Preview
FILEB
Elamf'a‘fiicauy AM Sherri
Court of California. County of Los Angeles on 04/30/2021 10:00
3y Superior byE. Salcido.Deputy
R. Caner. Executive OfficerlCIerk of Court. 3|erk
Andrew Hillier (State Bar No. 295779)
Hillier Law
600W. Broadway, Suite 700
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: (619) 500-7906
Facsimile: (619) 839-3895
andrew@ahillierlaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff,
A. Sameh El Kharbawy
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY 0F Los ANGELES ‘
21 CE CG 02214
A. SAMEH EL KHARBAWY, Case No.: 20LBCV00465
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plaintiff’
PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE 0F
.
APPLICATION AND APPLICATION
ll
vs_ FOR LEAVE T0 SERVE;
DECLARATION 0F ANDREW HILLIER
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BOARD 0F TRUSTEES 0F THE Datefi May 4, 2021
13 Tlme- 8-30 a-m-
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY;
De t.: S26
l4 DARRYL L. HAMM, an individual; Ju ge: Hon_ Michael Vicencia
LYNNETTE ZELEZNY, an individual;
15 JOS,EPH I.CASTRO, an individual;
SAUL IlMENEZ-SANDOVAL, an individual;
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XUANNING FU, an individual;
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AND DOES 1 through 50,
18 Defendants.
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“ ‘' ’
i'-P'L'AINTIFF’S EXPARTEQPLICATIONEQR‘L A37.
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M ‘
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Pagel
NOTICE OF APPLICATION AND APPLICATION
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1200 et seq, on
May 4, 2021 at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be hard in Department S-26 of
the above-entitled Court, located at 275 Magnolia Ave, Long Beach, CA 90802, Plaintiff A.
Sameh E1 Kharbawy will and hereby does respectfully apply ex parte for leave to serve the
remaining defendants.
Good cause exists to grant Plaintiff’s application. The Court previously ordered Plaintiff
to request leave to serve additional parties based on defense counsel’s unfounded claim that
10 Plaintiff only aimed to serve those defendants to delay the Court’s ruling on a motion to transfer.
ll Defendant’s accusation was baseless and false. In reality, Plaintiff has no wish to further delay a
12 ruling on the venue motion, and to that end, has specifically waived any argument related the
l3 answer status of defendants. Leave to serve should be granted.
14 As set forth in the attached ,Declaration of Andrew Hillier (“Hillier Decl.”) filed
15 concurrently herewith, Plaintiff’s counsel timely provided notice of this application to
16 Defendants’ counsel of record, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1203, via email on
l7 April 30, 2021 at approximately 9:00 a.m. (Hillier Decl., 112.)
18- This ex parte application is based on this Notice, the related Memorandum of Points and
l9 Authorities, the Hillier Decl. with attached exhibits, the pleadings and documents on file with this
20 Court, and any further evidence Or argument the Court considers at the hearing ofthis application.
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22 Dated: April 30, 2021 Respectfully Submitted,
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By: #
Andrew. H‘l “1er_, Esq.
Attorney for Plamtxff
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I
EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE
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PLAINTIFF’ S
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. Page 2
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
At a recent hearing, counsel for Board of Trustees for the California State University (“the
University” or “Defendant”) falsely accused Plaintiffs counsel—without a shred of supporting
evidence—of misrepresenting an illness to this Court for the purposes of obtaining a hearing
continuance. Defendant wrongly claimed that Plaintiff only wanted a continuance to advance an
argument regarding service of individual defendants related to a venue dispute between the
parties. Neither assertion had any grounding in fact or law; in fact, as shown in this Application,
both are demonstrably false. In response to Defendant’s allegations at the hearing, the Court
10 issued an order requiring Plaintiff to request leave of court before personally serving the
ll remaining named defendants inthis matters The purpose of this ex parte application is to seek
12 such leave.
13 II. RELEVANT FACTS
14 This is an employment and civil rights action. Plaintiff A. Sameh E1 Kharbawy filed suit
15 against the University and five individuals (“the individual defendants”) alleging, inter alia,
16' discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and reprisal. On March 25 ,
2021, this Court held a hearing
17 on the University’s second motion to transfer venue. At the hearing, the Court ordered additional
18 briefing, set a briefing schedule, and set a new hearing date for April 8, 2021. Between the two
l9 hearings, Plaintiffs counsel fell ill, requiring care at both an urgent care facility and the
20 emergency room. As counsel was unable to work on the briefing due to illness, Plaintiffrequested
21 a brief continuance of the hearing date. (Hillier Decl., 1]3.)
22 At the April 8 hearing, Defendant’s counsel (Nathan Jackson) baselessly alleged that
23 Plaintiffs counsel was either not illor not too illto work. Mr. Jackson only proffered rationale
24 for his false accusation was that one of the individual defendants was personally served (by a
25 third-party process server) the day prior. Mr. Jackson claimed that Plaintiff only wanted a
26 contmuance ofthe hearmg date to serve more defendants. Without citation to authority, he alleged
27 that such service would create a ba31s for delaymg a rulmg. on the'venue motion, referencing the
a'
28 notiOn that- court cannot ru-leon a motion for transfer efendants have answered.
PLAINTIFF’ S EXPARTE APPLICATION FQR ' "
LE‘
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Page 3
Delving into pure conspiracy, Defense counsel alleged that Plaintiff would or could push out the
venue hearing in perpetuity by rotating service of the individual defendants.1 (Hillier Dec1., 1]4.)
As described in detail below, Mr. Jackson was wrong on allaccounts: Plaintiff’s counsel
was, indeed, illand Plaintiffs months—long saga of trying to serve the individual defendants has
no nefarious or conspiratorial aim.
To resolve the dispute at the hearing, the Court asked Plaintiff s counsel if he was willing
to produce redacted medical records demonstrating treatment related to his illness. Counsel
agreed. Citing the above argument regarding venue, Defendant requested the Court order Plaintiff
to obtain leave of court prior to serving additional defendants. The Court so ordered. The Court
10 set another briefing schedule and continued the hearing date. (Hillier Decl., 1] 5.)
ll Shortly following the April 8 hearing, Plaintiff‘s counsel spoke with Defendant’s counsel
12 and informed him that Plaintiff would specifically waive any venue argument related to the
l3 individual defendants’ answer stétus. Indeed, Plaintiff submitted his supplemental briefing on the
l4 venue motion on April 23, 2021 without such arguments. (Hillier Decl., 116.)
15 Plaintiff now requests this Court grant leave to Plaintiff to serve the remaining individual
16 defendants.
17 III. ARGUNENT
18 First and foremost, permission to serve should be granted because Plaintiff specifically
19 agreed to—and did—waive all venue arguments related to the answer status of the individual
20 defendants. The nefarious rotating service plot described by Mr. Jackson at the April 8 hearing
21 was never a reality, and itcertainly can’t be now that the argument has been waived. There isno
22 reason to continue to prevent service ofthe individual defendants based on an argument that isn’t
2
23 at issue.
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25 1
unclear why_ Defendant believes that Plaintiff wants to delay a ruling on venue. He decidedly does not.
It 1s
2
worth notmg that Defendant’s assertions regarding the effect of service on- the_ venue dispute were bald, without
It ls
26 any legal support or oltatlon P1a1nt1ff ls not aWare of any authority that‘holds that the service
status of a named
defendaxit 1s relevant to'venue con51deratlons
Th_e an_swer status of named defendants ca'_n be relevant under C. C. P. §
27
'
‘
,372 (holding that all properly
nué. based on the convenience
28 of w1tnesses)) however jas descrlbed below Plaintiffis spcmfic .venue argument related to
"
defendants anSwe'r status. i-
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. PLAINTIFF S_ EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR LE VE TO SERVE
Page 4
Second, Defendant was completely out of line to suggest, without any factual basis, that
Plaintiffs counsel misrepresented an illness. To prove the point, Counsel’s redacted medicél
records (related to the at-issue illness) are attached to his declaration in support of this
Application, including medical records evidencing treatment received at the urgent care facility,
medical records evidencing treatment received in the emergency room, an accounting of
diagnostic tests performed at both locations, and medical records related to a later follow—up
appointment. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 1.)
Third, Defendant was wrong to suggest that Plaintiff was newly attempting to serve the
individual defendants. In fact, that saga is a lengthy one:
10 o When Plaintiff and Defense counsel first spoke, Defense counsel (Jesse Maddox) advised
ll that his firm represented both the University and the individual defendants. At that time,
12 Plaintiffs counsel asked Mr. Maddox to accept service on behalf of the individual
13 defendants. Mr. Maddox reported that the University was “angry” with Plaintiff and
l4 wouldn’t allow counsel to accept service on behalf of the individual defendants for that
15 reason (presumably to force Plaintiff to incur-the costs of service). Plaintiff’s counsel
16 asked Mr. Maddox to reconsider, both to preserve the professional relationship between
17 the parties and to promote efficiency. Mr. Maddox said he would ask the University about
18 permission; on December 17, 2020, he wrote to Plaintiff’s counsel: “I am checking with
19 my clients about the service issue and will let you know ASAP.”
20 0 On January 19, 2021, Mr. Maddox informed Plaintiff" s counsel that the University would
21 not lethim accept service on behalf ofthe individual defendants. Three days later, Plaintiff
22 sent a Notice of Acknowledgement and Receipt (“NAR”), along all the relevant
23 documents for service to each of the individual defendants. (Hillier Decl., Ex 2.) Shortly
24 thereafter, the University’s in—house counsel acknowledged that the individual defendants
25 jsfirecmved -the NAR. service packages, but objected to them on claimed (and baseless)
”‘13, m'
26 """‘tech'nica1- defioxenCIes, tmvmng ré-‘issuance. The 1nd1v1dual defendants did not return a
27 signed NAR.
V V.
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o The NAR deadline expired on February 19, 2021. On February 26, 2021, Plaintiffs
counsel engaged a process server to serve the individual defendants. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 3.)
Over the next few weeks, the process server attempted to serve the individual defendants
at their business addresses. The server reported that either the individual defendants were
not in their offices or the server could not access offices. The server substitute-served two
individual defendants (Defendants Hamm and Castro), but was unable to serve the other
defendants in any form. Plaintiff’s counsel received the declarations of diligence fiom the
server on April 2, 2021. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 4.)
o Plaintiff’ s counsel ordered a skip trace on the individual defendants to ascertain their home
10 addresses to effect personal service there. Following the skip trace, the process server tried
ll to serve the individual defendants again, this time successfully serving Defendant
12 Jimenez-Sandoval. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 5.)That was on April 7——the day before the above-
13 described hearing.
l4 (Hillier Decl., 8.) As demonstrated, Plaintiff’s efforts to serve the individual defendants are not
15 part of a nefarious plot to delay the proceedings of the case. Quite the opposite, in fact. Plaintiff
l6 wants to move this matter forward; Defendant’s objection to the proper service of defendants is
17 preventing that.3
18 Finally, it is worth noting that while all of this was going on, the individual defendants
19 have been actively participating in this lawsuit. A11 of the individual defendants have submitted
20 declarations (some more than once) in support of Defendant’s various motions for transfer. Since
21 the individual defendants have the summons and complaint, have retained attorneys who already
22 litigating this matter, and are actively participating in the lawsuit, nothing would justify
23 prohibiting their service.
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Should‘plenrso'n'aysemicve efforts fail,-P1aint-iffplans toappl}; to serve
via.pub1.ip_'1_19‘tivc.§
,zp‘LgmemF’s EXrARTEVAPPL'IcATION FOR LEAVETQ SERVE
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Pag¢6
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the above, Plaintiff respectfully requests this court grant Plaintiff leave to serve the
remaining individual defendants.
Dated: April 30, 2021 Respectfully Submitted,
By:
45L“
L/
Andrew Hilliér, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff,
A. SAMEH EL KHARBAWY
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PLAINTIFF’S EXPARTE A_PPLICATIONFOR ' '
Page7
THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE IS
ATTACHED IS A FULL. THUE. AND CORRECT COPY
OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN
MY OFFICE.
mm. Jun 1 4 ‘2021
SHERRI H. CARTER
Exe utive Officer/Clerk o! the Superior
Preview
FILEB Elamf'a‘fiicauy AM Sherri Court of California. County of Los Angeles on 04/30/2021 10:00 3y Superior byE. Salcido.Deputy R. Caner. Executive OfficerlCIerk of Court. 3|erk Andrew Hillier (State Bar No. 295779) Hillier Law 600W. Broadway, Suite 700 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 500-7906 Facsimile: (619) 839-3895 andrew@ahillierlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff, A. Sameh El Kharbawy SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY 0F Los ANGELES ‘ 21 CE CG 02214 A. SAMEH EL KHARBAWY, Case No.: 20LBCV00465 10 plaintiff’ PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE 0F . APPLICATION AND APPLICATION ll vs_ FOR LEAVE T0 SERVE; DECLARATION 0F ANDREW HILLIER 12 BOARD 0F TRUSTEES 0F THE Datefi May 4, 2021 13 Tlme- 8-30 a-m- CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY; De t.: S26 l4 DARRYL L. HAMM, an individual; Ju ge: Hon_ Michael Vicencia LYNNETTE ZELEZNY, an individual; 15 JOS,EPH I.CASTRO, an individual; SAUL IlMENEZ-SANDOVAL, an individual; 16 XUANNING FU, an individual; l7 AND DOES 1 through 50, 18 Defendants. l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “ ‘' ’ i'-P'L'AINTIFF’S EXPARTEQPLICATIONEQR‘L A37. 1’ - "' H. .‘E M ‘ ‘ Pagel NOTICE OF APPLICATION AND APPLICATION TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1200 et seq, on May 4, 2021 at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be hard in Department S-26 of the above-entitled Court, located at 275 Magnolia Ave, Long Beach, CA 90802, Plaintiff A. Sameh E1 Kharbawy will and hereby does respectfully apply ex parte for leave to serve the remaining defendants. Good cause exists to grant Plaintiff’s application. The Court previously ordered Plaintiff to request leave to serve additional parties based on defense counsel’s unfounded claim that 10 Plaintiff only aimed to serve those defendants to delay the Court’s ruling on a motion to transfer. ll Defendant’s accusation was baseless and false. In reality, Plaintiff has no wish to further delay a 12 ruling on the venue motion, and to that end, has specifically waived any argument related the l3 answer status of defendants. Leave to serve should be granted. 14 As set forth in the attached ,Declaration of Andrew Hillier (“Hillier Decl.”) filed 15 concurrently herewith, Plaintiff’s counsel timely provided notice of this application to 16 Defendants’ counsel of record, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1203, via email on l7 April 30, 2021 at approximately 9:00 a.m. (Hillier Decl., 112.) 18- This ex parte application is based on this Notice, the related Memorandum of Points and l9 Authorities, the Hillier Decl. with attached exhibits, the pleadings and documents on file with this 20 Court, and any further evidence Or argument the Court considers at the hearing ofthis application. 21 22 Dated: April 30, 2021 Respectfully Submitted, 23 24 25 26 By: # Andrew. H‘l “1er_, Esq. Attorney for Plamtxff 27 28 I EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE ‘ PLAINTIFF’ S “ . Page 2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION At a recent hearing, counsel for Board of Trustees for the California State University (“the University” or “Defendant”) falsely accused Plaintiffs counsel—without a shred of supporting evidence—of misrepresenting an illness to this Court for the purposes of obtaining a hearing continuance. Defendant wrongly claimed that Plaintiff only wanted a continuance to advance an argument regarding service of individual defendants related to a venue dispute between the parties. Neither assertion had any grounding in fact or law; in fact, as shown in this Application, both are demonstrably false. In response to Defendant’s allegations at the hearing, the Court 10 issued an order requiring Plaintiff to request leave of court before personally serving the ll remaining named defendants inthis matters The purpose of this ex parte application is to seek 12 such leave. 13 II. RELEVANT FACTS 14 This is an employment and civil rights action. Plaintiff A. Sameh E1 Kharbawy filed suit 15 against the University and five individuals (“the individual defendants”) alleging, inter alia, 16' discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and reprisal. On March 25 , 2021, this Court held a hearing 17 on the University’s second motion to transfer venue. At the hearing, the Court ordered additional 18 briefing, set a briefing schedule, and set a new hearing date for April 8, 2021. Between the two l9 hearings, Plaintiffs counsel fell ill, requiring care at both an urgent care facility and the 20 emergency room. As counsel was unable to work on the briefing due to illness, Plaintiffrequested 21 a brief continuance of the hearing date. (Hillier Decl., 1]3.) 22 At the April 8 hearing, Defendant’s counsel (Nathan Jackson) baselessly alleged that 23 Plaintiffs counsel was either not illor not too illto work. Mr. Jackson only proffered rationale 24 for his false accusation was that one of the individual defendants was personally served (by a 25 third-party process server) the day prior. Mr. Jackson claimed that Plaintiff only wanted a 26 contmuance ofthe hearmg date to serve more defendants. Without citation to authority, he alleged 27 that such service would create a ba31s for delaymg a rulmg. on the'venue motion, referencing the a' 28 notiOn that- court cannot ru-leon a motion for transfer efendants have answered. PLAINTIFF’ S EXPARTE APPLICATION FQR ' " LE‘ ' Page 3 Delving into pure conspiracy, Defense counsel alleged that Plaintiff would or could push out the venue hearing in perpetuity by rotating service of the individual defendants.1 (Hillier Dec1., 1]4.) As described in detail below, Mr. Jackson was wrong on allaccounts: Plaintiff’s counsel was, indeed, illand Plaintiffs months—long saga of trying to serve the individual defendants has no nefarious or conspiratorial aim. To resolve the dispute at the hearing, the Court asked Plaintiff s counsel if he was willing to produce redacted medical records demonstrating treatment related to his illness. Counsel agreed. Citing the above argument regarding venue, Defendant requested the Court order Plaintiff to obtain leave of court prior to serving additional defendants. The Court so ordered. The Court 10 set another briefing schedule and continued the hearing date. (Hillier Decl., 1] 5.) ll Shortly following the April 8 hearing, Plaintiff‘s counsel spoke with Defendant’s counsel 12 and informed him that Plaintiff would specifically waive any venue argument related to the l3 individual defendants’ answer stétus. Indeed, Plaintiff submitted his supplemental briefing on the l4 venue motion on April 23, 2021 without such arguments. (Hillier Decl., 116.) 15 Plaintiff now requests this Court grant leave to Plaintiff to serve the remaining individual 16 defendants. 17 III. ARGUNENT 18 First and foremost, permission to serve should be granted because Plaintiff specifically 19 agreed to—and did—waive all venue arguments related to the answer status of the individual 20 defendants. The nefarious rotating service plot described by Mr. Jackson at the April 8 hearing 21 was never a reality, and itcertainly can’t be now that the argument has been waived. There isno 22 reason to continue to prevent service ofthe individual defendants based on an argument that isn’t 2 23 at issue. 24 25 1 unclear why_ Defendant believes that Plaintiff wants to delay a ruling on venue. He decidedly does not. It 1s 2 worth notmg that Defendant’s assertions regarding the effect of service on- the_ venue dispute were bald, without It ls 26 any legal support or oltatlon P1a1nt1ff ls not aWare of any authority that‘holds that the service status of a named defendaxit 1s relevant to'venue con51deratlons Th_e an_swer status of named defendants ca'_n be relevant under C. C. P. § 27 ' ‘ ,372 (holding that all properly nué. based on the convenience 28 of w1tnesses)) however jas descrlbed below Plaintiffis spcmfic .venue argument related to " defendants anSwe'r status. i- - - . PLAINTIFF S_ EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR LE VE TO SERVE Page 4 Second, Defendant was completely out of line to suggest, without any factual basis, that Plaintiffs counsel misrepresented an illness. To prove the point, Counsel’s redacted medicél records (related to the at-issue illness) are attached to his declaration in support of this Application, including medical records evidencing treatment received at the urgent care facility, medical records evidencing treatment received in the emergency room, an accounting of diagnostic tests performed at both locations, and medical records related to a later follow—up appointment. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 1.) Third, Defendant was wrong to suggest that Plaintiff was newly attempting to serve the individual defendants. In fact, that saga is a lengthy one: 10 o When Plaintiff and Defense counsel first spoke, Defense counsel (Jesse Maddox) advised ll that his firm represented both the University and the individual defendants. At that time, 12 Plaintiffs counsel asked Mr. Maddox to accept service on behalf of the individual 13 defendants. Mr. Maddox reported that the University was “angry” with Plaintiff and l4 wouldn’t allow counsel to accept service on behalf of the individual defendants for that 15 reason (presumably to force Plaintiff to incur-the costs of service). Plaintiff’s counsel 16 asked Mr. Maddox to reconsider, both to preserve the professional relationship between 17 the parties and to promote efficiency. Mr. Maddox said he would ask the University about 18 permission; on December 17, 2020, he wrote to Plaintiff’s counsel: “I am checking with 19 my clients about the service issue and will let you know ASAP.” 20 0 On January 19, 2021, Mr. Maddox informed Plaintiff" s counsel that the University would 21 not lethim accept service on behalf ofthe individual defendants. Three days later, Plaintiff 22 sent a Notice of Acknowledgement and Receipt (“NAR”), along all the relevant 23 documents for service to each of the individual defendants. (Hillier Decl., Ex 2.) Shortly 24 thereafter, the University’s in—house counsel acknowledged that the individual defendants 25 jsfirecmved -the NAR. service packages, but objected to them on claimed (and baseless) ”‘13, m' 26 """‘tech'nica1- defioxenCIes, tmvmng ré-‘issuance. The 1nd1v1dual defendants did not return a 27 signed NAR. V V. 28 o The NAR deadline expired on February 19, 2021. On February 26, 2021, Plaintiffs counsel engaged a process server to serve the individual defendants. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 3.) Over the next few weeks, the process server attempted to serve the individual defendants at their business addresses. The server reported that either the individual defendants were not in their offices or the server could not access offices. The server substitute-served two individual defendants (Defendants Hamm and Castro), but was unable to serve the other defendants in any form. Plaintiff’s counsel received the declarations of diligence fiom the server on April 2, 2021. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 4.) o Plaintiff’ s counsel ordered a skip trace on the individual defendants to ascertain their home 10 addresses to effect personal service there. Following the skip trace, the process server tried ll to serve the individual defendants again, this time successfully serving Defendant 12 Jimenez-Sandoval. (Hillier Decl., Ex. 5.)That was on April 7——the day before the above- 13 described hearing. l4 (Hillier Decl., 8.) As demonstrated, Plaintiff’s efforts to serve the individual defendants are not 15 part of a nefarious plot to delay the proceedings of the case. Quite the opposite, in fact. Plaintiff l6 wants to move this matter forward; Defendant’s objection to the proper service of defendants is 17 preventing that.3 18 Finally, it is worth noting that while all of this was going on, the individual defendants 19 have been actively participating in this lawsuit. A11 of the individual defendants have submitted 20 declarations (some more than once) in support of Defendant’s various motions for transfer. Since 21 the individual defendants have the summons and complaint, have retained attorneys who already 22 litigating this matter, and are actively participating in the lawsuit, nothing would justify 23 prohibiting their service. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 3 Should‘plenrso'n'aysemicve efforts fail,-P1aint-iffplans toappl}; to serve via.pub1.ip_'1_19‘tivc.§ ,zp‘LgmemF’s EXrARTEVAPPL'IcATION FOR LEAVETQ SERVE ' ‘ " Pag¢6 IV. CONCLUSION Given the above, Plaintiff respectfully requests this court grant Plaintiff leave to serve the remaining individual defendants. Dated: April 30, 2021 Respectfully Submitted, By: 45L“ L/ Andrew Hilliér, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff, A. SAMEH EL KHARBAWY 10 11 12 l3 14 15 l6 l7 18 l9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S EXPARTE A_PPLICATIONFOR ' ' Page7 THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE IS ATTACHED IS A FULL. THUE. AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN MY OFFICE. mm. Jun 1 4 ‘2021 SHERRI H. CARTER Exe utive Officer/Clerk o! the Superior