Motion for Discovery in DEUTSCHE BANK AG v. VIK, CAROLINE Et Al| Trellis.Law

On June 09, 2020 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Deutsche Bank Ag, and Alexander Vik, Caroline Vik, for T90 - Torts - All other in the District Court of Fairfield County.

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DOCKET NO. FST-CV20-6047029-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
: STAMFORD/NORWALK
Plaintiff, : AT STAMFORD
v. :
: December 20, 2021
CAROLINE VIK and ALEXANDER VIK, :
:
Defendants. :
:

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS DISCOVERY
OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank”) respectfully submits this memorandum

of law in support of its objections (“Objections”) to the July 9, 2021 Interrogatories and Requests

for Production, and the October 1, 2021 Revised Requests to Admit, of Defendants Alexander

Vik (“Mr. Vik”) and Caroline Vik (“Ms. Vik”) (collectively, “Defendants”) (collectively, the

“Requests”). Deutsche Bank’s memorandum of law is in response to Defendants’ December 10,

2021 memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 170.00) (“Defs. Br.” or “Memorandum”) in which

Defendants claimed certain of Deutsche Bank’s Objections.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

As a threshold matter, Defendants’ premise that Deutsche Bank has any obligation to

produce any information to them relating to jurisdictional discovery is fundamentally flawed. In

light of the factual questions raised by Mr. Vik’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 109.00 (the “PJ Motion”)), including his 2019 testimony before this Court

that Greenwich, Connecticut is his home, Judge Krumeich granted Deutsche Bank’s request for

jurisdictional discovery from Defendants. (March 4, 2021 Memorandum of Decision (Dkt. No.

135.00) (“March 4 Order”) at 8 (“In order to have a meaningful hearing, plaintiff must be given

the opportunity to conduct discovery into [Mr. Vik’s] residence and other jurisdictional facts.”)
(emphasis added).) He limited that discovery to “jurisdictional facts” relating to two topics: (1)

whether 10 Ashton was Mr. Vik’s usual place of abode on the date of service, and (2) whether

Mr. Vik is subject to long-arm jurisdiction due to his business and tortious conduct within the

state. (Id. at 1.)

Judge Krumeich fashioned his order in this way because the primary source for

information regarding Mr. Vik’s connections with the State of Connecticut is, without question,

Mr. Vik. His daughter, Ms. Vik, also has relevant information regarding her father’s

whereabouts, as do other third parties with whom he has relationships. Deutsche Bank, however,

does not have custody, possession, or control of any information connected to this Court’s

exercise of jurisdiction over Mr. Vik. Despite this uncontroversial fact, Defendants have sought

jurisdictional discovery from Deutsche Bank. In the spirit of cooperation and to move the case

forward as expeditiously as possible, Deutsche Bank has produced more than 20,000 pages of

discovery to Defendants, and engaged in repeated negotiations with Defendants regarding their

improper requests. Defendants now burden this Court with frivolous motion practice that reveals

the truth: they never intended to collect meaningful discovery from Deutsche Bank, but only to

prolong pre-trial proceedings and force Deutsche Bank to undertake costly and time-consuming

discovery disputes. Tellingly, not even one of the Requests at issue in Defendants’ motion has

anything to do with this Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Vik.

Defendants’ insistence on pursuing these baseless Requests, together with the nine

depositions they have noticed (which are the subject of Deutsche Bank’s separate motion for a

protective order) demonstrate that Defendants are pursuing a pattern of gamesmanship and

harassment. This Court should sustain Deutsche Bank’s objections to the discovery Requests.

2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

The procedural and factual background relevant to Deutsche Bank’s Memorandum of

Law in Support of its Discovery Objections overlaps significantly with the background set forth

in Deutsche Bank’s December 20, 2021 Motion for a Protective Order. (Dkt. No. 173.00.) So as

not to further burden the Court, Deutsche Bank respectfully refers the Court to that motion’s

memorandum of law for a more fulsome summary of the parties’ ongoing discovery dispute,

Dkt. No. 173.00 at 3-10.

For purposes of this motion, however, we note that the parties disagree on the scope of

discovery granted by Judge Krumeich: (1) a ten page decision on Mr. Vik’s PJ Motion ordering

an evidentiary hearing “to establish jurisdictional facts” and granting Deutsche Bank’s request

for jurisdictional discovery (March 4 Order at 1), and (2) a short order in connection with

Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to the Prior Pending Action Doctrine (Dkt. No. 113.00)

(the “PPA Motion”) and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens (Dkt. No. 115.00) (the “FNC

Motion”), which stated in full: “The Court will hear evidence in support of defendants’ motion

to dismiss for forum non conveniens and their request for stay at the hearing to be scheduled on

the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Counsel shall notify the clerk’s office

when these matters are ready to be heard.” (March 2, 2021 Order (Dkt. No. 115.02) (the “FNC

Short Order”).)

Despite the fact that Defendants neither requested nor were granted any preliminary

discovery, Defendants served Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests to Admit on

July 9, 2021, and served revised Requests to Admit on October 1, 2021. As Defendants concede,

the bulk of those Requests are unrelated to Mr. Vik’s PJ Motion. Instead, the Requests seek

discovery meant to bolster Defendants’ flawed FNC and PPA motions.

3
Rather than issue blanket objections to the Requests as beyond the scope of the March 4

Order, Deutsche Bank engaged in good faith negotiations with Defendants, ultimately producing

approximately 20,000 pages of pleadings and other court filings in a variety of foreign actions.1

Deutsche Bank made this production as a courtesy to Defendants’ counsel, who had not yet been

retained at the time those actions had been commenced.2 The production was also made after

telephonic meet and confers as well as the exchange of letter correspondence. (See December

10, 2021 Affidavit of Good Faith Efforts to Resolve Discovery (Dkt. No. 171.00) (“Frank Aff.”)

¶¶ 7, 9 (describing September 17, 2021 and September 30, 2021 telephone conferences); see also

id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 14 (describing the parties’ letter correspondence).) As a product of those

negotiations, Deutsche Bank served on Defendants Supplemental Responses and Objections,

which reflect significant concessions by Deutsche Bank in the interest of cooperation. For the

Court’s reference, a redline of Deutsche Bank’s initial responses and objections against its

supplemental and revised responses and objections is attached here. (Ex. 1.) Ultimately,

Deutsche Bank made its production subject to its Objection that Defendants were not entitled to

discovery on the FNC and PPA matters.

But Defendants never intended to resolve their written discovery Requests without this

Court’s intervention. Despite Deutsche Bank’s cooperation, Defendants now contest Deutsche

Bank’s Objections to Interrogatories 3, 4, 9, 13, 26 and 30 (the “Disputed Interrogatories”)

1
For the avoidance of doubt, these foreign actions are not “prior pending” actions, which
Defendants have essentially conceded by converting their motion to dismiss to a motion seeking a stay of
proceedings. (Ex. 2, March 2, 2021 Hearing Tr. 71:6-9, 72:1-5; Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to the Prior Pending Action Doctrine (Dkt. No. 130.00) at 1, 3.)
Such a motion does not contest the Court’s jurisdiction.
2
The English translations that Deutsche Bank produced were prepared at Deutsche Bank’s own
expense during the course of the foreign proceedings.

4
(Frank Aff. Ex. A); Requests for Production 1, 14, 15, 16, and 18 (the “Disputed RFPs”) (Frank

Aff. Ex. C); and Requests to Admit 1 through 4, 9, and 10 (the “Disputed RFAs”) (Frank Aff.

Ex. B) (together with the Disputed Interrogatories and the Disputed RFPs, the “Disputed

Requests”). Those Disputed Requests cover a broad scope of information, none of which is

relevant to this Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Vik, including:

 All pleadings or other court filings from every action that Deutsche Bank has commenced
over the span of eight years in an attempt to enforce upon what is currently a more than
$300 million judgment debt (Interrogatory Nos. 3-4);

 Engagement letters and similar documents between Deutsche Bank and its Norwegian
counsel (Interrogatory No. 26);

 Correspondence sent to the Viks providing notice of legal proceedings (RFP No. 15);

 All documents and communications with various non-parties concerning Mr. and Ms.
Vik, Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (a Turks and Caicos shell company controlled by Mr. Vik,
which is also a judgment debtor to Deutsche Bank), and Confirmit. (RFP Nos. 16, 18);
and

 Broad admissions about whether courts around the world have explicitly referred to Mr.
Vik’s obstructionist litigation tactics or fraudulent transfers as a “sham” (Request to
Admit No. 4).

Not only do these requests seek documents and information well outside the scope of permissible

discovery in this action, but they are also facially improper, overbroad, and harassing.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISPUTED REQUESTS ARE IRRELEVANT TO JURISDICTIONAL
DISCOVERY

Judge Krumeich’s March 4 Order was unambiguous: Defendants must produce

discovery to Deutsche Bank concerning the issues relevant to Mr. Vik’s PJ Motion. (See March

4 Order at 8, 10.) As Defendants themselves recently argued, “[t]he only relevant question

currently before the Court is whether [Deutsche Bank’s] discovery requests are narrowly

tailored, necessary, and material to the issue of jurisdiction.” (Defendants’ July 30, 2021

5
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Discovery Objections (Dkt. No. 156.00) at 2-3); see

also id. at 10-11 (“our Supreme and Appellate Courts have made clear that once a party moves to

dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, the only discovery that may be sought is discovery that is

material to whether the court has jurisdiction and is necessary to the Court’s determination”)

(emphasis in original); id. at 12 (arguing that its objection to a discovery request with “no

bearing on jurisdictional discovery” should be sustained) (emphasis added).

As Defendants concede, most of the Disputed Requests concern their FNC and PPA

motions to dismiss, not the PJ Motion. (See, e.g., Defs. Br. at 15 (arguing that Defendants “must

be permitted to seek discovery” in connection with those motions).) According to Defendants,

the Disputed Requests have some relevance to whether this Court should dismiss Deutsche

Bank’s case, which arises from a Connecticut-based conspiracy among Connecticut residents to

falsify a Connecticut contract and use that contract as the basis for a frivolous and vexatious

lawsuit in a court sitting in Connecticut, in favor of a court sitting in Norway. But the Disputed

Requests have no connection to whether the Court can subject Mr. Vik to its jurisdiction.

Notably, Defendants did not argue in their briefs or at argument that discovery was necessary or

appropriate to resolve the FNC and PPA Motions; they served their burdensome requests only

after Judge Krumeich permitted Deutsche Bank to seek discovery on the issue of personal

jurisdiction. Deutsche Bank’s discovery has been limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction.

As a result, Deutsche Bank objected to each Disputed Request as “beyond the scope of

jurisdictional discovery.” (Defs. Br. at 10-15 (listing Deutsche Bank’s Objections to the

Disputed Interrogatories and RFPs); id. at 19-22 (listing Deutsche Bank’s Objections to the

Disputed RFAs).) Defendants address neither these objections nor the explicit limitations that

Judge Krumeich imposed in defining jurisdictional discovery in the March 4 Order in their

6
moving papers. Instead, Defendants attempt to transform the single sentence of the FNC Short

Order into a broad grant of jurisdictional discovery relating to their FNC and PPA Motions.

(Defs. Br. at 15 (“The court (Krumeich, J.) specifically held that an evidentiary hearing was

required in connection with these motions.”).) This attempt falls flat in the face of the

thoughtful, ten-page analysis Judge Krumeich issued in connection with his grant of discovery to

Deutsche Bank. (March 4 Order.) If Judge Krumeich had intended to make the unusual decision

to grant discovery relating to motions to dismiss based on FNC and PPA (relief which

Defendants did not even request), he would have done so explicitly. Defendants do not, and

cannot, point to any specific grant of discovery, because Judge Krumeich made no such ruling.

There is simply no basis for Defendants’ Requests.3

Defendants also argue that the Court should overrule Deutsche Bank’s Objections to the

Disputed Requests because Deutsche Bank provided “some” discovery in connection with the

Requests. (Defs. Br. at 8, 10, 17-18 (suggesting that because Deutsche Bank endeavored to

produce some discovery relating to Defendants’ joint motions to dismiss, it may not object to

producing other discovery). But Deutsche Bank’s good faith effort to cooperate and progress

this Action by producing some materials to Defendants cannot now be argued to be a waiver,

particularly where Deutsche Bank produced that information pursuant to a specific objection

regarding the scope of the March 4 Order. Even more absurd is Defendants’ attempt to cast

3
No purportedly “[n]ew information” regarding “[l]awsuits in Norway” (which were filed
after the instant action) can have any impact on this analysis. (Defs. Br. at 5.) Such purported evidence
can only conceivably relate to Defendants’ flawed FNC and PPA motions to dismiss, which are not
relevant to the jurisdictional discovery granted to Deutsche Bank. (See id. at 9 (claiming Norwegian
lawsuit Defendants say they recently learned of “is highly relevant to the forum non conveniens and prior
pending action motions to dismiss.”).) In any event, Defendants have no genuine interest in such
evidence, and have only raised it here in the hopes of propping up their supposed discovery grievances
and affording them a basis to burden the Court with motion practice.

7
Deutsche Bank’s good faith Objections as “a tactic to strategically hide harmful information.”

(Defs. Br. at 18 n.4.) This empty posturing reveals the weak foundation of Defendants’ claims.

Defendants continue to grasp at straws by claiming that Deutsche Bank “repeatedly

refused” to represent whether it has withheld documents on the basis of its Objections. (Id. at 9

(emphasis in original).) Deutsche Bank did, in fact, make that representation as to most

Requests. (See Frank Aff., Ex. A (Responses and Objections to Defendants’ Interrogatory Nos.

13-21); id. Ex. C (Responses and Objections to Defendants’ Requests for Production Nos. 2-13,

17, 20).) For others, it was infeasible to do so based on the breath of the Request (e.g.,

Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4) or because Deutsche Bank had objected to the Request in its entirety.

This Objection is not substantive and, again, reveals the lack of merit underlying Defendants’

motion.

II. DEUTSCHE BANK’S OBJECTIONS SHOULD BE SUSTAINED EVEN IF
DEFENDANTS CAN SEEK FNC AND PPA-RELATED DISCOVERY

A cursory review of the comparison between Deutsche Bank’s original and supplemental

responses and objections to Defendants’ Requests demonstrates the good faith with which

Deutsche Bank approached its negotiations with Defendants, while also showing the bad faith

that Defendants have evinced in filing this motion. (Ex. 1 (redline of Deutsche Bank’s

supplemental and revised responses and objections against its initial responses and objections).)

The Disputed Requests that remain after the significant concessions Deutsche Bank made in

negotiations with Defendants are facially improper, even if the Court were to accept Defendants’

contorted view of Judge Krumeich’s grant of jurisdictional discovery.

8
A. The Objections to the Disputed Interrogatories and RFPs Should Be
Sustained

1. Interrogatories 3 and 4 are Unduly Burdensome and Irrelevant

Interrogatories 3 and 4 seek information concerning all of Deutsche Bank’s efforts to

collect on a $300 million judgment debt rendered in 2013. Among other things, Defendants seek

“all pleadings or other submissions to the court” in at least a dozen different actions over the

course of eight years. Not only is this an exceedingly burdensome request for public

information, but Mr. Vik himself was a party to most of these actions and therefore has access to

the very documents that Defendants demand from Deutsche Bank. In any event, Defendants

have offered no basis for the notion that a 2013 action alleging that Mr. Vik is the alter ego of

Deutsche Bank’s judgment debtor, or an English action adjudicating the issue of whether Mr.

Vik improperly withheld or fabricated evidence has any bearing on jurisdiction in this action.

2. Deutsche Bank Fully Responded to Interrogatory No. 9

Interrogatory No. 9 seeks information about whether eight non-parties, six of whom are

associated with Mr. Vik and none of whom are associated with Deutsche Bank, reside in or

maintain an office in Connecticut. Glaringly absent, however, is any explanation of why

Defendants believe that Deutsche Bank’s response is deficient. On the contrary, Deutsche Bank

answered this interrogatory to the best of its ability based on information reasonably available to

it at the time. (See Frank Aff., Ex. A at 7 (“Subject to and without waiving the foregoing

objections, Deutsche Bank lacks knowledge or information sufficient to answer this

Interrogatory, except to state that SHI and Xcelera at one time operated their businesses at 10

Ashton Drive, Greenwich, Connecticut, and, on information and belief, that Mr. Vik directed the

activities of Confirmit AS from that address.”).)

9
3. Interrogatory No. 13 is Premature

Interrogatory No. 13 demands that Deutsche Bank state the basis for its argument in its

opposition to Vik’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction that at the time of

service Alexander Vik “in fact was residing at 10 Ashton Drive, and had been doing so for at

least eight months” and identify all documents in support of that claim. (Frank Aff., Ex. A at 9-

10.) As an initial matter, Deutsche Bank understood Defendants to have withdrawn this

Interrogatory. Regardless, and as Deutsche Bank explained to Defendants during one of the

parties’ lengthy meet and confers, the basis for that claim appears in Deutsche Bank’s

memorandum of law. Moreover, the documents that support that assertion are attached to the

affidavit submitted in support of that memorandum. To the extent Defendants seek information

concerning any additional evidence that Deutsche Bank intends to introduce at the March 4

hearing, Deutsche Bank has agreed that it will exchange exhibit lists with Defendants at the

appropriate time.

4. Interrogatory Nos. 26 and 30 are Irrelevant

Even if this Court were to accept that Defendants are entitled to discovery concerning

their FNC and PPA motions, which it should not, Interrogatory Nos. 26 and 30 would still be

irrelevant. Interrogatory No. 26 seeks information about the scope of Deutsche Bank’s

engagement of a Norwegian law firm, including the date of its retention, and instructs Deutsche

Bank to identify any engagement letters with the firm. (Frank Aff., Ex. A at 18.) This request

has no bearing on the issues before this Court. First, Defendants are well aware that the

Wiersholm Law Firm represents Deutsche Bank in the actions pending in Norway. But neither

the scope of its engagement nor the dates of its retention has any bearing on whether this dispute

is best suited to be heard in Connecticut or Norway. In any event, the request improperly seeks

privileged information. Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Calco Construction &

10
Development Co., 2012 WL 2335199, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 23, 2012) (issuing protective

order to bar inter alia, the production of engagement and retention letters and commenting that

“[c]learly some of the requests could be protected by the attorney-client privilege. . . .”).

Nor is there any basis for Defendants’ Interrogatory No. 30, which asks Deutsche Bank to

identify “the place where damages as a result of the Defendants’ actions as alleged in the

complaint in the Action were suffered and identify all documents concerning the determination

as to the place where damages were suffered.” (Frank Aff., Ex. A at 21.) But as Deutsche Bank

explained in its response to the previous interrogatory, “for the purposes of Defendants’ pending

motions to dismiss, Deutsche Bank has not claimed that it suffered damages in Connecticut, and

will not present evidence in support of such a claim as part of its opposition to the motions to

dismiss.” (Id., Ex. A at 20-21.) In light of this response, the issue of where Deutsche Bank

suffered damages is only relevant to merits discovery, which Defendants agree is stayed.

5. RFP No. 1 is Unduly Burdensome and Irrelevant

RFP No. 1 seeks “[a]ll documents identified in the [] Interrogatories,” including

“information related to the other legal proceedings around the world concerning [Deutsche

Bank’s] claims in the present case.” (See Defs. Br. at 6.) Like Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4, RFP

No. 1 relates to at least a dozen different actions around the world over the course of the past

eight years. In addition to being unduly burdensome, it, again, requests public information that

is independently in the possession of Mr. Vik.

6. RFP Nos. 14-16 and 18 are Irrelevant

Defendants’ silence in the face of Deutsche Bank’s Objections to the remaining RFPs

confirms that they are irrelevant, even to the FNC and PPA motions. RFP No. 14 seeks “any and

all documents obtained from the file of the Enforcement Officer” in Oslo, Norway, who

registered an execution lien on the shares of Confirmit. (Frank Aff., Ex. C at 9.) RFP No. 15

11
requests correspondence among Deutsche Bank and Defendants and related documents, while

RFP No. 16. requests “all communications between” Deutsche Bank and Defendants and two

non-parties: Rand AS, a Norwegian company that once purported to own Deutsche Bank’s

judgment debtor, Sebastian Holdings, Inc., and Hans Erik Olav, who at various times owned

and/or controlled Rand AS and who purportedly signed the fraudulent Right of First Refusal that

is the subject of this litigation. Id., Ex. C at 9-10; see also Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, 92.) Finally, RFP

No. 18 requests “agreements” between Deutsche Bank and Defendants and the same non-parties.

Defendants have not explained how any of these requests could possibly be relevant to any

pending motion to dismiss. (Frank Aff., Ex. C at 10-11.) To the extent they are at all relevant to

the merits of Deutsche Bank’s claims, which for the most part, they do not appear to be,

discovery of those materials is stayed. (March 4 Order at 9, n.4.)

B. The Objections to the Disputed RFAs Should Be Sustained

Deutsche Bank responded substantively to each of the Disputed RFAs. (Frank Aff., Ex.

B.) It did so in good faith even though none of the Disputed RFAs is relevant to this Court’s

jurisdiction over Mr. Vik and are all therefore improper. Deutsche Bank’s objections to them as

outside the scope of the Court-ordered jurisdictional discovery should be sustained for the same

reasons its objections to the Disputed Interrogatories and Disputed RFPs should be sustained.

The issues Defendants take with Deutsche Bank’s additional Objections to the RFAs, that certain

of them use vague or otherwise unclear or overbroad language, ring hollow in the face of

Deutsche Bank’s fulsome responses. To be sure, Defendants’ bare accusation that Deutsche

Bank is “game playing” by objecting to a lack of clarity over certain terms in the Requests

cannot challenge the obvious sufficiency of Deutsche Bank’s responses to the RFAs. (See

Practice Book § 13-23 (“A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and

when good faith requires that a party qualify his or her answer or deny only a part of the matter
12
of which an admission is requested, such party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify

or deny the remainder.”).)

III. THE COURT SHOULD IGNORE DEFENDANTS’ IMPROPER ATTEMPTS TO
BOLSTER THEIR SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DISMISSAL

Defendants devote much of their motion to rehashing their flawed arguments in favor of

their motions to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens or to stay this action.

These motions have already been fully briefed and Deutsche Bank does not intend to engage in

Defendants’ attempt to re-brief them here. Rather than burden the Court with another recitation

of the parties’ arguments, Deutsche Bank respectfully refers the Court to its memoranda of law

in opposition to both motions (Dkt. Nos. 125.00 and 126.00) and will be prepared to address the

issues further at the March 2, 2022 hearing.

CONCLUSION

The Court should sustain in their entirety Deutsche Bank’s Objections to the Disputed

Requests.

PLAINTIFF DEUTSCHE BANK AG

By: /s/ David G. Januszewski
David G. Januszewski
Juris No. 403654
Sheila C. Ramesh (PHV # 535593)
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP
32 Old Slip
New York, New York 10005
Telephone: 212-701-3000
djanuszewski@cahill.com
sramesh@cahill.com

Thomas D. Goldberg
Jennifer M. Palmer
Day Pitney LLP
One Stamford Plaza
263 Tresser Boulevard

13
Stamford, CT 06901
Juris No. 014230
Telephone: 203-977-7300
tgoldberg@daypitney.com
jpalmer@daypitney.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Deutsche Bank AG

14
DOCKET NO. FST-CV20-6047029-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
: STAMFORD/NORWALK
Plaintiff, : AT STAMFORD
v. :
: December 20, 2021
CAROLINE VIK and ALEXANDER VIK, :
:
Defendants. :
:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the attached was sent via electronic mail to the
following counsel of record for Defendants:
Monte E. Frank
Johanna S. Katz
Pullman & Comley, LLC
850 Main Street P.O. Box 7006
Bridgeport, Connecticut 06601
mfrank@pullcom.com
jkatz@pullcom.com

/s/ Jennifer M. Palmer
Jennifer M. Palmer
Exhibit 1
DOCKET NO.: FST-CV20-6047029-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:::
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, Plaintiff, : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
:::: STAMFORD/NORWALK AT
STAMFORD
v.
SEPTEMBER 7,OCTOBER 15, 2021
CAROLINE VIK and ALEXANDER VIK,
Defendants. :
:

OBJECTIONS OF PLAINTIFF DEUTSCHE BANK AG’S REVISED RESPONSES
AND OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS CAROLINE AND ALEXANDER VIK’S’
FIRST SET OF JURISDICTIONAL INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION, AND REQUESTS TO ADMIT

Plaintiff Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank”), by its attorneys, hereby objects

to the July 9, 2021 Jurisdictional Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests to

Admit (“Jurisdictional Requests”) of Defendants Caroline Vik and Alexander Vik as follows.

OFFER TO CONFER IN GOOD FAITH

Deutsche Bank offers to meethas met and conferconferred in good faith with

counsel for Defendants concerning the RequestsInterrogatories and the following Responses

and Objections, and reserves all rights.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS

Deutsche Bank makes the following General Objections, which are incorporated

into each of its Specific Objections and Responses below. None of the General or Specific

Objections (collectively, the “Objections”) is an admission as to the relevance, materiality,

authenticity, or admissibility of any information provided herein.

OBJECTIONS TO DEFINITIONS

1. At Definition Nos. 5 and 7, the Jurisdictional Requests define “Plaintiff”

and “You” to mean “Deutsche Bank AG, and each of its predecessors, successors, and assignees,
agents, servants, representatives, trustees, consultants, brokers, accountants and attorneys,

employees, contractors, officers or directors, and all other persons or entities who are acting or

have acted on behalf of, or who are or have been subject to the direction or control of, any of the

foregoing.” Deutsche Bank objects to Definition Nos. 5 and 7 to the extent that they seek to

include Deutsche Bank’s “predecessors, successors, and assignees, agents, servants,

representatives, trustees, consultants, brokers, accountants and attorneys, employees, contractors,

officers or directors, and all other persons or entities who are acting or have acted on behalf of,

or who are or have been subject to the direction or control of, any of the foregoing” on the

grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overly broad and unduly burdensome, and purports to

require production of information that is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. As provided in Connecticut Practice Book § 13-1(c)(9),

Deutsche Bank will construe “Plaintiff” or “You” to mean the party to whom the discovery

requests are directed, i.e., Deutsche Bank AG.

2. At Definition No. 17, the Jurisdictional Requests define “State the basis”

to mean “(i) to state each and every discoverable fact which relates to that allegation, fact or

subject matter, including, but not limited to, an identification of all acts, failures to act,

occurrences, occasions, transactions, dealings, conduct, and conversations related to that

allegation, fact or subject matter; (ii) to state the source of your information or knowledge

relating to each such fact; (iii) to identify all persons having knowledge of each such fact; (iv) to

identify each document known to you embodying, referring or relating to each such fact; and (v)

to specify each event, occurrence or instance on which you intend to introduce evidence at trial

relating to that allegation, fact or subject matter.” Deutsche Bank objects to Definition No. 17 on

the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overly broad and unduly burdensome, and purports

to require production of information that is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence, and seeks to impose obligations on Deutsche Bank beyond

those required by the Connecticut Practice Book and other applicable rules and law.

OBJECTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS

1. Deutsche Bank objects to the instruction regarding “lost or destroyed documents,

ESI or tangible thing,” in that it purports to impose obligations on Deutsche Bank beyond those

required by the Connecticut Practice Book and other applicable rules and law.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES

Interrogatory No.1

Identify the persons answering these interrogatories and state their titles and job descriptions.

Objection and Response to Interrogatory No. 1

The answers to these interrogatories were prepared by Deutsche Bank’s counsel at

Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP. Because the interrogatories seek information concerning

Deutsche Bank’s legal contentions rather than factual information, no verification is necessary.

Interrogatory No. 2

Identify all persons who provided information for, assisted in, or otherwise participated in the
preparation of responses to these interrogatories and accompanying requests for production and
requests to admit.

ObjectionResponse to Interrogatory No. 2

None. Interrogatory No. 3Internal counsel at Deutsche Bank and outside

counsel at Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP and Advokatfirmaet Wiersholm AS provided

information for, assisted in, or otherwise participated in the preparation of Deutsche

Bank’s responses to the July 9, 2021 Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and

Requests to Admit and the October 1, 2021 Revised Requests to Admit.

Interrogatory No. 3

Identify all legal proceedings anywhere in the world concerning Deutsche Bank’s efforts to
collect the English Judgment, including any proceedings brought by receivers or others on
Deutsche Bank’s behalf. With respect to each legal proceeding, identify:
a. the parties;
b. docket number or index number;
c. the date the proceeding was commenced;
d. the court or other tribunal in which it is pending;
e. all pleadings or other submissions to the court or other tribunal; and
f. the current status.

Objection and Response to Interrogatory No. 3

Deutsche Bank objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks

information that is beyond the scope of jurisdictional discovery and is not relevant to the pending

motions to dismiss. Deutsche Bank further objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it

seeks information that is: (i) public; (ii) already in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control, or

available from other sources to which Defendants have access; or (iii) otherwise available

through more convenient, more efficient, less burdensome, or less expensive means.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Deutsche Bank refers

Defendants to its Complaint in this action including paragraphs 45-64, which describe some of

the efforts by Deutsche Bank to collect the English Judgment.

Interrogatory No. 4

Identify all legal proceedings anywhere in the world concerning Deutsche Bank and any of the
non-parties identified in paragraphs 18 through 25 of the Complaint. This interrogatory includes
any proceedings brought by receivers or others on Deutsche Bank’s behalf. With respect to each
legal proceeding, identify:
a. the parties;
b. docket number or index number;
c. the court or other tribunal in which it is pending;
d. the date the proceeding was commenced;
e. the court or other tribunal in which it is pending;
f. all pleadings or other submissions to the court or other tribunal; and
g. the current status.
Objection and Response to Interrogatory No. 4

Deutsche Bank objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it seeks

information that is beyond the scope of jurisdictional discovery and is not relevant to the pending
motions to dismiss. Deutsche Bank further objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it

seeks information that is: (i) public; (ii) already in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control, or

available from other sources to which Defendants have access; or (iii) otherwise available

through more convenient, more efficient, less burdensome, or less expensive means.

Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Deutsche Bank refers

Defendants to paragraphs 45-64 of its Complaint, which describe some of the efforts by

Deutsche Bank to collect the English Judgment.

Interrogatory No. 5

Identify all witnesses you intend to call

Case Info

Judge

Sheila A. Ozalis Track Judge’s New Case

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Document Filed Date

December 20, 2021

Case Filing Date

June 09, 2020

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Motion-Secondary: DEUTSCHE BANK AG v. VIK, CAROLINE Et Al

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