Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
———————————————————————x
WALTER L. STIPA SPRECASE,
Index No. 652830/2018
Plaintiff,
-against- AFFIRMATION OF
ANDREW P. KARAMOUZIS
DANIEL TENREIRO, and IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
CARLA M BRASCHI-KARAM DE TENREIRO, TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
Defendants.
———————————————————————x
ANDREW P. KARAMOUZIS, an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the
Courts of the State of New York, hereby affirms the following statements to be true under the
penalties of perjury:
1. I am a member of the firm of Moran • Karamouzis LLP, attorneys for Plaintiff
Walter L. Stipa Sprecase (“Plaintiff” or “Stipa”), and in that capacity I am fully familiar with the
underlying facts and circumstances of this action.
2. I make this Affirmation in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery from
Defendants Daniel Tenreiro and Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro pursuant to CPLR 3124 and
CPLR 3126, respectively.
A. Legal Standards Under CPLR § 3124 and CPLR § 3126
3. As this Court is well aware, disclosure is governed by Article 31 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules. In general, there “shall be full disclosure of all matters material and
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of burden of proof….” CPLR
3101. “The words, ‘material and necessary,’ are … to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure,
upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by
sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity.” Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.,
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21 N.Y.2d 403, 406 (1968); see also, Vargas v. Lee, 170 A.D.3d 1073 (2nd Dep’t 2019). CPLR
3101. “embodies the policy determination that liberal discovery encourages fair an effective
resolution of disputes on the merits, minimizing the possibility for ambush and unfair
surprise.” Forman v. Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d 656, 661 (2018) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
4. In light of the important role disclosure plays in the orderly progress of the litigation
process, the CPLR provides remedies for the failure to comply with disclosure. Specifically,
CPLR 3124, provides that “[i]f a person fails to respond to or comply with any request, notice,
interrogatory, demand, question or order under this article, except a notice to admit under section
3123, the party seeking disclosure may move to compel compliance or a response.” CPLR 3124
(McKinney’s 2020).
5. More significantly, however, CPLR 3126, permits this Court, in its discretion, to
impose significant sanctions for discovery abuses:
If any party, or a person who at the time a deposition is taken or an
examination or inspection is made is an officer, director, member,
employee or agent of a party or otherwise under a party’s control,
refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose
information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed
pursuant to this article, the court may make such orders with regard
to the failure or refusal as are just, among them:
1. an order that the issues to which the information is relevant shall
be deemed resolved for purposes of the action in accordance
with the claims of the party obtaining the order; or
2. an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or
opposing designated claims or defenses, from producing in
evidence designated things or items of testimony, or from
introducing any evidence of the physical, mental or blood
condition sought to be determined, or from using certain
witnesses; or
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3. an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action
or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against
the disobedient party.
CPLR 3126 (McKinney’s 2020).
6. The penalties listed in CPLR 3126 “were not intended to be exhaustive” and the
“practice commentaries to CPLR 3126 encourage the courts to exercise their ingenuity, and to
devise sanctions as narrowly tailored as possible to the circumstances of the individual
case.” DiDomenico v. C&S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 41, 49 (2nd Dep’t 1998).
7. In order to warrant the imposition of sanctions (e.g., dismissal of the non-complying
party’s pleading, precluding the non-complying party from introducing evidence to support its
claims), it must be shown that the party’s failure to comply with discovery demands or court orders
is willful. See Davis v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 442, 613 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep’t 1994).
Where, as here, Defendant can offer no legitimate excuse or explanation for his utter failure to
respond to Plaintiff’s numerous requests for compliance, willfulness can be inferred. Frias v.
Fortini, 240 A.D.2d 467, 468, 658 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (2d Dep’t 1997); see also Arnoff v. Lorio,
208 A.D.2d 581, 581, 618 N.Y.S.2d 218 (the defendant satisfied the “willful and contumacious”
standard by failing to appear for a deposition despite two previous court orders compelling her to
do so).
8. In addition to other remedies, this Court has the inherent power to award Plaintiff
his costs and expenses incurred as a result of the non-compliance of Defendant, including the costs
of bringing this motion. See Figdor v. City of New York, 33 A.D.3d 560, 823 N.Y.S.2d 385, (1st
Dep’t 2006) (directing defendant to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,000 where
defendant’s response to discovery orders was inexcusably lax).
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B. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel a Forensic Inspection of Defendant’s Apple iMac Computer
9. After Defendant’s miraculous production of the Fraudulent Payment Agreement on
December 12, 2018, Plaintiff repeatedly requested that Defendant produce the original document
as well as any supporting documents relating to the creation and execution of the Fraudulent
Payment Agreement. Specifically, on or about December 18, 2018, Plaintiff served its Second
Request for Production of Documents (“Plaintiff’s Second Request”), which requested, among
other things:
1. The original Payment Agreement.
2. All documents relating to or concerning the drafting and/or
negotiations of the Payment Agreement including, but not
limited to, correspondence, e-mails, texts, pdfs, facsimiles,
handwritten notes, and the like.
3. All documents relating to or concerning the transmittal and
execution of the Payment Agreement including, but not
limited to, correspondence, e-mails, texts, pdfs, facsimiles,
handwritten notes, and the like.
A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Second Request for Production of Documents, dated
December 18, 2018 is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
10. Defendant never produced a single document in response to Plaintiff’s Second
Request.
11. As a result, Plaintiff demanded a forensic inspection of Defendant’s computer(s) to
help determine the creation of and authenticity of the Fraudulent Payment Agreement. On August
15, 2020, Wilfredo Rodriguez, counsel for Plaintiff requested a forensic inspection Defendant’s
computer(s) and sent a Notice of Inspection, by letter to David Bamberger, Defendant’s then-
counsel. A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s Notice of Inspection, dated August 15, 2019,
is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Specifically, the Notice of Inspection stated:
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Given the crucial legal implications of the Payment Agreement
and Tenreiro's apparent inability to locate the original document,
we hereby request that Tenreiro allow a limited forensic inspection
of all computers of any kind which he has used between the time
periods December 30, 2012-January 13, 2013 (seven days before
and after the Payment Agreement was alleged to be drafted and
signed) and June 6, 2018-December 12, 2018 (the time between
when the action was filed and the Payment Agreement was
produced) to create, modify, store, or delete the specific computer
file(s) from which the Payment Agreement was derived.
This inspection will be conducted by an independent IT forensic
specialist whom we will retain, and will be limited to the specific
electronic files regarding the Payment Agreement identified above.
Id., at 2.
12. However, Defendant refused to produce his computer(s) and also claimed that he
no longer had the computer that he used to create the Fraudulent Payment Agreement in his
possession.
13. During the course of this litigation, Plaintiff concluded that Defendant, just as he
manufactured the Fraudulent Payment Agreement, may have also manufactured at least one other
fraudulent document, namely, a letter from Defendant to Isabel Stipa and Luis Hernandez, dated
June 3, 2014 (the “Chubb Inspection Letter”), in a further effort to defeat Plaintiff’s claims and
bolster his otherwise feeble counter-claims. A true and correct copy of the Chubb Inspection
Letter, dated June 3, 2014, is attached as Exhibit C.
14. On October 19, 2021, Wilfredo Rodriguez, Esq., counsel for Plaintiff advised
Stephanie Emanuel, Esq., counsel for Defendant, by letter of these concerns -- “As was previously
communicated to your predecessor counsel, David Bamberger, Esq., of Akabas & Sproule, we
believe that the letter dated June 3, 2014 addressed to CPS 8CDE Corp. and signed by Mr.
Tenreiro, on behalf of his company, Park Avenue Interiors, Inc., is not authentic and was
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fraudulently created.” A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s letter, dated October 19, 2021,
is attached as Exhibit D.
15. During the course of Defendant’s recent deposition, Plaintiff testified that he owned
and used a 2013 Apple iMac Computer, Serial No. DCPLM08JFQPG (the “iMac Computer”)
during the relevant time period. See Excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of Daniel Tenreiro
(“Depo. Tr.”), dated October 21, 2021, at p. 58, lines 2 - 22, p. 277, lines 14 -22, p. 374, lines 6 -
12, and p. 378, lines 10 - 25, which is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
16. Further, Defendant also testified that the iMac Computer was the only computer
that he had and that he used it for all purposes (e.g., personal and business). Id., at p. 277, lines 14
-22.
17. Finally, Defendant testified that he, in fact, still has his iMac Computer and that it
is presently located at his office at 2572 Park Avenue, Bronx, New York. Id., at p. 58, lines 2 -
17.
18. During his deposition, Defendant was asked how he created the Fraudulent
Payment Agreement testified that he created the Fraudulent Payment Agreement on his iMac
Computer. Id., at pp. 56 - 58. (Exhibit E). Defendant also testified that he created the Chubb
Inspection Letter on his iMac Computer. Id., at p. 278, lines 6 -10.
19. Accordingly, at that point, Plaintiff again demanded the production of the iMac
Computer for a limited forensic inspection. Id., at p. 373, (Exhibit E) lines 10 – 13, 18- 25, and p.
374, line 2. (Exhibit E).
20. On November 1, 2021, Mr. Rodriguez wrote to Ms. Emanuel again to “reserve the
right to request and require a more detailed forensic inspection of Mr. Tenreiro’s desktop computer
[the iMac Computer] used to create Exhibit 53 [the Chubb Inspection Letter] for the period of May
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1, 2014 – June 30, 2014.” A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s letter, dated November 1,
2021, is attached as Exhibit F.
21. On November 16, 2021, Mr. Rodriguez wrote to Ms. Emanuel again to request
production of the iMac Computer for a limited forensic inspection -- “As per our request on the
record during Mr. Tenreiro’s deposition on Thursday, November 11th and, as previously stated in
our letter of November 1, 2021 (copy enclosed), this letter will serve as our formal demand for the
production of Mr. Tenreiro’s Apple iMac desktop computer and its hard drive for our forensic
review and inspection by no later than November 22, 2021.” A true and correct copy of Mr.
Rodriguez’s letter, dated November 16, 2021, is attached as Exhibit G.
22. Despite repeated requests, Defendant has consistently refused to produce his iMac
Computer for a limited forensic inspection.
23. Accordingly, by this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel production of Defendant’s
iMac Computer for a limited forensic inspection, at Plaintiff’s cost and expense. To that end,
Plaintiff has previously agreed and remains willing to agree to any reasonable guidelines and
protections to safeguard Defendant’s privacy and limit the forensic inspection of the iMac
Computer to review of the specific Electronically Stored Information that relates to the Fraudulent
Payment Agreement and the Chubb Inspection Letter.
D. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel Production of Outstanding Discovery Including
Defendant’s JPMorgan Chase Bank Account Statements
24. As set forth in detail in the Amended Complaint, this action arises out of
Defendant’s Tenreiro’s default of a $500,000 loan obligation that was secured by collateral
pledged by Plaintiff Stipa. In or about February 2018, Plaintiff defaulted upon his loan obligations
to JPMorgan Chase Bank (“Chase”), the lender. As a result, Chase promptly liquidated Plaintiff’s
collateral and applied the proceeds to the outstanding principal amount and accrued interest. Based
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upon Defendant’s default and wrongful conduct, Plaintiff commenced this action against
Defendant to recover the amounts that were liquidated from his account.
25. One of the critical fact issues that is central to Plaintiff’s claims is that the $500,000
loan provided to Plaintiff by Chase, which was based upon Plaintiff’s pledge of collateral, provided
the main source of funds for Defendants’ purchase of Unit 8E at 470 Park Avenue, New York,
NY.
26. To that point, on August 27, 2018, Plaintiff served Karen Neuwirth, Esq.,
Defendant’s original counsel, with discovery requests, including Plaintiff’s First Request for
Production. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s First Request for Production of Documents, dated
August 27, 2018, is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
27. Plaintiff’s Document Request No. 34 requested: “All documents pertaining to your
[Defendants’] 2013 purchase of Unit 8E at 470 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10029 (‘Unit
8E/470 Park Avenue’)”.
28. Plaintiff’s Document Request No. 35 requested: “All documents pertaining to the
source of funds used in connection with your purchase of Unit 8E/470 Park Avenue.”
29. In response to Request No. 34, Defendant produced a five-page notice of public
auction and one-page memorandum of sale.
30. In response to Request No. 35, Defendant produced a single, six-page JPMorgan
Chase Bank Account Statement for No. xxxxxxxxxxx4050 for the period of May 6, 2013 through
May 31, 2013 (the “JPMorgan Chase Statement”).
31. During late 2018 and through May 2019, Plaintiff made numerous good faith
requests for production of outstanding discovery to Ms. Neuwirth to no avail.
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32. On August 15, 2019, Mr. Rodriguez made a final good faith request to resolve
outstanding discovery disputes, by letter to Mr. Bamberger, Defendant’s then-counsel who
substituted for Ms. Neuwirth. A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s Good Faith Letter, dated
August 15, 2019, is attached hereto as Exhibit I.
33. Specifically, the Good Faith Letter outlined all of the outstanding discovery that
Plaintiff had failed to produce to date and requested production of same on or before September
6, 2019, specifically including responses to Request Nos. 34 and 35.
34. During his deposition, Defendant testified that as of August 27, 2018, the date of
Plaintiff’s original Request for Production of Documents, Defendant had access to all of his
JPMorgan Bank Statements. See Depo. Tr., at 370, lines 17 - 25.
35. To date, Defendant has failed to produce any additional responsive documents to
Request Nos. 34 or 35, including any other documents related to the purchase of Unit 8E, any
additional JPMorgan Bank Statements, and/or any other financial statements or documents
reflecting a source of funds for the purchase of Unit 8E.
36. Accordingly, by this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to produce of all
documents responsive to Request Nos. 34 and 35, including Defendant’s JPMorgan Bank
Statements for the period of March 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013, all documents reflecting
the source of funds used to purchase Unit 8E (including any other bank account or fianacila
statements), and the contract of sale for Unit 8E.
D. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel the Continued Deposition of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro
37. As set forth in detail above, and in conjunction with Plaintiff’s motion to compel a
forensic inspection of Defendant’s iMac Computer and production of outstanding document
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discovery, Plaintiff requests the continued examination of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro in order to
complete his examination regarding these matters and related issues.
38. Further, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant Tenreiro’s continued deposition to
explore several areas of questioning that Defendant’s counsel objected to and issued numerous
instructions not to answer to Defendant Tenreiro regarding conversations between Defendants
Daniel Tenreiro and his wife, Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro, regarding the
purchase on Unit 8E, the $500,000 loan and amounts owed to Plaintiff.
Q. Have you ever had any communication with your wife
regarding the amount of money that you owe Mr. Stipa, as we saw
in prior emails, which, according to your testimony, just related to
interest?
A. I don't owe him any money.
Q. That's not the question whether you do or do not. Did you,
in fact, have communications that involved –
MR. MAIRA. Excuse me. Objection. Objection. You’re going into
marital communications too extensively. That's between him and his
wife. Ask for her deposition, if you want, but forget asking him
about what he said to his wife. Please.
MR. RODRIGUEZ. Sorry, counsel, sorry, are you instructing him
on some husband and wife privilege?
MR. MAIRA. Yes marital communications, privilege, correct.
* * *
MR. RODRIGUEZ. So just to be clear, Mr. Maira, are you
instructing him not to answer question?
MR. MAIRA. Not on communications he said to his wife. Don't
answer period mark it for a ruling. Go ahead.
See Depo. Tr., p. 224, lines 24 – 25, p, 225, lines 2 – 23, and p. 226, lines 7 - 14. See also,
Depo. Tr., pp. 227 – 228 and 230 – 232. (Exhibit E).
39. The elements for the spousal privilege are:
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(a) a communication,
(b) induced by the marital relationship,
(c) made in confidence,
(d) during the marriage, if it is,
(e) not waived, and
(f) not subject to an exception.
See CPLR § 4502 (McKinney’s 2020).
40. In order to qualify for privileged treatment, the exchange between the spouses must
have been “induced by the marital relation and prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty
engendered by such relationship.” Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99, 144 N.E.2d
72 (1957). Thus, not all “daily and ordinary exchanges” between spouses will qualify; the
privilege encompasses only “those which would not have been made but for the absolute
confidence in, and induced by, the marital relationship.” People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 217
N.Y.S.2d 65, 176 N.E.2d 81 (1960).
41. In Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., Bloomingdale Bros. Division v. Esser, 409
N.Y.S.2d 353 (N.Y. Sup. 1978), a case of first impression, the Court stated the parameters of the
marital privilege under CPLR § 4502 as follows:
The provision prohibiting testimony as to confidential
communications applies only to those which are made in
confidence, or which from their nature and the circumstances of
disclosure appear to be made or are such as spring out of and are
induced by the marital relation and are therefore confidential in
character. They must be expressly made confidential, or be of a
confidential nature or be induced by the marital relation.
Confidential communications do not include ordinary
conversations relating to matters of business, or other matters,
which there is no reason to suppose either party would have been
unwilling to hold in the presence of any person . . .“ (N.Y.Jur.,
Supra, pp. 218-219).
Id. (upholding marital privilege but recognizing exception for ordinary business matters and for
fraud) (emphasis added). See also, G-Fours, Inc. v. Miele, 496 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming
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trial court that marital privilege did not apply because “[t]he questions posed to Mrs. Miele dealt
with business matters that either were not confidential or, if deliberate efforts were made to conceal
them to prevent execution of judgment, were not privileged even if the parties intended them to be
confidential”).
42. Further, “[t]he marital privilege is not available to refuse disclosure of
communications designed to perpetrate frauds on third parties.” Id., at 812. See also, In re Donald
Sheldon & Co., Inc., 191 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 1996) (“We hold that the facts of the case
before us fall squarely within the Second Circuit’s ruling in G–Fours. There is probable cause to
believe that the Sheldons attempted to conceal assets to prevent the Trustee from executing on the
judgment. Further, those questions upon which the spousal privilege was asserted relate to the
existence or location of the allegedly concealed assets. Thus, the communications are not
privileged even if the parties intended them to be confidential.”).
43. These are preliminary questions of fact for the court, requiring determination on a
case-by-case basis. Matter of Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 439 N.E.2d 378
(1982). The witness has the burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege. “The burden
of establishing that certain communications are privileged and protected from discovery under the
spousal privilege is on the party asserting the privilege.” Kennedy v. North Westchester Hospital,
Inc., 2014 WL 6707022, * 4 (N.Y.Sup. 2014) (quoting Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank,
78 N.Y.2d 371, 377 (1991)).
44. Finally, “[t]he privilege between spouses set forth in CPLR 4502 (subd. (b)) is a
testimonial privilege that only prevents one spouse from testifying against the other at a
trial.” People v. Watkins, 63 A.D.2d 1033 (2d Dept 1978).
45. Because the questions at issue specifically involved ordinary business maters which
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are the subject of this action, and because Defendant has also evidenced an affirmative effort to
defraud Plaintiff in an effort to avoid judgment (e.g., the Fraudulent Payment Agreement), the
spousal privilege is inapplicable, Defendant’s objections are without merit and Defendant should
be directed to appear for continued deposition to answer the questions posed. See Gerard v. Cahill,
2014 WL 1806464, *7 (N.Y.Sup. 2104) (“The spousal privilege does not attach to “ordinary
conversations relating to matters of business which there is no reason to suppose [the spouse]
would have been unwilling to hold in the presence of any person.”); GoSmile, Inc. v. Levine, 2012
WL 2057006 (N.Y.Sup. 2012) (“Under the applicable statute, ordinary business matters are an
exception to the marital privilege and therefore ordinary conversations relating to matters of
business which there is no reason to suppose the spouse would have been unwilling to hold in the
presence of any person are not protected, e.g., the existence and location of a spouse’s bank
accounts or the ownership and transfer of property do not encroach upon the marital privilege.”);
Guillen v. Fisher-Treger Realty, LLC, 2018 WL 5099134 (N.Y. Sup. 2018) (“Any spousal
privilege that might apply was waived when plaintiff commenced this action.”); In re Donald
Sheldon & Co., Inc., 191 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 1996) (marital privilege did not apply in
matters where spouse was attempting to conceal assets and avoid creditors).
46. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, The Court should order the continued
deposition of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro on a date certain.
E. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel Production of E-Mails and Texts from
Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Kram de Tenreiro
47. During the course of her deposition, Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de
Tenreiro testified that she had several communications, via text, email and/or What’s App, with
Magel Stipa, Plaintiff’s spouse, which were directly related to the $500,000 loan and the issues in
this action. See Excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro,
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dated November 30, 2021, at p. 101, lines 4 – 19, p. 120, lines 7 – 11, p. 122, lines 19 – 25 and p.
123, lines 2 – 10, attached hereto as Exhibit J.
48. Accordingly, at the time, Plaintiff requested production of the relevant
communications. However, to date, Defendants have not produced any of the documents that
Mrs. Tenreiro testified about.
49. Accordingly, by this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant Carla M. Braschi-
Karam de Tenreiro to produce copies of the text, email and/or What’s App communications with
Magel Stipa, Plaintiff’s spouse.
F. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel the Continued Deposition of
Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro
50. Plaintiff seeks to compel the continued examination of Defendant Carla M.
Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro for the limited purpose of questioning her regarding her
communications with Magel Stipa, Plaintiff’s spouse, as set forth in the requested text, email
and/or What’s App communications.
G. Conclusion
51. For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant
his Motion to Compel Discovery in its entirety and an issue an Order:
a. Ordering Defendant Daniel Tenreiro to produce his iMac Computer for
limited forensic inspection;
b. Ordering Defendant Daniel Tenreiro to produce responsive documents to
Plaintiff’s Request Nos. 34 and 35, including copies of his JPMorgan Chase
bank statements for JPMorgan Chase Bank Account No. xxxxxxxxxxx4050
for the period of January 1, 2013 – June 30, 2013 and any other financial
statements or documents reflecting a source of funds for purchase of Unit
8E during the same period, or, alternatively, if Defendant Daniel Tenreiro
is no longer in possession, custody or control of such documents, he shall
provide a sworn affidavit explaining the facts and circumstances related to
the failure to produce such documents and the disposition of such
documents;
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c. Ordering the continued examination of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro on a date
certain;
d. Ordering Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro to produce
various texts, email and/or What’s App communications with Magel Stipa,
Plaintiff’s spouse, regarding the issues raised in this action;
e. Ordering the continued deposition of Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam
de Tenreiro on a date certain; and
f. Ordering appropriate sanctions, including an award of reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this motion, against
Defendant Daniel Tenreiro for his failure to comply with his discovery
obligations, pursuant to CPLR § 3126; and
g. All such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Dated: December 17, 2021
Rockville Centre, New York
Andrew P. Karamouzis
Andrew P. Karamouzis
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