Tentative ruling on Jul. 10, 2024 in Santa Cruz County, CA - Case no: xxxxx864

24CV00800 BURDGE v. AIRSTREAM INC. AIRSTREAM’S MOTION TO STAY The motion to stay is denied. I. BACKGROUND Kathryn Burdge’s (“Burdge’) amended complaint, filed on March 26, 2024, alleges a violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act in relation to her purchase of a 2023 Airstream Atlas RV. She purchased the Airstream in Temecula, California and she resided in Page 6 of 9 Santa Cruz County at the time of the purchase. Burdge asserts various deficiencies/defects with the RV. In connection with the purchase of the Airstream, Burdge signed a Limited Warranty which stated, in part, the following: “LEGAL REMEDIES: EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR DECIDING LEGAL DISPUTES RELATING TO THE ALLEGED BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY NATURE RESTS IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE STATE OF MANUFACTURE, WHICH IS OHIO.” (Ex. B to Dec. of March.) This language is found on the second page of the Limited Warranty and is the second paragraph before the signature line for the purchaser. The sales contract is 6 pages long and signatures were required on each page and, on some pages, multiple signatures on each page. II. MOTION Airstream seeks to stay this action to allow Burdge to re-file the case in Ohio, the forum selection state. Airstream bases its motion on the above-referenced forum selection clause contained in the signed limited warranty. Airstream contends a motion to enforce a forum selection clause is a motion to stay (or dismiss) the action to allow a plaintiff to file in the proper court. Airstream argues the forum selection provision is mandatory and reasonable. Further, Airstream acknowledges Burdge cannot be compelled to waive her rights under Song-Beverly, and thus, it will stipulate to have the Ohio courts apply Song-Beverly in this case. Airstream contends a stay would allow for time to determine if the Ohio courts would apply Song-Beverly. If they will not, then Burdge could bring the case back to Santa Cruz. Burdge opposes the stay. She argues Airstream failed to provide evidence demonstrating she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause. Even though Burdge signed the limited warranty “she had to sign the document even if she did not understand the importance of the forum selection clause.” (Opp at pg. 3.) That is, Burdge was required to sign the acknowledgment of document and that does not prove she waived her rights under Song-Beverly freely and voluntarily. Burdge asserts Airstream failed to provide evidence that the designated forum will not diminish her rights afforded under California law. Specifically, she argues, even if the court finds she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause, Airstream cannot show that Ohio law will not diminish her substantive rights. Burdge contends Airstream’s offer to stipulate to have the Song-Beverly apply in Ohio is insufficient because the choice of law in the Limited Page 7 of 9 Warranty states that Ohio law will govern procedural issues and how the express warranty is construed and interpreted. III. DISCUSSION “Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489; see also Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-79; CCP § 128(a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.”].) "The procedure for enforcing a forum selection clause is a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens." (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1294.) “California law is ‘in accord with the modern trend which favors enforceability of such [mandatory] forum selection clauses. [Citations.] No satisfying reason of public policy has been suggested why enforcement should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered into freely and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's length. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 444-445.) “‘California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents in a way that violates our state's public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 141, 147.) “The party opposing enforcement of a forum selection clause ordinarily ‘bears the substantial burden of proving why it should not be enforced.’ [Citations.] That burden, however, is reversed when the claims at issue are based on unwaivable rights created by California statutes. In that situation, the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause bears the burden to show litigating the claims in the contractually designated forum ‘will not diminish in any way the substantive rights afforded … under California law.’ [Citations.]” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) In this case, while she did sign the limited warranty, the court agrees with Burdge that the warranty was not signed knowingly as to the forum selection clause and that application of the clause would be unreasonable and/or unfair. The clause is buried in the second to the last paragraph and is written in legalese such that a reasonable consumer could not be expected to understand they were acquiescing to file a lawsuit in Ohio. The exclusive jurisdiction section does not adequately inform the consumer that they would need to file suit in Ohio for warranty issues, especially given that Burdge lives in California and purchased the Airstream in Page 8 of 9 California. The court also notes the length of the sales contract and number of signatures required as factors which balance in Burdge’s favor. The court does not find Airstream has carried its burden in demonstrating that Burdge’s substantive rights will not be diminished in any way if the case is brought in Ohio. Despite the offer of Airstream’s counsel to stipulate to apply California law in Ohio, there is no guarantee the Ohio courts will agree to this arrangement; that is, what is the effect of the stipulation in the Ohio courts? Second, Airstream’s proposal would create two pending actions, which does not promote judicial economy. Third, having California courts apply California law simply makes more sense in terms of protecting Burdge’s rights under the Song-Beverly Act and for efficient case management. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 9 of 9

24CV01847 FOSTER v. CITY OF SANTA CRUZ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ACT As discussed below, the petition is denied. I. BACKGROUND AND PETITION Lisa Foster (“Foster”) brings this petition pursuant to Government Code section 946.6 for relief from the clams presentation requirements. Foster alleges she tripped on a sidewalk either maintained or owned by the City, sustaining injuries. Foster’s prior counsel, Mr. Horowitz, mistakenly submitted a government claim to the Judicial Branch-Superior Court of Santa Cruz, rather than the City. After Foster served the City with her complaint (see case no. 23CV00638), it answered but then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging Foster’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. The court granted this motion and dismissed the complaint. Foster now brings this petition, based on a theory of estoppel, and contends the City “engaged in a calculated course of delay and concealment with the intent and effect of preventing Petitioner’s counsel from discovering his mistake in time to correct it.” Timeline of relevant events: - July 31, 2022: Foster alleged she sustained injuries after tripping over a raised portion of the sidewalk at the intersection of Pelton and Lighthouse Avenue in Santa Cruz. - November 15, 2022: Mr. Horowitz mistakenly completed a government claim form for the Judicial Branch and mailed it to Santa Cruz Superior Court. (Dec. of Horowitz at ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) Page 9 of 16 - November 28, 2022: Mr. Horowitz received back a signed certified receipt of mailing regarding the Judicial Branch claim. (Dec. of Horowitz at ¶ 4.) - March 17, 2023: Horowitz filed a complaint on petitioner’s behalf against the City of Santa Cruz, case number 23CV00638. (Dec. of Horowitz at ¶ 5.) - April 18, 2023: the complaint in 23CV00638 is served on the City. (Dec. of Horowitz at ¶ 6.) - May 15, 2023: the City filed and served a declaration of demurring or moving part in support of automatic extension. - June 27, 2023: the City filed its answer in 23CV00638. - November 1, 2023: the City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on Foster’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act, specifically, her failure to present a claim to the proper entity. - January 26, 2024: the court granted the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, without leave to amend in case 23CV00638 for Foster’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. - January 31, 2024: counsel for Foster asserts she presented an application to the City for leave to present a late claim, which is denied. (The application is not attached to the petition or the declaration from Mr. Vivian, her current counsel.) - June 27, 2024: Foster filed this petition. Attached to the petition are declarations from Mr. Horowitz as well as Mr. Vivian. The petition refers to sections in Mr. Vivian’s declaration which do not exist and to the late claim she presented to the City in January of 2024, but this document is not attached. (See pgs 5 & 6 of Petition.) Foster argues she is entitled to relief based upon equitable estoppel principles. She concedes her prior counsel made a mistake when he submitted her claim to the incorrect governmental entity. “However, counsel for Petitioner’s mistaken belief that he had submitted the Government Claim to the City was a mistake of facts such as would support an estoppel under the circumstances.” (Pet. at pg. 10.) Foster cites Kleinecke v. Montecito Water District (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 240. Foster states counsel for the City engaged in a course of conduct and concealed facts with the intent and effect of preventing Foster’s counsel from discovering his mistake of fact – that he had filed a claim with the wrong entity. In this case, the complaint was served on the City on April 18, 2023. Foster argues the City received the automatic 30-day extension and counsel for requested an additional 45-days to respond to the complaint. Foster asserts the City raised the affirmative defense of failure to comply with the Government Claims statute but did not allege any facts to support this defense and the case management statement filed by the City on July 13, Page 10 of 16 2023 did not disclose its intention to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon Foster’s failure to submit a Government claim. (Pet. at pg. 14.) II. OPPOSITION First, the City asserts the court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief because Foster failed to submit an application for leave to file a late claim within one year of the cause of action. The City contends “‘[w]hen the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under the Government Code section 946.6.’” (Opp. at pg. 2, citing Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779.) Although Foster states she submitted an application, no declaration or judicially noticed record shows any application. Further, the City alleges this application, assuming it exists, was submitted more than one year after the incident and thus, the court does not have jurisdiction to grant relief. The City argues Foster failed to show excusable neglect pursuant to the statute [i.e. mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect]. The showing for relief from the late claim process is similar to the showing required for relief from default judgment. The City asserts Foster made no attempt to establish excusable neglect because she failed to discover the correct entity. Further, the City points out on November 28, 2022 Mr. Horowitz received a signed certified receipt of mailing for the claim form sent to the superior court and if the receipt was reviewed with reasonable diligence, the error would have been discovered with ample time to properly file a claim with the City. (Opp at pg. 4.) The City also argues equitable estoppel does not apply because there is no evidence it affirmatively acted to petitioner’s detriment. The doctrine of equitable estoppel, contends the City, applies in limited circumstances when the public entity’s agents or employees have deterred the filing of a timely claim by an affirmative act. (Opp at pg. 4, citing Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified Schools Dist. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 165, 170.) Further, the City asserts the affirmative act requirement cannot arise from statements made by counsel during litigation that does not relate to the Government Claims Act, citing Castaneda v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1063-64.) The City argues Castaneda holds that affirmative conduct must come from the public entity or its agents or employees, not the attorneys who represented the entity and there is no allegation of an affirmative act on the part of the city. III. DISCUSSION If a claimant failed to present a claim within six months, they must first pursue the late claims procedure before seeking relief from the court. “Before a court can relieve a potential plaintiff from the Government Claims Act (Govt C §§810-99.6) requirements, the potential Page 11 of 16 plaintiff must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence one of the grounds for relief set out in Govt C §946.6(c). [Citations.] Further, the factual theory supporting the claim from relief … must be the same in both the petition presented to the court and the late claim application rested to the public entity.” [Citation.] (California Gov’t Tort Liability Practice (CEB 2024) §7.65.) In this case, petitioner does not rely upon one of the statutorily enumerated grounds for relief, but relies upon the doctrine of estoppel as a basis for relief. Late Claims Procedure: • Claimant must initially apply to the public entity for leave to present the claim after the 6- month period has expired. (Gov’t Code §911.4(a).) The application must be presented within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov’t Code § 911.4.) • The governing board of the entity must timely grant or deny the application. • If the board denies, the claimant may timely petition the superior court for relief from the claim-presentation requirement. Timeliness “If the public entity denied the application for leave to present a late claim, the claimant may file a petition for a court order relieving the claimant from the need to comply with Gov’t Code section 945.4. The relief sought is not permission to present a late claim, but an order relieving the claimant from presenting a claim at all.” [Citations.] (California Gov’t Tort Liability Practice (CEB 2024) § 7.60). A petition for relief must be filed six months after the late claim application is denied. Foster did not provide a copy of the late claim application but her counsel asserts it was presented on January 31, 2024. The accident occurred on July 31, 2022. We do not have a record of the late claim application served on the City, though petitioner’s counsel refers to it. Statutory Basis for Relief Government Code section 946.6 governs the court’s role in assessing claim presentation relief requests. (a) If an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant to Section 911.6, a petition may be made to the court for an order relieving the petitioner from Section 945.4. The proper court for filing the petition is a superior court that would be a proper court for the trial of an action on the cause of action to Page 12 of 16 which the claim relates. If the petition is filed in a court which is not a proper court for the determination of the matter, the court, on motion of any party, shall transfer the proceeding to a proper court. If an action on the cause of action to which the claim relates would be a limited civil case, a proceeding pursuant to this section is a limited civil case. (b) The petition shall show each of the following: (1) That application was made to the board under Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied. (2) The reason for failure to present the claim within the time limit specified in Section 911.2. (3) The information required by Section 910. The petition shall be filed within six months after the application to the board is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant to Section 911.6. (c) The court shall relieve the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4 if the court finds that the application to the board under Section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time not to exceed that specified in subdivision (b) of Section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied pursuant to Section 911.6 and that one or more of the following is applicable, including mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. Other grounds for relief are also enumerated but are not relevant to this petition. The petition must contain the following: • That the application for leave to present a late claim was made to the board under Government Code section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied. • The reason the claim was not presented with the time specified in Government Code section 911.2, subdivision (a); and • The information required by government Code section 910. (California Gov’t Tort Liability Practice (CEB 2024) §7.64.) Estoppel In general, estoppel in this context requires four elements: (1) the public entity must be aware of the facts; (2) the public entity must intend its conduct be acted on or must act so that the party asserting estoppel had a right to believe it was intended; (3) the claimant must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the claimant must rely on the conduct of the entity to their detriment. (California Gov’t Tort Liability Practice (CEB 2024) § 5.81.) “Under the doctrine of equitable Page 13 of 16 estoppel a public entity may be estopped from asserting the claimant’s failure to present a timely claims as a defense.” This can occur “because either the claimant, ignorant of the true facts, relied on, to their detriment, a public entity’s innocent or deliberate misrepresentation; or the public entity acted in an ‘unconscionable manner.’” (Id. at § 7.5). Estoppel has been found to be appropriate if the agency provides false or misleading statements. “Without an affirmative duty to give advice, mere failure by the public employees to advise the injured person of the need to present a claim is not a sufficient basis for estoppel.” (Id. at§5.83.) Whether estoppel exists in a case is generally a question of fact. (Id. at § 5.86.) The basis for Foster’s estoppel claim is the conduct of the City’s counsel once the lawsuit was filed. Because Foster’s counsel failed to serve the City with a proper claim, the first notice it would have had of the incident, presumably, was through service of the complaint. Thus, all the conduct complained of by Foster as the basis for estoppel occurred during the course of the litigation of this petition and the underlying civil action which was dismissed. The City cites Castaneda v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation which examined the issue of estoppel in the claims process. “[A]cts or misleading statements which can estop a public agency are those made by the ‘public entity’ or ‘its agents or employees,’ in this case the Department of Corrections or the Board, not the deputy attorneys general representing the public entity during litigation.” [Citation.] (Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1065.) “Where the misleading statements that give rise to estoppel are those made by the defendant public agency, its employees or agents, specifically about the claims filing duty, it defies logic that positions taken or not taken by an opposing party's attorney in litigation, which never mention any part of the Act, could give rise to estoppel under the Act.” (Id.) “Most cases finding estoppel when failure to present a timely claim or complaint is based upon misstatement of fact or law involve unrepresented claimants. Courts generally charge claimants’ counsel with knowledge of the law concerning the Government Claims Act (Govt C §§820-996.6) and its deadlines and hold that misstatements to counsel concerning those deadlines cannot result in estoppel.” (California Gov’t Tort Liability Practice (CEB 2024) § 5.84.) The court notes Foster has been represented throughout this process: first by Mr. Horowitz and now Mr. Vivian. There is no evidence that Foster or her counsel had any interactions with the City, other than with its counsel, before or after the lawsuit was filed. Per Castenda, Foster’s claim of estoppel cannot be based upon the conduct of litigation counsel as they had no duty to inform Foster’s counsel of the claims filing process. Page 14 of 16 Further, should the court impute the City’s counsel’s conduct onto the City, the conduct complained of does not give rise to successful claim of estoppel. There is no evidence the City deliberately or innocently misrepresented facts or acted in an unconscionable manner. Foster asserts “counsel for the City engaged in a calculated course of conduct and concealed facts with the intent and effect of preventing Petitioner’ counsel from discovering his mistake of fact – that he had filed a Government Claim with the wrong entity.” (Pet. at pgs. 12-13.) A review of the exhibits before the court show that on May 10, 2023, after service of the complaint, counsel for the City, Mr. Humy, wrote to Mr. Horowitz, stating that the case had just “come across [his] desk recently …” and asks for “more time to assess the case properly” before asking for a 30-day extension to respond to the complaint. (Dec. of Vivian, Ex. 1.) On June 14, 2023, Mr. Humy wrote to Mr. Horowitz’s office, stating that he was following up on “where the incident took place” because he was considering filing a cross-complaint. (Dec. of Vivian, Ex. 2.) The City was granted an extension until June 27, 2023 to respond to the complaint. July 31, 2023 marked one year from the accident. On August 17, 2023, Mr. Humy wrote to Mr. Horowitz’s office, stating that his records do not show a claim was filed with the City and could Mr. Horowitz provide a copy of the filed claim. (Dec. of Horowitz, Ex. 3.) In response, on August 18, 2023, Mr. Horowitz’s office sent a copy of the government claim which, at the time, Foster’s counsel believed had been submitted to the City. Mr. Humy immediately responded, stating the attached claim form showed it was filed with the Judicial Branch and there was no indication it was ever sent to the City. Mr. Humy informed Mr. Horowitz that the claim was defective. (Dec. of Vivian, Exs. 1 – 4.) It appears, based on the email chain, that counsel for the City did not realize a proper claim had not been submitted until August 18, 2023, when Mr. Humy saw the attachment from Mr. Horowitz’s office did not show that a claim was presented to the City and asking Mr. Horwitz to provide a copy of the filed claim. There is no evidence before the court that counsel had knowledge of the claims filing error before the statute of limitations ran and attempted to hide this fact from Foster’s counsel. In sum, petitioner has not carried her burden. First, she has not demonstrated she presented a late claim application to the City. Her attorney references the claim but the document is not before the court. Second, she has not demonstrated that equitable estoppel applies. The petition is denied. Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice: A-H – Granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the Page 15 of 16 tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 16 of 16

23CV00355 TAPIA v. POSADA ASSOCIATES, et al. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT The motion is granted. The court finds that the settlement falls within a range of reasonableness and is presumptively valid; appears to be a product of serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations; and has no obvious deficiencies. The court grants approval of the Settlement Agreement. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 1 of 1

23CV00355 TAPIA v. POSADA ASSOCIATES, et al. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT The motion is granted. The court finds that the settlement falls within a range of reasonableness and is presumptively valid; appears to be a product of serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations; and has no obvious deficiencies. The court grants approval of the Settlement Agreement. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 1 of 1

23CV01706 BAKER v. FUTURE MOTION (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF BAKER’S MOTION TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST The unopposed motion is granted. Brittany Baker, plaintiff’s surviving spouse, is appointed plaintiff’s successor in interest in this action. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

20CV01351 CHINA TIANJIU INT’L RESOURCES GRP LTD v. KWAN et al. (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED The unopposed motion to be relieved is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to immediately secure successor counsel, since a business entity party cannot proceed in pro per. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

23CV00355 TAPIA v. POSADA ASSOCIATES, et al. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT The motion is granted. The court finds that the settlement falls within a range of reasonableness and is presumptively valid; appears to be a product of serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations; and has no obvious deficiencies. The court grants approval of the Settlement Agreement. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 1 of 1

18CV03112 CAVALRY SPV I, LLC v. GALERA OPPOSITION TO CLAIM OF EXEMPTION (WAGE GARNISHMENT) Parties are to appear to confirm the amounts that are included in the parties’ papers.