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  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
  • Walter L Stipa Sprecase v. Daniel Tenreiro, Carla M Braschi-Karam De Tenreiro Commercial - Contract document preview
						
                                

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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK ———————————————————————x WALTER L. STIPA SPRECASE, Index No. 652830/2018 Plaintiff, -against- AFFIRMATION OF ANDREW P. KARAMOUZIS DANIEL TENREIRO, and IN SUPPORT OF MOTION CARLA M BRASCHI-KARAM DE TENREIRO, TO COMPEL DISCOVERY Defendants. ———————————————————————x ANDREW P. KARAMOUZIS, an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of New York, hereby affirms the following statements to be true under the penalties of perjury: 1. I am a member of the firm of Moran • Karamouzis LLP, attorneys for Plaintiff Walter L. Stipa Sprecase (“Plaintiff” or “Stipa”), and in that capacity I am fully familiar with the underlying facts and circumstances of this action. 2. I make this Affirmation in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendants Daniel Tenreiro and Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro pursuant to CPLR 3124 and CPLR 3126, respectively. A. Legal Standards Under CPLR § 3124 and CPLR § 3126 3. As this Court is well aware, disclosure is governed by Article 31 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. In general, there “shall be full disclosure of all matters material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of burden of proof….” CPLR 3101. “The words, ‘material and necessary,’ are … to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity.” Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 1 1 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406 (1968); see also, Vargas v. Lee, 170 A.D.3d 1073 (2nd Dep’t 2019). CPLR 3101. “embodies the policy determination that liberal discovery encourages fair an effective resolution of disputes on the merits, minimizing the possibility for ambush and unfair surprise.” Forman v. Henkin, 30 N.Y.3d 656, 661 (2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 4. In light of the important role disclosure plays in the orderly progress of the litigation process, the CPLR provides remedies for the failure to comply with disclosure. Specifically, CPLR 3124, provides that “[i]f a person fails to respond to or comply with any request, notice, interrogatory, demand, question or order under this article, except a notice to admit under section 3123, the party seeking disclosure may move to compel compliance or a response.” CPLR 3124 (McKinney’s 2020). 5. More significantly, however, CPLR 3126, permits this Court, in its discretion, to impose significant sanctions for discovery abuses: If any party, or a person who at the time a deposition is taken or an examination or inspection is made is an officer, director, member, employee or agent of a party or otherwise under a party’s control, refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed pursuant to this article, the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or refusal as are just, among them: 1. an order that the issues to which the information is relevant shall be deemed resolved for purposes of the action in accordance with the claims of the party obtaining the order; or 2. an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, from producing in evidence designated things or items of testimony, or from introducing any evidence of the physical, mental or blood condition sought to be determined, or from using certain witnesses; or 2 2 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 3. an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party. CPLR 3126 (McKinney’s 2020). 6. The penalties listed in CPLR 3126 “were not intended to be exhaustive” and the “practice commentaries to CPLR 3126 encourage the courts to exercise their ingenuity, and to devise sanctions as narrowly tailored as possible to the circumstances of the individual case.” DiDomenico v. C&S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 41, 49 (2nd Dep’t 1998). 7. In order to warrant the imposition of sanctions (e.g., dismissal of the non-complying party’s pleading, precluding the non-complying party from introducing evidence to support its claims), it must be shown that the party’s failure to comply with discovery demands or court orders is willful. See Davis v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 442, 613 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep’t 1994). Where, as here, Defendant can offer no legitimate excuse or explanation for his utter failure to respond to Plaintiff’s numerous requests for compliance, willfulness can be inferred. Frias v. Fortini, 240 A.D.2d 467, 468, 658 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (2d Dep’t 1997); see also Arnoff v. Lorio, 208 A.D.2d 581, 581, 618 N.Y.S.2d 218 (the defendant satisfied the “willful and contumacious” standard by failing to appear for a deposition despite two previous court orders compelling her to do so). 8. In addition to other remedies, this Court has the inherent power to award Plaintiff his costs and expenses incurred as a result of the non-compliance of Defendant, including the costs of bringing this motion. See Figdor v. City of New York, 33 A.D.3d 560, 823 N.Y.S.2d 385, (1st Dep’t 2006) (directing defendant to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,000 where defendant’s response to discovery orders was inexcusably lax). 3 3 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 B. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel a Forensic Inspection of Defendant’s Apple iMac Computer 9. After Defendant’s miraculous production of the Fraudulent Payment Agreement on December 12, 2018, Plaintiff repeatedly requested that Defendant produce the original document as well as any supporting documents relating to the creation and execution of the Fraudulent Payment Agreement. Specifically, on or about December 18, 2018, Plaintiff served its Second Request for Production of Documents (“Plaintiff’s Second Request”), which requested, among other things: 1. The original Payment Agreement. 2. All documents relating to or concerning the drafting and/or negotiations of the Payment Agreement including, but not limited to, correspondence, e-mails, texts, pdfs, facsimiles, handwritten notes, and the like. 3. All documents relating to or concerning the transmittal and execution of the Payment Agreement including, but not limited to, correspondence, e-mails, texts, pdfs, facsimiles, handwritten notes, and the like. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Second Request for Production of Documents, dated December 18, 2018 is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 10. Defendant never produced a single document in response to Plaintiff’s Second Request. 11. As a result, Plaintiff demanded a forensic inspection of Defendant’s computer(s) to help determine the creation of and authenticity of the Fraudulent Payment Agreement. On August 15, 2020, Wilfredo Rodriguez, counsel for Plaintiff requested a forensic inspection Defendant’s computer(s) and sent a Notice of Inspection, by letter to David Bamberger, Defendant’s then- counsel. A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s Notice of Inspection, dated August 15, 2019, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Specifically, the Notice of Inspection stated: 4 4 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 Given the crucial legal implications of the Payment Agreement and Tenreiro's apparent inability to locate the original document, we hereby request that Tenreiro allow a limited forensic inspection of all computers of any kind which he has used between the time periods December 30, 2012-January 13, 2013 (seven days before and after the Payment Agreement was alleged to be drafted and signed) and June 6, 2018-December 12, 2018 (the time between when the action was filed and the Payment Agreement was produced) to create, modify, store, or delete the specific computer file(s) from which the Payment Agreement was derived. This inspection will be conducted by an independent IT forensic specialist whom we will retain, and will be limited to the specific electronic files regarding the Payment Agreement identified above. Id., at 2. 12. However, Defendant refused to produce his computer(s) and also claimed that he no longer had the computer that he used to create the Fraudulent Payment Agreement in his possession. 13. During the course of this litigation, Plaintiff concluded that Defendant, just as he manufactured the Fraudulent Payment Agreement, may have also manufactured at least one other fraudulent document, namely, a letter from Defendant to Isabel Stipa and Luis Hernandez, dated June 3, 2014 (the “Chubb Inspection Letter”), in a further effort to defeat Plaintiff’s claims and bolster his otherwise feeble counter-claims. A true and correct copy of the Chubb Inspection Letter, dated June 3, 2014, is attached as Exhibit C. 14. On October 19, 2021, Wilfredo Rodriguez, Esq., counsel for Plaintiff advised Stephanie Emanuel, Esq., counsel for Defendant, by letter of these concerns -- “As was previously communicated to your predecessor counsel, David Bamberger, Esq., of Akabas & Sproule, we believe that the letter dated June 3, 2014 addressed to CPS 8CDE Corp. and signed by Mr. Tenreiro, on behalf of his company, Park Avenue Interiors, Inc., is not authentic and was 5 5 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 fraudulently created.” A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s letter, dated October 19, 2021, is attached as Exhibit D. 15. During the course of Defendant’s recent deposition, Plaintiff testified that he owned and used a 2013 Apple iMac Computer, Serial No. DCPLM08JFQPG (the “iMac Computer”) during the relevant time period. See Excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of Daniel Tenreiro (“Depo. Tr.”), dated October 21, 2021, at p. 58, lines 2 - 22, p. 277, lines 14 -22, p. 374, lines 6 - 12, and p. 378, lines 10 - 25, which is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 16. Further, Defendant also testified that the iMac Computer was the only computer that he had and that he used it for all purposes (e.g., personal and business). Id., at p. 277, lines 14 -22. 17. Finally, Defendant testified that he, in fact, still has his iMac Computer and that it is presently located at his office at 2572 Park Avenue, Bronx, New York. Id., at p. 58, lines 2 - 17. 18. During his deposition, Defendant was asked how he created the Fraudulent Payment Agreement testified that he created the Fraudulent Payment Agreement on his iMac Computer. Id., at pp. 56 - 58. (Exhibit E). Defendant also testified that he created the Chubb Inspection Letter on his iMac Computer. Id., at p. 278, lines 6 -10. 19. Accordingly, at that point, Plaintiff again demanded the production of the iMac Computer for a limited forensic inspection. Id., at p. 373, (Exhibit E) lines 10 – 13, 18- 25, and p. 374, line 2. (Exhibit E). 20. On November 1, 2021, Mr. Rodriguez wrote to Ms. Emanuel again to “reserve the right to request and require a more detailed forensic inspection of Mr. Tenreiro’s desktop computer [the iMac Computer] used to create Exhibit 53 [the Chubb Inspection Letter] for the period of May 6 6 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 1, 2014 – June 30, 2014.” A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s letter, dated November 1, 2021, is attached as Exhibit F. 21. On November 16, 2021, Mr. Rodriguez wrote to Ms. Emanuel again to request production of the iMac Computer for a limited forensic inspection -- “As per our request on the record during Mr. Tenreiro’s deposition on Thursday, November 11th and, as previously stated in our letter of November 1, 2021 (copy enclosed), this letter will serve as our formal demand for the production of Mr. Tenreiro’s Apple iMac desktop computer and its hard drive for our forensic review and inspection by no later than November 22, 2021.” A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s letter, dated November 16, 2021, is attached as Exhibit G. 22. Despite repeated requests, Defendant has consistently refused to produce his iMac Computer for a limited forensic inspection. 23. Accordingly, by this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel production of Defendant’s iMac Computer for a limited forensic inspection, at Plaintiff’s cost and expense. To that end, Plaintiff has previously agreed and remains willing to agree to any reasonable guidelines and protections to safeguard Defendant’s privacy and limit the forensic inspection of the iMac Computer to review of the specific Electronically Stored Information that relates to the Fraudulent Payment Agreement and the Chubb Inspection Letter. D. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel Production of Outstanding Discovery Including Defendant’s JPMorgan Chase Bank Account Statements 24. As set forth in detail in the Amended Complaint, this action arises out of Defendant’s Tenreiro’s default of a $500,000 loan obligation that was secured by collateral pledged by Plaintiff Stipa. In or about February 2018, Plaintiff defaulted upon his loan obligations to JPMorgan Chase Bank (“Chase”), the lender. As a result, Chase promptly liquidated Plaintiff’s collateral and applied the proceeds to the outstanding principal amount and accrued interest. Based 7 7 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 upon Defendant’s default and wrongful conduct, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendant to recover the amounts that were liquidated from his account. 25. One of the critical fact issues that is central to Plaintiff’s claims is that the $500,000 loan provided to Plaintiff by Chase, which was based upon Plaintiff’s pledge of collateral, provided the main source of funds for Defendants’ purchase of Unit 8E at 470 Park Avenue, New York, NY. 26. To that point, on August 27, 2018, Plaintiff served Karen Neuwirth, Esq., Defendant’s original counsel, with discovery requests, including Plaintiff’s First Request for Production. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s First Request for Production of Documents, dated August 27, 2018, is attached hereto as Exhibit H. 27. Plaintiff’s Document Request No. 34 requested: “All documents pertaining to your [Defendants’] 2013 purchase of Unit 8E at 470 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10029 (‘Unit 8E/470 Park Avenue’)”. 28. Plaintiff’s Document Request No. 35 requested: “All documents pertaining to the source of funds used in connection with your purchase of Unit 8E/470 Park Avenue.” 29. In response to Request No. 34, Defendant produced a five-page notice of public auction and one-page memorandum of sale. 30. In response to Request No. 35, Defendant produced a single, six-page JPMorgan Chase Bank Account Statement for No. xxxxxxxxxxx4050 for the period of May 6, 2013 through May 31, 2013 (the “JPMorgan Chase Statement”). 31. During late 2018 and through May 2019, Plaintiff made numerous good faith requests for production of outstanding discovery to Ms. Neuwirth to no avail. 8 8 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 32. On August 15, 2019, Mr. Rodriguez made a final good faith request to resolve outstanding discovery disputes, by letter to Mr. Bamberger, Defendant’s then-counsel who substituted for Ms. Neuwirth. A true and correct copy of Mr. Rodriguez’s Good Faith Letter, dated August 15, 2019, is attached hereto as Exhibit I. 33. Specifically, the Good Faith Letter outlined all of the outstanding discovery that Plaintiff had failed to produce to date and requested production of same on or before September 6, 2019, specifically including responses to Request Nos. 34 and 35. 34. During his deposition, Defendant testified that as of August 27, 2018, the date of Plaintiff’s original Request for Production of Documents, Defendant had access to all of his JPMorgan Bank Statements. See Depo. Tr., at 370, lines 17 - 25. 35. To date, Defendant has failed to produce any additional responsive documents to Request Nos. 34 or 35, including any other documents related to the purchase of Unit 8E, any additional JPMorgan Bank Statements, and/or any other financial statements or documents reflecting a source of funds for the purchase of Unit 8E. 36. Accordingly, by this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to produce of all documents responsive to Request Nos. 34 and 35, including Defendant’s JPMorgan Bank Statements for the period of March 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013, all documents reflecting the source of funds used to purchase Unit 8E (including any other bank account or fianacila statements), and the contract of sale for Unit 8E. D. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel the Continued Deposition of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro 37. As set forth in detail above, and in conjunction with Plaintiff’s motion to compel a forensic inspection of Defendant’s iMac Computer and production of outstanding document 9 9 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 discovery, Plaintiff requests the continued examination of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro in order to complete his examination regarding these matters and related issues. 38. Further, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant Tenreiro’s continued deposition to explore several areas of questioning that Defendant’s counsel objected to and issued numerous instructions not to answer to Defendant Tenreiro regarding conversations between Defendants Daniel Tenreiro and his wife, Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro, regarding the purchase on Unit 8E, the $500,000 loan and amounts owed to Plaintiff. Q. Have you ever had any communication with your wife regarding the amount of money that you owe Mr. Stipa, as we saw in prior emails, which, according to your testimony, just related to interest? A. I don't owe him any money. Q. That's not the question whether you do or do not. Did you, in fact, have communications that involved – MR. MAIRA. Excuse me. Objection. Objection. You’re going into marital communications too extensively. That's between him and his wife. Ask for her deposition, if you want, but forget asking him about what he said to his wife. Please. MR. RODRIGUEZ. Sorry, counsel, sorry, are you instructing him on some husband and wife privilege? MR. MAIRA. Yes marital communications, privilege, correct. * * * MR. RODRIGUEZ. So just to be clear, Mr. Maira, are you instructing him not to answer question? MR. MAIRA. Not on communications he said to his wife. Don't answer period mark it for a ruling. Go ahead. See Depo. Tr., p. 224, lines 24 – 25, p, 225, lines 2 – 23, and p. 226, lines 7 - 14. See also, Depo. Tr., pp. 227 – 228 and 230 – 232. (Exhibit E). 39. The elements for the spousal privilege are: 10 10 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 (a) a communication, (b) induced by the marital relationship, (c) made in confidence, (d) during the marriage, if it is, (e) not waived, and (f) not subject to an exception. See CPLR § 4502 (McKinney’s 2020). 40. In order to qualify for privileged treatment, the exchange between the spouses must have been “induced by the marital relation and prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty engendered by such relationship.” Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99, 144 N.E.2d 72 (1957). Thus, not all “daily and ordinary exchanges” between spouses will qualify; the privilege encompasses only “those which would not have been made but for the absolute confidence in, and induced by, the marital relationship.” People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 176 N.E.2d 81 (1960). 41. In Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., Bloomingdale Bros. Division v. Esser, 409 N.Y.S.2d 353 (N.Y. Sup. 1978), a case of first impression, the Court stated the parameters of the marital privilege under CPLR § 4502 as follows: The provision prohibiting testimony as to confidential communications applies only to those which are made in confidence, or which from their nature and the circumstances of disclosure appear to be made or are such as spring out of and are induced by the marital relation and are therefore confidential in character. They must be expressly made confidential, or be of a confidential nature or be induced by the marital relation. Confidential communications do not include ordinary conversations relating to matters of business, or other matters, which there is no reason to suppose either party would have been unwilling to hold in the presence of any person . . .“ (N.Y.Jur., Supra, pp. 218-219). Id. (upholding marital privilege but recognizing exception for ordinary business matters and for fraud) (emphasis added). See also, G-Fours, Inc. v. Miele, 496 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming 11 11 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 trial court that marital privilege did not apply because “[t]he questions posed to Mrs. Miele dealt with business matters that either were not confidential or, if deliberate efforts were made to conceal them to prevent execution of judgment, were not privileged even if the parties intended them to be confidential”). 42. Further, “[t]he marital privilege is not available to refuse disclosure of communications designed to perpetrate frauds on third parties.” Id., at 812. See also, In re Donald Sheldon & Co., Inc., 191 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 1996) (“We hold that the facts of the case before us fall squarely within the Second Circuit’s ruling in G–Fours. There is probable cause to believe that the Sheldons attempted to conceal assets to prevent the Trustee from executing on the judgment. Further, those questions upon which the spousal privilege was asserted relate to the existence or location of the allegedly concealed assets. Thus, the communications are not privileged even if the parties intended them to be confidential.”). 43. These are preliminary questions of fact for the court, requiring determination on a case-by-case basis. Matter of Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 439 N.E.2d 378 (1982). The witness has the burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege. “The burden of establishing that certain communications are privileged and protected from discovery under the spousal privilege is on the party asserting the privilege.” Kennedy v. North Westchester Hospital, Inc., 2014 WL 6707022, * 4 (N.Y.Sup. 2014) (quoting Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 377 (1991)). 44. Finally, “[t]he privilege between spouses set forth in CPLR 4502 (subd. (b)) is a testimonial privilege that only prevents one spouse from testifying against the other at a trial.” People v. Watkins, 63 A.D.2d 1033 (2d Dept 1978). 45. Because the questions at issue specifically involved ordinary business maters which 12 12 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 are the subject of this action, and because Defendant has also evidenced an affirmative effort to defraud Plaintiff in an effort to avoid judgment (e.g., the Fraudulent Payment Agreement), the spousal privilege is inapplicable, Defendant’s objections are without merit and Defendant should be directed to appear for continued deposition to answer the questions posed. See Gerard v. Cahill, 2014 WL 1806464, *7 (N.Y.Sup. 2104) (“The spousal privilege does not attach to “ordinary conversations relating to matters of business which there is no reason to suppose [the spouse] would have been unwilling to hold in the presence of any person.”); GoSmile, Inc. v. Levine, 2012 WL 2057006 (N.Y.Sup. 2012) (“Under the applicable statute, ordinary business matters are an exception to the marital privilege and therefore ordinary conversations relating to matters of business which there is no reason to suppose the spouse would have been unwilling to hold in the presence of any person are not protected, e.g., the existence and location of a spouse’s bank accounts or the ownership and transfer of property do not encroach upon the marital privilege.”); Guillen v. Fisher-Treger Realty, LLC, 2018 WL 5099134 (N.Y. Sup. 2018) (“Any spousal privilege that might apply was waived when plaintiff commenced this action.”); In re Donald Sheldon & Co., Inc., 191 B.R. 139 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 1996) (marital privilege did not apply in matters where spouse was attempting to conceal assets and avoid creditors). 46. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, The Court should order the continued deposition of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro on a date certain. E. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel Production of E-Mails and Texts from Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Kram de Tenreiro 47. During the course of her deposition, Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro testified that she had several communications, via text, email and/or What’s App, with Magel Stipa, Plaintiff’s spouse, which were directly related to the $500,000 loan and the issues in this action. See Excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro, 13 13 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 dated November 30, 2021, at p. 101, lines 4 – 19, p. 120, lines 7 – 11, p. 122, lines 19 – 25 and p. 123, lines 2 – 10, attached hereto as Exhibit J. 48. Accordingly, at the time, Plaintiff requested production of the relevant communications. However, to date, Defendants have not produced any of the documents that Mrs. Tenreiro testified about. 49. Accordingly, by this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant Carla M. Braschi- Karam de Tenreiro to produce copies of the text, email and/or What’s App communications with Magel Stipa, Plaintiff’s spouse. F. Plaintiff Seeks to Compel the Continued Deposition of Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro 50. Plaintiff seeks to compel the continued examination of Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro for the limited purpose of questioning her regarding her communications with Magel Stipa, Plaintiff’s spouse, as set forth in the requested text, email and/or What’s App communications. G. Conclusion 51. For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant his Motion to Compel Discovery in its entirety and an issue an Order: a. Ordering Defendant Daniel Tenreiro to produce his iMac Computer for limited forensic inspection; b. Ordering Defendant Daniel Tenreiro to produce responsive documents to Plaintiff’s Request Nos. 34 and 35, including copies of his JPMorgan Chase bank statements for JPMorgan Chase Bank Account No. xxxxxxxxxxx4050 for the period of January 1, 2013 – June 30, 2013 and any other financial statements or documents reflecting a source of funds for purchase of Unit 8E during the same period, or, alternatively, if Defendant Daniel Tenreiro is no longer in possession, custody or control of such documents, he shall provide a sworn affidavit explaining the facts and circumstances related to the failure to produce such documents and the disposition of such documents; 14 14 of 15 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/20/2021 02:32 PM INDEX NO. 652830/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 299 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/20/2021 c. Ordering the continued examination of Defendant Daniel Tenreiro on a date certain; d. Ordering Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro to produce various texts, email and/or What’s App communications with Magel Stipa, Plaintiff’s spouse, regarding the issues raised in this action; e. Ordering the continued deposition of Defendant Carla M. Braschi-Karam de Tenreiro on a date certain; and f. Ordering appropriate sanctions, including an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this motion, against Defendant Daniel Tenreiro for his failure to comply with his discovery obligations, pursuant to CPLR § 3126; and g. All such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. Dated: December 17, 2021 Rockville Centre, New York Andrew P. Karamouzis Andrew P. Karamouzis 15 15 of 15