant states that his request is made under Code of Civil Procedure § 581(g). Section 581(g) concerns delay in prosecution. Plaintiff timely served the Defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint, and Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff has been purposefully trying to slow the action down through her delay in serving Defendant with amended discovery responses. Defendant alternatively asks the Court to dismiss the complaint on its own motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 583. Section 583 was repealed in 1984. To the extent that the motion can be deemed a request for a terminating sanction under Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2023.010 and 2023.030, the motion is still insufficient. Plaintiff provided at least some discovery responses in the form of answers to the interrogatories and documents responsive to the requests for production. If Defendant believed the responses were inadequate, then the next step would be to move to compel further responses and have the Court independently determine the adequacy of the responses. Instead, Defendant sought terminating sanctions. The Court also notes that it did not place a timeframe on the payment of monetary sanctions in its original minute orders. (See 3-8-24 MOs.) In any case, the sanctions awards are enforceable as judgments but, in and of themselves, are insufficient grounds to warrant dismissal of the complaint. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995).) Defendant’s ”supplement” to the motion filed on July 11, 2024, was untimely filed and improperly raised new arguments. The Court disregards it. Plaintiff’s opposition was untimely filed and the Court was unable to review it prior to preparing this ruling.

23CV02337 COX v. MROCZEK, et al. CONFIRMATION OF 6/28/24 ORDER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT AND OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS The court has reviewed plaintiff’s Notification of Objection to and Disapproval of Any Proposed Order or Other Order: 1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Complaint; or 2) Striking Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s objections merely go to the process by which parties engage on proposed orders; CRC 3.1312 has no impact on the power of the court to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss this action. The court’s previous order of 6/28/24 granting defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint is confirmed, as is dismissal of this action. Defendants are ordered to submit a formal dismissal order for the court’s signature. Page 1 of 2 Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2

WAGNER VS. LLOYD Case Number: CVCV21-0198602 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of counsel. At the last hearing on May 20, 2024, both parties represented that they were trying to obtain counsel. There was also a question of whether Plaintiff was acting in her capacity as a Trustee. An appearance by both parties is required on today’s calendar. Plaintiff should be prepared to address whether the property is held by a trust or as individuals.