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DOCKET
DOCKET NO.NO.FST-CV20-6047029-S
FST-CV20-6047029-S : SUPERIOR COURT
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, : J.D. OF STAMFORD-
PLAINTIFF, NORWALK
VS. :
AT STAMFORD
:
CAROLINE VIK, ET AL, : JANUARY 25, 2022
Defendant.
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY OBJECTIONS
The information sought by the Viks is relevant, material, not publicly available,
and not in the Viks’ possession. DBAG’s claims otherwise are directly contradicted by
statements DBAG itself has previously made in this litigation. Not only is DBAG
judicially estopped from advancing such blatantly inconsistent positions, but its
objections also lack merit. Therefore, the Viks respectfully request that the Court
overrule DBAG’s discovery objections and order itto fully and immediately comply with
its obligations under the Connecticut Practice Book.
A. The Viks are Entitled to Discovery in Connection with the Pending
Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to the Doctrines of Forum Non
Conveniens and Prior Pending Action
The driving argument in DBAG’s motion as to why itbelieves that “the disputed
requests are irrelevant to jurisdictional discovery” is DBAG’s recently concocted claim
that the Viks are not entitled to any discovery in connection with the pending motions to
dismiss pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and prior pending action. See
MOL, pp. 5-8. To that end, DBAG states, “[t]here is simply no basis for Defendants’
Requests” Id. at p. 7. As set forth in the Viks’ Objection to DBAG’s Motion for Protective
Order, (Doc. Entry No. 176.00), the “basis” for these discovery requests arises out of
Judge Krumeich’s prior orders, DBAG’s own prior positions, the Case Management
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Order and the relevant decisional law. DBAG made the exact same argument in its
motion for protective order, which the Court rejected. See Doc. Entry No. 176.01 (court
order sustaining the Viks’ objection to DBAG’s motion for protective order).
The Viks will not repeat the facts and law set forth in the objection to the motion
for protective order here, except to reiterate that Judge Krumeich determined that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary for the Court to decide the forum non conveniens,
prior pending action, and personal jurisdiction motions to dismiss; see Doc. Entry Nos.
138.02; 113.02; and that itcannot be seriously disputed that the law requires that the
parties be permitted to engage in discovery prior to any evidentiary hearing. See
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56-59 (1983) (reversable error where
trial court denied motion for continuance, which in effect denied discovery, on an issue
which the court clearly recognized as requiring a resolution of contested fact). Cf. 2
Conn. Prac., Civil Practice Forms Form 106.11 (4th ed.) (“Ifa longarm or constructive
service is in dispute and an evidentiary hearing is required on a motion to dismiss, the
parties must be afforded an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the hearing.
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).”).
B. DBAG Should Be Required to Comply With Each of the Disputed
Discovery Requests
DBAG’s objections to the specific discovery requests have no more merit than its
specious arguments regarding the scope of discovery for the upcoming hearing on the
three pending motions. It is clear that DBAG is continuing its modus operandi of
advancing inconsistent positions and delaying the production of documents. It continues
2
to play games.1 The Court should order DBAG to fully respond to each of the Viks’
narrowly tailored requests.
1. Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 and RFP No. 1
DBAG argues that Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 and RFP No. 1 are “exceedingly
burdensome” because the information requested is “public information.” MOL, p. 9. It is
not. Indeed, DBAG admitted that this is not public information in its Motion for Protective
Order filed on December 20, 2021. (Docket Entry No. 173.00, p. 13) (acknowledging
that Norway’s court system “does not maintain a publicly available docket.”).2 DBAG’s
argument that “Mr. Vik himself was a party to most of these actions and therefore has
access to the very documents that Defendants demand from Deutsche Bank” is even
more blatantly false. See MOL, p. 9. Not only was Mr. Vik not a party to these actions,
but, again, DBAG has admitted that Mr. Vik was not a party to these actions. See
Response to Requests to Admit No. 10 (admitting that Mr. Vik was “not a named party
in any of the litigation matters referenced in the Complaint other than the action pending
in this Court brought by Deutsche Bank against SHI and Mr. Vik…”).
1
DBAG’s egregious conduct is not limited to this litigation. Just last week, Judge Lee
denied DBAG’s motion for articulation in the related matter Deutsche Bank AG v.
Sebastian Holdings, Inc., et. al, No. X08-FST-CV13-5014167-S. In that decision, the
Court specifically commented on DBAG’s meritless arguments and disingenuous
conduct. See Decision dated Jan. 20, 2022; Doc. Entry No. 437.01, p. 3 (“Regrettably,
six of the nine identified passages have been misquoted, improperly edited, or removed
from their proper context.”); p. 6 (“However, in the course of arguing this motion,
Deutsche Bank did not see fit to mention the contents of these three paragraphs, raising
a serious question as to the adequacy of its briefing on this question.”); p. 8 (“This
request for articulation is entirely without merit.”); p. 9 (“Once again, the plaintiff
misquotes the memorandum of decision.”) (attached as Exhibit A).
2 It is difficult to fathom how DBAG could argue in one pleading that this information is
public, and simultaneously argue in another pleading filed on that same date that the
information is not public.
3
By way of example, the Viks only recently learned about DBAG’s lawsuit against
Attorney Hens lngvald Stensholdt, his law firm, CMS Kluge Advokatfirmaand, and the
Tryg Insurance Company (“Kluge Case”), in which DBAG raises many of the same
claims that itraises here in this litigation against the Viks. Unless DBAG fully complies
with Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 and RFP No. 1, the Viks will not be able to view
pleadings and related documents in the Kluge Case. DBAG may have also commenced
litigations against other third parties raising the same claims it raises against the Viks
here. The Viks only learned about the Kluge Case by chance when a journalist wrote an
article about the litigation in a Norwegian newspaper. DBAG’s refusal to disclose highly
relevant and material information about lawsuits it has commenced in Norway, or
elsewhere, with similar claims as alleged against the Viks in the case at bar has the
potential to seriously prejudice the Viks. DBAG must be ordered to comply with these
requests.
2. Interrogatory No. 9
DBAG appears to have abandoned its objections that the information sought in
Interrogatory No. 9 is beyond the scope, is irrelevant, is vague and calls for legal
conclusions. Itprovides no argument in support of these objections at all, and instead
simply claims that it has “answered this interrogatory to the best of its ability.” MOL, p. 9.
As the Viks explained in their MOL in opposition to DBAG’s discovery objections, (Doc.
Entry No. 170.00), however, DBAG has repeatedly refused to indicate whether it is
withholding responsive information on the basis of its objections. Unless and until it
does so under oath, the Viks have no way to know whether DBAG’s responses made
“[s]ubject to and without waiving” their objections are complete. Assuming, (as the Viks
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must, until told otherwise), that DBAG is in fact withholding responsive information on
the basis of its objection, DBAG should be ordered to fully comply with this request.
Indeed, DBAG has not even attempted to argue otherwise.
3. Interrogatory No. 13:
It defies common sense that the Viks’ request that DBAG state the basis for its
jurisdictional claim and identify documents in support of that claim is somehow
“premature.” DBAG has invoked this Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Vik, a Norwegian
national who resides in Monaco. It is DBAG’s burden to prove that Mr. Vik is a
Connecticut resident. In its objection to Mr. Vik’s personal jurisdiction motion to dismiss,
DBAG argued that at the time of service Mr. Vik “in fact was residing at 10 Ashton Drive,
and had been doing so for at least eight months.” The Court then determined that an
evidentiary hearing on the question of jurisdiction was necessary and ordered the
parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. Interrogatory number 13 seeks information
that is the sine qua non of DBAG’s jurisdictional claim. DBAG’s refusal to provide this
information cannot be construed in any other way than gamesmanship. DBAG has
insisted repeatedly that it has proof that Mr. Vik was residing at 10 Ashton Drive at the
time of service, yet when pressed it refuses to support this claim.
It appears that DBAG endeavors to do away with the discovery process
altogether. Not only does it object to responding to the Viks’ discovery requests on the
ground that the requests are “premature” but italso recently argued in connection with
its motion for protective order seeking to avoid the depositions of some of its officers
that no depositions are “appropriate or necessary” because the parties will exchange
exhibits for the March 4, 2022 evidentiary hearing. Acceptance of DBAG’s position
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would necessarily mean that there would never be any need for discovery in any case,
for any issue, leaving it all to the exchange of exhibits prior to trial. Our rules did away
with trial by ambush a long time ago. The Court should order DBAG to provide this
relevant and material information.
4. Interrogatory No. 26
The relevance of Interrogatory No. 26 is obvious. The issue before the Court in
connection with the forum non conveniens and prior pending action motions to dismiss
is that DBAG has instituted legal actions in Norway alleging claims identical or virtually
identical to the claims it has alleged here in this action. Indeed, DBAG’s counsel at the
Wiersholm Law Firm has advertised that “Wiersholm is currently assisting the Bank in
pursuing a damages claim against SHI, Erik Martin Vik, et al. for the reduced sales
amount caused by their obstruction.” See Exhibit B to Doc. Entry No. 170.00.
DBAG appears to believe that the existence of lawsuits in Norway with identical,
or virtually identical, claims is irrelevant if those lawsuits were filed after this lawsuit, as
opposed to prior. See Pl.’s Opposition to Prior Pending Action Motion to Dismiss docket
Entry No. 125.00 (arguing that “while Deutsche Bank did ultimately commence litigation
in Norway asserting claims similar to those alleged here, that litigation did not
commence until after this litigation and thus is not a prior pending action.” (emphasis in
original)). See also MOL, p. 4, n. 1 (arguing that the Norwegian actions are not “prior
pending”). Although DBAG is wrong and even actions filed after this case may be
grounds for dismissal or a stay; see BCBS Goshen Realty, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning
Commission, 22 Conn. App. 407, 409 (1990) (flexibility of prior pending action doctrine
permits dismissal of prior action, as opposed to subsequent action); the Viks must be
6
able to learn the full extent of these Norwegian litigations to fully and fairly prosecute
their motion and defend against DBAG’s arguments.
Interrogatory No. 26 seeks the identity of the DBAG individual and the specific
entity that engaged the Norwegian law firm. This information will assist the Viks’ efforts
to learn who at DBAG, a global bank, made the decisions to engage the firm as part of
the Bank’s “global litigation strategy” against the Viks. It is hypocritical for DBAG to
seek a protective order claiming that the people the Viks seek to depose are not the real
decision makers, and, at the same time, refuse to tell the Viks what person and entity
actually retained the lawyers in Norway to pursue the various cases against the Viks
and others, and to identify the dates of the retentions and the engagement letters
memorializing the retentions.
Throughout this litigation, DBAG has tried to hide behind its lawyers, and deny
the Viks the opportunity to discover the details of the prior cases and current cases
pending in Norway. In response to Interrogatory No. 2, DBAG did not lista single non-
lawyer as providing information or assisting in preparing responses to the
interrogatories. Instead, DBAG responded that the Wiersholm Law Firm and other
DBAG lawyers provided information for the discovery responses, but did not state which
lawyers from Wiersholm provided the information. The information sought, including the
engagement letters, will further assist the Viks to understand which DBAG individual or
entity retained the Wiersholm Law Firm, which lawyers there worked on the prior and
pending matters in Norway, and the scope of the retentions.
5. Interrogatory No. 30
DBAG argues that the location of its damages is somehow not relevant, but
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again, this information is highly relevant to the forum non conveniens and prior pending
action motions to dismiss. The “Durkin factors” that the Court must consider in deciding
whether to grant the Viks’ forum non coveniens motion require consideration of the
public interest in holding trial in view of interested persons and having matters decided
in their local forum. See Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 258 Conn. 454, 462 (2001). Certainly,
the location where DBAG suffered damages is relevant to this inquiry.
6. Requests for Production Nos. 14–16 and 18
Likewise, a consideration of the “Durkin factors” militates a conclusion that the
documents requested in Requests for Production Nos. 14—16 and 18 are relevant. The
first private interest Durkin factor requires the Court to consider the “relative ease of
access to sources of proof.” The information sought in these requests are examples of
the type of evidence that are relevant to DBAG’s claims in this case, yet, upon
information and belief, much (ifnot all) of this information is located in Norway. As set
forth in more detail in the Viks’ memorandum of law in opposition to DBAG’s discovery
objections (Doc. Entry No. 170.00), in its objection to the forum non conveniens motion
to dismiss, DBAG asked the Court to “dismiss” the Viks’ motion “for its failure to identify
any Norwegian sources of proof with the requisite specificity.” Now that the Viks seek to
obtain these Norwegian sources of proof so that they can offer further specificity, DBAG
argues that the information is “irrelevant.” Certainly, DBAG cannot have it both ways.
7. The Requests to Admit
Practice Book § 13-28 requires, in relevant part, that the responding party’s
“answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the
answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the
8
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify
his or her answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested,
such party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder.”
DBAG’s objections and responses to the Viks’ requests to admit fail to meet this
good faith standard. DBAG does not even attempt to argue otherwise. It has barely
responded to the Viks’ argument as to the insufficiency of its responses. Instead, it
simply, and dismissively, claims that its responses are “fulsome” and “sufficient” in its
one-paragraph response. DBAG’s responses are neither fulsome nor sufficient. As
described in more detail in the Viks’ memorandum of law in opposition to DBAG’s
discovery objections (Doc. Entry No. 170.00), the responses are rambling,
nonresponsive, and at times nonsensical.
For example, rather than respond directly to the Viks’ requests that ask DBAG to
admit statements about “the Defendants”—who are specifically defined as “Alexander
Vik and Caroline Vik”—DBAG proceeds to describe alleged actions of certain non-party
individuals and entities that DBAG contends are controlled by Mr. Vik. See Objection
and Response to Requests to Admit Nos. 1-4, 10. These “responses” are non-
responsive, and DBAG knows it.Indeed, DBAG objects to Request to Admit No. 9 on
the ground that “it does not specify whether it applies to decisions directed by Mr. Vik in
actions where he was not personally named as a party.” It makes no sense that DBAG
would, on the one hand, deny certain requests to admit on the basis that the statements
apply to litigations involving individuals and entities “controlled” by Mr. Vik, then, on the
other hand, object to a request on the ground that the request does not specify whether
9
it applies to actions where Mr. Vik was not named as a party. Not only are these two
positions contradictory, but both are disingenuous.
The Court should order DBAG to fully and fairly respond to the Viks’ requests to
admit—in good faith. See Practice Book § 13-28.
ALEXANDER VIK AND CAROLINE VIK
By: /s/ Monte E. Frank
Monte E. Frank
Johanna S. Katz
Pullman & Comley, LLC
850 Main Street P.O. Box 7006
Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006
Juris No. 47892
Telephone 203 330 2000
Facsimile 203 576 8888
His Attorneys
10
CERTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered
electronically or non-electronically on January 25, 2022, to all counsel and self-
represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was
received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will
immediately be electronically served.
Day Pitney LLP
One Stamford Plaza
263 Tresser Boulevard
Stamford, CT 06901-13236
Cahill Gordon & Reindel
32 Old Slip
New York, NY 10005
David G. Januszewski, Esq.
PHV Brian T. Markley
PHV Sheila C. Ramesh
/s/ Monte E. Frank
Monte E. Frank
11
ACTIVE/81751.1/JKATZ/10052792v2
EXHIBIT A
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DOCKET DOCKET NO.NO.FST-CV20-6047029-S FST-CV20-6047029-S : SUPERIOR COURT DEUTSCHE BANK AG, : J.D. OF STAMFORD- PLAINTIFF, NORWALK VS. : AT STAMFORD : CAROLINE VIK, ET AL, : JANUARY 25, 2022 Defendant. DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S DISCOVERY OBJECTIONS The information sought by the Viks is relevant, material, not publicly available, and not in the Viks’ possession. DBAG’s claims otherwise are directly contradicted by statements DBAG itself has previously made in this litigation. Not only is DBAG judicially estopped from advancing such blatantly inconsistent positions, but its objections also lack merit. Therefore, the Viks respectfully request that the Court overrule DBAG’s discovery objections and order itto fully and immediately comply with its obligations under the Connecticut Practice Book. A. The Viks are Entitled to Discovery in Connection with the Pending Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to the Doctrines of Forum Non Conveniens and Prior Pending Action The driving argument in DBAG’s motion as to why itbelieves that “the disputed requests are irrelevant to jurisdictional discovery” is DBAG’s recently concocted claim that the Viks are not entitled to any discovery in connection with the pending motions to dismiss pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and prior pending action. See MOL, pp. 5-8. To that end, DBAG states, “[t]here is simply no basis for Defendants’ Requests” Id. at p. 7. As set forth in the Viks’ Objection to DBAG’s Motion for Protective Order, (Doc. Entry No. 176.00), the “basis” for these discovery requests arises out of Judge Krumeich’s prior orders, DBAG’s own prior positions, the Case Management 1 Order and the relevant decisional law. DBAG made the exact same argument in its motion for protective order, which the Court rejected. See Doc. Entry No. 176.01 (court order sustaining the Viks’ objection to DBAG’s motion for protective order). The Viks will not repeat the facts and law set forth in the objection to the motion for protective order here, except to reiterate that Judge Krumeich determined that an evidentiary hearing was necessary for the Court to decide the forum non conveniens, prior pending action, and personal jurisdiction motions to dismiss; see Doc. Entry Nos. 138.02; 113.02; and that itcannot be seriously disputed that the law requires that the parties be permitted to engage in discovery prior to any evidentiary hearing. See Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56-59 (1983) (reversable error where trial court denied motion for continuance, which in effect denied discovery, on an issue which the court clearly recognized as requiring a resolution of contested fact). Cf. 2 Conn. Prac., Civil Practice Forms Form 106.11 (4th ed.) (“Ifa longarm or constructive service is in dispute and an evidentiary hearing is required on a motion to dismiss, the parties must be afforded an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the hearing. Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).”). B. DBAG Should Be Required to Comply With Each of the Disputed Discovery Requests DBAG’s objections to the specific discovery requests have no more merit than its specious arguments regarding the scope of discovery for the upcoming hearing on the three pending motions. It is clear that DBAG is continuing its modus operandi of advancing inconsistent positions and delaying the production of documents. It continues 2 to play games.1 The Court should order DBAG to fully respond to each of the Viks’ narrowly tailored requests. 1. Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 and RFP No. 1 DBAG argues that Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 and RFP No. 1 are “exceedingly burdensome” because the information requested is “public information.” MOL, p. 9. It is not. Indeed, DBAG admitted that this is not public information in its Motion for Protective Order filed on December 20, 2021. (Docket Entry No. 173.00, p. 13) (acknowledging that Norway’s court system “does not maintain a publicly available docket.”).2 DBAG’s argument that “Mr. Vik himself was a party to most of these actions and therefore has access to the very documents that Defendants demand from Deutsche Bank” is even more blatantly false. See MOL, p. 9. Not only was Mr. Vik not a party to these actions, but, again, DBAG has admitted that Mr. Vik was not a party to these actions. See Response to Requests to Admit No. 10 (admitting that Mr. Vik was “not a named party in any of the litigation matters referenced in the Complaint other than the action pending in this Court brought by Deutsche Bank against SHI and Mr. Vik…”). 1 DBAG’s egregious conduct is not limited to this litigation. Just last week, Judge Lee denied DBAG’s motion for articulation in the related matter Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., et. al, No. X08-FST-CV13-5014167-S. In that decision, the Court specifically commented on DBAG’s meritless arguments and disingenuous conduct. See Decision dated Jan. 20, 2022; Doc. Entry No. 437.01, p. 3 (“Regrettably, six of the nine identified passages have been misquoted, improperly edited, or removed from their proper context.”); p. 6 (“However, in the course of arguing this motion, Deutsche Bank did not see fit to mention the contents of these three paragraphs, raising a serious question as to the adequacy of its briefing on this question.”); p. 8 (“This request for articulation is entirely without merit.”); p. 9 (“Once again, the plaintiff misquotes the memorandum of decision.”) (attached as Exhibit A). 2 It is difficult to fathom how DBAG could argue in one pleading that this information is public, and simultaneously argue in another pleading filed on that same date that the information is not public. 3 By way of example, the Viks only recently learned about DBAG’s lawsuit against Attorney Hens lngvald Stensholdt, his law firm, CMS Kluge Advokatfirmaand, and the Tryg Insurance Company (“Kluge Case”), in which DBAG raises many of the same claims that itraises here in this litigation against the Viks. Unless DBAG fully complies with Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 and RFP No. 1, the Viks will not be able to view pleadings and related documents in the Kluge Case. DBAG may have also commenced litigations against other third parties raising the same claims it raises against the Viks here. The Viks only learned about the Kluge Case by chance when a journalist wrote an article about the litigation in a Norwegian newspaper. DBAG’s refusal to disclose highly relevant and material information about lawsuits it has commenced in Norway, or elsewhere, with similar claims as alleged against the Viks in the case at bar has the potential to seriously prejudice the Viks. DBAG must be ordered to comply with these requests. 2. Interrogatory No. 9 DBAG appears to have abandoned its objections that the information sought in Interrogatory No. 9 is beyond the scope, is irrelevant, is vague and calls for legal conclusions. Itprovides no argument in support of these objections at all, and instead simply claims that it has “answered this interrogatory to the best of its ability.” MOL, p. 9. As the Viks explained in their MOL in opposition to DBAG’s discovery objections, (Doc. Entry No. 170.00), however, DBAG has repeatedly refused to indicate whether it is withholding responsive information on the basis of its objections. Unless and until it does so under oath, the Viks have no way to know whether DBAG’s responses made “[s]ubject to and without waiving” their objections are complete. Assuming, (as the Viks 4 must, until told otherwise), that DBAG is in fact withholding responsive information on the basis of its objection, DBAG should be ordered to fully comply with this request. Indeed, DBAG has not even attempted to argue otherwise. 3. Interrogatory No. 13: It defies common sense that the Viks’ request that DBAG state the basis for its jurisdictional claim and identify documents in support of that claim is somehow “premature.” DBAG has invoked this Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Vik, a Norwegian national who resides in Monaco. It is DBAG’s burden to prove that Mr. Vik is a Connecticut resident. In its objection to Mr. Vik’s personal jurisdiction motion to dismiss, DBAG argued that at the time of service Mr. Vik “in fact was residing at 10 Ashton Drive, and had been doing so for at least eight months.” The Court then determined that an evidentiary hearing on the question of jurisdiction was necessary and ordered the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. Interrogatory number 13 seeks information that is the sine qua non of DBAG’s jurisdictional claim. DBAG’s refusal to provide this information cannot be construed in any other way than gamesmanship. DBAG has insisted repeatedly that it has proof that Mr. Vik was residing at 10 Ashton Drive at the time of service, yet when pressed it refuses to support this claim. It appears that DBAG endeavors to do away with the discovery process altogether. Not only does it object to responding to the Viks’ discovery requests on the ground that the requests are “premature” but italso recently argued in connection with its motion for protective order seeking to avoid the depositions of some of its officers that no depositions are “appropriate or necessary” because the parties will exchange exhibits for the March 4, 2022 evidentiary hearing. Acceptance of DBAG’s position 5 would necessarily mean that there would never be any need for discovery in any case, for any issue, leaving it all to the exchange of exhibits prior to trial. Our rules did away with trial by ambush a long time ago. The Court should order DBAG to provide this relevant and material information. 4. Interrogatory No. 26 The relevance of Interrogatory No. 26 is obvious. The issue before the Court in connection with the forum non conveniens and prior pending action motions to dismiss is that DBAG has instituted legal actions in Norway alleging claims identical or virtually identical to the claims it has alleged here in this action. Indeed, DBAG’s counsel at the Wiersholm Law Firm has advertised that “Wiersholm is currently assisting the Bank in pursuing a damages claim against SHI, Erik Martin Vik, et al. for the reduced sales amount caused by their obstruction.” See Exhibit B to Doc. Entry No. 170.00. DBAG appears to believe that the existence of lawsuits in Norway with identical, or virtually identical, claims is irrelevant if those lawsuits were filed after this lawsuit, as opposed to prior. See Pl.’s Opposition to Prior Pending Action Motion to Dismiss docket Entry No. 125.00 (arguing that “while Deutsche Bank did ultimately commence litigation in Norway asserting claims similar to those alleged here, that litigation did not commence until after this litigation and thus is not a prior pending action.” (emphasis in original)). See also MOL, p. 4, n. 1 (arguing that the Norwegian actions are not “prior pending”). Although DBAG is wrong and even actions filed after this case may be grounds for dismissal or a stay; see BCBS Goshen Realty, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 22 Conn. App. 407, 409 (1990) (flexibility of prior pending action doctrine permits dismissal of prior action, as opposed to subsequent action); the Viks must be 6 able to learn the full extent of these Norwegian litigations to fully and fairly prosecute their motion and defend against DBAG’s arguments. Interrogatory No. 26 seeks the identity of the DBAG individual and the specific entity that engaged the Norwegian law firm. This information will assist the Viks’ efforts to learn who at DBAG, a global bank, made the decisions to engage the firm as part of the Bank’s “global litigation strategy” against the Viks. It is hypocritical for DBAG to seek a protective order claiming that the people the Viks seek to depose are not the real decision makers, and, at the same time, refuse to tell the Viks what person and entity actually retained the lawyers in Norway to pursue the various cases against the Viks and others, and to identify the dates of the retentions and the engagement letters memorializing the retentions. Throughout this litigation, DBAG has tried to hide behind its lawyers, and deny the Viks the opportunity to discover the details of the prior cases and current cases pending in Norway. In response to Interrogatory No. 2, DBAG did not lista single non- lawyer as providing information or assisting in preparing responses to the interrogatories. Instead, DBAG responded that the Wiersholm Law Firm and other DBAG lawyers provided information for the discovery responses, but did not state which lawyers from Wiersholm provided the information. The information sought, including the engagement letters, will further assist the Viks to understand which DBAG individual or entity retained the Wiersholm Law Firm, which lawyers there worked on the prior and pending matters in Norway, and the scope of the retentions. 5. Interrogatory No. 30 DBAG argues that the location of its damages is somehow not relevant, but 7 again, this information is highly relevant to the forum non conveniens and prior pending action motions to dismiss. The “Durkin factors” that the Court must consider in deciding whether to grant the Viks’ forum non coveniens motion require consideration of the public interest in holding trial in view of interested persons and having matters decided in their local forum. See Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 258 Conn. 454, 462 (2001). Certainly, the location where DBAG suffered damages is relevant to this inquiry. 6. Requests for Production Nos. 14–16 and 18 Likewise, a consideration of the “Durkin factors” militates a conclusion that the documents requested in Requests for Production Nos. 14—16 and 18 are relevant. The first private interest Durkin factor requires the Court to consider the “relative ease of access to sources of proof.” The information sought in these requests are examples of the type of evidence that are relevant to DBAG’s claims in this case, yet, upon information and belief, much (ifnot all) of this information is located in Norway. As set forth in more detail in the Viks’ memorandum of law in opposition to DBAG’s discovery objections (Doc. Entry No. 170.00), in its objection to the forum non conveniens motion to dismiss, DBAG asked the Court to “dismiss” the Viks’ motion “for its failure to identify any Norwegian sources of proof with the requisite specificity.” Now that the Viks seek to obtain these Norwegian sources of proof so that they can offer further specificity, DBAG argues that the information is “irrelevant.” Certainly, DBAG cannot have it both ways. 7. The Requests to Admit Practice Book § 13-28 requires, in relevant part, that the responding party’s “answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the 8 substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify his or her answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, such party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder.” DBAG’s objections and responses to the Viks’ requests to admit fail to meet this good faith standard. DBAG does not even attempt to argue otherwise. It has barely responded to the Viks’ argument as to the insufficiency of its responses. Instead, it simply, and dismissively, claims that its responses are “fulsome” and “sufficient” in its one-paragraph response. DBAG’s responses are neither fulsome nor sufficient. As described in more detail in the Viks’ memorandum of law in opposition to DBAG’s discovery objections (Doc. Entry No. 170.00), the responses are rambling, nonresponsive, and at times nonsensical. For example, rather than respond directly to the Viks’ requests that ask DBAG to admit statements about “the Defendants”—who are specifically defined as “Alexander Vik and Caroline Vik”—DBAG proceeds to describe alleged actions of certain non-party individuals and entities that DBAG contends are controlled by Mr. Vik. See Objection and Response to Requests to Admit Nos. 1-4, 10. These “responses” are non- responsive, and DBAG knows it.Indeed, DBAG objects to Request to Admit No. 9 on the ground that “it does not specify whether it applies to decisions directed by Mr. Vik in actions where he was not personally named as a party.” It makes no sense that DBAG would, on the one hand, deny certain requests to admit on the basis that the statements apply to litigations involving individuals and entities “controlled” by Mr. Vik, then, on the other hand, object to a request on the ground that the request does not specify whether 9 it applies to actions where Mr. Vik was not named as a party. Not only are these two positions contradictory, but both are disingenuous. The Court should order DBAG to fully and fairly respond to the Viks’ requests to admit—in good faith. See Practice Book § 13-28. ALEXANDER VIK AND CAROLINE VIK By: /s/ Monte E. Frank Monte E. Frank Johanna S. Katz Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street P.O. Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 Juris No. 47892 Telephone 203 330 2000 Facsimile 203 576 8888 His Attorneys 10 CERTIFICATION I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on January 25, 2022, to all counsel and self- represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served. Day Pitney LLP One Stamford Plaza 263 Tresser Boulevard Stamford, CT 06901-13236 Cahill Gordon & Reindel 32 Old Slip New York, NY 10005 David G. Januszewski, Esq. PHV Brian T. Markley PHV Sheila C. Ramesh /s/ Monte E. Frank Monte E. Frank 11 ACTIVE/81751.1/JKATZ/10052792v2 EXHIBIT A