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BARBARA J. PARKER, City Attorney, SBN 069722
MARIA BEE, Chief Assistant City Attorney, SBN 167716
KEVIN MCLAUGHLIN, Supervising Deputy City Attorney, SBN 251477
MICHAEL QUIRK, Deputy City Attorney, SBN 283351
One Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, 6th Floor
Oakland, California 94612
AG
Telephone: (510) 238-3839, Fax: (510) 238-6500
Email: mquirk@oaklandcityattorney.org € ‘ Le) Nt N
33244/3110575 ban \
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Attorneys for Defendant, NP cee 49 ® we
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CITY OF OAKLAND 2
(also erroneously sued as on Pps
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OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT) op pA ne
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
11
12 MILDRED L. OLIVER, Case No. RG19007799
13 Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO
JUDGE James Reilly
14 Vv. DEPARTMENT 25
15 CITY OF OAKLAND, OAKLAND POLICE
DEPARTMENT, AND DOES 1-25,
16 INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
17 Defendants. SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR
18 ALTERNATIVELY SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION
19
Date: December 15, 2021
20 Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 25
21 Reservation No: R-2282494
22
Complaint filed: February 21, 2019
23 Trial date: January 24, 2022
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 000. ecccecccseseeceeseessseeeseneeecaesesesescseeecaeseesesesseseaeeseneaesesesseeeeecseseeesseseaeses
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Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..0..oeeccececcessesessseseeseseseeeeaenececaesecesseseseeseseneeecacaeeecaeseseeeeaeatets
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A. Oliver isassigned to conduct an IAD investigation of officer misconduct.............5
B. Oliver failsan examination for a promotional opportunity... eeecesseeeeeteeeees
6
C. Oliver istransferred to Patrol 0.0...cecceecescsceseseeseseseesseseseeseeeseeesesessecescseeeeeaeataes
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D Oliver breaches protocol at a crime scene under her supervision involving an active
shooter, goes out on stress leave one week later,and never returns to work...........
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E. Oliver isdisciplined for not securing the active shooting scene ........ccee 7
TI. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 0.0...ccccceeeseeseseseseseneesesssseseseseseesessanesesessseteeeeseeesees
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TV. ARGUMENT 00 ececceccccceeceseerseseseeeeaescsnesescseestsssstevscneseeseeeeecasasnstssaeesecaeseeeeseaseetetssseeseasy
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A. Legal Standard ou... ce escssssescscesesersssseescsceessesceseseseseesesseesecaeseseeseseessacseseeesaeeeeeaes
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10 B. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s FEHA discrimination
CLAIMS eee seeeceeesescsscesescececssescecccseseseesesescscececassesaesesescessscesessaeaesecaeseeseeseaeeeeeaeees
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11 1. Oliver’s claim of discrimination for being removed from an IAD
INVeEstigation failS..........eesssssseeeeseeceeseeeeseeeeeseseseeseeeseseceseseseeecseeeeeesenes
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2. Oliver’s claim of discrimination for failing a lieutenant’s examination fails
13 eveeseveveaesesacaescuceacscecsssasessceacuesaesesesseaescueessaescessaeeeescseueterseaeeseseaeseeecateetetaeates
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3. Oliver’s claim her transfer to Patrol was discriminatory fails...................
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4. Oliver’s claim that tentative discipline was discriminatory fails..............
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15 5. Oliver’s complaints about the City’s handling of her leave and retirement as
Giscriminatory fail...
eeseseectseceeeeeeceseeeeseseseeeseecceeteeseseeenecseeeeeeeeetaes
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6. Oliver received a 30-day suspension because of her supervisory failures—
17 the suspension was not discriminatory and thus the claim fails................
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C. Oliver’s FEHA harassment claim fails and the Court should grant summary
18 ACJUGICALION 20...cececece eseeeeeceecseeseseesesecseceesesseseeeesssacessecssreeaeecseeseseesseessesetaeereaeeess
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19 Dz. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s fourth cause of action
for FEHA “Retaliation” 2... ceccscesescessseeesecessceeeceasesetseseseeeesceeeesseseeceeeeeaeeeeetae
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20 E. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s fifthcause of action for
“Whistleblower Retaliation” under Labor Code § 1102.5(b)........cccceceseereeeeees
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V. CONCLUSION 0. eeeceeccecesesesesssesescsesecescscscesesesescscscieaceeseeaesesescaescieeescacececeseeestststseaeacaceees
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 217 Cal. App. 4th 1402 (2013)... cc ccccecesessssessessesessesseeeseeeeseees
1]
Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1441 (2002)..0....cccccccssesessssesscseeeseesestesssscseeseeteseeeses
10, 12
Arnold v.Dignity Health, 53 Cal. App. Sth 412 (2020) ......ececcccsseseeeseesessesesesesesesesessesesesseecseaeeeessseeeeees
10
Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 327 (2008) ........cccccccccccessssscesseseseesessesesssseseescsesseseesecaeseesseaeaee
24
Chen v.County of Orange, 96 Cal. App. 4th 926 (2002)...
eceeceeececesesesesesesesesessseseseseseseeees
11, 12, 20, 22
Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, 18 Cal. App. Sth 908 (2017) .....cceeeccsssssssesescseeceseeseceseseeceeseeeeseseeeeasseeees
9
Dinslage v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 5 Cal. App. Sth 368 (2016)...
eccccseesessececeseesseesseeeeeseeeeseeenes
21
Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000) oo... ceeesseeeseseeseeseeceeseeeeeeeneeesees
9, 10, 12, 18
Hager v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 228 Cal. App. 4th 1538 (2014)...
ccceeeeesssseseceseeceesesesenenseeesesesessseerseeeeees
23
10 Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215 (1999) oo. ceeccssceeeseesesseseeeeseceeseeeeeseeeseseeeeseeseeeseaees
16
Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203 (2013) ...ccccecccsessescsesessssescsesenecseseeceseseseesaeeeeesseeeeeaeaes
13
11
Horn v.Cushman & Wakefield W., Inc.,72 Cal. App. 4th 798 (1999)........ seccceseeseeseeaceaceaeeseaeeeneeeeaseateneeaens
9
12 Jumaane y. City of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 4th 1390 (2015) oo...
ccecceccscscsssseceseseescsesessssesesseseseneceees
1]
13 Loggins v.Kaiser Permanente Internat., 151 Cal. App. 4th 1102 (2007). 00... eeceseeseseesesceeeeeeeeeeeeees
22
Lyle v.Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264 (2006) .........cccccsscsscssesseeeeesseseesesssseseeeseenaeens
19, 20
14
Mathieu v. Norrell Corp., 115 Cal. App. 4th 1174 (2004)...
cccesesseseceseeeeseseeesceecneeeeecseseeesasseeeeaeaeseses
1]
15 McCoy v.Pac. Mar. Assn., 216 Cal. App. 4th 283 (2013) .o.eeeeccceccesesceeceeseseeseeeesaeeatenenseecesaceeccesaseneeeens
20
16 McRae v.Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 142 Cal. App. 4th 377 (2006) .........ccccecccecseeeeessssesscsssecseeeeseeseees
10, 12
Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 878 (1985).....:cccccecsscessssssesseceeseseeetseecesesseseeaeeeees
11, 13, 16
17
Morgan v.Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000)... eee eceseeseesesseessceeecceceeeneceeeseeeesceeaees
22
18 Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243 (2009)...
.ceeeeceeeeeeeecesseneeeeeeeaeeaeeaeeaeenseeeeaneaseaeeaes
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19 Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1378 (2005)......cecccsecseseeeceseetecneeeees
23
Pinero v. Specialty Restaurants, 130 Cal. App. 4th 635 (2005) .....ceccccccccesccsscseesesseeseescescsecseceeeeeneens
12, 15
20
Quinn v.City ofLos Angeles, 84 Cal. App. 4th 472 (2000)...
eeessceseesesseseeseseeeeseeceseeeeseeeeaeesseeeaeenenesaees
13
2) Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 226 Cal. App. 4th 830 (2014)... ces seesceececeseeeeseeeeseeecsceeeseeeeseeseesaateceeeees
12
22 Sheffield v.LA Cnty. Dept. of Social Services, 109 Cal. App. 4th 153 (2003)...
eceeeseecseseeseteceeeeeeeeees 20
Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975) ...eccecccccccessesssssceseeseeseeseeeeeseseseeeseccessesaeeecseeeeeaeeateees
8,15
23
Thomas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 77 Cal. App. 4th 507 (2000) ........ecescececsessecsesceeeetseceesseeseeeeeeaeeeaeeaeeaees
10
24 Trop v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1133 (2005)... eee esceseeseeeeeeseeetteeseeeseceeeereesees
14, 18
25 Yanowitz v.L’Oreal USA, Inc.,36 Cal. 4th 1028 (2005)...
ecececcceecsecceseeceseeseeeesseeeacecesceesaeeeeetens
15, 16, 20
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
r ®
FEDERAL CASES
Brooks v.City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000) .......ccccccescsssessssscsesesesssscsesessscssscsssscecssssseasavens
15
Carrasco v. San Ramon Valley Unified Sch. Dist.,No. C 04-02395 CRB, 2005 WL 3260607 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 1,2005), aff'd, 258 F. App’x 114 (Oth Cir. 2007) oo. cceescesseseseseseeseseseesesesetscssssssscseseeseseaans
11
Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2006).........ccccccscsceccsescccsessssssssseseesseesees
22
Faragher v.City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)....cssssssssssssssseseesesesesesescssssecscsesssssssesesesesecsesescscarecess
20
Hardage v.CBS Broad., Inc., 427 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) .....c.cccccscccsesssssssssssssssssssssscsescssssasscsceseseseseess
20
Klein v.Ellison, No. 20-CV-04439-JSC, 2021 WL 2075591 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2021) ....cccccccccceeeeeeees
13
Ledergerber v.Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997) .......ccccccssscscscscscscscscscssscsscscscscsesescecsvssecseeseseseseans
12
Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) .......ccccccssssscsssscsscseessscssssessesesscsesssescecsevessssesenseas
24
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ...ccccccccccssecsscssesssssssscsessssesssvecsetevavsesesecseee
9, 18, 20
10 Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2004) o....ccccccsccccccsesescseseesessessesescssscssssssesessssatieans
15
11 Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1997)......c.ccccssscscsecssseseessescecessssscsesestecsessseceeas
14
12 Steiner v.Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994) oo...cccccccsssscsesscsssssssssscsccscscesesvevseeees
14
Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002).....ccccccscccccscsscscsesecscssssescscessssssecssescssssescacccsvsesavavacaaeeees
15
13 Strother v.S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996) ....ceccccceccseeceseeseneeseeeeseeseesesseaes
20
14 Tatum v.Schwartz, 405 F. App’x 169 (9th Cir. 2010) .....ecececcsesssssesesssssesscecseeesesescscsescsescsesssesescsssesnsness
24
Yates v.AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) ....c.ccccccececcccssssesescesescssescsesessesesesessssescesessecssssecsaeseeeaes
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STATE STATUTES
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Cal. A.B. 9 § 3, 2018-19 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019)...
cccccccccsesssscscsssscscsessescsesceesscscseestsvsseseseaceecevaceaes
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18 Code Civ. Proc. § 43 7C(C) o..eeeecsssessssscssesesseseeescecesesesssseseseesesessseesesssesassesassessssescsesasesscseseseescsesssesssessscseeseseass
9
19 Gov. Code § 12940(h) oo... cceeceeseesesesesesesesesessensesesesesesesesesesssssssssssssssesesesasacesssssseseseasesseassesescstseesecsesess
21
Gov. Code § 12960...
eecceesseseseeseesesseseseesessesesceseesesseseesesesssseesesscssesssscsevsesscsesacacsacssssseasecsuescassasescsusaees
1]
20
Labor Code § 1102.5 oo. ccececessessesesseseesseeesssecsecsesecsscscseesesecseeseececsessasscsscscsessssssscsssscssceccstssssecesescecescanes
5
21 Labor Code § 1102.5(b) .....ceccceecesescessesesseseeeeseecsesesessesecseseeseeasscesesesesesacseseseesesessessessesesesscseeseesssecseeeeeees
22
22
23 FEDERAL STATUTES
24 A2 U.S.C. § 20006 et Seq. eee eeecescesessesessesessessecesesaesecsesscsessesecsssscsesssscesecsesececsesesssassecsesetssesseseensitssssceees
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
L INTRODUCTION
This is an employment discrimination case filedby PlaintiffMildred Oliver (“Oliver”) against the City
of Oakland (“City”). She is a former Oakland Police Department (“OPD”) sergeant, now retiredand receiving
disability benefits. The City appreciates Oliver’s approximately 20 years of service toOPD before she lefton
disability. But discipline Oliver received for failing tosecure the scene of an active shooter was not the result
of discrimination or retaliation.
On February 14,2017, Oliver was the commanding officer atthe scene of an active shooter on Las
Vegas Avenue in Oakland, and she seriously mishandled the situation. Shortly after,she went on stress leave,
and began tomake complaints that various personnel actions spanning several years prior were discriminatory
10 or done as some sort of retaliation. She was disciplined for her mishandling of the active shooter incident and
11 claims thatwas discriminatory orretaliatory as well.
12 Many of the issues Oliver complains about are time-barred or are too insignificant to amount to an
13 adverse employment action. The only timely adverse action—the discipline imposed for mishandling the
14 active shooter incident—is supported by an incontrovertible legitimate business reason, which Oliver cannot
15 show was pretext for discrimination or done in retaliationfor any sortof protected activity.
16 Oliver’s claims boil down toa nameless and unfounded conspiracy toundermine her career, without
17 any coherent evidence of adiscriminatory or retaliatorymotive against her. There is no viable claim under
18 FEHA or Labor Code § 1102.5 and the City’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.
19 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
20 A. Oliver is assigned to conduct an IAD investigation of officer misconduct
21 OPD hired Oliver in August 1997. (UMF 1.) Amid a variety of assignments, Oliver worked in Patrol
22 three separate times, serving about five years in Patrol cumulatively, before being transferred toOPD’s
23 Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) in 2014. (UMF 2.) While in IAD, in2014, Oliver filledout a form
24 expressing her preference for a position outside IAD. (UMF 3.) This form stayed in her filewhile she was in
25 IAD. (d.)
26 On September 25, 2015, an OPD officer committed suicide and lefta suicide note. (UMF 4.) Oliver
27 was the IAD investigator initiallyassigned to investigate an internal affairscomplaint relatedto the suicide
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
note.’ (UMF 7.) She reported her initial
evaluation up the chain of command, recommending thata criminal
investigation precede her own IAD investigation. (UMF 9.) But OPD’s Criminal Investigations Division
(“CID”) had already been investigating the suicide and surrounding circumstances. In fact, one of Oliver’s
IAD supervisors had watched an interview conducted by CID prior to Oliver receiving the IAD case file.
(UMF 6.) Oliver’s recommendation was conveyed toCID, but CID declined to pursue a further criminal
investigation. (UMF 10.)
iro)
The JAD investigation continued. (/d.) Oliver was latertaken off the investigation, aftera federal
compliance director and independent monitor team (“IMT”) overseeing anegotiated settlement agreement
o
with OPD criticizedhow it had been handled. (UMF 16.) An independent investigator hired by theIMT later
10 filed hisfindings on the investigation with the federal court. (UMF 21.) The report was criticalboth of
il Oliver’s initial
investigation and OPD’s handling and management of the matter as a whole. (/d.) Oliver
12 claims thatbeing taken off the investigation was discriminatory or done inretaliation for recommending that
1B the IAD investigation be tolled while CID investigated the matter.
14 B. Oliver fails an examination for a promotional opportunity
15 Around February 24, 2016, the City posted a department-wide testingopportunity fora promotion to
16 lieutenant. (UMF 23.) The City hired an independent third-party consultant to create and assist with
17 administering the examination. (UMF 25.) Oliver passed the firstphase of the exam, but she failed the
18 second. (UMF 26.) The second phase was a series of panel interviews administering different scenarios for
19 candidates to interpret. (UMF 25.) The panelists were law enforcement officers from outside agencies—not
20 OPD personnel—and the resultswere scored solely by the outside panelists. (/d.) Oliver claims her poor
21 result was discriminatory and retaliatory for her recommendation thatthe IAD misconduct investigation be
22 tolled.
23 Cc. Oliver is transferred to Patrol
24 On August 22, 2016, as part of the annual “watch change” to transfer OPD personnel to Patrol, an
25 executive team made the decision to transferOliver to Patrol effective January 2017. (UMF 28.) Then, as
26 now, OPD had an acute need for sergeants in Patrol. (UMF 29.) Oliver did not oppose the transfer and started
27
28 | The City
herself,by
isunaware
filingthis
of anyone
lawsuit.
publicly identifyingOliver asthe IAD investigator on that case untilOliver did so
6
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
in Patrol on January 14, 2017. (UMF 32, 38.) However, she now claims the transfer was discriminatory or
done in retaliation.In her new Patrol assignment, Oliver reported to Lt. Dominique Arotzarena, a white male.
(UMF 39.) Oliver worked with him two days a week. (/d.) She worked with Lt. Arotzarena for
approximately five weeks and claims thathe harassed her and created a hostile work environment. (See UMF
38, 50.) Before working with him, Oliver never had an issue with a supervisor. (UMF 80).
D. Oliver breaches protocol at a crime scene under her supervision involving an active
shooter, goes out on stress leave one week later, and never returns to work
On February 14,2017, Oliver responded to a shooting on the 9500 block of Las Vegas Avenue. (UMF
44.) She was the supervising officer on the scene. (UMF 45.) At the scene, the victim reported to officers
10 that he had been sleeping in hiscar when someone began shooting out the car’s windows. (UMF 44.)
11 Oliver called her supervisor, and then directed all officersto leave the area. (UMF 46-47.) Three days
12 later,on February 17, 2017, OPD officerswere entangled in an officer-involved shooting and the same suspect
13 was shot and killed. (UMF 48.) The same day, IAD opened an investigation into how theFebruary 14
14 shooting was handled by OPD personnel, including Oliver. (UMF 49.)
15 On February 23, 2017, nine days aftermishandling the Las Vegas Avenue shooting, for the firsttime,
16 Oliver submitted a written complaint with OPD alleging a hostile work environment. (UMF 50.) The next
17 day, she went out on medical leave due to stress,and Oliver never returned to work. (/d.) Oliver retired on
18 May 15, 2019 with a retirement disabilitybenefit. (UMF 68.)
19 E. Oliver is disciplined for not securing the active shooting scene
20 On February 5, 2018, as aresult of the IAD investigation into the February 14, 2017 Las Vegas
21 Avenue shooting incident, IAD issued a sustained finding that Oliver had violated her duties as a supervisor
22 under OPD Manual of Rules No. 285. (UMF 57.)
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
Police issued a notice of intentto demote. (UMF 57.) However, Oliver invoked her right to aSkelly hearing
to respond to the proposed discipline. (UMF 58.) The Skelly hearing was held, and ultimately, on January
15, 2019, the City imposed a 30-day suspension. (UMF 58, 63.) Despite Oliver’s numerous failingsand the
DD
legitimate basis for her discipline, Oliver claims her discipline was discriminatory and retaliatory. She also
NSN
alleges the City intentionally delayed her retirement.
CO
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Oo
10 After she startedher medical leave, Oliver submitted several complaints to the California Department
11 of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
12 On April 25, 2017, the EEOC received from Oliver an EEOC “charge” which identified the “earliest” dates of
13 discrimination as “01-13-2017,” i.e.the date of her transfer to Patrol. (UMF 51.) On February 22, 2018,
14 Oliver submitted a “complaint” to the DFEH. (UMF 59.) On February 21, 2019, Oliver submitted another
15 complaint to the DFEH. (UMF 64.) She filedthis lawsuit on February 21, 2019, and the operative amended
16 complaint was filed April 23, 2019. Her complaint alleges the following as discriminatory acts against her:
17
“unfavorable outcome during Lt.’stest in June 2016”
18 “transferred from preferred position in IAD to Patrol in January 2017”
“notice of intention to demote on February 5,2018”
19 “failure to accommodate to return Sgt. Oliver towork”
20 “forcing the plaintiff to seek a disability retirement”
“delaying thatretirement process”
- 21 “disciplinary letter imposing a 30-day suspension as of January 15, 2019”
22 FAC 7 68.
23 Oliver also alleges ahostile work environment, and retaliation. However, Oliver does not possess
24 evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. None of the allegations survive summary judgment.
25
* Before the effective date of any adverse action, amember of the state civil service is entitled to notice of
26 the proposed action and its grounds, a copy of the formal charges and the evidence on which they are
based, and an opportunity to respond to the appointing agency imposing the adverse action. Skelly v.
27 State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 215 (1975).
3 The FAC also alleges Oliver was “scapegoated,” but this allegation is far too vague to be considered an
28 adverse action against her.
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DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Legal Standard
“Generally, a defendant moving for summary adjudication must present evidence that either
conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff'scause of action or show[s] that the plaintiffdoes not
possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence necessary to establish at leastone element of the cause of
action. Ifthe [defendant] satisfiesits initial
burden, the burden shifts to the [plaintiff]toset forth specific facts
showing thata triable issue of material fact exists.” Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, 18 Cal. App. Sth 908,
924-25 (2017) (quotations and citations omitted). “To satisfy thisinitialburden in an employment
discrimination case, a defendant employer must either undermine an element of the plaintiffs prima facie
10 case—by affirmatively negating itor showing the plaintiffcannot prove it—or provide a legitimate
1 nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Jd. at 926. The motion “shall be granted ifall
12 the papers submitted show that there isno triableissue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
13 entitled toa judgment as a matter of law.” Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).
14
B. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s FEHA discrimination
15 claims
16 Oliver’s discrimination claims cannot satisfy her obligations under the burden-shifting analysis set
17 forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas and adopted in California for claims under
18 FEHA. See Horn v.Cushman & Wakefield W., Inc., 72 Cal. App. 4th 798, 805-06 (1999) (citingMcDonnell
19 Douglas Corp. v.Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973)). To survive summary judgment under this
20 framework, a plaintiffmust firstestablish a prima facie case of discrimination. If she does, the employer may
21 articulate anondiscriminatory reason foritsconduct. If itdoes, the burden shiftsback to the employee to
22 show the employer’s reasons are apretext forunlawful discrimination. Horn, 72 Cal. App. 4th at806. Oliver
23 failsat every step.
24 To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiffmust provide evidence that (1) she was a
25 member of a protected class, (2)she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the
26 position she sought, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. See Guz v. Bechtel
27 Nat'l, Inc.,24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). Oliver’s claims failat this firststepbecause (a)the vast majority of
28 the actions she alleges are not considered “adverse employment actions” as a matter of law, and (b) her central
9
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799
complaint—that itwas discriminatory to discipline her for failing to secure an active crime scene—as well as
allother claims in this case,fail because there isno circumstance that suggests a discriminatory motive.
To be actionable under FEHA, an employment action must materially affectthe terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. McRae v.Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 142 Cal. App. 4th 377, 386 (2006). The
effects must be “detrimental and substantial.” Id. (emphasis added). This requirement “guards against both
judicial micromanagement of business practices and frivolous suits over insignificant slights.” Jd.(quoting
DN
Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1455 (2002)). If the law were otherwise, the courts
~t
would be thrust intothe role of personnel officers, and employers would face discrimination suitsover “any
action that an irritable,chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like.” Thomas v.Dep’t of Corrections, 77 Cal.
10 App. 4th 507, 511 (2000) (quotation omitted).
11 In Guz, the Supreme Court emphasized that “the great weight of federal and California authority holds
12 that an employer isentitled to summary judgment if,considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its
13 actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficientto permit a rational inference that the employer’s actual motive
14 was discriminatory.” Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 356. Oliver’s claims of gender and race discrimination are based on
15 a litany of insignificant slights. She also cannot show “substantial responsive evidence” of pretext. See
16 Arnold v. Dignity Health, 53 Cal. App. Sth 412, 421 (2020). Summary judgment should be granted.
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Tu Ta | 1 NL eee ee « BARBARA J. PARKER, City Attorney, SBN 069722 MARIA BEE, Chief Assistant City Attorney, SBN 167716 KEVIN MCLAUGHLIN, Supervising Deputy City Attorney, SBN 251477 MICHAEL QUIRK, Deputy City Attorney, SBN 283351 One Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, 6th Floor Oakland, California 94612 AG Telephone: (510) 238-3839, Fax: (510) 238-6500 Email: mquirk@oaklandcityattorney.org € ‘ Le) Nt N 33244/3110575 ban \ ni WA yet Attorneys for Defendant, NP cee 49 ® we Xv4 CITY OF OAKLAND 2 (also erroneously sued as on Pps . * parka 08? OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT) op pA ne SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 11 12 MILDRED L. OLIVER, Case No. RG19007799 13 Plaintiff, ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO JUDGE James Reilly 14 Vv. DEPARTMENT 25 15 CITY OF OAKLAND, OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND DOES 1-25, 16 INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 17 Defendants. SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR 18 ALTERNATIVELY SUMMARY ADJUDICATION 19 Date: December 15, 2021 20 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: 25 21 Reservation No: R-2282494 22 Complaint filed: February 21, 2019 23 Trial date: January 24, 2022 24 25 26 27 28 1 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 000. ecccecccseseeceeseessseeeseneeecaesesesescseeecaeseesesesseseaeeseneaesesesseeeeecseseeesseseaeses 5 Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..0..oeeccececcessesessseseeseseseeeeaenececaesecesseseseeseseneeecacaeeecaeseseeeeaeatets 5 A. Oliver isassigned to conduct an IAD investigation of officer misconduct.............5 B. Oliver failsan examination for a promotional opportunity... eeecesseeeeeteeeees 6 C. Oliver istransferred to Patrol 0.0...cecceecescsceseseeseseseesseseseeseeeseeesesessecescseeeeeaeataes 6 D Oliver breaches protocol at a crime scene under her supervision involving an active shooter, goes out on stress leave one week later,and never returns to work........... 7 E. Oliver isdisciplined for not securing the active shooting scene ........ccee 7 TI. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 0.0...ccccceeeseeseseseseseneesesssseseseseseesessanesesessseteeeeseeesees 8 TV. ARGUMENT 00 ececceccccceeceseerseseseeeeaescsnesescseestsssstevscneseeseeeeecasasnstssaeesecaeseeeeseaseetetssseeseasy 9 A. Legal Standard ou... ce escssssescscesesersssseescsceessesceseseseseesesseesecaeseseeseseessacseseeesaeeeeeaes 9 10 B. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s FEHA discrimination CLAIMS eee seeeceeesescsscesescececssescecccseseseesesescscececassesaesesescessscesessaeaesecaeseeseeseaeeeeeaeees 9 11 1. Oliver’s claim of discrimination for being removed from an IAD INVeEstigation failS..........eesssssseeeeseeceeseeeeseeeeeseseseeseeeseseceseseseeecseeeeeesenes 10 12 2. Oliver’s claim of discrimination for failing a lieutenant’s examination fails 13 eveeseveveaesesacaescuceacscecsssasessceacuesaesesesseaescueessaescessaeeeescseueterseaeeseseaeseeecateetetaeates 13 3. Oliver’s claim her transfer to Patrol was discriminatory fails................... 14 14 4. Oliver’s claim that tentative discipline was discriminatory fails.............. 15 15 5. Oliver’s complaints about the City’s handling of her leave and retirement as Giscriminatory fail... eeseseectseceeeeeeceseeeeseseseeeseecceeteeseseeenecseeeeeeeeetaes 16 16 6. Oliver received a 30-day suspension because of her supervisory failures— 17 the suspension was not discriminatory and thus the claim fails................ 18 C. Oliver’s FEHA harassment claim fails and the Court should grant summary 18 ACJUGICALION 20...cececece eseeeeeceecseeseseesesecseceesesseseeeesssacessecssreeaeecseeseseesseessesetaeereaeeess 19 19 Dz. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s fourth cause of action for FEHA “Retaliation” 2... ceccscesescessseeesecessceeeceasesetseseseeeesceeeesseseeceeeeeaeeeeetae 20 20 E. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s fifthcause of action for “Whistleblower Retaliation” under Labor Code § 1102.5(b)........cccceceseereeeeees 22 21 V. CONCLUSION 0. eeeceeccecesesesesssesescsesecescscscesesesescscscieaceeseeaesesescaescieeescacececeseeestststseaeacaceees 24 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES STATE CASES Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 217 Cal. App. 4th 1402 (2013)... cc ccccecesessssessessesessesseeeseeeeseees 1] Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1441 (2002)..0....cccccccssesessssesscseeeseesestesssscseeseeteseeeses 10, 12 Arnold v.Dignity Health, 53 Cal. App. Sth 412 (2020) ......ececcccsseseeeseesessesesesesesesesessesesesseecseaeeeessseeeeees 10 Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 327 (2008) ........cccccccccccessssscesseseseesessesesssseseescsesseseesecaeseesseaeaee 24 Chen v.County of Orange, 96 Cal. App. 4th 926 (2002)... eceeceeececesesesesesesesesessseseseseseseeees 11, 12, 20, 22 Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, 18 Cal. App. Sth 908 (2017) .....cceeeccsssssssesescseeceseeseceseseeceeseeeeseseeeeasseeees 9 Dinslage v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 5 Cal. App. Sth 368 (2016)... eccccseesessececeseesseesseeeeeseeeeseeenes 21 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000) oo... ceeesseeeseseeseeseeceeseeeeeeeneeesees 9, 10, 12, 18 Hager v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 228 Cal. App. 4th 1538 (2014)... ccceeeeesssseseceseeceesesesenenseeesesesessseerseeeeees 23 10 Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215 (1999) oo. ceeccssceeeseesesseseeeeseceeseeeeeseeeseseeeeseeseeeseaees 16 Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203 (2013) ...ccccecccsessescsesessssescsesenecseseeceseseseesaeeeeesseeeeeaeaes 13 11 Horn v.Cushman & Wakefield W., Inc.,72 Cal. App. 4th 798 (1999)........ seccceseeseeseeaceaceaeeseaeeeneeeeaseateneeaens 9 12 Jumaane y. City of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 4th 1390 (2015) oo... ccecceccscscsssseceseseescsesessssesesseseseneceees 1] 13 Loggins v.Kaiser Permanente Internat., 151 Cal. App. 4th 1102 (2007). 00... eeceseeseseesesceeeeeeeeeeeeees 22 Lyle v.Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264 (2006) .........cccccsscsscssesseeeeesseseesesssseseeeseenaeens 19, 20 14 Mathieu v. Norrell Corp., 115 Cal. App. 4th 1174 (2004)... cccesesseseceseeeeseseeesceecneeeeecseseeesasseeeeaeaeseses 1] 15 McCoy v.Pac. Mar. Assn., 216 Cal. App. 4th 283 (2013) .o.eeeeccceccesesceeceeseseeseeeesaeeatenenseecesaceeccesaseneeeens 20 16 McRae v.Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 142 Cal. App. 4th 377 (2006) .........ccccecccecseeeeessssesscsssecseeeeseeseees 10, 12 Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 878 (1985).....:cccccecsscessssssesseceeseseeetseecesesseseeaeeeees 11, 13, 16 17 Morgan v.Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000)... eee eceseeseesesseessceeecceceeeneceeeseeeesceeaees 22 18 Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243 (2009)... .ceeeeceeeeeeeecesseneeeeeeeaeeaeeaeeaeenseeeeaneaseaeeaes 19 19 Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1378 (2005)......cecccsecseseeeceseetecneeeees 23 Pinero v. Specialty Restaurants, 130 Cal. App. 4th 635 (2005) .....ceccccccccesccsscseesesseeseescescsecseceeeeeneens 12, 15 20 Quinn v.City ofLos Angeles, 84 Cal. App. 4th 472 (2000)... eeessceseesesseseeseseeeeseeceseeeeseeeeaeesseeeaeenenesaees 13 2) Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 226 Cal. App. 4th 830 (2014)... ces seesceececeseeeeseeeeseeecsceeeseeeeseeseesaateceeeees 12 22 Sheffield v.LA Cnty. Dept. of Social Services, 109 Cal. App. 4th 153 (2003)... eceeeseecseseeseteceeeeeeeeees 20 Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975) ...eccecccccccessesssssceseeseeseeseeeeeseseseeeseccessesaeeecseeeeeaeeateees 8,15 23 Thomas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 77 Cal. App. 4th 507 (2000) ........ecescececsessecsesceeeetseceesseeseeeeeeaeeeaeeaeeaees 10 24 Trop v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1133 (2005)... eee esceseeseeeeeeseeetteeseeeseceeeereesees 14, 18 25 Yanowitz v.L’Oreal USA, Inc.,36 Cal. 4th 1028 (2005)... ecececcceecsecceseeceseeseeeesseeeacecesceesaeeeeetens 15, 16, 20 26 27 28 3 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 r ® FEDERAL CASES Brooks v.City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000) .......ccccccescsssessssscsesesesssscsesessscssscsssscecssssseasavens 15 Carrasco v. San Ramon Valley Unified Sch. Dist.,No. C 04-02395 CRB, 2005 WL 3260607 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1,2005), aff'd, 258 F. App’x 114 (Oth Cir. 2007) oo. cceescesseseseseseeseseseesesesetscssssssscseseeseseaans 11 Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2006).........ccccccscsceccsescccsessssssssseseesseesees 22 Faragher v.City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)....cssssssssssssssseseesesesesesescssssecscsesssssssesesesesecsesescscarecess 20 Hardage v.CBS Broad., Inc., 427 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) .....c.cccccscccsesssssssssssssssssssssscsescssssasscsceseseseseess 20 Klein v.Ellison, No. 20-CV-04439-JSC, 2021 WL 2075591 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2021) ....cccccccccceeeeeeees 13 Ledergerber v.Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997) .......ccccccssscscscscscscscscscssscsscscscscsesescecsvssecseeseseseseans 12 Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) .......ccccccssssscsssscsscseessscssssessesesscsesssescecsevessssesenseas 24 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ...ccccccccccssecsscssesssssssscsessssesssvecsetevavsesesecseee 9, 18, 20 10 Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2004) o....ccccccsccccccsesescseseesessessesescssscssssssesessssatieans 15 11 Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1997)......c.ccccssscscsecssseseessescecessssscsesestecsessseceeas 14 12 Steiner v.Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994) oo...cccccccsssscsesscsssssssssscsccscscesesvevseeees 14 Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002).....ccccccscccccscsscscsesecscssssescscessssssecssescssssescacccsvsesavavacaaeeees 15 13 Strother v.S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996) ....ceccccceccseeceseeseneeseeeeseeseesesseaes 20 14 Tatum v.Schwartz, 405 F. App’x 169 (9th Cir. 2010) .....ecececcsesssssesesssssesscecseeesesescscsescsescsesssesescsssesnsness 24 Yates v.AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) ....c.ccccccececcccssssesescesescssescsesessesesesessssescesessecssssecsaeseeeaes 14 15 16 STATE STATUTES 17 Cal. A.B. 9 § 3, 2018-19 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019)... cccccccccsesssscscsssscscsessescsesceesscscseestsvsseseseaceecevaceaes 11 18 Code Civ. Proc. § 43 7C(C) o..eeeecsssessssscssesesseseeescecesesesssseseseesesessseesesssesassesassessssescsesasesscseseseescsesssesssessscseeseseass 9 19 Gov. Code § 12940(h) oo... cceeceeseesesesesesesesesessensesesesesesesesesesssssssssssssssesesesasacesssssseseseasesseassesescstseesecsesess 21 Gov. Code § 12960... eecceesseseseeseesesseseseesessesesceseesesseseesesesssseesesscssesssscsevsesscsesacacsacssssseasecsuescassasescsusaees 1] 20 Labor Code § 1102.5 oo. ccececessessesesseseesseeesssecsecsesecsscscseesesecseeseececsessasscsscscsessssssscsssscssceccstssssecesescecescanes 5 21 Labor Code § 1102.5(b) .....ceccceecesescessesesseseeeeseecsesesessesecseseeseeasscesesesesesacseseseesesessessessesesesscseeseesssecseeeeeees 22 22 23 FEDERAL STATUTES 24 A2 U.S.C. § 20006 et Seq. eee eeecescesessesessesessessecesesaesecsesscsessesecsssscsesssscesecsesececsesesssassecsesetssesseseensitssssceees 11 25 26 27 28 4 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 L INTRODUCTION This is an employment discrimination case filedby PlaintiffMildred Oliver (“Oliver”) against the City of Oakland (“City”). She is a former Oakland Police Department (“OPD”) sergeant, now retiredand receiving disability benefits. The City appreciates Oliver’s approximately 20 years of service toOPD before she lefton disability. But discipline Oliver received for failing tosecure the scene of an active shooter was not the result of discrimination or retaliation. On February 14,2017, Oliver was the commanding officer atthe scene of an active shooter on Las Vegas Avenue in Oakland, and she seriously mishandled the situation. Shortly after,she went on stress leave, and began tomake complaints that various personnel actions spanning several years prior were discriminatory 10 or done as some sort of retaliation. She was disciplined for her mishandling of the active shooter incident and 11 claims thatwas discriminatory orretaliatory as well. 12 Many of the issues Oliver complains about are time-barred or are too insignificant to amount to an 13 adverse employment action. The only timely adverse action—the discipline imposed for mishandling the 14 active shooter incident—is supported by an incontrovertible legitimate business reason, which Oliver cannot 15 show was pretext for discrimination or done in retaliationfor any sortof protected activity. 16 Oliver’s claims boil down toa nameless and unfounded conspiracy toundermine her career, without 17 any coherent evidence of adiscriminatory or retaliatorymotive against her. There is no viable claim under 18 FEHA or Labor Code § 1102.5 and the City’s motion for summary judgment should be granted. 19 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 A. Oliver is assigned to conduct an IAD investigation of officer misconduct 21 OPD hired Oliver in August 1997. (UMF 1.) Amid a variety of assignments, Oliver worked in Patrol 22 three separate times, serving about five years in Patrol cumulatively, before being transferred toOPD’s 23 Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) in 2014. (UMF 2.) While in IAD, in2014, Oliver filledout a form 24 expressing her preference for a position outside IAD. (UMF 3.) This form stayed in her filewhile she was in 25 IAD. (d.) 26 On September 25, 2015, an OPD officer committed suicide and lefta suicide note. (UMF 4.) Oliver 27 was the IAD investigator initiallyassigned to investigate an internal affairscomplaint relatedto the suicide 28 5 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 note.’ (UMF 7.) She reported her initial evaluation up the chain of command, recommending thata criminal investigation precede her own IAD investigation. (UMF 9.) But OPD’s Criminal Investigations Division (“CID”) had already been investigating the suicide and surrounding circumstances. In fact, one of Oliver’s IAD supervisors had watched an interview conducted by CID prior to Oliver receiving the IAD case file. (UMF 6.) Oliver’s recommendation was conveyed toCID, but CID declined to pursue a further criminal investigation. (UMF 10.) iro) The JAD investigation continued. (/d.) Oliver was latertaken off the investigation, aftera federal compliance director and independent monitor team (“IMT”) overseeing anegotiated settlement agreement o with OPD criticizedhow it had been handled. (UMF 16.) An independent investigator hired by theIMT later 10 filed hisfindings on the investigation with the federal court. (UMF 21.) The report was criticalboth of il Oliver’s initial investigation and OPD’s handling and management of the matter as a whole. (/d.) Oliver 12 claims thatbeing taken off the investigation was discriminatory or done inretaliation for recommending that 1B the IAD investigation be tolled while CID investigated the matter. 14 B. Oliver fails an examination for a promotional opportunity 15 Around February 24, 2016, the City posted a department-wide testingopportunity fora promotion to 16 lieutenant. (UMF 23.) The City hired an independent third-party consultant to create and assist with 17 administering the examination. (UMF 25.) Oliver passed the firstphase of the exam, but she failed the 18 second. (UMF 26.) The second phase was a series of panel interviews administering different scenarios for 19 candidates to interpret. (UMF 25.) The panelists were law enforcement officers from outside agencies—not 20 OPD personnel—and the resultswere scored solely by the outside panelists. (/d.) Oliver claims her poor 21 result was discriminatory and retaliatory for her recommendation thatthe IAD misconduct investigation be 22 tolled. 23 Cc. Oliver is transferred to Patrol 24 On August 22, 2016, as part of the annual “watch change” to transfer OPD personnel to Patrol, an 25 executive team made the decision to transferOliver to Patrol effective January 2017. (UMF 28.) Then, as 26 now, OPD had an acute need for sergeants in Patrol. (UMF 29.) Oliver did not oppose the transfer and started 27 28 | The City herself,by isunaware filingthis of anyone lawsuit. publicly identifyingOliver asthe IAD investigator on that case untilOliver did so 6 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 in Patrol on January 14, 2017. (UMF 32, 38.) However, she now claims the transfer was discriminatory or done in retaliation.In her new Patrol assignment, Oliver reported to Lt. Dominique Arotzarena, a white male. (UMF 39.) Oliver worked with him two days a week. (/d.) She worked with Lt. Arotzarena for approximately five weeks and claims thathe harassed her and created a hostile work environment. (See UMF 38, 50.) Before working with him, Oliver never had an issue with a supervisor. (UMF 80). D. Oliver breaches protocol at a crime scene under her supervision involving an active shooter, goes out on stress leave one week later, and never returns to work On February 14,2017, Oliver responded to a shooting on the 9500 block of Las Vegas Avenue. (UMF 44.) She was the supervising officer on the scene. (UMF 45.) At the scene, the victim reported to officers 10 that he had been sleeping in hiscar when someone began shooting out the car’s windows. (UMF 44.) 11 Oliver called her supervisor, and then directed all officersto leave the area. (UMF 46-47.) Three days 12 later,on February 17, 2017, OPD officerswere entangled in an officer-involved shooting and the same suspect 13 was shot and killed. (UMF 48.) The same day, IAD opened an investigation into how theFebruary 14 14 shooting was handled by OPD personnel, including Oliver. (UMF 49.) 15 On February 23, 2017, nine days aftermishandling the Las Vegas Avenue shooting, for the firsttime, 16 Oliver submitted a written complaint with OPD alleging a hostile work environment. (UMF 50.) The next 17 day, she went out on medical leave due to stress,and Oliver never returned to work. (/d.) Oliver retired on 18 May 15, 2019 with a retirement disabilitybenefit. (UMF 68.) 19 E. Oliver is disciplined for not securing the active shooting scene 20 On February 5, 2018, as aresult of the IAD investigation into the February 14, 2017 Las Vegas 21 Avenue shooting incident, IAD issued a sustained finding that Oliver had violated her duties as a supervisor 22 under OPD Manual of Rules No. 285. (UMF 57.) 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 Police issued a notice of intentto demote. (UMF 57.) However, Oliver invoked her right to aSkelly hearing to respond to the proposed discipline. (UMF 58.) The Skelly hearing was held, and ultimately, on January 15, 2019, the City imposed a 30-day suspension. (UMF 58, 63.) Despite Oliver’s numerous failingsand the DD legitimate basis for her discipline, Oliver claims her discipline was discriminatory and retaliatory. She also NSN alleges the City intentionally delayed her retirement. CO II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Oo 10 After she startedher medical leave, Oliver submitted several complaints to the California Department 11 of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 12 On April 25, 2017, the EEOC received from Oliver an EEOC “charge” which identified the “earliest” dates of 13 discrimination as “01-13-2017,” i.e.the date of her transfer to Patrol. (UMF 51.) On February 22, 2018, 14 Oliver submitted a “complaint” to the DFEH. (UMF 59.) On February 21, 2019, Oliver submitted another 15 complaint to the DFEH. (UMF 64.) She filedthis lawsuit on February 21, 2019, and the operative amended 16 complaint was filed April 23, 2019. Her complaint alleges the following as discriminatory acts against her: 17 “unfavorable outcome during Lt.’stest in June 2016” 18 “transferred from preferred position in IAD to Patrol in January 2017” “notice of intention to demote on February 5,2018” 19 “failure to accommodate to return Sgt. Oliver towork” 20 “forcing the plaintiff to seek a disability retirement” “delaying thatretirement process” - 21 “disciplinary letter imposing a 30-day suspension as of January 15, 2019” 22 FAC 7 68. 23 Oliver also alleges ahostile work environment, and retaliation. However, Oliver does not possess 24 evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. None of the allegations survive summary judgment. 25 * Before the effective date of any adverse action, amember of the state civil service is entitled to notice of 26 the proposed action and its grounds, a copy of the formal charges and the evidence on which they are based, and an opportunity to respond to the appointing agency imposing the adverse action. Skelly v. 27 State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 215 (1975). 3 The FAC also alleges Oliver was “scapegoated,” but this allegation is far too vague to be considered an 28 adverse action against her. 8 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 IV. ARGUMENT A. Legal Standard “Generally, a defendant moving for summary adjudication must present evidence that either conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff'scause of action or show[s] that the plaintiffdoes not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence necessary to establish at leastone element of the cause of action. Ifthe [defendant] satisfiesits initial burden, the burden shifts to the [plaintiff]toset forth specific facts showing thata triable issue of material fact exists.” Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, 18 Cal. App. Sth 908, 924-25 (2017) (quotations and citations omitted). “To satisfy thisinitialburden in an employment discrimination case, a defendant employer must either undermine an element of the plaintiffs prima facie 10 case—by affirmatively negating itor showing the plaintiffcannot prove it—or provide a legitimate 1 nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Jd. at 926. The motion “shall be granted ifall 12 the papers submitted show that there isno triableissue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 13 entitled toa judgment as a matter of law.” Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c). 14 B. The Court should grant summary adjudication on Oliver’s FEHA discrimination 15 claims 16 Oliver’s discrimination claims cannot satisfy her obligations under the burden-shifting analysis set 17 forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas and adopted in California for claims under 18 FEHA. See Horn v.Cushman & Wakefield W., Inc., 72 Cal. App. 4th 798, 805-06 (1999) (citingMcDonnell 19 Douglas Corp. v.Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973)). To survive summary judgment under this 20 framework, a plaintiffmust firstestablish a prima facie case of discrimination. If she does, the employer may 21 articulate anondiscriminatory reason foritsconduct. If itdoes, the burden shiftsback to the employee to 22 show the employer’s reasons are apretext forunlawful discrimination. Horn, 72 Cal. App. 4th at806. Oliver 23 failsat every step. 24 To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiffmust provide evidence that (1) she was a 25 member of a protected class, (2)she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the 26 position she sought, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. See Guz v. Bechtel 27 Nat'l, Inc.,24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). Oliver’s claims failat this firststepbecause (a)the vast majority of 28 the actions she alleges are not considered “adverse employment actions” as a matter of law, and (b) her central 9 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RG19007799 complaint—that itwas discriminatory to discipline her for failing to secure an active crime scene—as well as allother claims in this case,fail because there isno circumstance that suggests a discriminatory motive. To be actionable under FEHA, an employment action must materially affectthe terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. McRae v.Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 142 Cal. App. 4th 377, 386 (2006). The effects must be “detrimental and substantial.” Id. (emphasis added). This requirement “guards against both judicial micromanagement of business practices and frivolous suits over insignificant slights.” Jd.(quoting DN Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1455 (2002)). If the law were otherwise, the courts ~t would be thrust intothe role of personnel officers, and employers would face discrimination suitsover “any action that an irritable,chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like.” Thomas v.Dep’t of Corrections, 77 Cal. 10 App. 4th 507, 511 (2000) (quotation omitted). 11 In Guz, the Supreme Court emphasized that “the great weight of federal and California authority holds 12 that an employer isentitled to summary judgment if,considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its 13 actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficientto permit a rational inference that the employer’s actual motive 14 was discriminatory.” Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 356. Oliver’s claims of gender and race discrimination are based on 15 a litany of insignificant slights. She also cannot show “substantial responsive evidence” of pretext. See 16 Arnold v. Dignity Health, 53 Cal. App. Sth 412, 421 (2020). Summary judgment should be granted. 17 1.