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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY 0F FRESNO Entered by:
Civil Department -Non-Limited
TITLE 0F CASE:
Tranquility Pistachio, LLC vs. Susan Kilsdonk
Case Number:
LAW AND MOTION MINUTE ORDER 19CECG02335
Hearing Date: January 6,2022 Hearing Type: Demurrer
Department: 403 Judge: Kristi Culver Kapetan
Court Clerk: Estela Alvarado Reporter: Not Reported
Appearing Parties:
Plaintiff:No Appearances Defendant: No Appearances
Counsel: Counsel:
[ ]
Off Calendar
[ ]
Continued to [ ]
Set for ___ at _ Dept. _ for _
[ ]
Submitted on points and authorities with/without argument. [ ]
Matter isargued and submitted.
[ ]
Upon filing of points and authorities.
[ ]
Motion is granted [ ]
in part and denied in part. [ ]
Motion isdenied [
]with/without prejudice.
‘
[ ]Taken under advisement
[X] No Oral Argument requested; per Local Rule 2.2.6 & CRC 3.1308(a)(1).
[X] Defendant’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint is SUSTAINEDIOVERRULED as stated on the tentative ruling.
[X] Tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. See attached copy of the Tentative Ruling.
[X] Pursuant to CRC 3.1 312(a) and CCP section 1019.5(a), no further order is necessary. The minute order
adopting the tentative ruling serves as the order of the court.
[X] Service by the clerk willconstitute notice of the order.
[ ]
Judgment debtor_ sworn and examined.
[
]Judgment debtor _ failed to appear.
Bench warrant issued in the amount of $ _
JUDGMENT: -
[ ]Money damages [ ]Default [ ]Other __ entered in the amountof:
Principal $_ lnterest$_ Costs $_ Attorney fees $_, Total $_
[ ]Claim of exemption [ ]granted [ ]denied. Court orders withholdings modifiedto $_ per_
FURTHER, COURT ORDERS:
[ ]Monies held by levying officerto be [
]releasedtojudgmentcreditor. [
]returned tojudgmentdebtor.
] $_
[
to be released tojudgment creditor and balance returned tojudgment debtor.
[ ] Levying Officer,County of _, notified. [ ]Writ to issue
[ ]
Notice to be filed within 15 days. [ ]
Restitution of Premises
[
]Other: __
CV-14b R03-18
F-—
Il__..I_A..._.
LAW AND MOTION MINUTE ORDER
(03)
Tentative Rulin
Re: Tranquility Pistachio, LLC v. Kilsdonk
Superior Cour’r Cose No. 19CECGO2385
Hearing Do’re: January 6, 2022 (Dept. 403)
Mofion: Defendant‘s Demurrer ’ro Amehded Complaint
Tentative Ruling:
To sus’roin defendon’r's demurrer To ’rhe second, Third, fif’rh, six’rh, seven’rh, 0nd nin’rh
causes of action in The amended complaint for failure ’ro s’rofe facts sufficient ’ro
consfi’ru’re o cause of ocfion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).) To overrule ’rhe
demurrer To the four’rh and eigh’rh causes of action. To gron’r leave To amend Gs To The
second, Third, fifth, 0nd sixth causes of action. To deny leave ’ro amend os ’ro The sevem‘h
0nd nin’rh causes of oc’rion. Ploinflff shall serve 0nd fileher second amended complaint
within 10 days of the date of service of This order. All new allegations shall be in boldface.
Explanation:
Second Cause of Action: The second cause of oc’rion foils ’ro state o valid claim
for breach of The implied covenon’r because if merely duplicates The first couse of ocfion
for breach of confroc’r wi’rhouf alleging ony additional foc’rs.
“'Every contracf imposes on each party o duty of good foi’rh 0nd foir dealing in
each performance and in ifs enforcemenf.‘ Simply stated, The burden imposed is ””rhot
neither party will do onyfhing which will injure The right of The o’rher f0 receive The benefits
of the agreement!“ Or, To pu’r h‘
onofherwoy, The 'implied covenant imposes Upon each
pon‘y The obligation To do everything Tho’r ’rhe contract presupposes ’rhey will do ’ro
accomplish ifs purpose.' This rule was developed ‘in The contract arena 0nd is aimed of
making effective ’rhe cgreemen’r's promises.‘ The 'precise nature 0nd ex’ren’r of The duty
imposed will depend on The contractual purposes.” (Careou & Co. v. Security Pacific
Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Col.App.3d 1371, 1393, infernal ci’rofions omi’r’red.)
”A '“breoch of ’rhe implied covenant of good foi’rh 0nd fair dealing involves
something beyond breach of the contractual du’ry i’rself”0nd hos been held Tho?
i’r ‘[b]od
foi’rh implies unfair dealing ro’rher Than mistaken judgment...” (Id. o’r p.1394, infernal
ci’ro’rions omified.)
”Thus, allegations which assert such o claim musf show fho’r The conduct of ’rhe
defendant, whether or n01 i’r
olso constitutes 0 breach of o consensual contract Term,
demonstrates o failure or refusal To discharge controc’ruol responsibilities, prompted no’r
by cm honest mistake, bod judgment or negligence bu’r ro’rher by o conscious 0nd
deliberate 0d, which unfairly frusfro’res The agreed common purposes 0nd disappoints
The reasonable expectations of The o’rher pon‘y Thereby depriving That pon‘y of the
benefits of The agreement. Jusf what conducf will mee’r These criteria mus’r be
determined on o cose by case basis 0nd will depend on The contractual purposes 0nd
3
recsonoblyjusfified expectations of The parties." (Id. o’rp. 1395.) However, “[i]f
The ollegofions do n01 go beyond The sToTemenT of o mere confroc’r breach 0nd, relying
on The some alleged acts, simply seek The some damages or other relief already claimed
in o companion contract cause of action, ’rhey may be disregarded os superfluous as no
additional claim is oc’ruolly stated.“ (Ibid.)
Here, plaintiff's firs’rcause of ocfion for breach of confroc’r 0nd second cause of
action for breach of ’rhe implied covenant rely on identical ollego’rions regarding
defendant's alleged breach. “By knowledge, oc’rion, and in’ren’rDefendant breached
i’rs agreement wi’rh Tranquility by, among o’rher Things, misuse of the core 0nd
maintenance clause of The deed of ’rrust by The imposition of unreasonable and
outrageous requirements which were for beyond The normal 0nd Traditional husbandry
practices of The Property." (Compare Amended Complaint, 1111XVIII a 0nd XIX o.) The
second cause of oc’rion odds o conclusory ollegofion Thc’r The defendant olso ignored
The implied covenant of good faith 0nd fair dealing in ’rhe contract (Amended
Complaint, 1] XIX b), bu? plaintiff alleges no other facts Tho’r would Tend To support i’rs
conclusion ’rho’r defendant breached The implied covenon’r.
In ofherwords, plaintiff hos not alleged Tho? defendant did ony’rhing To breach ’rhe
implied covenant beyond The some ac’rs That allegedly constituted'o breach of ’rhe
contract Terms. The only foc’rs alleged in support of The firsf 0nd second causes of oc’rion
ore identical, namely Tho’r defendant imposed “unreasonable 0nd outrageous
requirements" on plaintiff Tho’r were “for beyond the normal 0nd Traditional husbandry
practices” for forming The property. Plaintiff hos no’r alleged Tho’r defendant did any
im‘en’rional oc’r To frustrate the purpose of The contract 0nd ’ro prevent plaintiff from
benefi’rfing from i’r
Thof wos no’r also c1 breach of The contract Terms Themselves. Thus, The
breach of the implied covenant claim foils ’ro sfofe 0 volid cause of ocfion, cs i’r
is
duplicative of ’rhe confroc’r claim. Consequently, the coun‘ intends ’ro susToin The
demurrer ’ro The second cause of ocfion with leave ’ro amend.
Third Cause of Action: While if is en’rifled “slander of Title“, ’rhe ’rhird cause of ocfion
only contains allegations Tho’r seem ’ro relate fo 0 breach of contract claim. Plaintiff
alleges ’rhof defendant "by knowledge, oc’rion, 0nd in’ren’rbreached i’rsagreemen’r wh‘h
Plaintiff by, among o’rher Things, failing To provide any prospects 0nd leads whatsoever,
in ei’rher Timely, competent or satisfactory fashion 0nd further, faking moneys from
PloinTiff from soles which were nof The result whatsoever of any effon‘ or action on The
port of [Defendant]? (Amended Complaint, 1]XX 0.) “As d result of This breach (These
breaches), Ploim‘iff hos been damaged in on omoun’r ’ro be determined of Trial."
(Amended Complaint, 1] XX, b.)
The allegations here ore confusing, as They only seem ’ro relo’re ’ro a breach of
contract Terms fhcn‘ ore not alleged anywhere else in The amended Icomploin'r, 0nd ore
no’r contained in the ofioched contract They appear To be CUT 0nd posted from on
en’rirely different complainf in o differen’r case. In any even’r. They do n01 se’r for’rh cmy of
The elemen’rs of o slander of claim
Ti’rle or provide any foc’rs That would tend ’ro support
such elemen’rs.‘ As a result, ’rhe cour’r in’rends To sus’roin ’rhe demurrer To The Third cause
of oc’rion for failure To sto’re facts sufficient ’ro constitute a cause of ocfion, wi’rh leave ’ro
amend.
Fourth Cause of Action: Defendant also demurs To the four’rh cause of action for
"folse light." “'Folse ligh’ris o species of invasion of privacy, based on publicity Tho’r places
o plaintiff before The public in o folse light That would be highly offensive ’ro a reasonable
person, 0nd where ’rhe defendant knew or oc’red in reckless disregard os ’ro’rhe folsh‘y of
The publicized mofierond ’rhe false Iigh’r in which The plaintiff would be ploced.‘ ‘A “false
light" claim, like libel, exposes 0 person ’ro hatred, con’remp’r, ridicule, or obloquy 0nd
assumes The audience will recognize i1 as such.‘ '“A ‘folse Iigh’r‘cause of ocfion is in
substance equivalent To o libel claim, 0nd should meet The some requirements of ’rhe
libel claim, including proof of malice [where malice is required for The libel cloim]."'"
(Jackson v. Moyweofher (201 7) 10 Col.App.5’rh 1240, 1264, infernal ci’ro’rions omitted.)
Here, ploim‘iff alleges Tho? defendonf mode false ond defamatory s’roTemen’rs,
”including bu’r no’r limi’red ’ro Those sef forth in paragraph X above", which placed plaintiff
“in o false light before The business and general public.“ (Amended Complaint, 1] XVI 1.)
Paragraph X alleges Thof defendom‘ visited local businesses wifh whom plaintiff was either
affiliated or doing business 0nd advised Them no’r to do business wi’rh ploin’riff,Gs They
were ”deodbeots” 0nd she was going ’ro foreclose on Them. (Id. of 1] X.) Ploin’riff alleges
Tho’r These comments had a chilling effec’r on ifs ability ’ro procure goods and services in
The area. (Ibid.) “As o resul’r of Defendant's actions, Tranquility hos suffered general
damages in The form of loss of reputation 0nd goodwill in on amount To be determined
01 Trial; bu’r in ony event, n01 less ’rhcm $100,000.00 in loss." (Id. OT 1]XXI d.) Plaintiff also
alleges Thof Ios’r income
i’r
Gs ctresult of defendant’s oc’rions. (Id. o’r1| XXI e.)
In her demurrer, defendant argues ’rhof any s’ro’remen’rs That she mode cbouf
intending ’ro foreclose on plaintiff were True, os she did in focf file o no’rice of default 0nd
commence foreclosure proceedings against plaintiff. In cmy even’r, defendant contends
That c1 no’rice of default is a privileged publication under Civil Code secfion 47 cmd Thus
conno’r support o false ligh’r, slander, or libel cause of cc’rion.
l’r
is True that The filing of The no’rice of defoul’r iso privileged publication under Civil
Code sections 47 0nd 2924, subdivision (dm). (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12
Col.App.5’rh 1331 , 1136.) Thus, plaintiff conno’r base slander of Title or false
i’rs light claims
on The filingof The no’rice of defouh‘.
However, here plaintiff hos also alleged Tho’r defendon’r Told plaintiff's business
partners or offiliofes That plaintiff was o “deadbeat" 0nd Tho’r she was going To foreclose
on Them. (Amended Complaint, 1|X.) Such statements were allegedly false 0nd caused
horm ’ro ploim‘iff by loss of business goodwill 0nd repu’ro’rion, os well os loss of income. (Id.
o’r 11XXI d, e.) While The statement That defendon’r wos going ’ro foreclose on plaintiff wos
in focf true, The statement Thof plaintiff wos o “deadbeat" wos n01.
‘
”The elements of o cause of action for slander of fifle ore (1) a publication, which is (2) without
privilege orjusfificofion, (3) false, 0nd (4) causes pecuniary loss.” (La Jolla Group IIv. Bruce (2012)
21 1 Cal.AppATh 46], 472, infernal citations omitted.)
5
Merriom—Webster defines a “deadbeat" “cs one who persistently foils ’ro pay
personal deb’rs or expenses." (See h’rfgs:[[www.merriam—
webs’rer.com/dicTionory/decdbeat.) Thus, defendant essenfiolly Told plaintiff's business
associates That plaintiff was no’r paying i’rs debts, which cost doubt on plaintiff's reliability
cs o customer or business affiliate. Ye’r here The notice of defoul’r wos no’r based on
plaintiff failing ’ro pay on The mortgage, bu’r ro’rher on ifs failure ’ro maintain the property
in good condition. There ore no fcc’rs in The amended comploim‘ Tho’r indicate ’rho’r
plaintiff wos behind on mortgage payments or foiled ’ropoy ony money ’rha’r i1owed To
defendant. Also, The sToTemenTs about plaintiff being o “deadbeat" allegedly harmed
ploin’riff by damaging ifs relationships wi’rh o’rher local businesses and causing ’ro
i’r
lose
income. Therefore, plaintiff hos adequately alleged ifs claim for false ligh’r, 0nd The court
im‘ends To overrule ’rhe demurrer To ’rhe four’rh cousé of action.
Eighth Cause of Action: Defendom‘ has also demurred To The eighth cause of
ocfion for business slander, which again relies on The some alleged statements Tho’r
suppon‘ ’rhe four’rh cause of oc’rion. Defendant contends Tho’r any s’ro’remen’rs Tho’r i’r
mode about foreclosing on plaintiff were in foc’r ’rrue, cmd ’rhus cannot be defamatory.
Also, defendant contends Tho’r The nofice of defoul’r was a privileged publication under
Civil Code section 47 0nd 2924, subdivision (d)(1 ). Therefore; defendon’r concludes Tho’r
The eighth cause of oc’rion foils To s’ro’re focTs ’roconstitute o valid cause of oc’rion for
business slander.
However, os discussed obove wi’rh regard ’ro The fdlse ligh’r claim, defendant
ollegedly Told plaintiff's business associates 0nd affiliates Tho? plaintiff wos o “deadbeat”,
when in fact plaintiff had no’r foiled ’ropay any deb’rs i’r
owed To defendant. (Amended
Comploin’r, 1]X.) Thus, even Though ’rhe s’rcn‘emen’rs about filing foreclosure proceedings
moy hove been True 0nd privileged, ’rhe s’rofemem‘ obou’r plaintiff being o deadbeat was
no’r, and con form the basis for o slander claim. As o resul’r, ’rhe cour’r im‘ends To overrule
’rhe demurrer fo The eighth cause of oc’rion.
Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action: Defendant nex’r demurs To ’rhe fif’rh0nd six’rh
causes of oc’rion for intentional interference wi’rh existing business relations 0nd
prospective economic advantage. Defendant contends That plaintiff hos no’r alleged
The existence of o contractual relationship, or any ocfuol breach of such o relationship.
Defendant olso argues thof plaintiff hos no’r alleged The existenceof on existing
economic relafionship ’rho’r held the probability of o fu’rure economic benefit ’ro plaintiff,
so ploinfiff hos no’r alleged o sufficient claim for interference with prospec’rive economic
advantage.
“The elements which o plaintiff must plead ’ro s’ro’re ’rhe cause of cc’rion for
infem‘ionol in’rerference wi’rh contractual relations ore (1) o valid controc’r between
plaintiff 0nd o Third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of ’rhiscon’rroc’r; (3) defendant's
intentional oc’rs designed fo induce o breach ordisrupfion of The contractual relationship:
(4) oc’ruol breach or disruption of The contractual relationship; 0nd (5)resul’ring damage."
(Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Sfearns & Co. (1990) 50 Col.3d 1118, H26, inferno!
ci’rofions omitted.)
On The o’rher hand, The elemen’rs of The Tor’r of inTenTionol interference with
prospective economic advantage ore ”(1) The existence, between fhe plaintiff 0nd
6
some fhird party, of cm economic relationship Tho’r contains ’rhe probability of fu’rure
economic benefi’r ’ro ’rhe plaintiff; (2) The defendant's knowledge of The relationship; (3)
intentionally wrongful oc’rs designed ’ro disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of
’rhe relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by ’rhe defendant's ocfion."
(Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt Soufh, Inc. (2017) 2 Col.5’rh 505, 512,
infernal ci’rofion omih‘ed.)
“The Tor’r of interference wi’rh prospective economic advantage protects ’rhe
some interest in sToble economic relo’rionships cs does The for’r of interference wi’rh
confrocf, Though in’rerference with prospective odvcm’roge does not require proof of o
legally binding confrocf." (Pacific Gas & Electric v. Bear Stems & Co., supra, 01 p. 1126,
infernal citations omified.)
“[A] cause of oc’rion for intentional interference wi’rh contract requires on
underlying enforceable contract Where there is no existing, enforceable contract, only
a claim for infe‘rference wi’rh prospecfive advantage moy be pleaded. To do otherwise
unnecessarily confuses ’rhe Two Torts 0nd foils ’ro recognize ’rheir inherent differences. The
fon‘ of interference wi’rh contractual relofions protects on existing, formally cemented
economic relationship. The ’ror’rof interference wi’rh prospective business relations
protects nonformolized or anticipated business relo’rionships which ore reasonably
certain to occur, but which ore nonetheless prospective. Thus, if o plaintiff is To be
successful in the former, i’r
is necessary That on enforceable contract be pled 0nd .
proven." (PMC, Inc. v. Sobon Entertainment, Inc. (1 996) 45 COI.App.4fh 579, 601, i’rolics
omified.)
“However, os o mo’r’rer of low, o threshold causation requirement exists for
maintaining o cause of cc’rion for ei’rher Tor’r, namely, proof Thon‘ is reasonably probable
i’r
Tho? ’rhe Ios’reconomic advantage would hove been realized buf for ’rhe defendant's
interference.” (Yousf v. Longo (1 987) 43 Col.3d 64, 71 ,iTolics omitted.)
Here, plaintiff alleges Thc’r i’r
hod “ongoing business relationships with existing
cliem‘s, cusfomers, and associates, who continually do business wh‘h Tranquility."
(Amended Complaint, 1] XXII c.) Defendant is n'oT o party ’ro’rhese relationships. (Ibid.)
Defendant knew of These business relationships 0nd intentionally interfered wi’rh Them by
communicating false 0nd defomcl’rory informofion, including Telling The business
associates Tho? ploinfiff was o “deadbeat" 0nd That defendant wos going ’ro foreclose
on ploin’riff. (Id.01 1H] XXII b, X.) Defendant mode These false s’ro’remen’rs wi’rh The infen’r
’ro interfere with plaintiff's business 0nd itsrelationships with i’rsbusiness associates. (Id. o’r
11 XXII c.) Plaintiff suffered horm 10 iTs business relationships “by diminishing The esteem,
respect, goodwill, 0nd confidence in which Tronquili’ry is held by i’rs business associates."
(Id. o’r 1]XXII d.) Plaintiff alleges That i1suffered damages os o fesuIT in fhe amount of 01
least $100,000, as well cs horm To reputation.
i’rs (Id. G’r 'llXXII e.) Plaintiff makes similar
ollego’rions with regard to ifsinterference wi’rh prospective economic advantage claim,
except That i1 also alleges fho’r had
i’r “o prospective business relationship wi’rh many
potential business associates" cmd Tho? defendon’r interfered wi’rh These prospective
relationships Gs well. (Id. 01‘ 1]XXIII o—h.)
However, these allegations ore insufficient To sfo’re claims for interference with
existing or prospective business relationships. While plaintiff alleges Tho’r it hod existing
7
economic relationships wi’rh unnamed Third parties, i’r
does no’r allege ’rhcn‘ i’r
hodony
oc’ruol, enforceable contracts wi’rh The Third parties, or that defendant’s statements
resulted in The Termination or any of ’rhe existing confroc’rs i’r
had wifh customers or
business associates. Plaintiff never alleges Tho’r i1 los’r any confroc’rs or customers because
of defendon’r's false sfo’remem‘s.
Plainfiff olso never alleges any foc’rs showing Tho’r i’rhad existing business
relationships wi’rh Third parties Tho’r were reasonably likely To lead ’ro future economic
advantage ’ro if, or Th0? defendonf’s conduct interfered wi’rh any such likely fu’rure
advantage. Ploin’riff only alleges Tho? defendant's sfo’remen’rs caused o diminution of
The ”es’reem, respect, goodwill 0nd confidence" Tho’r plaintiff’s business associates once
had for it. (Amended Complaint 1]XXIII e.) These allegations ore nof sufficien’r to show
Tho’r defendon’r dc’ruolly interfered wi’rh ploinfiff's existing or future business relationships.
0nd Thcn‘ plaintiff suffered any damages from The interference. Therefore, ’rhe coufl
intends ’ro sustain The demurrer ’ro The fifth 0nd six’rh causes of oc’rion, wi’rh leave To
amend.
Seventh and Ninth Causes of Action: Ploin’riff seeks ’ro state claims for conversion
of reol proper’ry 0nd conspiracy ’ro conver’r real properfy based on The allegation Tho?
defendon’r “used unreasonable core cmd moin’tenclnce requirements for ’rhe Property To
reclaim vio
i’r
The mechanism of foreclosure" and Tho’r defendant intended To resell The
property for o significantly higher price per acre Tho’r plaintiff poid in September of 20] 7.
'
(Amended Complaint, 1] XXIV, b.)
However, “conversion is o ton‘ Tho’r moy be commi’n‘ed only wi’rh relation ’ro
personal property and no’r real proper’ry." (Munger v. Moore (1970) H Col.App.3d 1, 7;
Groner v. Hogseh‘ (1948) 84 Col.App.2d 657, 662.) Thus, plaintiff cannot state 0 claim for
conversion based on defendant's afiemp’red foreclosure on The subject real property,
0nd The nin’rh cause of action foils ’ro s’ro’reo valid Claim.
Also, To The extent Thcn‘ ploin’riffseeks To hold defendant liable for conspiring ’ro
convert the properfy, ”conspiracy" is no’r o seporofe civil cause of action under California
low. Instead, h‘
is merely a vehicle for holding one person liable for conspiring To assist
another person in committing a fort.
”'Conspirocy is no’r a cause of ocfion, but o legal doctrine ’rho’r imposes liability on
persons who, although nof ocfuolly committing o ’ror’rThemselves, shore with The
immediate Ton‘feosors ctcommon plan or design in perpeTrO’rionQ...
i’rs
[1]]S’ronding alone,
o conspiracy does no harm and engenders no ’ror’r
liability. must
I’r
be oc’rivc’red by The
commission of cm oc’ruol Tor’r.’‘A conspiracy cannot be alleged os o Ton‘ separate from
’rhe underlying wrong i’r
is organized To achieve.” (Moran v. Endres (2006) 135
Col.App.4Th 952, 954—955, quoting Applied Equipment Corp. v. Liffon Saudi Arabic Lfd.
(1994) 7 Col.4’rh 503, 510—51 1, 513.)
Thus, plaintiff conno’r sfo’re 0 seporofe cause of oc’rion ogoins’r defendant for
”conspiracy” To commit conversion of ’rhe real property. As discussed above, i’ris n01
possible To s’ro’re o claim for conversion of real propen‘y. Nor con ploin’riff allege a
seporofe claim for conspiracy based on such conversion. Furthermore, plaintiff hos no’r
alleged ’rhof defendant oc’ruolly conspired wi’rh another person who commified a
8
separate ’rorT. Indeed, based on ’rhe amended complain’r's allegations, defendant
apparently conspired with herself ’ro commit The alleged conversion. Therefore, plaintiff
hos foiled To allege facts sufficient To suppor’r ei’rher ifs conspiracy or conversion claim.
i’rs
Nor does if appear To be reasonably likely That plaintiff will be able To cure ’rhe defects in
The seven’rh 0nd ninth causes of oc’rion given
if. leave To amend. As o result, The cour’r
intends To sustain The demurrer To The seventh 0nd nin’rh causes of ocfion, without leave
’ro amend.
Plaintiff's Request for Further Time to Amend Complaint: Finally, To The extent Tho’r
ploinfiff requests additional Time 10 amend The complaint, The courtin’rends To deny the
request. The amended complaint hos been on file for over o yeor, 0nd plaintiff’s counsel
hos been on notice for many months Tho’r defendant wos challenging The sufficiency of
The complain’r‘s allegations. While plaintiff's counsel alleges fho’r plaintiff hos been sick
0nd unable ’ro ossis’rcounsel wiTh fhe omendmen’r until recently, counsel hos now had
several weeks in which To confer wi’rh his client 0nd drof’r o second amended complaint.
Therefore, The cour’r in’rends ’ro require The second amended complaint To be filed 0nd
Served within ’ren doys of service of This order.
Pursuant ’ro California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(0), and Code of CivilProcedure
section 1019. 5, subdivision (o), no fur’rher written order is hecessory. The minute order
adopting This Tem‘o’rive ruling will serve cs ’rhe order of The cour’r 0nd service by The clerk
will constitute notice of The order.
Kema/b/JL
/
/// 2L
(Judge' s iqfitioé) /Do (e)
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF FRESNO FOR COURTUSE ONLY
CivilDepartment, Central Division
1130 "O“ Street
Fresno, California 93724-0002
(559) 457-2000
TITLE 0F CASE:
Tranquility Pistachio, LLC vs. Susan Kilsdonk
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 0F MAILING C’isg'icggggzss
|certify thatlam not a party to this cause and that a true copy of the:
[Minute Order and Tentative Ruling, dated 1/6/22]
was placed ina sealed envelope and placed for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown below
following our ordinary business practice. | am readily familiar with this court’s practice for collecting and processing
correspondence for mailing. 0n the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited
in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service with postage fully prepaid.
Place of mailing: Fresno, California 93724-0002
On Date: 01/07/2022 Clerk, by .Deputy
E. Alvarado
Charles K. Manock David L.Emerzian
Manock Law McCormick Barstow LLP
448 W. Shaw Ave 7647 N Fresno Street
Fresno, CA 93704 Fresno, CA 93720
D Clerk's Certificate of Mailing Additional Address Page Attached
TGN-06b R08-06 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY 0F FRESNO Entered by: Civil Department -Non-Limited TITLE 0F CASE: Tranquility Pistachio, LLC vs. Susan Kilsdonk Case Number: LAW AND MOTION MINUTE ORDER 19CECG02335 Hearing Date: January 6,2022 Hearing Type: Demurrer Department: 403 Judge: Kristi Culver Kapetan Court Clerk: Estela Alvarado Reporter: Not Reported Appearing Parties: Plaintiff:No Appearances Defendant: No Appearances Counsel: Counsel: [ ] Off Calendar [ ] Continued to [ ] Set for ___ at _ Dept. _ for _ [ ] Submitted on points and authorities with/without argument. [ ] Matter isargued and submitted. [ ] Upon filing of points and authorities. [ ] Motion is granted [ ] in part and denied in part. [ ] Motion isdenied [ ]with/without prejudice. ‘ [ ]Taken under advisement [X] No Oral Argument requested; per Local Rule 2.2.6 & CRC 3.1308(a)(1). [X] Defendant’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint is SUSTAINEDIOVERRULED as stated on the tentative ruling. [X] Tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. See attached copy of the Tentative Ruling. [X] Pursuant to CRC 3.1 312(a) and CCP section 1019.5(a), no further order is necessary. The minute order adopting the tentative ruling serves as the order of the court. [X] Service by the clerk willconstitute notice of the order. [ ] Judgment debtor_ sworn and examined. [ ]Judgment debtor _ failed to appear. Bench warrant issued in the amount of $ _ JUDGMENT: - [ ]Money damages [ ]Default [ ]Other __ entered in the amountof: Principal $_ lnterest$_ Costs $_ Attorney fees $_, Total $_ [ ]Claim of exemption [ ]granted [ ]denied. Court orders withholdings modifiedto $_ per_ FURTHER, COURT ORDERS: [ ]Monies held by levying officerto be [ ]releasedtojudgmentcreditor. [ ]returned tojudgmentdebtor. ] $_ [ to be released tojudgment creditor and balance returned tojudgment debtor. [ ] Levying Officer,County of _, notified. [ ]Writ to issue [ ] Notice to be filed within 15 days. [ ] Restitution of Premises [ ]Other: __ CV-14b R03-18 F-— Il__..I_A..._. LAW AND MOTION MINUTE ORDER (03) Tentative Rulin Re: Tranquility Pistachio, LLC v. Kilsdonk Superior Cour’r Cose No. 19CECGO2385 Hearing Do’re: January 6, 2022 (Dept. 403) Mofion: Defendant‘s Demurrer ’ro Amehded Complaint Tentative Ruling: To sus’roin defendon’r's demurrer To ’rhe second, Third, fif’rh, six’rh, seven’rh, 0nd nin’rh causes of action in The amended complaint for failure ’ro s’rofe facts sufficient ’ro consfi’ru’re o cause of ocfion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).) To overrule ’rhe demurrer To the four’rh and eigh’rh causes of action. To gron’r leave To amend Gs To The second, Third, fifth, 0nd sixth causes of action. To deny leave ’ro amend os ’ro The sevem‘h 0nd nin’rh causes of oc’rion. Ploinflff shall serve 0nd fileher second amended complaint within 10 days of the date of service of This order. All new allegations shall be in boldface. Explanation: Second Cause of Action: The second cause of oc’rion foils ’ro state o valid claim for breach of The implied covenon’r because if merely duplicates The first couse of ocfion for breach of confroc’r wi’rhouf alleging ony additional foc’rs. “'Every contracf imposes on each party o duty of good foi’rh 0nd foir dealing in each performance and in ifs enforcemenf.‘ Simply stated, The burden imposed is ””rhot neither party will do onyfhing which will injure The right of The o’rher f0 receive The benefits of the agreement!“ Or, To pu’r h‘ onofherwoy, The 'implied covenant imposes Upon each pon‘y The obligation To do everything Tho’r ’rhe contract presupposes ’rhey will do ’ro accomplish ifs purpose.' This rule was developed ‘in The contract arena 0nd is aimed of making effective ’rhe cgreemen’r's promises.‘ The 'precise nature 0nd ex’ren’r of The duty imposed will depend on The contractual purposes.” (Careou & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Col.App.3d 1371, 1393, infernal ci’rofions omi’r’red.) ”A '“breoch of ’rhe implied covenant of good foi’rh 0nd fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual du’ry i’rself”0nd hos been held Tho? i’r ‘[b]od foi’rh implies unfair dealing ro’rher Than mistaken judgment...” (Id. o’r p.1394, infernal ci’ro’rions omified.) ”Thus, allegations which assert such o claim musf show fho’r The conduct of ’rhe defendant, whether or n01 i’r olso constitutes 0 breach of o consensual contract Term, demonstrates o failure or refusal To discharge controc’ruol responsibilities, prompted no’r by cm honest mistake, bod judgment or negligence bu’r ro’rher by o conscious 0nd deliberate 0d, which unfairly frusfro’res The agreed common purposes 0nd disappoints The reasonable expectations of The o’rher pon‘y Thereby depriving That pon‘y of the benefits of The agreement. Jusf what conducf will mee’r These criteria mus’r be determined on o cose by case basis 0nd will depend on The contractual purposes 0nd 3 recsonoblyjusfified expectations of The parties." (Id. o’rp. 1395.) However, “[i]f The ollegofions do n01 go beyond The sToTemenT of o mere confroc’r breach 0nd, relying on The some alleged acts, simply seek The some damages or other relief already claimed in o companion contract cause of action, ’rhey may be disregarded os superfluous as no additional claim is oc’ruolly stated.“ (Ibid.) Here, plaintiff's firs’rcause of ocfion for breach of confroc’r 0nd second cause of action for breach of ’rhe implied covenant rely on identical ollego’rions regarding defendant's alleged breach. “By knowledge, oc’rion, and in’ren’rDefendant breached i’rs agreement wi’rh Tranquility by, among o’rher Things, misuse of the core 0nd maintenance clause of The deed of ’rrust by The imposition of unreasonable and outrageous requirements which were for beyond The normal 0nd Traditional husbandry practices of The Property." (Compare Amended Complaint, 1111XVIII a 0nd XIX o.) The second cause of oc’rion odds o conclusory ollegofion Thc’r The defendant olso ignored The implied covenant of good faith 0nd fair dealing in ’rhe contract (Amended Complaint, 1] XIX b), bu? plaintiff alleges no other facts Tho’r would Tend To support i’rs conclusion ’rho’r defendant breached The implied covenon’r. In ofherwords, plaintiff hos not alleged Tho? defendant did ony’rhing To breach ’rhe implied covenant beyond The some ac’rs That allegedly constituted'o breach of ’rhe contract Terms. The only foc’rs alleged in support of The firsf 0nd second causes of oc’rion ore identical, namely Tho’r defendant imposed “unreasonable 0nd outrageous requirements" on plaintiff Tho’r were “for beyond the normal 0nd Traditional husbandry practices” for forming The property. Plaintiff hos no’r alleged Tho’r defendant did any im‘en’rional oc’r To frustrate the purpose of The contract 0nd ’ro prevent plaintiff from benefi’rfing from i’r Thof wos no’r also c1 breach of The contract Terms Themselves. Thus, The breach of the implied covenant claim foils ’ro sfofe 0 volid cause of ocfion, cs i’r is duplicative of ’rhe confroc’r claim. Consequently, the coun‘ intends ’ro susToin The demurrer ’ro The second cause of ocfion with leave ’ro amend. Third Cause of Action: While if is en’rifled “slander of Title“, ’rhe ’rhird cause of ocfion only contains allegations Tho’r seem ’ro relate fo 0 breach of contract claim. Plaintiff alleges ’rhof defendant "by knowledge, oc’rion, 0nd in’ren’rbreached i’rsagreemen’r wh‘h Plaintiff by, among o’rher Things, failing To provide any prospects 0nd leads whatsoever, in ei’rher Timely, competent or satisfactory fashion 0nd further, faking moneys from PloinTiff from soles which were nof The result whatsoever of any effon‘ or action on The port of [Defendant]? (Amended Complaint, 1]XX 0.) “As d result of This breach (These breaches), Ploim‘iff hos been damaged in on omoun’r ’ro be determined of Trial." (Amended Complaint, 1] XX, b.) The allegations here ore confusing, as They only seem ’ro relo’re ’ro a breach of contract Terms fhcn‘ ore not alleged anywhere else in The amended Icomploin'r, 0nd ore no’r contained in the ofioched contract They appear To be CUT 0nd posted from on en’rirely different complainf in o differen’r case. In any even’r. They do n01 se’r for’rh cmy of The elemen’rs of o slander of claim Ti’rle or provide any foc’rs That would tend ’ro support such elemen’rs.‘ As a result, ’rhe cour’r in’rends To sus’roin ’rhe demurrer To The Third cause of oc’rion for failure To sto’re facts sufficient ’ro constitute a cause of ocfion, wi’rh leave ’ro amend. Fourth Cause of Action: Defendant also demurs To the four’rh cause of action for "folse light." “'Folse ligh’ris o species of invasion of privacy, based on publicity Tho’r places o plaintiff before The public in o folse light That would be highly offensive ’ro a reasonable person, 0nd where ’rhe defendant knew or oc’red in reckless disregard os ’ro’rhe folsh‘y of The publicized mofierond ’rhe false Iigh’r in which The plaintiff would be ploced.‘ ‘A “false light" claim, like libel, exposes 0 person ’ro hatred, con’remp’r, ridicule, or obloquy 0nd assumes The audience will recognize i1 as such.‘ '“A ‘folse Iigh’r‘cause of ocfion is in substance equivalent To o libel claim, 0nd should meet The some requirements of ’rhe libel claim, including proof of malice [where malice is required for The libel cloim]."'" (Jackson v. Moyweofher (201 7) 10 Col.App.5’rh 1240, 1264, infernal ci’ro’rions omitted.) Here, ploim‘iff alleges Tho? defendonf mode false ond defamatory s’roTemen’rs, ”including bu’r no’r limi’red ’ro Those sef forth in paragraph X above", which placed plaintiff “in o false light before The business and general public.“ (Amended Complaint, 1] XVI 1.) Paragraph X alleges Thof defendom‘ visited local businesses wifh whom plaintiff was either affiliated or doing business 0nd advised Them no’r to do business wi’rh ploin’riff,Gs They were ”deodbeots” 0nd she was going ’ro foreclose on Them. (Id. of 1] X.) Ploin’riff alleges Tho’r These comments had a chilling effec’r on ifs ability ’ro procure goods and services in The area. (Ibid.) “As o resul’r of Defendant's actions, Tranquility hos suffered general damages in The form of loss of reputation 0nd goodwill in on amount To be determined 01 Trial; bu’r in ony event, n01 less ’rhcm $100,000.00 in loss." (Id. OT 1]XXI d.) Plaintiff also alleges Thof Ios’r income i’r Gs ctresult of defendant’s oc’rions. (Id. o’r1| XXI e.) In her demurrer, defendant argues ’rhof any s’ro’remen’rs That she mode cbouf intending ’ro foreclose on plaintiff were True, os she did in focf file o no’rice of default 0nd commence foreclosure proceedings against plaintiff. In cmy even’r, defendant contends That c1 no’rice of default is a privileged publication under Civil Code secfion 47 cmd Thus conno’r support o false ligh’r, slander, or libel cause of cc’rion. l’r is True that The filing of The no’rice of defoul’r iso privileged publication under Civil Code sections 47 0nd 2924, subdivision (dm). (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Col.App.5’rh 1331 , 1136.) Thus, plaintiff conno’r base slander of Title or false i’rs light claims on The filingof The no’rice of defouh‘. However, here plaintiff hos also alleged Tho’r defendon’r Told plaintiff's business partners or offiliofes That plaintiff was o “deadbeat" 0nd Tho’r she was going To foreclose on Them. (Amended Complaint, 1|X.) Such statements were allegedly false 0nd caused horm ’ro ploim‘iff by loss of business goodwill 0nd repu’ro’rion, os well os loss of income. (Id. o’r 11XXI d, e.) While The statement That defendon’r wos going ’ro foreclose on plaintiff wos in focf true, The statement Thof plaintiff wos o “deadbeat" wos n01. ‘ ”The elements of o cause of action for slander of fifle ore (1) a publication, which is (2) without privilege orjusfificofion, (3) false, 0nd (4) causes pecuniary loss.” (La Jolla Group IIv. Bruce (2012) 21 1 Cal.AppATh 46], 472, infernal citations omitted.) 5 Merriom—Webster defines a “deadbeat" “cs one who persistently foils ’ro pay personal deb’rs or expenses." (See h’rfgs:[[www.merriam— webs’rer.com/dicTionory/decdbeat.) Thus, defendant essenfiolly Told plaintiff's business associates That plaintiff was no’r paying i’rs debts, which cost doubt on plaintiff's reliability cs o customer or business affiliate. Ye’r here The notice of defoul’r wos no’r based on plaintiff failing ’ro pay on The mortgage, bu’r ro’rher on ifs failure ’ro maintain the property in good condition. There ore no fcc’rs in The amended comploim‘ Tho’r indicate ’rho’r plaintiff wos behind on mortgage payments or foiled ’ropoy ony money ’rha’r i1owed To defendant. Also, The sToTemenTs about plaintiff being o “deadbeat" allegedly harmed ploin’riff by damaging ifs relationships wi’rh o’rher local businesses and causing ’ro i’r lose income. Therefore, plaintiff hos adequately alleged ifs claim for false ligh’r, 0nd The court im‘ends To overrule ’rhe demurrer To ’rhe four’rh cousé of action. Eighth Cause of Action: Defendom‘ has also demurred To The eighth cause of ocfion for business slander, which again relies on The some alleged statements Tho’r suppon‘ ’rhe four’rh cause of oc’rion. Defendant contends Tho’r any s’ro’remen’rs Tho’r i’r mode about foreclosing on plaintiff were in foc’r ’rrue, cmd ’rhus cannot be defamatory. Also, defendant contends Tho’r The nofice of defoul’r was a privileged publication under Civil Code section 47 0nd 2924, subdivision (d)(1 ). Therefore; defendon’r concludes Tho’r The eighth cause of oc’rion foils To s’ro’re focTs ’roconstitute o valid cause of oc’rion for business slander. However, os discussed obove wi’rh regard ’ro The fdlse ligh’r claim, defendant ollegedly Told plaintiff's business associates 0nd affiliates Tho? plaintiff wos o “deadbeat”, when in fact plaintiff had no’r foiled ’ropay any deb’rs i’r owed To defendant. (Amended Comploin’r, 1]X.) Thus, even Though ’rhe s’rcn‘emen’rs about filing foreclosure proceedings moy hove been True 0nd privileged, ’rhe s’rofemem‘ obou’r plaintiff being o deadbeat was no’r, and con form the basis for o slander claim. As o resul’r, ’rhe cour’r im‘ends To overrule ’rhe demurrer fo The eighth cause of oc’rion. Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action: Defendant nex’r demurs To ’rhe fif’rh0nd six’rh causes of oc’rion for intentional interference wi’rh existing business relations 0nd prospective economic advantage. Defendant contends That plaintiff hos no’r alleged The existence of o contractual relationship, or any ocfuol breach of such o relationship. Defendant olso argues thof plaintiff hos no’r alleged The existenceof on existing economic relafionship ’rho’r held the probability of o fu’rure economic benefit ’ro plaintiff, so ploinfiff hos no’r alleged o sufficient claim for interference with prospec’rive economic advantage. “The elements which o plaintiff must plead ’ro s’ro’re ’rhe cause of cc’rion for infem‘ionol in’rerference wi’rh contractual relations ore (1) o valid controc’r between plaintiff 0nd o Third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of ’rhiscon’rroc’r; (3) defendant's intentional oc’rs designed fo induce o breach ordisrupfion of The contractual relationship: (4) oc’ruol breach or disruption of The contractual relationship; 0nd (5)resul’ring damage." (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Sfearns & Co. (1990) 50 Col.3d 1118, H26, inferno! ci’rofions omitted.) On The o’rher hand, The elemen’rs of The Tor’r of inTenTionol interference with prospective economic advantage ore ”(1) The existence, between fhe plaintiff 0nd 6 some fhird party, of cm economic relationship Tho’r contains ’rhe probability of fu’rure economic benefi’r ’ro ’rhe plaintiff; (2) The defendant's knowledge of The relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful oc’rs designed ’ro disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of ’rhe relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by ’rhe defendant's ocfion." (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt Soufh, Inc. (2017) 2 Col.5’rh 505, 512, infernal ci’rofion omih‘ed.) “The Tor’r of interference wi’rh prospective economic advantage protects ’rhe some interest in sToble economic relo’rionships cs does The for’r of interference wi’rh confrocf, Though in’rerference with prospective odvcm’roge does not require proof of o legally binding confrocf." (Pacific Gas & Electric v. Bear Stems & Co., supra, 01 p. 1126, infernal citations omified.) “[A] cause of oc’rion for intentional interference wi’rh contract requires on underlying enforceable contract Where there is no existing, enforceable contract, only a claim for infe‘rference wi’rh prospecfive advantage moy be pleaded. To do otherwise unnecessarily confuses ’rhe Two Torts 0nd foils ’ro recognize ’rheir inherent differences. The fon‘ of interference wi’rh contractual relofions protects on existing, formally cemented economic relationship. The ’ror’rof interference wi’rh prospective business relations protects nonformolized or anticipated business relo’rionships which ore reasonably certain to occur, but which ore nonetheless prospective. Thus, if o plaintiff is To be successful in the former, i’r is necessary That on enforceable contract be pled 0nd . proven." (PMC, Inc. v. Sobon Entertainment, Inc. (1 996) 45 COI.App.4fh 579, 601, i’rolics omified.) “However, os o mo’r’rer of low, o threshold causation requirement exists for maintaining o cause of cc’rion for ei’rher Tor’r, namely, proof Thon‘ is reasonably probable i’r Tho? ’rhe Ios’reconomic advantage would hove been realized buf for ’rhe defendant's interference.” (Yousf v. Longo (1 987) 43 Col.3d 64, 71 ,iTolics omitted.) Here, plaintiff alleges Thc’r i’r hod “ongoing business relationships with existing cliem‘s, cusfomers, and associates, who continually do business wh‘h Tranquility." (Amended Complaint, 1] XXII c.) Defendant is n'oT o party ’ro’rhese relationships. (Ibid.) Defendant knew of These business relationships 0nd intentionally interfered wi’rh Them by communicating false 0nd defomcl’rory informofion, including Telling The business associates Tho? ploinfiff was o “deadbeat" 0nd That defendant wos going ’ro foreclose on ploin’riff. (Id.01 1H] XXII b, X.) Defendant mode These false s’ro’remen’rs wi’rh The infen’r ’ro interfere with plaintiff's business 0nd itsrelationships with i’rsbusiness associates. (Id. o’r 11 XXII c.) Plaintiff suffered horm 10 iTs business relationships “by diminishing The esteem, respect, goodwill, 0nd confidence in which Tronquili’ry is held by i’rs business associates." (Id. o’r 1]XXII d.) Plaintiff alleges That i1suffered damages os o fesuIT in fhe amount of 01 least $100,000, as well cs horm To reputation. i’rs (Id. G’r 'llXXII e.) Plaintiff makes similar ollego’rions with regard to ifsinterference wi’rh prospective economic advantage claim, except That i1 also alleges fho’r had i’r “o prospective business relationship wi’rh many potential business associates" cmd Tho? defendon’r interfered wi’rh These prospective relationships Gs well. (Id. 01‘ 1]XXIII o—h.) However, these allegations ore insufficient To sfo’re claims for interference with existing or prospective business relationships. While plaintiff alleges Tho’r it hod existing 7 economic relationships wi’rh unnamed Third parties, i’r does no’r allege ’rhcn‘ i’r hodony oc’ruol, enforceable contracts wi’rh The Third parties, or that defendant’s statements resulted in The Termination or any of ’rhe existing confroc’rs i’r had wifh customers or business associates. Plaintiff never alleges Tho’r i1 los’r any confroc’rs or customers because of defendon’r's false sfo’remem‘s. Plainfiff olso never alleges any foc’rs showing Tho’r i’rhad existing business relationships wi’rh Third parties Tho’r were reasonably likely To lead ’ro future economic advantage ’ro if, or Th0? defendonf’s conduct interfered wi’rh any such likely fu’rure advantage. Ploin’riff only alleges Tho? defendant's sfo’remen’rs caused o diminution of The ”es’reem, respect, goodwill 0nd confidence" Tho’r plaintiff’s business associates once had for it. (Amended Complaint 1]XXIII e.) These allegations ore nof sufficien’r to show Tho’r defendon’r dc’ruolly interfered wi’rh ploinfiff's existing or future business relationships. 0nd Thcn‘ plaintiff suffered any damages from The interference. Therefore, ’rhe coufl intends ’ro sustain The demurrer ’ro The fifth 0nd six’rh causes of oc’rion, wi’rh leave To amend. Seventh and Ninth Causes of Action: Ploin’riff seeks ’ro state claims for conversion of reol proper’ry 0nd conspiracy ’ro conver’r real properfy based on The allegation Tho? defendon’r “used unreasonable core cmd moin’tenclnce requirements for ’rhe Property To reclaim vio i’r The mechanism of foreclosure" and Tho’r defendant intended To resell The property for o significantly higher price per acre Tho’r plaintiff poid in September of 20] 7. ' (Amended Complaint, 1] XXIV, b.) However, “conversion is o ton‘ Tho’r moy be commi’n‘ed only wi’rh relation ’ro personal property and no’r real proper’ry." (Munger v. Moore (1970) H Col.App.3d 1, 7; Groner v. Hogseh‘ (1948) 84 Col.App.2d 657, 662.) Thus, plaintiff cannot state 0 claim for conversion based on defendant's afiemp’red foreclosure on The subject real property, 0nd The nin’rh cause of action foils ’ro s’ro’reo valid Claim. Also, To The extent Thcn‘ ploin’riffseeks To hold defendant liable for conspiring ’ro convert the properfy, ”conspiracy" is no’r o seporofe civil cause of action under California low. Instead, h‘ is merely a vehicle for holding one person liable for conspiring To assist another person in committing a fort. ”'Conspirocy is no’r a cause of ocfion, but o legal doctrine ’rho’r imposes liability on persons who, although nof ocfuolly committing o ’ror’rThemselves, shore with The immediate Ton‘feosors ctcommon plan or design in perpeTrO’rionQ... i’rs [1]]S’ronding alone, o conspiracy does no harm and engenders no ’ror’r liability. must I’r be oc’rivc’red by The commission of cm oc’ruol Tor’r.’‘A conspiracy cannot be alleged os o Ton‘ separate from ’rhe underlying wrong i’r is organized To achieve.” (Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Col.App.4Th 952, 954—955, quoting Applied Equipment Corp. v. Liffon Saudi Arabic Lfd. (1994) 7 Col.4’rh 503, 510—51 1, 513.) Thus, plaintiff conno’r sfo’re 0 seporofe cause of oc’rion ogoins’r defendant for ”conspiracy” To commit conversion of ’rhe real property. As discussed above, i’ris n01 possible To s’ro’re o claim for conversion of real propen‘y. Nor con ploin’riff allege a seporofe claim for conspiracy based on such conversion. Furthermore, plaintiff hos no’r alleged ’rhof defendant oc’ruolly conspired wi’rh another person who commified a 8 separate ’rorT. Indeed, based on ’rhe amended complain’r's allegations, defendant apparently conspired with herself ’ro commit The alleged conversion. Therefore, plaintiff hos foiled To allege facts sufficient To suppor’r ei’rher ifs conspiracy or conversion claim. i’rs Nor does if appear To be reasonably likely That plaintiff will be able To cure ’rhe defects in The seven’rh 0nd ninth causes of oc’rion given if. leave To amend. As o result, The cour’r intends To sustain The demurrer To The seventh 0nd nin’rh causes of ocfion, without leave ’ro amend. Plaintiff's Request for Further Time to Amend Complaint: Finally, To The extent Tho’r ploinfiff requests additional Time 10 amend The complaint, The courtin’rends To deny the request. The amended complaint hos been on file for over o yeor, 0nd plaintiff’s counsel hos been on notice for many months Tho’r defendant wos challenging The sufficiency of The complain’r‘s allegations. While plaintiff's counsel alleges fho’r plaintiff hos been sick 0nd unable ’ro ossis’rcounsel wiTh fhe omendmen’r until recently, counsel hos now had several weeks in which To confer wi’rh his client 0nd drof’r o second amended complaint. Therefore, The cour’r in’rends ’ro require The second amended complaint To be filed 0nd Served within ’ren doys of service of This order. Pursuant ’ro California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(0), and Code of CivilProcedure section 1019. 5, subdivision (o), no fur’rher written order is hecessory. The minute order adopting This Tem‘o’rive ruling will serve cs ’rhe order of The cour’r 0nd service by The clerk will constitute notice of The order. Kema/b/JL / /// 2L (Judge' s iqfitioé) /Do (e) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF FRESNO FOR COURTUSE ONLY CivilDepartment, Central Division 1130 "O“ Street Fresno, California 93724-0002 (559) 457-2000 TITLE 0F CASE: Tranquility Pistachio, LLC vs. Susan Kilsdonk CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 0F MAILING C’isg'icggggzss |certify thatlam not a party to this cause and that a true copy of the: [Minute Order and Tentative Ruling, dated 1/6/22] was placed ina sealed envelope and placed for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown below following our ordinary business practice. | am readily familiar with this court’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. 0n the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service with postage fully prepaid. Place of mailing: Fresno, California 93724-0002 On Date: 01/07/2022 Clerk, by .Deputy E. Alvarado Charles K. Manock David L.Emerzian Manock Law McCormick Barstow LLP 448 W. Shaw Ave 7647 N Fresno Street Fresno, CA 93704 Fresno, CA 93720 D Clerk's Certificate of Mailing Additional Address Page Attached TGN-06b R08-06 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING