Preview
\
Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
FILED
SAN MATEO COUNTY
(S.B. #160744)
Jeremy A. Graham, Esq. (S.B. #234166)
'
SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, N0
1970 Broadway, Ninth Floor APC
Lm Oakland, California 94612
Telephone: (510) 891~9800
Facsimile: (510) 891—7030
Email: scole@scalaw.com
Email: jgraham scalaw.com
Web: www.sca aw.com
Attorneys for Representative
and the Aggrieved Plaintiffs
laid—lilo Employees
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
OF SAN MATEO
YVONNE COVARRUBIAS, and
ATIEH ZAHABI, ) Case No. CIV537692
APC individually, and on )
behalf of all other similarly
situated )
FLOOR
aggrieved employees,
W > PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
ASSOCIATES,
LA 94612
9800
BUILDING
) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
AT
NINTH
CA
891-
Plaintiffs, DISCOVERY RESPONSE AND
8:
EYS
vs. 3 FOR MONETARY SAN REQUEST
TOWER
(510)
OAKLAND,
BROADWAY,
Arrow. )
CTIONS
TEL:
COLE1115
'1‘
)
1970 MACY’S WEST STORES, INC, )
SCOTT
and DOES through )
1
100, inclusive, )
) Date: December 7, 2016
) Time: 9:00 am.
Defendant. ) Dept: 21
) Judge: Honorable Robert D. Foiles
lVNlQldO /_
.
_ ,_._
GJV537692
_
5
REPLY
.
Reply
:
275089
lllIll!llllllllllllllllllllllll
Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of
Mot on to Compel Further
Discovery Response
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Belaire- West Landscape v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.4th 554 (2007), the principal
case relied on in Defendant Macy’s West Stores, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Oppositi8on [sic] to Plaintiffs’
Motion to Compel and Request for Monetary Sanctions (“Opposition”), was decided numerous state
\OOO\IO\Ul-J>-UJI\J*—‘
and federal cases have expressly rejected its use of an opt-out notice prior to disclosure of contact
information, including phone numbers, for non-parties whose interests are at stake in litigation.
These cases heavily outweigh the weak authority cited by Defendant. Such non-party employees
“may reasonably be supposed to want their information disclosed to counsel whose communications
in the course of investigating the claims asserted in this lawsuit may alert them to similar claims they
may able to assert.” Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253 (2008). Further,
Defendant presently has and has had the infcrmation sought by Plaintiffs available to it from the
APC outset of this litigation. It should not be permited to gain unfair advantage by causing unnecessary
delay in producing the information requested, or by imposing the cost of an unnecessary procedure
FLOOR
LAW 94612
ASSOCIATES,
BUILDING
on Plaintiffs. Id.; see also Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, (“. . .[B]oth
891-9800
NINTH
AT
CA 166 Cal.App.3d 867, 871 (1985)
(510)
& TOW’ER
ATTORNEYS
OAKLAND,
BROADWAY,
sides should be permitted to investigate the case fully.”).
TEL:
COLETIIF.
1970 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
SCOTT
A. AN OPT-OUT NOTICE IS NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED
Defendant’s argument opt-out “legally required”
NNNNNNNNNp—I—Ip—IHt—Ip—Au—a—a—H
that an notice is is without merit.
(Opposition at p. 2). Defendant supports its argument1 with Belaire-West Landscape v.Superior
“\IONM-PUJN—‘OOOONQLII-PWNflo
Court, 149 Cal.App.4th 554 (2007), but ignores the great weight of authority cited in Plaintiffs’ brief
and decided gfie_r Belaire where contact information was ordered produced without notice to the
non-parties. See Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court, 169 Cal.App.4th 958 (2008); Puerto v.
Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th 1242 (2008); Khalilpour v. Cellco P ’Ship, 2010 US. Dist. LEXIS
1
Defendant also cites Planned Parenrhood Golden Gate v. Superior Court, 83
Cal.App.4th 347 (2000) in support of its privacy argument. However, Planned Parenthood is
easily distinguishable. There, serious concerns attached to the production of non-party contact
information given the controversial nature of subject matter underlying the litigation. The court
noted the “unique dangers” in that case, and cited “36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84
assaults, 2 kidnappings, 327 clinic invasions, 71 chemical attacks, and the murder of Dr. David
Gunn.” Id. at 361-362. None of those dangers are faced by Macy’s retail store employees.
-1-
Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Further Discovery Response
43885, *9-10 (ND. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010); Kress '2. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 201 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87845, *10 (ED. Cal. Aug. 8, 201 1); Munoz v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
141176, *11-12 (ED. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011); York v. Starbucks Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92274,
*4-5 (CD. Cal. June 30, 2009); Putnam v. Ell Lilly & Co., 508 F.Supp.2d 812, 813-814 (CD. Cal.
2007). Thus,
\OOO\10\U14>UJN'—'
Belaire did not create, and does not impose, a “legal requirement” that an opt-out
notice be used.
Significantly, the fact that Plaintiffs seek telephone numbers does not change the analysis.
Defendant relies heavily on In re Autozone Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 201 1 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132973 (ND. Cal. Nov. 17, 2011), in which the magistrate concluded a Belaire notice was
required since the plaintiffs sought class members’ phone numbers rather than mere addresses. Id. at
*4-5. Autozone however, remains an outlier among the post-Belaire in reasoning that the disclosure
APC of telephone. contact information alters the conclusion that given both the minimal privacy interests
a:
o
c at stake and the presumption that most non-party employees who have a stake in the litigation would
E’
l"‘0
LAW:58
ASSOCIATES,
[23:9
BUILDING
AT
25:? want to be contacted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, 5 listof names and contact information is subject to
._oo
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3""
& (:53
TO‘VER
ATTORNEYS
discovery without prior notice. In nearly every case Plaintiffs cited in their moving papers, the
E 5:“?
COLE
not
a:
TH
O
|\ contact information at issue included telephone numbers.2 See Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at
2‘
SCOTI‘
969; Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th
NNNNNNNNN—‘b—li—lp—IHI—di—Ii—d—‘I—l
at 1259; Khalflpour, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43885 at *10; Kress,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87845 at *15-16; York, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92274 at *3-4; Putnam, 508
F.Supp.2d at 814; Wiegele v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9444, *2-3 (SD.
“\IONM-D-UJN—‘0000QQLA-PWN—‘O
Cal. Feb. 8, 2007); Pioneer Electronics (USA,, Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 360, 364 (2007);
Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal.App.3d 867, 869 (1985); Wallman v. TowerAir, Inc., 189
F.R.D. 566, 570 (ND. Cal. 1999); Jimenez v. Domino ’s Pizza,LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66510,
*8 (CD. Cal. Jan. 11, 2006); Babbitt v. Albertson ’s, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19091, *16 (ND.
Cal. Nov. 30, 1992). Indeed, courts note that itis “a common practice in the class action context for
disclosure of potential class members, including names, addresses, and telephone numbers, to be
disclosed.” Kress, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87345 at *10 (citing cases) (emphasis added); see also
2
Munoz, supra, is silent as to the nattre of the contact information requested by the
plaintiffs.
-2-
Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Mot on to Compel Further Discovery Response
York v. Starbucks Corp, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92274 at *4 (CD. Cal. June 30, 2009) (“Should the
employees decide that .. .they do not want to talk to Plaintiff’s counsel, they can tell counsel that
they do not want to talk to him and he will end the conversation. . ..the intrusion into their privacy
will be minor and brief”).
It is worth noting that the reasoning in Autozone was outdated when the case was decided and
\DOO\IO\UIJ>-UJN—‘
remains so today. Call-screening technologies, in particular, caller ID, were already extremely
common in 201 l and have become near universal today on both mobile and land-line phones. Those
Aggrieved Employees who may feel their privacy is invaded by an unwanted call from Plaintiffs’
counsel would presumably simply decline to answer a call from an unknown number, which isjust
as easy to do as deleting an unwanted email cr tossing out a piece of junk mail.
Defendant’s other cases are also distinguishable. In Murphy v. Target Corp., 201 1 U.S. Dist.
APC LEXIS 62458 (8D. Cal. June 14, 201 1) the Court’s order for an opt-out notice was based in part on
FLOOR
the fact that “Plaintiff’s counsel previously advocated the use of an ‘opt—out’ procedure, citing this
LAW 94612
ASSOCIATES,
BUILDING
AT
891-9800
NINTH
CA
Court’s preference for the procedure outlined in Belaire.” Id. at *12. Additionally, in Nguyen v.
(510)
& T0\NER
OAKLAND,
ATTORNEYS
BROADWAY,
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 275 F.R.D. 503 (CD. Cal. 2011), there was no dispute as to whether an
TEL:
COLE
THE
1970
opt-out notice was required. The Plaintiff had conceded that a Belaire notice was appropriate, but the
parties disputed the proper scope of discovery; The order also makes no reference as to which party
SCOTT
should bear the costs of notice.
NMNNNNNNNp—Iv—Ih—Ip—Ap—dp—twwp—Ip—A
See, generally, Id. Finally, in Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340 (1978), the respondent plaintiffs were required to pay unusual costs associated with
“flaw-PWNHOOWQQM#WNHO
generating the list of class members occasioned by the manner in which the information was stored
by the Defendant (i.e., “the manual sorting ou: of names and addresses from old records maintained
on paper, the keypunching of up to 300,000 computer cards, and the creation of new computer
programs for use with extant tapes and tapes tltat would have to be created from the paper records”);
not the cost of an opt-out notice. Id. at 359—360.
B. . SANCTIONS ARE WARRANTED
As shown above, Defendant’s intransigence in insisting not only that an opt-out notice be
used prior to identifying and producing contact information for the Aggrieved Employees, whose
-3-
Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Moton to Compel Further Discovery Response
rights are at stake in this case, all of whom may already be contacted by defense counsel, and who it
is presumed would want to be contacted by Paintiffs’ counsel, but also that Plaintiffs bear the full
cost of such notice, lacks legal support. Sanctons, therefore, are warranted. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
2023.030(a). Indeed, Defendant’s position appears to be an attempt, thus far successful, to delay
Plaintiffs
OOONONMAUJNH
in their ability to inVestigate their claims by maintaining itsmonopoly on access to the
Aggrieved Employees and, further, to discourage Plaintiffs from pursuing their claims by imposing
on them the full cost of an unnecessary opt-out notice. Even if Plaintiffs’ motion is otherwise
granted, the failure to issue sanctions here runs the risk of giving the Court’s tacit approval to such
unfair tactical behavior.
III. CONCLUSION
APC For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their motion in
FLOOR
its entirety.
LAW
ASSOCIATES,
BUILDING
CA94612
891-9800
NINTH
AT
EYS
(510)
& RN
OAKLAND,
BROADWAY, Dated: November 30, 2016
THETOWER
TEL;
A'ITO
COLE
[970
SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, APC
SCOTT NNNNNNNNN—‘i—l—l—lp—lb—lr—‘D—‘I—lr—‘
WVONM-RWN—‘OOOOVQUIJRWN—o
By: fl“)
Jeremy A.
Attorneys
Graham,
(MC/LN.--“
Esq.
for the Representative Plaintiffs
and the Aggrieved Employees
-4-
Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Mot on to Compel Further Discovery Response
Preview
\ Scott Edward Cole, Esq. FILED SAN MATEO COUNTY (S.B. #160744) Jeremy A. Graham, Esq. (S.B. #234166) ' SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, N0 1970 Broadway, Ninth Floor APC Lm Oakland, California 94612 Telephone: (510) 891~9800 Facsimile: (510) 891—7030 Email: scole@scalaw.com Email: jgraham scalaw.com Web: www.sca aw.com Attorneys for Representative and the Aggrieved Plaintiffs laid—lilo Employees IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO YVONNE COVARRUBIAS, and ATIEH ZAHABI, ) Case No. CIV537692 APC individually, and on ) behalf of all other similarly situated ) FLOOR aggrieved employees, W > PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ASSOCIATES, LA 94612 9800 BUILDING ) MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER AT NINTH CA 891- Plaintiffs, DISCOVERY RESPONSE AND 8: EYS vs. 3 FOR MONETARY SAN REQUEST TOWER (510) OAKLAND, BROADWAY, Arrow. ) CTIONS TEL: COLE1115 '1‘ ) 1970 MACY’S WEST STORES, INC, ) SCOTT and DOES through ) 1 100, inclusive, ) ) Date: December 7, 2016 ) Time: 9:00 am. Defendant. ) Dept: 21 ) Judge: Honorable Robert D. Foiles lVNlQldO /_ . _ ,_._ GJV537692 _ 5 REPLY . Reply : 275089 lllIll!llllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Mot on to Compel Further Discovery Response I. INTRODUCTION Since Belaire- West Landscape v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.4th 554 (2007), the principal case relied on in Defendant Macy’s West Stores, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Oppositi8on [sic] to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel and Request for Monetary Sanctions (“Opposition”), was decided numerous state \OOO\IO\Ul-J>-UJI\J*—‘ and federal cases have expressly rejected its use of an opt-out notice prior to disclosure of contact information, including phone numbers, for non-parties whose interests are at stake in litigation. These cases heavily outweigh the weak authority cited by Defendant. Such non-party employees “may reasonably be supposed to want their information disclosed to counsel whose communications in the course of investigating the claims asserted in this lawsuit may alert them to similar claims they may able to assert.” Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253 (2008). Further, Defendant presently has and has had the infcrmation sought by Plaintiffs available to it from the APC outset of this litigation. It should not be permited to gain unfair advantage by causing unnecessary delay in producing the information requested, or by imposing the cost of an unnecessary procedure FLOOR LAW 94612 ASSOCIATES, BUILDING on Plaintiffs. Id.; see also Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, (“. . .[B]oth 891-9800 NINTH AT CA 166 Cal.App.3d 867, 871 (1985) (510) & TOW’ER ATTORNEYS OAKLAND, BROADWAY, sides should be permitted to investigate the case fully.”). TEL: COLETIIF. 1970 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT SCOTT A. AN OPT-OUT NOTICE IS NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED Defendant’s argument opt-out “legally required” NNNNNNNNNp—I—Ip—IHt—Ip—Au—a—a—H that an notice is is without merit. (Opposition at p. 2). Defendant supports its argument1 with Belaire-West Landscape v.Superior “\IONM-PUJN—‘OOOONQLII-PWNflo Court, 149 Cal.App.4th 554 (2007), but ignores the great weight of authority cited in Plaintiffs’ brief and decided gfie_r Belaire where contact information was ordered produced without notice to the non-parties. See Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court, 169 Cal.App.4th 958 (2008); Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th 1242 (2008); Khalilpour v. Cellco P ’Ship, 2010 US. Dist. LEXIS 1 Defendant also cites Planned Parenrhood Golden Gate v. Superior Court, 83 Cal.App.4th 347 (2000) in support of its privacy argument. However, Planned Parenthood is easily distinguishable. There, serious concerns attached to the production of non-party contact information given the controversial nature of subject matter underlying the litigation. The court noted the “unique dangers” in that case, and cited “36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84 assaults, 2 kidnappings, 327 clinic invasions, 71 chemical attacks, and the murder of Dr. David Gunn.” Id. at 361-362. None of those dangers are faced by Macy’s retail store employees. -1- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Further Discovery Response 43885, *9-10 (ND. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010); Kress '2. Price Waterhouse Coopers, 201 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87845, *10 (ED. Cal. Aug. 8, 201 1); Munoz v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141176, *11-12 (ED. Cal. Dec. 8, 2011); York v. Starbucks Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92274, *4-5 (CD. Cal. June 30, 2009); Putnam v. Ell Lilly & Co., 508 F.Supp.2d 812, 813-814 (CD. Cal. 2007). Thus, \OOO\10\U14>UJN'—' Belaire did not create, and does not impose, a “legal requirement” that an opt-out notice be used. Significantly, the fact that Plaintiffs seek telephone numbers does not change the analysis. Defendant relies heavily on In re Autozone Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 201 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132973 (ND. Cal. Nov. 17, 2011), in which the magistrate concluded a Belaire notice was required since the plaintiffs sought class members’ phone numbers rather than mere addresses. Id. at *4-5. Autozone however, remains an outlier among the post-Belaire in reasoning that the disclosure APC of telephone. contact information alters the conclusion that given both the minimal privacy interests a: o c at stake and the presumption that most non-party employees who have a stake in the litigation would E’ l"‘0 LAW:58 ASSOCIATES, [23:9 BUILDING AT 25:? want to be contacted by Plaintiffs’ counsel, 5 listof names and contact information is subject to ._oo :98 3"" & (:53 TO‘VER ATTORNEYS discovery without prior notice. In nearly every case Plaintiffs cited in their moving papers, the E 5:“? COLE not a: TH O |\ contact information at issue included telephone numbers.2 See Crab Addison, 169 Cal.App.4th at 2‘ SCOTI‘ 969; Puerto, 158 Cal.App.4th NNNNNNNNN—‘b—li—lp—IHI—di—Ii—d—‘I—l at 1259; Khalflpour, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43885 at *10; Kress, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87845 at *15-16; York, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92274 at *3-4; Putnam, 508 F.Supp.2d at 814; Wiegele v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9444, *2-3 (SD. “\IONM-D-UJN—‘0000QQLA-PWN—‘O Cal. Feb. 8, 2007); Pioneer Electronics (USA,, Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 360, 364 (2007); Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal.App.3d 867, 869 (1985); Wallman v. TowerAir, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 566, 570 (ND. Cal. 1999); Jimenez v. Domino ’s Pizza,LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66510, *8 (CD. Cal. Jan. 11, 2006); Babbitt v. Albertson ’s, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19091, *16 (ND. Cal. Nov. 30, 1992). Indeed, courts note that itis “a common practice in the class action context for disclosure of potential class members, including names, addresses, and telephone numbers, to be disclosed.” Kress, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87345 at *10 (citing cases) (emphasis added); see also 2 Munoz, supra, is silent as to the nattre of the contact information requested by the plaintiffs. -2- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Mot on to Compel Further Discovery Response York v. Starbucks Corp, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92274 at *4 (CD. Cal. June 30, 2009) (“Should the employees decide that .. .they do not want to talk to Plaintiff’s counsel, they can tell counsel that they do not want to talk to him and he will end the conversation. . ..the intrusion into their privacy will be minor and brief”). It is worth noting that the reasoning in Autozone was outdated when the case was decided and \DOO\IO\UIJ>-UJN—‘ remains so today. Call-screening technologies, in particular, caller ID, were already extremely common in 201 l and have become near universal today on both mobile and land-line phones. Those Aggrieved Employees who may feel their privacy is invaded by an unwanted call from Plaintiffs’ counsel would presumably simply decline to answer a call from an unknown number, which isjust as easy to do as deleting an unwanted email cr tossing out a piece of junk mail. Defendant’s other cases are also distinguishable. In Murphy v. Target Corp., 201 1 U.S. Dist. APC LEXIS 62458 (8D. Cal. June 14, 201 1) the Court’s order for an opt-out notice was based in part on FLOOR the fact that “Plaintiff’s counsel previously advocated the use of an ‘opt—out’ procedure, citing this LAW 94612 ASSOCIATES, BUILDING AT 891-9800 NINTH CA Court’s preference for the procedure outlined in Belaire.” Id. at *12. Additionally, in Nguyen v. (510) & T0\NER OAKLAND, ATTORNEYS BROADWAY, Baxter Healthcare Corp., 275 F.R.D. 503 (CD. Cal. 2011), there was no dispute as to whether an TEL: COLE THE 1970 opt-out notice was required. The Plaintiff had conceded that a Belaire notice was appropriate, but the parties disputed the proper scope of discovery; The order also makes no reference as to which party SCOTT should bear the costs of notice. NMNNNNNNNp—Iv—Ih—Ip—Ap—dp—twwp—Ip—A See, generally, Id. Finally, in Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978), the respondent plaintiffs were required to pay unusual costs associated with “flaw-PWNHOOWQQM#WNHO generating the list of class members occasioned by the manner in which the information was stored by the Defendant (i.e., “the manual sorting ou: of names and addresses from old records maintained on paper, the keypunching of up to 300,000 computer cards, and the creation of new computer programs for use with extant tapes and tapes tltat would have to be created from the paper records”); not the cost of an opt-out notice. Id. at 359—360. B. . SANCTIONS ARE WARRANTED As shown above, Defendant’s intransigence in insisting not only that an opt-out notice be used prior to identifying and producing contact information for the Aggrieved Employees, whose -3- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Moton to Compel Further Discovery Response rights are at stake in this case, all of whom may already be contacted by defense counsel, and who it is presumed would want to be contacted by Paintiffs’ counsel, but also that Plaintiffs bear the full cost of such notice, lacks legal support. Sanctons, therefore, are warranted. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2023.030(a). Indeed, Defendant’s position appears to be an attempt, thus far successful, to delay Plaintiffs OOONONMAUJNH in their ability to inVestigate their claims by maintaining itsmonopoly on access to the Aggrieved Employees and, further, to discourage Plaintiffs from pursuing their claims by imposing on them the full cost of an unnecessary opt-out notice. Even if Plaintiffs’ motion is otherwise granted, the failure to issue sanctions here runs the risk of giving the Court’s tacit approval to such unfair tactical behavior. III. CONCLUSION APC For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant their motion in FLOOR its entirety. LAW ASSOCIATES, BUILDING CA94612 891-9800 NINTH AT EYS (510) & RN OAKLAND, BROADWAY, Dated: November 30, 2016 THETOWER TEL; A'ITO COLE [970 SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, APC SCOTT NNNNNNNNN—‘i—l—l—lp—lb—lr—‘D—‘I—lr—‘ WVONM-RWN—‘OOOOVQUIJRWN—o By: fl“) Jeremy A. Attorneys Graham, (MC/LN.--“ Esq. for the Representative Plaintiffs and the Aggrieved Employees -4- Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Mot on to Compel Further Discovery Response