Preview
DOCKET NO.: UWY-CV21-6060768-S : SUPERIOR COURT
CYNTHIA BROWN, CONSERVATOR : J.D. OF WATERBURY
OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF
ELIZABETH STEWART,
CYNTHIA BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND EDWARD STEWART
VS. : AT WATERBURY
SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL : NOVEMBER 23, 2021
REQUEST TO REVISE
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-35, Defendants, Saint Mary’s Hospital, Inc., Trinity Health of
New England Corporation, Inc. and Mark Stevens, PA, hereby request the following revisions of
Plaintiff’s Complaint dated May 17, 2021:
I. FIRST REQUESTED REVISION
A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED:
Paragraph 7 of the First and Second Counts: specifically, the portion of that paragraph
alleging that Ms. Stewart’s injuries were caused by the negligence of St. Mary’s Hospital and/or
Trinity Health through their “agents, servants or employees.”
B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS:
Defendants request that plaintiff revise paragraph 7 to identify by name the alleged “agents,
servants or employees” if plaintiff is referring to any individuals other than PA Stevens, Dr.
Quatrocelli, PA Garceau and PA Stemple.
General Statutes § 52-190a requires plaintiff to conduct a pre-suit inquiry and obtain a written
opinion from a similar health care provider supporting plaintiff’s claims of negligence. References
to unnamed agents, servants or employees are improper. Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth &
Women’s Ctr., 314 Conn. 709, 724 (2014) (claims of vicarious liability of an institutional defendant
for medical malpractice of its employees must be supported by a good faith letter directed to the
conduct of specific individuals whose conduct is at issue). In this matter, both the Complaint and
opinion letters refer to the four healthcare providers referenced above. In the event that plaintiff
intends to challenge the conduct of any additional providers who are alleged to be agents or employees
of St. Mary’s Hospital or Trinity Health, it must be specifically alleged. Vague allegations against
unspecified individuals do not sufficiently apprise defendants of the claims asserted against them.
C. RESPONSE
II. SECOND REQUESTED REVISION
A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED:
Paragraph 7(a) and (b) of the First, Second and Third Counts, alleging that defendants were
negligent in one or more of the following ways:
“a. failed to diagnose Elizabeth’s condition;”
“b. misdiagnosed Elizabeth’s condition;”
B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS:
2
The allegations contained in these subparagraphs constitute improper “catch-all” allegations
of medical negligence, giving no warning to defendants of the specific nature of plaintiff’s claims.
Lewandowski v. Finkel, 129 Conn. 526, 530 (1942). These broad and vague allegations deprive
defendants of fair notice of the conduct being challenged by plaintiffs, prevent defendants from
determining whether they have any legal or factual defenses to plaintiffs’ claims, and fail to narrow
the legal and factual issues for trial. See New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 199 (1945)
(plaintiff’s legal theory may be hard to pin down if a complaint is not clarified and this may allow
plaintiff to argue at trial or on appeal that the vague allegations support several legal theories).
If these subparagraphs are permitted to remain in the Complaint, plaintiff could arguably
attempt to challenge some other aspect of care beyond the allegations in the Complaint without ever
putting defendants on notice that such care was at issue. These broad allegations would permit
plaintiffs to raise at trial,for the first time, issues of alleged negligence without having apprised
defendants of the same. Deletion of these catch-all allegations will not prejudice plaintiffs, as
plaintiffs have alleged in numerous ways in the remaining fourteen subparagraphs of Paragraph 7
their allegations that defendants failed to appropriately evaluate the cause of Ms. Stewart’s presenting
symptoms. Accordingly, these catch-all allegations are entirely duplicative of what has already been
alleged with more specificity. They should be deleted as vague, broad, repetitive and prejudicial.
C. RESPONSE:
3
III. THIRD REQUESTED REVISION
A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED:
Paragraph 7(e) through (k) of the First, Second and Third Counts, alleging that defendants
were negligent in one or more of the following ways:
“e. Failed to conduct an appropriate differential diagnosis so as to include a stroke;
f. Failed to investigate whether Elizabeth’s symptoms could be related to a stroke;
g. Failed to appreciate the signs and symptoms of a stroke;
h. Failed to rule out a stroke as a potential cause of Elizabeth’s symptoms;
i. Failed to consider a stroke as Elizabeth’s primary medical problem;
j. Failed to identify a stroke via testing;
k. Failed to conduct a complete neurological examination in a patient with signs and
symptoms of stroke;”
B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS:
Practice Book § 10-35 permits a request for the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious,
scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations in an adverse party’s pleading.
While using different words in each subparagraph, plaintiff essentially alleges in these seven
subparagraphs that defendants failed to rule out a stroke. There is no substantive distinction among
these multiple allegations, and they must be deleted as repetitive and prejudicial.
C. RESPONSE
4
IV. FOURTH REQUESTED REVISION
A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED:
Paragraph 7(p) of the First, Second and Third Counts, alleging that defendants were negligent
in that they:
“p. Failed to involve specialists to diagnose and/or treat Elizabeth’s life-threatening
condition.”
B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS:
Practice Book § 10-35 permits a request for the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious,
scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations in an adverse party’s
pleading.” Plaintiff alleges in subparagraph (p) that defendants were obligated to involve
“specialists” to diagnose her condition. If plaintiff is referring to a neurology consultation, that
allegation is already specifically set forth in subparagraph (l), and subparagraph (p) must be deleted
as repetitive and prejudicial. If plaintiff is alleging that a consultation with some other medical
specialist was indicated, the specialty or specialties should be alleged with specificity.
C. RESPONSE
5
DEFENDANTS,
SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC.
TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND
CORPORATION, INC. AND
MARK STEVENS, PA
BY: /s/Gretchen G. Randall
Michael D. Neubert
Gretchen G. Randall
NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.
195 Church Street, 13th Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
Tel. (203) 821-2000
Juris No. 407996
mneubert@npmlaw.com
grandall@npmlaw.com
6
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the foregoing was mailed or delivered electronically on this 23rd day of
November 2021, to all attorneys and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for
electronic delivery was received from all attorneys and self-represented parties receiving electronic
delivery.
Thomas P. Cella, Esq.
Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald, LLP
237 Buckingham Street
Hartford, CT 06126
tpc@hksflaw.com
Frederick J. Trotta, Sr., Esq.
Halloran & Sage, LLP
One Century Tower
265 Church Street, Suite 802
New Haven, CT 06510
trotta@halloransage.com
/s/ Gretchen G. Randall ______
Gretchen G. Randall
NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.
7
Preview
DOCKET NO.: UWY-CV21-6060768-S : SUPERIOR COURT CYNTHIA BROWN, CONSERVATOR : J.D. OF WATERBURY OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF ELIZABETH STEWART, CYNTHIA BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND EDWARD STEWART VS. : AT WATERBURY SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL : NOVEMBER 23, 2021 REQUEST TO REVISE Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-35, Defendants, Saint Mary’s Hospital, Inc., Trinity Health of New England Corporation, Inc. and Mark Stevens, PA, hereby request the following revisions of Plaintiff’s Complaint dated May 17, 2021: I. FIRST REQUESTED REVISION A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED: Paragraph 7 of the First and Second Counts: specifically, the portion of that paragraph alleging that Ms. Stewart’s injuries were caused by the negligence of St. Mary’s Hospital and/or Trinity Health through their “agents, servants or employees.” B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS: Defendants request that plaintiff revise paragraph 7 to identify by name the alleged “agents, servants or employees” if plaintiff is referring to any individuals other than PA Stevens, Dr. Quatrocelli, PA Garceau and PA Stemple. General Statutes § 52-190a requires plaintiff to conduct a pre-suit inquiry and obtain a written opinion from a similar health care provider supporting plaintiff’s claims of negligence. References to unnamed agents, servants or employees are improper. Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Ctr., 314 Conn. 709, 724 (2014) (claims of vicarious liability of an institutional defendant for medical malpractice of its employees must be supported by a good faith letter directed to the conduct of specific individuals whose conduct is at issue). In this matter, both the Complaint and opinion letters refer to the four healthcare providers referenced above. In the event that plaintiff intends to challenge the conduct of any additional providers who are alleged to be agents or employees of St. Mary’s Hospital or Trinity Health, it must be specifically alleged. Vague allegations against unspecified individuals do not sufficiently apprise defendants of the claims asserted against them. C. RESPONSE II. SECOND REQUESTED REVISION A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED: Paragraph 7(a) and (b) of the First, Second and Third Counts, alleging that defendants were negligent in one or more of the following ways: “a. failed to diagnose Elizabeth’s condition;” “b. misdiagnosed Elizabeth’s condition;” B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS: 2 The allegations contained in these subparagraphs constitute improper “catch-all” allegations of medical negligence, giving no warning to defendants of the specific nature of plaintiff’s claims. Lewandowski v. Finkel, 129 Conn. 526, 530 (1942). These broad and vague allegations deprive defendants of fair notice of the conduct being challenged by plaintiffs, prevent defendants from determining whether they have any legal or factual defenses to plaintiffs’ claims, and fail to narrow the legal and factual issues for trial. See New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 199 (1945) (plaintiff’s legal theory may be hard to pin down if a complaint is not clarified and this may allow plaintiff to argue at trial or on appeal that the vague allegations support several legal theories). If these subparagraphs are permitted to remain in the Complaint, plaintiff could arguably attempt to challenge some other aspect of care beyond the allegations in the Complaint without ever putting defendants on notice that such care was at issue. These broad allegations would permit plaintiffs to raise at trial,for the first time, issues of alleged negligence without having apprised defendants of the same. Deletion of these catch-all allegations will not prejudice plaintiffs, as plaintiffs have alleged in numerous ways in the remaining fourteen subparagraphs of Paragraph 7 their allegations that defendants failed to appropriately evaluate the cause of Ms. Stewart’s presenting symptoms. Accordingly, these catch-all allegations are entirely duplicative of what has already been alleged with more specificity. They should be deleted as vague, broad, repetitive and prejudicial. C. RESPONSE: 3 III. THIRD REQUESTED REVISION A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED: Paragraph 7(e) through (k) of the First, Second and Third Counts, alleging that defendants were negligent in one or more of the following ways: “e. Failed to conduct an appropriate differential diagnosis so as to include a stroke; f. Failed to investigate whether Elizabeth’s symptoms could be related to a stroke; g. Failed to appreciate the signs and symptoms of a stroke; h. Failed to rule out a stroke as a potential cause of Elizabeth’s symptoms; i. Failed to consider a stroke as Elizabeth’s primary medical problem; j. Failed to identify a stroke via testing; k. Failed to conduct a complete neurological examination in a patient with signs and symptoms of stroke;” B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS: Practice Book § 10-35 permits a request for the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations in an adverse party’s pleading. While using different words in each subparagraph, plaintiff essentially alleges in these seven subparagraphs that defendants failed to rule out a stroke. There is no substantive distinction among these multiple allegations, and they must be deleted as repetitive and prejudicial. C. RESPONSE 4 IV. FOURTH REQUESTED REVISION A. PORTION OF PLEADING SOUGHT TO BE REVISED: Paragraph 7(p) of the First, Second and Third Counts, alleging that defendants were negligent in that they: “p. Failed to involve specialists to diagnose and/or treat Elizabeth’s life-threatening condition.” B. REQUESTED REVISIONS AND REASONS FOR THE REVISIONS: Practice Book § 10-35 permits a request for the deletion of any unnecessary, repetitious, scandalous, impertinent, immaterial or otherwise improper allegations in an adverse party’s pleading.” Plaintiff alleges in subparagraph (p) that defendants were obligated to involve “specialists” to diagnose her condition. If plaintiff is referring to a neurology consultation, that allegation is already specifically set forth in subparagraph (l), and subparagraph (p) must be deleted as repetitive and prejudicial. If plaintiff is alleging that a consultation with some other medical specialist was indicated, the specialty or specialties should be alleged with specificity. C. RESPONSE 5 DEFENDANTS, SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL, INC. TRINITY HEALTH OF NEW ENGLAND CORPORATION, INC. AND MARK STEVENS, PA BY: /s/Gretchen G. Randall Michael D. Neubert Gretchen G. Randall NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 Tel. (203) 821-2000 Juris No. 407996 mneubert@npmlaw.com grandall@npmlaw.com 6 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that the foregoing was mailed or delivered electronically on this 23rd day of November 2021, to all attorneys and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all attorneys and self-represented parties receiving electronic delivery. Thomas P. Cella, Esq. Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald, LLP 237 Buckingham Street Hartford, CT 06126 tpc@hksflaw.com Frederick J. Trotta, Sr., Esq. Halloran & Sage, LLP One Century Tower 265 Church Street, Suite 802 New Haven, CT 06510 trotta@halloransage.com /s/ Gretchen G. Randall ______ Gretchen G. Randall NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 7