Tentative ruling on Jun. 14, 2024 in San Diego County, CA - Case no: xxxxxCTL

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: C-60 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner CASE NO.: 37-2023-00002923-CU-CR-CTL CASE TITLE: BOYD VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Civil Rights EVENT TYPE: Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Defendants County of San Diego and Sgt. William Munsch's motion for summary adjudication is DENIED as untimely. Defendants motion to seal exhibits B, C, E, and F to its lodgment in support of its motion for summary adjudication is OFF CALENDAR, as it was filed without a reserved hearing date. The court will set a hearing date of August 9, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in this department for the motion to seal to be heard. Motion for Summary Adjudication Defendants did not file and serve their motion within the required 75-day time limit set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a)(2), which is a jurisdictional requirement the court has no authority to disregard. (See, e.g., McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 ["[I]n light of the express statutory language, trial courts do not have authority to shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings."].) Here, Defendants served their motion by electronic service on April 4, 2024. (See, e.g., ROA #130, pp. 1-2.) The motion was noticed for a hearing on June 21, 2024. (ROA #120, p. 1.) The last day to serve the motion is calculated by "counting backward from the hearing date, excluding the day of the hearing as provided by Section 12." (Code Civ. Proc., § 12c, subd. (a), underlining added.) Counting 75 days backwards from the June 21, 2024 hearing date results in a date of April 7, 2024 (Sunday), which is a holiday. If the last day to serve a motion is a holiday, that day is also excluded from the calculation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 12.) As the court understands the interaction of Code of Civil Procedure sections 12 and 12c, in counting backwards from the hearing date, if the last day to serve the motion falls on a holiday, exclusion of that day from the calculation means the last day to serve the motion is the next non-holiday counting backward. In other words, if the last day falls on a Sunday, the last day to serve the motion is the Friday before that Sunday, and not the Monday following that Sunday. Had Defendants served their moving papers via personal service, their motion filed on April 4, 2024 (Thursday) would have been timely. But because Defendants used electronic service, the statutorily prescribed 75-day notice period "shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B), emphasis added; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(2) ["If the notice is served by . . . another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by two court days."].) Thus, for a motion for Event ID: 3061483 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 6 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: BOYD VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00002923-CU-CR-CTL [IMAGED] summary judgment with a noticed hearing date of June 21, 2024 to be timely served by electronic means, it needed to be served no later than April 3, 2024. By filing and serving their motion on April 4, 2024, Defendants provided less than the statutorily required notice period, rendering their motion untimely. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is denied without prejudice. Motion to Seal Defendants filed their motion to seal without reserving a hearing for the motion, in violation of this court's local rules; as such, it will not be heard. (San Diego Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.1.19.A ["Failure to reserve a date for hearing will result in the demurrer, motion, ex parte application, or order to show cause hearing not being heard."].) The court will set a hearing date for the motion for August 9, 2024. The documents filed conditionally under seal will remain conditionally sealed until the motion is heard. The court will treat the unredacted documents Plaintiff filed in connection with his opposition to Defendants' motion for summary adjudication, which currently have an elevated security level, as documents filed conditionally under seal pursuant to Rule 2.551, subdivision (b)(3), of the California Rules of Court. If Defendants want those documents sealed, they must file a motion to have them sealed. The court will set a hearing date of August 9, 2024 for this motion, coincident with the motion to seal exhibits B, C, E, and F of Defendants' lodgment in support of their motion for summary adjudication. The court will extend the time for filing this motion to 16 court days before August 9, 2024. If a motion is not filed within that timeframe, the hearing will be taken off calendar, and the security will be removed from ROA nos. 162 and 163. If the tentative is confirmed, the minute order will be the order of the court. Event ID: 3061483 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 6 Page: 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 08:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-74 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Blaine K. Bowman CASE NO.: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: The court addresses the evidentiary issues. Plaintiff's evidentiary objections are all OVERRULED. The court then rules as follows. Defendants Watkins Environmental, Inc., Pierce F. Barone and William Szymanski's motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Preliminarily, although Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, because the petition was filed in an existing lawsuit, the court treats Defendants' petition to compel arbitration as a motion to compel arbitration. See, Mar v. Perkins (2024) 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 at fn. 3. As such, there is no basis for Defendants' arguments that Plaintiff's opposition was untimely filed. Defendants seek to compel arbitration pursuant to the "AGREEMENT FOR AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AND BINDING ARBITRATION" signed by both Plaintiff and Pierce F. Barone, President of WEI. As to the foundational issue Plaintiff raises, the court finds the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.) applies to the Agreement. Under §2 of the FAA: A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Via the terms of Section 2 of the Agreement the parties expressly agreed that "[t]he FAA applies to this Agreement because WEI's business involves interstate commerce." The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's arguments or authorities in opposition. Plaintiff fails to address this provision and neither of the authorities Plaintiff relies on involves a similar provision. In this circumstance, the court finds the FAA applies to the Agreement. As Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126 explains, [t]he court's role under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is . . . limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 719–20 (9th Cir.1999); see also Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 477–78 (9th Cir.1991). If the response is affirmative on both counts, then the Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms. Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] Chiron Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130. Plaintiff first argues that Defendants have not met their burden of establishing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. "When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944. Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158 sets forth the applicable analysis under California law. The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence: "Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the [motion or] petition, the [party seeking arbitration] bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061 (Rosenthal).) However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process. First, the moving party bears the burden of producing "prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy." (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) The moving party "can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature." (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 (Bannister)) . . . . If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion. If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (See Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597.) The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. (See Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 546, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 [never saw or signed agreement]; Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1065, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 695 (Fabian) [never given or signed contract]; Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1054, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 (Espejo) [did not recall seeing or signing document]; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 (Ruiz) [did not recall signing agreement].) If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165-167. In its moving papers Defendants submit a copy of the Agreement with a signature on the line above the handwritten name "Frank Bernal Jr" [Plaintiff]. Under Gamboa, such evidence is sufficient to meet Defendants' burden of producing "prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy." Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to come forward with evidence challenging the authenticity of the agreement. Plaintiff submits evidence in the form of his own declaration wherein he states, in part: 4. I never received an arbitration agreement during my time working for WATKINS, nor did I receive or sign or read the at-will employment and arbitration agreement displayed in Exhibit A at any point during my employment with WATKINS. I was also never provided a copy of any arbitration agreement Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 2 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] associated with WATKINS until my lawyer sent me the document displayed in Exhibit A. 5. Before I spoke with my counsel, I was not even familiar with the term "arbitration" and did not know what that term meant. 6. No one at WATKINS ever mentioned to me or explained to me the contents or the significance of an arbitration agreement. I also was never told by anyone at WATKINS that I was giving up my rights to bring a lawsuit in court. In fact, the term "arbitration" was never brought up throughout the entirety of my employment with WATKINS. The court finds this evidence sufficient to meet Plaintiff's burden. Thus, the burden shifts back to Defendants to "establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties." Defendants submit the Declaration of Kendall Barone, office administrator and custodian of records for WEI. Kendall Barone states, in part: 3. In my capacity as Office Administrator and custodian of records for WEI, I personally deliver to WEI employees, collect from WEI employees, and maintain employee forms and documents, including the Agreement For At-Will Employment And Binding Arbitration ("Arbitration Agreement") signed on March 18, 2022 by plaintiff, which is the subject of WEI's Petition. A true and correct copy of the Arbitration Agreement is attached as Exhibit l to this declaration. 4. It is WEI's and my regular custom and practice to meet with new and existing WEI employees in person to provide and ask them to read and sign important human resources documents including arbitration agreements. Since prior to 2021, I have done this with WEI employees at the time of their hire, as well as and during their employment when documents are updated. Immediately after WEI employees sign and return any documents to me, including arbitration agreements, it is WEI's and my regular custom and practice to place and maintain all documents signed by employees in their respective WEI personnel files. I performed this process with plaintiff when he was hired by WEI on April 28, 2021, and, again on March 21, 2022. 5. On April 28, 2021, when plaintiff was hired by WEI, I met with him in person at WEI's offices in San Diego. During this meeting, I handed plaintiff paper copies of WEI's new-hire packet documents which included the following forms: - Designation Of Beneficiary - Employee Acknowledgement Of Handbook - General Safety Manual Acknowledgment - Employment Eligibility Verification, Form I-9 - Acknowledgment Of Neubridg Sub Plan - Form W-4 - Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate - Department of the Local Navy Population ID Card/Base Access Pass Registration - Agreement To Arbitrate Employment Disputes (signed by plaintiff April 28, 2021) 6. During my April 28, 2021 meeting with plaintiff, I provided plaintiff as much time as he needed to review these documents, and he did not indicate he needed more time or that he did not understand what he was reading and signing. He did not ask me any questions about the documents, and he was not pressured in any way to sign any document. At the time, I observed plaintiff review, sign, date, and place his printed name on these documents. He then returned the signed documents to me. True and correct copies of the documents he signed and returned to me on April 28, 2021, are attached to this declaration as Exhibits 2 through 10. 7. Thereafter, on March 18, 2022, I again met with plaintiff in person at WEI's offices to provide him paper copies of other and updated employment documents including the following: Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 3 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] - Agreement For At-Will Employment And Binding Arbitration (Exhibit 1) - Acknowledgment Of Neubridg Sub Plan - Employee Acknowledgment Of General Safety Manual - Employee Acknowledgement Of Agreement For At-Will Employment And Binding Arbitration - Employee Acknowledgement Of Handbook 8. During my meeting with plaintiff on March 18, 2022, he was provided as much time as he needed to review these documents, including the Arbitration Agreement attached as Exhibit 1. He did not indicate he needed more time or that he did not understand what he was reading and signing. He did not ask me any questions about the Arbitration Agreement and he did not say he was unfamiliar with the term "arbitration." He was never pressured in any way to sign any of these documents. The signatures and printed writing on these documents, other than my signature, title, and dates at the bottom of the I-9 Form, are all plaintiffs. During this meeting, I observed plaintiff sign, date, and place his printed name on the documents attached as Exhibits 11 through 14, as well as the Arbitration Agreement attached as Exhibit 1. He returned these documents to me and I placed them in his WEI personnel file. The court considers Plaintiff's statement that he did not receive or sign the Agreement. The court considers the detailed nature of the Kendall Barone declaration regarding the WEI process applicable to the signing of human resource documents, including arbitration agreements, and that Kendall Barone expressly states that she observed Plaintiff sign documents on April 20, 2021, and also observed Plaintiff sign documents on March 18, 2021, which documents included the Agreement. The court also considers that Plaintiff does not expressly deny that the signature on the Agreement is that of Plaintiff. In these circumstances, the court finds Defendants meet their burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The court is not persuaded by the arguments Plaintiff raises or by the authorities Plaintiff relies on. The court overrules Plaintiff's evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Pierce F. Barone. The Declaration of Kendall Barone sufficiently sets forth the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Agreement. Plaintiff's reliance on the results in Ruiz and Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062 is misplaced because both involved circumstances unique to electronic signatures. In contrast, Kendall Barone expressly states that she witnessed Plaintiff sign the Agreement. Plaintiff's reliance on the result in Gamboa is also misplaced because in Gamboa, the employer "presented no evidence that Gamboa [the plaintiff] saw or signed the arbitration agreement because the court sustained Gamboa's objections to the Clinic's proffered evidence." Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 168. In contrast, Defendants submit evidence that Kendall Barone observed Plaintiff signing the Agreement and Plaintiff does not expressly dispute that it is Plaintiff's signature on the Agreement. Although Plaintiff requests an evidentiary hearing on this issue, Plaintiff provides no authority requiring such a hearing. Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394 holds to the contrary. Also, to the extent Plaintiff may raise arguments as to the propriety of Defendants submitting the Declaration of Kendall Barone, Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047 specifically allows for Defendants to submit this declaration in reply. Plaintiff next argues that the Agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable as a result. Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223 explains, [u]nconscionability consists of both procedural and substantive elements. The procedural element addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. (See Armendariz, at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669; Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 63 P.3d 979 [procedural unconscionability "generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion"].) Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. (Armendariz, at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669; Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 330.) A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be "so one-sided as to 'shock the conscience.' " (24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 4 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] Court, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 533.) The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 972, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903; Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 330.) Both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability must be shown, but "they need not be present in the same degree" and are evaluated on " 'a sliding scale.' " (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669.) "[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa." (Ibid.) As indicated, procedural unconscionability requires oppression or surprise. " 'Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.' " Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005). Pinnacle, 55 Cal.4th at 246-247. Plaintiff claims procedural unconscionability based on the same arguments raised as to the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. The court finds, at best, such circumstances establish a low level of procedural unconscionability. On the issue of substantive unconscionability Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is one-sided because it excludes claims from arbitration that Defendants are more likely to bring against Plaintiff but requires Plaintiff to arbitrate virtually all claims. The provision Plaintiff relies on is section 3(b)(ii) of the Agreement. The pertinent text of section 3 reads: 3. Claims Subject to Arbitration. a. Covered Claims. . . . b. Uncovered Claims. The only exceptions to the requirement for mediation and binding arbitration are: (i) Claims by Employee alleging sexual harassment and/or sexual assault; claims arising under the National Labor Relations Act brought before the National Labor Relations Board; claims for benefits under the California Workers' Compensation Act; claims for unemployment or disability benefits with the California Employment Development Department; and any other claims that may not be compelled to arbitration under applicable state or federal law. (ii) Claims by WEI for injunctive or other equitable relief, including without limitation claims for unfair competition and the use or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, for which WEI may seek and obtain relief from a court of competent jurisdiction. The court finds, by its terms, Section 3 excludes from arbitration both claims more likely to be brought by Plaintiff as well as claims more likely to be brought by Defendants. Such circumstances do not support a finding that the Agreement is so one-sided as to shock the conscience. Also on the issue of substantively unconscionability, Plaintiff argues the Agreement impermissibly includes a class/collective action waiver. Plaintiff provides no authority to support this argument and such argument is contrary to Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1612, which upholds the validity of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. The court finds Plaintiff fails to establish any substantive unconscionability. Under Pinnacle and the authorities set forth above, Plaintiff must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability to defeat enforcement of the Agreement. Because Plaintiff fails to establish any substantive Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 5 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] unconscionability, the court finds Plaintiff fails to meet Plaintiff's burden of proving unconscionability. See also, Bigler v. Harker School (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 727, 736. The parties both raise issues as to the arbitration of Plaintiff's Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claims. Plaintiff does not dispute that Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims are subject to arbitration. See, Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639; Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104. The court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's representative PAGA claims should be dismissed. Such result is directly contrary to Adolph. Instead, the court exercises its discretion in favor of staying Plaintiff's representative PAGA claims pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to the first through eighth causes of action and the court stays this case as to these causes of action pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims. 9 U.S.C. § 3. As to the remaining causes of action, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff's ninth cause of action for "SEXUAL HARASSMENT, DISCRIMINATION, HOSTILE ENFIRONMENT, AND CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF FEHA" tenth cause of action for "CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY" and eleventh cause of action for "ASSAULT AND BATTERY" are expressly excluded from arbitration pursuant to Section 2(b)(i) of the Agreement (set forth above). Defendants offer no argument in reply on this issue. The court finds Plaintiff establishes that these three sexual harassment/assault-based causes of action are excluded from arbitration pursuant to Section 2(b)(i). Accordingly, Defendants' motion is DENIED as to the ninth, tenth and eleventh causes of action. In light this ruling the court does not reach the parties' arguments as to the applicability of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA). As Defendants' motion is DENIED as to the ninth, tenth and eleventh causes of action, this matter shall proceed as to these causes of action only. If this tentative ruling is confirmed the Minute Order will be the final order of the court and the parties shall not submit any further order on this motion. Unless the ruling(s) above indicate that an appearance is necessary, parties who wish to submit, who are satisfied with the above tentative ruling(s), and/or who do not otherwise wish to argue the motion(s) are encouraged to give notice to the Court and each other of their intention not to appear. Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 6

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 10:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-64 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Loren G. Freestone CASE NO.: 37-2022-00004671-CU-OE-CTL CASE TITLE: CUMMINS VS THE CITY OF NATIONAL CITY [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: TENTATIVE RULING Defendants The City of National City and The National City Police Department's Pitchess motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One, has explained the two-step process applicable to Pitchess motions in a civil case as follows: "Under the statutory scheme, a party seeking discovery of a peace officer's personnel records must follow a two-step process. First, the party must file a written motion describing the type of records sought, supported by affidavits showing good cause for the discovery, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the government agency identified has the records or information from the records. This initial burden is a relatively relaxed standard. Information is material if it will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. A declaration by counsel on information and belief is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the 'materiality' component of that section." "Second, if the trial court concludes the defendant has fulfilled these prerequisites and made a showing of good cause, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents 'potentially relevant' to the defendant's motion. The trial court shall examine the information in chambers, out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized to possess the records and such other persons the custodian of records is willing to have present. Subject to statutory exceptions and limitations, the trial court should then disclose to the defendant such information that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation." (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1085–1086.) Here, Defendants seek the following personnel records/Internal Affairs files: (1) Officer Michael Sportelli - Internal Affairs Case 2021-007 relating to a non-fatal Officer Involved Shooting (OIS) occurring on April 5, 2021; (2) Officer Robert Rude - Internal Affairs Case 2021-008 relating to a fatal OIS occurring on April 12, 2021; and (3) Plaintiff Ashley Cummins – all Internal Affairs cases, including but not limited to Case 2021-005 and 2021-007. Defendants have demonstrated that Internal Affairs Cases 2021-007 and 2021-008 are material and that there is good cause for their production. Cummins alleges: Event ID: 3098853 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 37 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: CUMMINS VS THE CITY OF CASE NUMBER: 37-2022-00004671-CU-OE-CTL NATIONAL CITY [IMAGED] "Defendants have kept an IA investigation for an officer-involved shooting against Ms. Cummins open to the date of this writing even though Ms. Cummins was cleared by the District Attorney's ('DA') office in or around December 2021. As a result, Ms. Cummins is unable to apply or even be considered for a law enforcement position until that IA investigation ends. Upon information and belief, it is common practice to close an IA investigation if the DA clears you. In an effort to punish Ms. Cummins, Defendants have kept the IA open and refuse to let Ms. Cummins move on." Cummins also testified that there "is no reason for that IA to still be open to try to hinder me from applying elsewhere other than retaliation." The IA investigation that was allegedly left open is Case 2021-007. That case relates to a high-risk vehicle stop of a stolen vehicle that resulted in Officers Sportelli and Cummins exchanging gunshots with a suspect who ultimately escaped. Case 2021-008 relates to an attempted apprehension of that same suspect a week later that resulted in Officer Rude and another NCPD officer exchanging gunshots with the suspect who ultimately died. Defendants explain that the records will help demonstrate "the unique circumstances presented by these two separate but related OIS incidents, the coordination between the NCPD Internal Affairs Unit and the San Diego County District Attorney's Office, and the time that may be required for OIS investigations to conclude." Defendants also explain that Officers Sportelli and Rude are male, and therefore the files will help show that she was treated no differently because she is a female. Defendants further explain that the records are "material to [their] police practices expert Karen Laser, including how NCPD officers are assessed following the discharge of their weapons including the application of the San Diego County OIS Protocol and NCPD Policies 300 and 304 regarding the Use of Force and Officer Involved Shootings." Cummins' argument that the request is overbroad for purposes of the first step is not persuasive. Defendants have also demonstrated that Internal Affairs Case 2021-005 is material and that there is good cause for its production. Cummins alleges: "In an effort to continue the career she loved in a better environment, Ms. Cummins was actively applying to other police departments/agencies in or near the San Diego area. Unfortunately for Ms. Cummins, Defendants, including Ms. Cummins' supervisor, Sergeant Hernandez, actively reached out to Sergeant Cephas of the San Diego Police Department ('SDPD') and told him that Ms. Cummins was 'trouble,' or words to that effect." Case 2021-005 was prompted by Cummins' allegation for employment with SDPD. Defendants were notified by SDPD when Cummins failed a polygraph examination during her background investigation. Defendants explain that the records will provide "material information about why Plaintiff was unable to secure employment with at least one of the local law enforcement agencies to whom she applied and thus is relevant to her claim for damages and her ability to mitigate damages." Cummins' argument that the request is duplicative of Defendants' subpoena to SDPD, to which Cummins separately objected and unsuccessfully moved to quash, is not persuasive. Defendants have not demonstrated that any other Internal Affairs cases relating to Cummins are material or that there is good cause for their production. Neither the motion nor the supporting declaration gave any explanation as to why any other cases should be produced. In reply, Defendants argue that the records are relevant to Cummins' allegations that they failed to open IA investigations in response to her complaints of discrimination and harassment. However, Defendants do not adequately explain how every investigation opened regarding Cummins during her tenure is relevant to investigations they should have opened into others as alleged in the complaint. The motion is therefore granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to Cases 2021-005, Event ID: 3098853 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 37 Page: 2 CASE TITLE: CUMMINS VS THE CITY OF CASE NUMBER: 37-2022-00004671-CU-OE-CTL NATIONAL CITY [IMAGED] 2021-007, and 2021-008. The motion is otherwise denied. The custodian of records for the National City Police Department is directed to produce the documents on July 12, 2024 at 2:30pm for an in camera examination. Event ID: 3098853 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 37 Page: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 11:00:00 AM DEPT.: C-69 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Katherine Bacal CASE NO.: 37-2021-00054291-CU-BC-CTL CASE TITLE: SHIFRIN VS STRATA EQUITY GLOBAL INC [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Breach of Contract/Warranty EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: TENTATIVE RULING The hearing on this matter is trailed to the afternoon calendar at 1:30 p.m. The Court will hear from the parties. Event ID: 3143138 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 16 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 11:00:00 AM DEPT.: C-69 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Katherine Bacal CASE NO.: 37-2023-00035064-CU-OR-CTL CASE TITLE: GOLDEN VS LINTON MANAGEMENT INC [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other Real Property EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: TENTATIVE RULING The Court on its own motion sets an Order to Show Cause for June 27, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. as to why this case and People v. Lisa Golden, Case No. 37-2021-00021672-CU-MC-CTL, should not be deemed related and reassigned to the same department. S.D. Superior Court Local Rule 1.2.2.B (supervising judge at each location is responsible for calendar operations of the departments and for assignment of proceedings in cases filed). Within two court days of this ruling, plaintiff is directed to serve notice of this order on all parties in this case, and to file this notice in Case Number 37-2021-00021672-CU-MC-CTL and serve it on all parties in that case. In light of the above, the Court defers holding the case management conference and defers ruling on the motion to be relieved as counsel of record and the motion to quash service of process. Event ID: 3126215 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 10 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 01:30:00 PM DEPT.: C-69 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Katherine Bacal CASE NO.: 37-2023-00040565-CU-BT-CTL CASE TITLE: WILLIS VS THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Business Tort EVENT TYPE: SLAPP / SLAPPback Motion Hearing CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: TENTATIVE RULING Defendants' special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint is DENIED. Preliminary Matters The Court declines to consider plaintiff Karen Willis' improperly filed additional documents (ROA # 16, 25-26, 32, 42, 44), which include an addendum, sur-rebuttal, and two declarations. See CCP § 1005(b); CRC, rule 3.1113(e). Plaintiff's objection to defendants' reply (ROA # 34) is overruled. Discussion Plaintiff's complaint alleges four causes of action for declaratory relief, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, civil fraud, and civil conspiracy. ROA # 1. All three defendants, The Walt Disney Company, Walt Disney World Entertainment, and Bradley Ross, filed a motion to strike the causes of action under CCP section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). ROA # 13. Timeliness A special motion to strike "may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint" unless the Court exercises its discretion for a later time. CCP § 425.16(f). As parties agree on when the defendants were served, the Court finds the motion timely. Even if there were some question in this regard, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the merits. Potential Exemption Before reaching whether the conduct or speech at issue is protected by section 425.16, the Court first addresses plaintiff's contention that this case is exempted from the anti-SLAPP statute under section 425.17(c) (the commercial speech exemption). See Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 664, 675 (addressing potential exemption first and finding the exemption inapplicable). The California Supreme Court has made clear the burden of proving that section 425.17(c) applies "falls on the party seeking the benefit of it-i.e., the plaintiff." Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 26. Event ID: 3133458 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 19 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: WILLIS VS THE WALT DISNEY CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00040565-CU-BT-CTL COMPANY [IMAGED] Here, while plaintiff quotes the commercial speech exemption in her opposition (ROA # 14), she merely argues without any supporting evidence that defendants are all primarily engaged in selling goods and services. Yet plaintiff does not show how the alleged speech or conduct would constitute representations about defendants' business and made for the purpose of getting approval, promoting, or securing a commercial transaction. CCP § 425.17(c)(1). Instead, the conduct at issue pertains to defendants alleged actions of avoiding entering into a commercial transaction with plaintiff. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 36-45,58, 62. Further, none of these allegations would be sufficient to meet the requirement under subsection (c)(2) concerning the intended audience. Plaintiff thus has not met her burden to show the commercial speech exemption applies. Protected Activity (Step One) "Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims 'aris[e] from' protected activity in which the defendant has engaged. If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least 'minimal merit."' Park v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (citations omitted); CCP § 425.16(b)(1). "[O]nly a claim 'that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute ... is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.'" Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 872 (citations omitted). Defendants argue all of plaintiff's claims within all the causes of action fall within the category of protected activity section 425.16(e)(4), which covers "any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of ... the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." Defendants argue each of plaintiff's causes of action arise from defendants' alleged decision to ban or not to book the Village People for performances at Disney, which defendants allegedly concealed from plaintiff. MPA at 4, citing Compl. ¶¶ 37-87. Among the paragraphs cited by defendants, the alleged conduct and speech consisted of defendant Bradley Ross being "very coy" about booking Village People; Ross refused to either commit to the booking or consider the booking" (¶ 37); Ross "did not seem to want to engage in talks related to a Village People performance" (¶ 38); and Ross failed to engage the talent agents "in a serious discussion about the prospects of a Village People booking, or not" (¶¶ 39, 42); and Ross was "very 'cold' on Village People" and "didn't seem interested in engaging in any talks" about ever booking the group again" (¶ 41). The aforementioned statements and conduct by Ross were allegedly made to talent agents representing the Village People, i.e., Seth Shomes of Day After Day Productions, and Joe Wohlfield of United Talent Agency. Id. ¶¶ 36, 40. Plaintiff also alleges Ross told another agent, Seth Cohen of Pyramid Entertainment, that if the Village People performed in the area that Ross would check them out but that Ross's statement was disingenuous and he did not go to "check out" their performance. Id. ¶¶ 43-47. Plaintiff alleges Disney, through Ross and his team, thus placed a "ban or 'do not book edict'" on the Village People performances and alleges this can be proven through Disney's internal written communications. Id. ¶ 49. Our California Supreme Court set forth the framework for analyzing whether speech falls under the catch-all provision in 425.16(e)(4). "First, we ask what 'public issue or [ ] issue of public interest' the speech in question implicates-a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest." FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 150. As to the first part of the analysis, the Supreme Court explained "the catchall provision demands 'some degree of closeness' between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest;" it must "in some manner itself contribute to the public debate." Id. at 150. This is examined by looking at "whether the defendant - through public or private speech or conduct-participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest." Id. Defendants assert they have a First Amendment right to exercise their editorial discretion not to hire any Event ID: 3133458 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 19 Page: 2 CASE TITLE: WILLIS VS THE WALT DISNEY CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00040565-CU-BT-CTL COMPANY [IMAGED] particular music group to perform at their venues, and that deciding which musical acts to book is in furtherance of their constitutionally protected free speech rights. MPA at 4, citing Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo (1974) 418 U.S. 241, 256-58, Hunter v. CBS Broad. Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1521. Miami Herald does not support their argument, as that case involved discussion of a state government statute that violated the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press concerning a newspaper's right to publish material concerning political, social and economic views, to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. Id., supra, at 255-258. Hunter also does not assist defendants, as that case involved selection of a news anchor for weather reports (a matter of public interest); and courts have recognized that reporting the news and creating a television show qualify as free speech exercise and selecting anchors helps advance those forms of First Amendment expression. Id. at 1521, 1527; see also Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 896 (similar). Here, unlike the cases cited by defendants, defendants have not shown for purposes of this motion that they are a print or television broadcasting news media organization. Defendants also argue the alleged speech or conduct involved an issue of public interest because it concerned a "person or entity in the public eye." Whether a matter is of public interest may include considerations such as whether the subject of the speech or activity is a "person or entity in the public eye." FilmOn.com Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 146. Generally, "[a] public issue is implicated if the subject of the statement or activity underlying the claim ... was a person or entity in the public eye." Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1254. Here, plaintiff acknowledges in her complaint that the Village People are in the public eye. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 21, 46. Accordingly, on this basis, the alleged speech/conduct at issue concerned an issue of public interest. Under the second part, the functional relationship portion of the analysis, "the second part of the test moves from a focus on identifying the relevant matters of public interest to addressing the specific nature of defendants' speech and its relationship to the matters of public interest." Film-On, supra, at 152. "[T]he inquiry of whether a statement contributes to the public debate is one a court can hardly undertake without incorporating considerations of context-including audience, speaker, and purpose." Id. at 151–152. This is discerned by "looking at the broader context" in which the speech was made, and "discerning through that context whether the company's conduct qualifies for statutory protection by furthering the public conversation on an issue of public interest." Id. at 153; see also Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1249 (reaffirming two-part test). Here, defendants do not sufficiently address and have not shown the alleged speech/conduct participates in or furthers the public conversation about the matter of public interest. Defendants allegedly made the statements and engaged in the conduct at issue, via one speaker, defendant Ross, in communications with three individual talent agents. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 40, 43-47. Defendants allegedly also has internal company communications that stated not to book the Village People. Compl. ¶ 49. Thus, these statements and conduct were not made to the "wider public," but rather, to a few select Village People agents and internal communications for defendants' business purposes. There is no indication that defendants' statements "entered the public sphere." Id. at 153. This context matters. In looking at this broader content and context, defendants have not shown that the alleged statements "contributed to or furthered the public conversation on an issue of public interest." Id. at 154. Consequently, defendants have not met their burden to show the statements and conduct at issue were made in furtherance of free speech in connection with a public issue under section 425.16(e)(4). Because defendants did not meet their burden on prong one, the burden did not shift to plaintiff under prong two to produce evidence showing a probability of prevailing on the causes of action. Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 1061. Conclusion For the reasons stated, defendants' motion to strike all causes of action alleged in plaintiff's complaint is DENIED. Event ID: 3133458 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 19 Page: 3 CASE TITLE: WILLIS VS THE WALT DISNEY CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00040565-CU-BT-CTL COMPANY [IMAGED] The minute order is the order of the Court. Plaintiff is directed to serve notice on all parties within two court days of this ruling. Event ID: 3133458 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 19 Page: 4

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 10:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-68 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Richard S. Whitney CASE NO.: 37-2022-00022203-CU-OE-CTL CASE TITLE: WEASON VS PLASTIC EXPRESS [E-FILE] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: TENTATIVE RULINGS: (1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT and (2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS are GRANTED. The Court will adopt as its own the proposed order filed on May 24, 2024. A copy of the executed order will be available for counsel to pick-up after Wednesday, June 26, 2024. Event ID: 3074409 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 26 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: C-75 JUDICIAL OFFICER:James A Mangione CASE NO.: 37-2023-00016329-CU-BC-CTL CASE TITLE: BRAY VS URBACH ROOFING INC [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Breach of Contract/Warranty EVENT TYPE: Discovery Hearing CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Defendants Urbach Roofing, Inc. and American Contractors Indemnity Company's Motions to Compel Further Discovery to (1) Requests for Production of Documents (Set One), (2) Form Interrogatories (Set One) and (3) Special Interrogatories (Set One) are granted. Plaintiff is directed to provide supplemental responses within fourteen (14) days. Defendants are awarded monetary sanctions of $950, to be paid within sixty (60) days. The minute order is the order of the Court. Event ID: 3116956 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 6 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 37-2023-00049192-CU-CL-CTL CASE TITLE: KURTIN PROPERTIES INC VS TRUAX [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other Collections EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Application of Bradley J. Dixon to appear Pro Hac Vice for Defendants is granted. Event ID: 3125557 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 11 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: SBM022437 CASE TITLE: FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY VS VELAZQUEZ [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Limited CASE TYPE: Breach of Contract/Warranty EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Judgment is granted The Court will sign the proposed order consistent with this ruling. Event ID: 3117268 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 20 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: C-60 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner CASE NO.: 37-2024-00002893-CU-OE-CTL CASE TITLE: SOSA VS FAMILY HEALTH CENTERS OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Defendant Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiff Eden Sosa's objection to the evidence submitted by Defendant in reply to the opposition is overruled. The evidence submitted by Defendant is a permissible response to the arguments and evidence submitted by Plaintiff in her opposition; it is not "new" evidence. Under "both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate." (Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 855, 861 (citation omitted).) "The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense." (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) Here, Defendant presents evidence Plaintiff agreed to binding arbitration of "all legal claims that could be filed in a court, and which arise from [Plaintiff's] employment with or separation from FHCSD," including "claims against FHCSD and its employees, board members, related companies, contractors, and/or agents," and "all claims of any kind that FHCSD may have against [Plaintiff] arising from [Plaintiff's] employment with or separation from FCHSD." (ROA #14, Valdez Dec., Ex. A, ¶ 4.) Defendant attaches the executed agreement, which was electronically signed by Plaintiff on March 7, 2023. (Valdez Dec., ¶¶ 4-5, Exs. B-C.) Plaintiff does not dispute she received and electronically signed the agreement. Accordingly, Defendant's evidence is sufficient to meet its burden; an arbitration agreement exists that was agreed to by Plaintiff. In opposition, Plaintiff's counsel asserts Defendant "forced Ms. Sosa to sign an agreement to arbitrate any and all employment disputes," and states in a footnote that "Ms. Sosa does not concede the arbitration agreement foisted on her by FHCSD is enforceable." (ROA #26, Plaintiff's Opposition, p. 3.) However, these assertions lack evidentiary support, and are not grounded in legal argument. As such, the court will disregard them and construe Plaintiff's opposition as a concession the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable if it is not barred by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 ("EFAA"), that Plaintiff's claims are within its scope, and that it is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. Plaintiff's argument in opposition is grounded solely on the EFAA, which amends the Federal Arbitration Act to prohibit employers from enforcing pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual harassment or sexual assault disputes. (9 U.S.C., § 402.) Plaintiff contends the EFAA Event ID: 3144199 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 5 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: SOSA VS FAMILY HEALTH CASE NUMBER: 37-2024-00002893-CU-OE-CTL CENTERS OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] prohibits the court from enforcing the March 2023 arbitration agreement because she has alleged sexual harassment by her former direct supervisor, Patrick Olsen, and this harassment did not lead to a "dispute" until she was terminated in September 2023 and then filed this action. The court disagrees. In support of her argument, Plaintiff relies heavily on Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 214; however, her reliance on Kader is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff did not report the alleged sexual harassment to anyone other than his harasser, as he alleged the harasser "threatened to fire him if he told anyone, implying [the harasser] did not dispute the conduct," and the plaintiff's attorney at oral argument "conceded [the plaintiff] never complained to anyone at the Center about [the harasser's] conduct." (Id. at p. 224.) Thus, there was no evidence the plaintiff "asserted any right, claim, or demand prior to filing charges with the DFEH in May 2022," or that the defendants "disagreed with any claim asserted by [the plaintiff] until after he filed charges with DFEH," which was after the arbitration agreement between the parties was executed. (Id.) Here, the alleged facts are materially dissimilar to those in Kader, and "the date that a dispute has arise for purposes of the Act is a fact-specific inquiry in each case[.]" (Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) In this case, Plaintiff alleges Defendant's now former Senior Vice President of Clinic Operations (and now dismissed Defendant), Patrick Olsen, exposed himself during a Teams meeting on December 14, 2022, and "appeared to be fondling his penis." (Complaint, ¶ 28.) Both Plaintiff and Dr. Sandra Cervantes were subjected to the exposure, and both reported the incident. Plaintiff "immediately" reported it to Dr. Christopher Gordon, Defendant's President and Chief Medical Officer, (Complaint, ¶ 29), and Dr. Cervantes reported it to Joe Mancillas, Defendant's Employee Relations Manager. (Complaint, ¶ 30.) After the reports, Dr. Cervantes received a call from Defendant's CEO, Fran Butler-Cohen, and in response to her report during the call, "Butler-Cohen criticized Dr. Cervantes for complaining about the inappropriate sexual conduct by Mr. Olsen and attacked Dr. Cervantes for acting like 'a victim.'" (Complaint, ¶ 31.) As to Plaintiff's report, "[l]ess than one-month after reporting Mr. Olsen's sexual harassment, Dr. Gordon issued Ms. Sosa a retaliatory and false 'verbal counseling'." (Complaint, ¶ 34.) "A dispute arises when one party asserts a right, claim, or demand, and the other side expresses disagreement or takes an adversarial posture." (Kader v. Southern California Medical Center, Inc., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) Keeping in mind this guiding principle, the above allegations of reporting harassment and the retaliatory responses to such reporting, are sufficient to conclude a dispute arose prior to the March 2023 arbitration agreement. The injury occurred on December 14, 2022, and Plaintiff asserted a right (to be free of harassment) when she "immediately" reported the harassing conduct. Defendant then took an adversarial posture less than a month after Plaintiff's report (i.e., in late January 2023), when Dr. Gordon allegedly "issued Ms. Sosa a retaliatory and false 'verbal counseling'." Thus, at least one month before the parties entered an arbitration agreement on March 7, 2023, a dispute concerning the sexual harassment alleged by Plaintiff in this case had arisen, thereby rendering the arbitration agreement a post-dispute agreement that does not fall within the scope of the EFAA. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to compel arbitration is granted. Plaintiff Eden Sosa and Defendant Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. are ordered to arbitration and this litigation is STAYED pending completion of arbitration. The court will vacate the Civil Case Management Conference set for July 26, 2024, and set a status conference for December 20, 2024, at 11:00 a.m. in this department. The minute order is the order of the court. Event ID: 3144199 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 5 Page: 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 37-2010-00088694-CL-CL-CTL CASE TITLE: CHRYSLER FINANCIAL SERVICES AMERICAS LLC VS. ROMERO-MARTINEZ [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Limited CASE TYPE: Rule 3.740 Collections EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Judgment is granted. The Court will sign the proposed amended judgment consistent with this ruling. Event ID: 3117169 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 18 Page: 1