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DOCKET NO.: FS2-FST-CV20-6047029-S SUPERIOR COURT
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STAMFORD/NORWALK
Plaintiff, AT STAMFORD
Vv.
December 18, 2020
CAROLINE VIK and ALEXANDER VIK,
Defendants.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG’S OPPOSITIONTO DEFENDANT ALEXANDER VIK’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION (DOC. 109.00)
Plaintiff Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank”) respectfully submits this memorandum
of law in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss Deutsche Bank’ s Complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction (Doc. 109.00 (the “PJ Motion”); Doc. 110.00 (the “Vik PJ Br.”)).!
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Complaint alleges that Mr. Vik’ s “primary residence and domicile is located at 10
Ashton Drive in Greenwich, Connecticut, where he has lived with his wife, Carie Vik, since
1988.” (Doc. 100.00 (“Compl.”) 27.) In recent testimony before this Court in a related case,”
addressing Mr. Vik’ s status as the alter ego of Turks and Caicos shell company and judgment
debtor Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (“SHI”), Mr. and Mrs. Vik each identified 10 Ashton Drive in
Greenwich, Connecticut (“10 Ashton Drive”) as their home, where they raised their four
children, including Defendant Caroline Vik:
“THE CLERK: Please state your name and address for the Court’s record.
MR. VIK: Alexander
M. Vik, 10 Ashton Drive, Greenwich, Connecticut.
Mr. Vik’s daughter, Defendant Caroline Vik, does not contest personal jurisdiction here.
Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., FST-CV13-5014167-S (Conn. Super. Ct.
2013) (the “Alter-Ego Action”).
MR. JANUSZEWSKL. . . . I would like to just cover a little of your
background . . . . you said you are a resident of Greenwich, Connecticut?”
MR. VIK: I live in Monaco
too . . . but right now I am at 10 Ashton Drive-
MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Ok.
MR. VIK: -Greenwich, Connecticut.
MR. JANUSZEWSKI: And you talked about Greenwich. You have raised
your family there, correct?
MR. VIK: Most of the time, yes.
MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Y ou have four children?
MR. VIK: Yes.
MR. JANUSZEWSKI: And those four children have grown up in
Greenwich, correct?
MR. VIK: Pretty much.”
(Dec. 18, 2020 Affidavit of Sheila C. Ramesh (“Ramesh PJ Aff.”) Ex. 1 (Trial Transcript from
the Alter Ego Action
(“CT Trial Tr.”), Day 1) 54:7-10, 55:5-13, 56:7-16.) Mrs. Vik went on to
testify.
“THE COURT: Ms. Vik, if you don’t mind, I’d like you to give us alittle
personal background.
MRS. VIK: Okay. . . I met Alex when we were in college in our
sophomore years . . .. So we got married
in ‘82. . . [and] I - - we decided
to
have children. . . . Finally, in 1987 our first daughter was bom. . . And when
she was just about two, just before her second birthday, we moved to 10 Ashton.
Drive, where we subsequently, luckily had three more children and raised them.
in Greenwich, or in the school in Greenwich and doing sports in Greenwich.
And so we pretty much raised our life in Greenwich.”
(Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr, Day 3) 25:21-27:4) (emphasis added).)
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Faced with overwhelming
evidence that Mr. Vik caused SHI to avoid its debts by fraudulently
transferring approximately $1 billion
in assets to accounts controlled
by Mr. Vik, his family, and
related entities, the Viks sought in the Alter Ego Action to cast themselves
in a sympathetic
light, as alocal family with Greenwich roots who had been mistreated
by a large financial
institution. Mr. Vik even conceded this Court's jurisdiction over him in that action. But because
the narrative of Mr. Vik as a Connecticut family man no longer suits his interests, he has altered
course here. Hoping to escape the jurisdiction of this Court, Mr. Vik now offers a strikingly
contradictory narrative in which he claims to have “resided in Greenwich for a relatively brief
portion of his life,” which was “two decades ago.” (Vik PJ Br. at 13.)
As set forth below, Mr. Vik’s motion to dismiss Deutsche Bank’ s Complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction is untenable. The allegations in the Complaint, and an extensive factual
record including information submitted with this Opposition, establish that 10 Ashton Drive is
Mr. Vik’s “usual place of abode” within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57(a), and thus
that the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over Mr. Vik. If Mr. Vik truly wished
to contest
those allegations, it was incumbent upon him to introduce supporting affidavits containing
undisputed
facts rebutting them. Otherwise, the Court “must take the facts to be those alleged in
the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in
amanner most favorable
to the pleader. . .. The motion
to dismiss . . . admits
all facts which
are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.” Cogswell
v. American Transit Insurance Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516 (2007) (emphasis added) (intemal
citations omitted). Mr. Vik failed to offer such evidence. Thus, while Mr. Vik’s memorandum
asserts that “Alexander Vik has not resided in Connecticut for twenty years” (Vik PJ Br. 1), that
assertion not only contradicts his and his wife's recent testimony in the Alter Ego Action, but is
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entitled to no weight because Mr. Vik has declined to submit an affidavit, swom declaration, or
other cognizable evidence substantiating it. The sole evidence that Mr. Vik submits in support of
his motion is a photograph of a Monaco residence card. Even if that document were properly
authenticated (which it is not), it would establish
at most that Mr. Vik has a residence
in Monaco,
just as his Connecticut driver's license establishes that he also has a residence in Connecticut.
The unrebutted allegations in the Complaint, construed as they must be in their most favorable
light, are more than sufficient
to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Vik
under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57(a). To the extent there could be any doubt, the evidentiary
record submitted herewith (see Ramesh PJ Aff. Exs.) substantiates the allegations.?
Not only does the Court have general jurisdiction over Mr. Vik, it also has jurisdiction
over Mr. Vik under the Connecticut
long-arm statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b, because Mr.
Vik has transacted business in this state and because he committed tortious acts in this state.
There are no due process obstacles to exercising that jurisdiction
here. For all these reasons, Mr.
Vik’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be denied.
BACKGROUND
Alexander Vik and His Fanily Built Their Home in Connecticut
Alexander Vik is a sophisticated billionaire investor who frequently travels the world on
business
and uses various offshore companies to hold his assets and make trades and investments
on his behalf. In 1988, Mr. Vik and his wife Camie Vik moved to Greenwich, Connecticut.
Mr. Vik asserts a purported technical defect in the form of the Marshal’s service on his
abode and the retum of service, but Mr. Vik waived any such defect - which in any event
would not be disqualifying- when he moved for a second extension of time in which to
file aresponsive pleading. (See Doc. 107.00 (Motion for Extension of Time on Consent
to Respond to Complaint, at 1 (“Defendants have agreed not to contest service while
otherwise reserving the right to move to dismiss on any other grounds, including lack of
personal jurisdiction.”).)
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(Ramesh PJ. Aff. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr, Day 3) 26:24-27:4).) They have based
their lives around
their Greenwich home, raising four children there through adulthood and operating multiple
businesses from
the estate. (Id.; see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 56:7-16).)
Mr. Vik and Mrs. Vik jointly purchased 10 Ashton Drive, and subsequently transferred full
ownership
to Mrs. Vik, who currently
owns the home. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 3 Jan. 22, 2013 Vik
Dep. Tr.) 55:5-11.) The Viks’ adult daughter Caroline Vik currently lives in the house at 10
Ashton Drive. (Vik PJ Br. 14; see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 2 CT Trial Day 3 Tr. 26:25-27:4.)
Mr. Vik has frequently and publicly acknowledged Connecticut as his home. For
example, in a 2014 interview, he stated that he and his family live in Greenwich, Connecticut,
and in swom testimony
before this Court in 2019, he and his wife reaffirmed
that statement.
(Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 7 (Jan. 25, 2014 Interview of Alexander Vik); id. Ex. 8 (Translation of Jan.
25, 2014 interview of Alexander Vik) at 1 (“We would love to stay [in Uruguay], but [the
children] have to go back to school in Greenwich, Connecticut, where
we live.”); id. Ex. 2 (CT
Trial Tr, Day 3) 25:21-27:4.) Moreover, Mr. Vik has a Connecticut driver's license that lists 10
Ashton Drive as his address (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 4 (Alexander Vik’s DMV Records)), has
maintained memberships at local gyms and sports clubs (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 5 (Apr. 28, 2015
Hearing Transcript
in the matter of Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, No. 161257/13 (N-Y. Sup. Ct.)
(“April 2015 Hearing Tr.”)) at 55:11-21), and regularly attends services at alocal church
(Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 6 June 19, 2019 Hearing Transcript in the Alter-Ego Action (“June 2019
Hearing Tr.”) at 2:1-5). These facts demonstrate
Mr. Vik’s long-standing
and deep ties to
Connecticut.
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‘The Viks Have Long Conducted Business from Their Connecticut Home
In 2006, Mr. Vik, through his alter ego, SHI, opened a foreign exchange (“FX”) prime
brokerage account with Deutsche Bank to conduct FX trading. Mr. Vik and at least six others,
including administrative assistants and third-party managers who made trades and investments
on behalf of Mr. Vik or SHI, regularly did business from an office annex to the Vik family home
at 10 Ashton Drive. See Sebastian Holdings, Inc. v. Kugler, 2012 WL 1190837, at*1 (D. Conn.
Mar. 30, 2012); (see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 3 (Jan. 22, 2013 Vik Dep. Tr.) 42:24-44:25, 47:15-
16, 50:5-51:1; 58:8-59:16; id. Ex. 9 (Jan. 30, 2012 Said Dep. Tr.) 77:2-78:25; id. Ex. 10 (Feb. 5,
2014 Affidavit of Kelsey Wells (“Wells Aff.”)) 113; id. Ex. 11 (Mar. 14, 2013 VanEerten Dep.
Tr) 25:9-29:6; id. Ex. 12 (Feb. 27, 2013 Johansson Dep. Tr.) 49:23-52:5; id. Ex. 13 (Sept. 29,
2008 Affidavit of Michael Kugler) 1116-17.)
In Connecticut, Mr. and Mrs. Vik established another corporate entity, a Connecticut
corporation originally named Vik Real Estate Management, Inc., and currently known as Ashton
Capital Management (“Ashton Capital”). The Viks claim to have established Ashton Capital for
the sole purpose of managing
the office annex at 10 Ashton Drive, which included paying the
salaries and benefits of third-party managers and administrative assistants who worked on behalf
of SHI (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 11 (Mar. 14, 2013 VanEerten Dep. Tr.) 13:24-14:2; id. Ex. 9 (Jan.
30, 2012 Said Dep. Tr.) 79:19-80:18; id. Ex. 12 (Feb. 27, 2013 Johansson Dep. Tr.) 21:22-22:9;
24:3-7, id. Ex. 10 (Feb. 5, 2014 Affidavit of Kelsey Wells) 415), and the Viks (id. Ex. 3 (Jan. 22,
2013 Vik Dep. Tr.) 58:8-59:16; 64:3-67:8).
From this same office annex in Greenwich, Mr. Vik has regularly conducted business,
including, upon information and belief, dealings from which Deutsche Bank’ s claims here arise.
(Vik PJ Br. 2, 22; see also Compl. 29, 101-108; Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 14 (Johansson 1st
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Witness Statement) 919, 15.) SHI engaged
in highly profitable, but risky, FX trading out of 10
Ashton Drive until the global financial crisis stuck. (Compl. 134; see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex.
1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 127:19-128:2, 140:23-141:12.) SHI accumulated hundreds of millions of
dollars in losses in October 2008 and, immediately thereafter, Mr. Vik caused
SHI to
fraudulently transfer its hundreds of millions of dollars of assets to himself, family members, and
entities that he controls. (Compl. {f] 35-37.) Among the assets that Mr. Vik caused SHI to
fraudulently transfer in 2008 were shares in the Norwegian software company Confirmit
AS
(“Confimnit”). (Id. 17.)
In 2009, Deutsche Bank commenced an action in London against SHI to recover
hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid margin calls. (Id. 139.) In 2013, the Commercial
Court, Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales issued a 431-
page judgment awarding Deutsche Bank $235,646,355 in damages, plus interest and costs, from
SHI (the “English Judgment”). (Id. 1140-41.) SHI claimed
that it lacked funds sufficient
to
satisfy the judgment, leaving Deutsche Bank to pursue various enforcement actions.
In 2019, Mr. and Mrs. Vik Reaffinmed Their Connecticut Residency
Among those enforcement actions is a 2014 suit that Deutsche Bank commenced in this
Connecticut Superior Court - the Alter Ego Action - seeking a declaration that, as SHI’s alter
ego, Mr. Vik is personally liable for its debts. In connection with that action, Mr. Vik consented
to personal jurisdiction in Connecticut. (Id. 128.) On November 19, 2019, the parties appeared
fora trial in the Alter Ego Action* Both Mr. Vik and his wife identified their current address
Post-trial briefing in that action concluded in April 2020, in the midst of the pandemic.
Judge Lee recently asked for supplemental briefing on an issue of foreign law with
memoranda due on January 15, 2021 and reply memoranda due on January 22, 2021.
(See Alter Ego Action, Doc. 420.01.)
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as’ 10 Ashton Drive, Greenwich Connecticut.” (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1)
54:7-10; id. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr, Day 3) 2:4-7), with Mrs. Vik noting
that her family had “raised
[their] life” in their Greenwich home. (Id. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr., Day 3) 26:25-27:4.) Mr. and
Mts. Vik attended
the entire trial, which ended in December
2019.
Fraudulent Transfers and Forced Sale of Confinmit Shares
In 2015, while defending the Alter-Ego Action and multiple other enforcement actions,
which sought to, inter alia, to unwind fraudulent transfers from SHI to Mr. Vik, Mr. Vik
purported again to transfer SHI’s ownership of the Confirmit shares. This time, from his
personal account
to the account of his father, Erik Martin Vik (“Vik Sr.”). (Compl. {ff 7-8.)
On December 21, 2016, a Norwegian Court invalidated both the 2008 and 2015 transfers
of the Confinmit shares into and out of Mr. Vik’s personal account. (Id. §9157-58.) The shares
revertedto SHI and became subject to enforcement
in partial satisfaction
of the English
Judgment. (Id.) In 2017, Deutsche Bank filed a petition seeking a forced sale of the Confimmit
shares. (Id. 59.) While living in Connecticut, Mr. Vik attempted
to participate
in the Confirmit
sale process by submitting an “all-cash” indicative bid of $325 million for the Confimmit shares
to ABG Sundal Collier ASA (“ABG”), the corporation named as sales assistant responsible for
conducting the court-ordered sale. (Id. 99.) The bid was 400% higher than the average of other
indicative bids. (Id. 1109.) Concemed about the potential for improper interference with the
sale, ABG told Mr. Vik that he could only continue to participate in the bidding process under
certain uncontroversial conditions. (Id. 4106.) While still in Connecticut, Mr. Vik wrote a letter
refusing
to comply with ABG’s conditions. (Vik PJ Br. 2, 22; see also Compl. 1107). In the
same letter, Mr. Vik asked ABG how
it would “deal with the rights of first refusal that exist on
the Confinnit shares.” (Compl. 1107.)
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‘The Fraudulent
Right of First Refusal
On November
1, 2019, only days after
Mr. Vik’ s letter
and at Mr. Vik’s direction,
Caroline Vik, a Connecticut resident, provided ABG with a copy of a purported right of first
refusal agreement (“ROFR”), which she claimed
to have entered into with SHI two years prior.
(Id. 4194, 123.) The ROFR purports to grant Caroline
Vik an irrevocable right to purchase
100% of Confinmit’s shares within 30 days of any competing
bid. (Id. 190.) In seeking
to
enforce
the ROFR, Caroline Vik claimed that the document
was contracted for and intended
to
be performed
in Connecticut. (Id. 31.) It appears that Hans Eirik Olav, a personal friend of
Mr. Vik, signed the ROFR on behalf of SHI (id. {1 92), though Mr. Olav has submitted
that his
signature may have been forged. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 15 (Mar. 5, 2020 Hans Firik Olav
Pleading Attachment (Oslo Court of Probate, Bankruptcy, and Enforcement) (referring
to the
ROFR and voicing concem as to the possibility that “we are faced with a document that has been
fabricated. I suggest that we appoint an independent third party with the necessary expertise to
ascertain whether or not we are dealing with a forged document.”).)
The Federal Action Seeking to Enforce the Fraudulent Right of First Refusal
On November 19, 2019, again at Mr. Vik’s direction, Caroline Vik commenced litigation
in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the “Connecticut District
Court”) seeking to enforce the fraudulent ROFR and enjoin the Confinnit sale (the “Federal
Action”). (Compl. 189, 122.) In support of that action, Mr. Vik submitted a declaration in
which he claimed to have been in Connecticut fora “substantial portio: of his efforts to involve
himself in the sale. (Id. 129.) After the Comnecticut District Court denied Caroline Vik’s
application for “fail[ure] to make a showing of likelihood of success on the merits of her claim,”
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she voluntarily dismissed the Federal Action. (Id. 4130.) The Confinnit sale closed on
February 14, 2020, at a price substantially lower than ABG and initial bids had predicted.
The Instant Aciion.
InJune 2020, Deutsche Bank commenced the instant action, seeking damages reflecting
Confirmit’s depressed sale price and asserting claims against Mr. Vik and Caroline
Vik for
tortious interference with business expectancy and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act. (Id. 91 151-63, 164-73.) On June 2, 2020, a Connecticut Marshal effected service
on Mr. Vik by: (1) serving
him at his 10 Ashton
Drive abode; and (2) serving
him via the
Secretary
of State and the mail. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 16 (Marshal’s
Retum of Service).) That
same day, the Marshal effected service on Caroline
Vik by serving her at the 10 Ashton Drive
abode. (Id.) The Marshal submitted
a single retum of service, which describes identical efforts
to serve both Mr. Vik and Caroline Vik at 10 Ashton Drive. (Id.) The retum contains a
scrivener’s error, which
in one place substitutes
Mr. Vik’s name with Caroline
Vik’s. (Id. at 1.)
Deutsche Bank also notified Mr. Vik’s long-time attomeys, who represent
him in the
Alter-Ego Action and who represented Caroline Vik at her deposition in a related action, that it
had commenced
this action against Mr. Vik and Caroline
Vik, both by phone
and with courtesy
copies by e-mail. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 17 (June 1, 2020 e-mail from D. Januszewski).)
Deutsche Bank had hoped that Defendants would accept service in light of the global pandemic,
but they did not. While Defendants originally retained their long-time attomeys in this matter,
they replaced them with their current counsel in September 2020. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 18 (Sept.
10, 2020 Appearance by Pullman & Comley LLC).)
On August 7, 2020, Defendants moved fora second extension of time within which to
move to dismiss or otherwise respond
to the Complaint. (Doc. 107.00 at 1.) Deutsche Bank
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consented
to the requested extension, and in exchange, Defendants agreed “not to contest
service.” (Id. at 1.)
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT HASJURISDICTION OVER MR. VIK PURSUANT TO CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-57(4) BECAUSE MR. VIK HAS A USUAL PLACE OF ABODE
INCONNECTICUT
A. Legal Standard
As Defendants acknowledge (Vik PJ Br. at 8), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57(a) “provides the
courts of this state with general in personamjurisdiction over individuals who maintain a usual
place of abode in this state.” Jancaterino
v. Karban, 65 Conn. L. Rptr. 254, 2017 WL 5015217,
at*2 (Conn. Super. Sep. 7, 2017) (citing Cleggv. Bishop, 105 Comn. 564, 570 (1927)). A “usual
Place of abode” need not be the individual’s domicile, or even his primary residence. Argent
Mortgage Co. v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 573 (2008). Rather, “a usual place of abode has been
defined as a place of residence within the state.” Id. at 577-78 (emphasis added). One “may
have two or more places of residence
within a [s]tate, or in two or more [s]tates, and each
may be
ausual place of abode.” Id. at 578 (quoting Clegg, 105 Conn. at 570). “[A] usual place of abode
. .. bas been determined to be a residence signifying a temporary place of habitation rather than a
permanent place where one lives with the intention to remain... . A person
may be a part-time
or full-time resident of the state and he may have a ‘usual place
of abode’ outside
the state and
may have one within the state at the same time and each be sufficient for service.” Capitol Light
& Supply Co. v. Gunning Electric Co., 24 Conn. Supp. 324, 326 (Conn. Super. 1963).
Where, as here, jurisdiction is premised on abode service pursuant to § 52-57(a), the
defendant bears the burden
of disproving personal jurisdiction. Cogswell, 282 Conn. at 515,
“(When] the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts
established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to
dismiss ... the trial court, in determining
the jurisdictional issue, may
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consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not
conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the
complaint... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed.
on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] If affidavits
and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion.
to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the
Plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits
or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without
further proceedings... If, however, the defendant submits either no
Hoof to rebut the plaintiff s jurisdictional allegations or only
evidence that fails to call those allegations into question .. . the
plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to
support the complaint ... but may rest on the jurisdictional
allegations therein.”
Designs for Health, Inc. v. Miller, 187 Conn. App. 1, 8 (2019) (emphasis added)
Mr. Vik’s failure to submit a swom affidavit in support of his motion renders his factual
Claims irrelevant, as they may not be considered on this motion. Id. at 6 (“Ordinarily, the
defendant
has the burden to disprove personal jurisdiction.”). The matters stated in the
Marshal’ s retum are given a presumption
of truth and, if true, conferjurisdiction. Fine
Honebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, 911 A.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). “General
Stabutes 52-57(a), authorizing abode service, should be construed liberally in cases in which the
defendant received actual notice.” Id. at 1154; see also Gondekv. Haugwitz-Reventlow, 1991
WL 112880, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1991) (finding that the chief purpose of abode
jurisdiction
is “to ensure actual notice to the defendant that the action is pendig”)
B. 10Ashton Drive Is a “Usual Place of Abode” of Mr. Vik's
As athreshold matter, by failing
to offer
a swom affidavit or other evidence rebutting
either the allegations conceming his abode or the substance of the Marshal’s retum, Mr. Vik has
failed to carry his burden of rebutting the existence of personal jurisdiction over him. See, eg.,
Compl. {127 (alleging that Mr. Vik’s “primary residence and domicile is located at 10 Ashton
Drive
in Greenwich, Connecticut”); Marjam Supply Co. v. Gorss, 1990
WL 271015, at*1
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(Conn. Super. Ct. May 21, 1990) (“[I]n situations of abode
or personal service, the defendant
has
the burden to prove the court lacks personal jurisdiction.”). Notably, in contrast to his decision
here not to submit any swom statement, in 2019, Mr. Vik submitted
a swom declaration in
support of the Federal Action in Connecticut, describing in detail his many contacts with
Connecticut. (Compl. 1108.)
Even
if this Court were inclined to look past Mr. Vik’s failure to introduce any competent
evidence, however, the arguments
that Mr. Vik does set forth are insufficient
to undermine the
existence of jurisdiction. Mr. Vik’s primary argument in opposition to abode jurisdiction is his
claim
that he only lived in Connecticut from 1989 until the year “2000 when he, his wife, and
their four then-minor children moved to the Principality of Monaco.” (Vik PJ Br. at 13.) But
like many stories that begin with the phrase “[o]nce upon a time,” Mr. Vik’s tale of permanently
abandoning his Greenwich home in 2000 is make-believe. (Vik PJ Br. at 13 (“Once upon a time,
Alexander Vik did reside
in Greenwich. That was two decades ago.”).)
As described above, both Mr. Vik and his wife testified in November 2019 that after
having raised four children in Greenwich, Connecticut, they still consider
it to be their home.
(Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 54:7-10; see also id. at 55:5-11 (Mr. Vik describing
himself as a resident of and living in both Greenwich and Monaco). Prior testimony from Mr.
Vik, as well as closely associated individuals, all of which post-dates
the year 2000, confirms the
same. For example, in 2015, Mr. Vik admitted
to maintaining
a membership at the Stanwich
Golf Club and New
Y ork Sports Club, both in Greenwich. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 5 (April 2015
Hearing Tr.) 55:11-21.) In addition, individuals working out of the office annex testified that 10
Ashton Drive was Mr. Vik’s “home
and office.” (Ramesh
PJ Aff. Ex. 9 Jan. 30, 2012 Said Dep.
Tr.) 51:16-52:13 (a separate third-party
manager testified that 10 Ashton Drive
is Mr. Vik’s
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home and his office “where
he lives and works”); id. Ex. 11 (Mar. 14, 2013 VanEerten Dep. Tr.)
33:6-19; id. Ex. 14 (Johansson 1st Witness Statement) 419, 15 (a longtime Vik associate
testified
that from 2000 to 2012 he worked at a desk in an office at 10 Ashton Drive immediately
adjacent
to Mr. Vik’s own work desk).) Confronted with this testimony, Mr. Vik cannot
seriously assert that he permanently abandoned 10 Ashton Drive in the year 2000.
Nor can Mr. Vik reconcile his argument here with repeated and public
acknowledgements that 10 Ashton Drive is his home. He told an interviewer
in 2014 that he and.
his family live in Greenwich. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 7 Jan. 25, 2014 Interview of Alexander
Vik); id. Ex. 8 (Translation of Jan. 25, 2014 Interview of Alexander Vik) at 1 (“With my wife,
Canie, and our children, we enjoy coming [to Uruguay] at the beginning
of the year, when they
have vacations, and stay a couple
of weeks. We would like to stay longer, but they must retum
to school in Greenwich, Connecticut, where we live.”).) In his 2010 Harvard University alumni
directory, he listed 10 Ashton Drive as his home address, after changing it froma Monaco
address listed
in 2005. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 19 (2005 Harvard Alunmi Directory); id. Ex. 20
(2010 Harvard Alunmi Directory).) Even Mr. Vik’s Connecticut driver's license, possession of
which, under Connecticut law, is a privilege only available to residents of the state, lists 10
Ashton Drive as his address. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 4 (Alexander Vik’s DMV Records); id. Ex. 21
(Connecticut Driver's License Checklist)); see also Baylis v. Commissioner, Department of
Motor Vehicles, 2000 WL 327416, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2000) (“A Connecticut
driver's license always contains a Connecticut address, so it is reasonable to infer that plaintiff
must have had a Connecticut address when he obtained the license.”); Capitol Light & Supply
Co., 24 Conn. Supp. at 327-28 (home of defendant’ s parents remained abode of defendant who
left the home and the state but maintained a Connecticut driver’ s license).
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Most significantly, Mr. Vik does not dispute that at the time of service he in fact was
residing
at 10 Ashton Drive, and had been doing so for at least eight months. In his
memorandum, Mr. Vik asserts that: “Recently, Mr. Vik stayed longerin Connecticut than he has
in past years because pandemic travel restrictions
made it difficult for him to depart, but he
retumed to Monaco
as soon as he was able.” (Vik PJ Br. at 15.) That bare statement, together
with the timeline presented by Mr. Vik’s own motion, corroborates the allegation that 10 Ashton
Drive
was a usual place of abode when the Marshal effected service.
(a) October 2019: While in Connecticut, Mr. Vik submitted an all-cash indicative bid
to acquire the Confinnit shares for $325 million (an amount 400% percent higher than the
average of the other indicative bids), and exchanged “email communications with ABG.°
(Vik PJ Br. at 2, 22.)
(b) November and December 2019: Mr. Vik visited his grandchild and participated in
a Connecticut trial. (Vik PJ Br. at2, 14-15, 22.) At trial, he testified
under oath that he
lives at 10 Ashton Drive. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 54:7-10.)
Testimony in the Connecticut trial concluded on December4, 2019. So taking at face
value the unswom contention that pandemic restrictions caused Mr. Vik to stay in
Connecticut longer than he otherwise would have, Mr. Vik either (1) remained in
Connecticut of his own choice for the next few months or (2) departed
at some point but
Mr. Vik may have communicated with ABG from Connecticut as early as August 2019.
(Vik PJ Br. at 2, 22; Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 23 (Nov. 26, 2019 Declaration of Alexander
Vik) 1118-9) (dating exchanges with ABG on August 12 and 15, 2019); id. Ex. 24 (Dec.
4, 2019 Supplemental Declaration of AlexanderVik ) 1/6) (Mr. Vik “was located in
Connecticut fora substantial portion of [his] interactions with ABG.”).) To the extent the
Court believes any doubt might exist as to its abode jurisdiction over Mr. Vik, it should
await the results of Deutsche Bank’ s jurisdictional discovery to leam more about the
regularity of Mr. Vik’s life in Connecticut.
-15
retumed to Connecticut of his own choice before pandemic-related travel restrictions
were imposed.
( February 2, 2020: Global air travel was restricted for the first time due to the
COVID-19 global pandemic. A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020,
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF MANAGED CARE (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-
timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020.
@ une 25, 2020: Certain restrictions on travel to Monaco are lifted. See Procedure
for Travelers Entering Monaco as of June 25, 2020, EMBASSY OF MONACO IN
WASHINGTON, D.C., https://monacodc.org/0625covid1
9en. pdf.
Inshort, Mr. Vik has proffered
nothing to rebut the presumption
that 10 Ashton Drive was his
home at the time of service. Indeed, in the months leading
up to service
in early June 2020, itis
hard to imagine another place where Mr. Vik would be more likely “to have knowledge of a
service by copy.” Pozzi v. Hamey, 24 Conn. Supp. 488, 490 (1963); see also Cohen v. Bayne,
28 Conn. Supp. 233, 237 (1969) (defining abode as the “habitation of an individual”); Jimenez
v.
DeRosa, 109 Conn. App. 332, 338-39 (2008) (defining abode as the presumptive“ me” of the
defendant at the time service is made).
C. 10Ashton Drive Is Mr. Vik’s Family Home
Even
if this Court were to credit Mr. Vik’s claim that 10 Ashton
Drive is not his “primary
residence” (Vik PJ Br. at 3), Mr. Vik’s concessions that the house “belongs to his wife” Carrie
Vik, and that Caroline Vik, one of his four adult children, lives there, are sufficient for abode
jurisdiction. (Vik PJ Br. at 14; Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr., Day 3) 3:13-16; Compl., Ex.
A a 1 (listing 10 Ashton Drive in Greenwich, Connecticut as Caroline Vik’ s domicile); see, eg.,
Gondekv. Haugwitz-Reventlow, 1991 WL 112880, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1991)
(defining usual place of abode as “the place in which a married man’s family resides”) (intemal
-16-
citation and quotation marks omitted); Source One Mortgage Services Corp. v. Puglisi, 1995 WL
356760, at*1 (Comn. Super. Ct. June 9, 1995) (“One of the earliest definitions of ‘place of
abode’ was ‘the place
in which a married man’s family resides.’”) (intemal citation omitted).)
In am effort
to sidestep case law establishing that he may be served at the home of his
wife and children, Mr. Vik claims to have “abandoned” 10 Ashton Drive in the year 2000. (Vik
PJ Br. at 9 (quoting the 1836 case, Grant v. Dalliber, for the proposition that “a place of abode
[is] a “place in which a married man’s family resides ... and where he has voluntarily
resided.
with them, as his home, and which he has never abandoned’) (emphasis in original).) Even
setting aside his and Mrs. Vik’s recent testimony
that their family “raised
a life” in Greenwich
together, the record confirms
that Mr. Vik is not estranged from his wife or family and has
evinced no intent to permanently abandon the Vik family home at 10 Ashton Drive. It therefore
remains a usual place of abode. See, e.g., Capitol Light & Supply Co., 24 Conn. Supp. at 327
(citing Husband
v. Crockett, 115 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1938)) (“A person may be absent a
considerable period of time froma house where his wife and children
are living, but such place
has been held to be a usual place
of abode” even if the wife and children only reside there
seasonally); Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Saturno, 2007 WL 2245821, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 19, 2007) (defendant's usual place of abode was where his daughter and family lived and
where he had resided for a time); Source One Mortgage Services Corp., 1995 WL 356760, at *2
(abode service was proper because defendant had not established
that his absence from his
family home was “anything other than temporary”); Enfield National Bankv. Baum, 1992 WL
11185, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1992) (approving of abode service at the house owned by
defendant’
s wife and stating that “[i]tis noteworthy
that husband and wife are not estranged”).
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D. Mr. Vik’ s Foreign Connections and Intermittent Presence in Connecticut Do Not
Affect the Jurisdictional Analysis
Mr. Vik’s attempt to distance himself from Connecticut by invoking izrelevant foreign
connections and his intermittent presence in Connecticut does not alter this analysis.
1. Mr. Vik’s Purported Monaco Residency Is Inelevant
Mr. Vik’s current claim that he is a resident of Monaco (Vik PJ Br. at 14) does
not nullify
his testimony and public statements confirming that he also lives in Connecticut. See National
Mortgage Corp. v. Benet, 2001 WL 838206, at*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 27, 2001) (“One may
have two or more places of residence. . . in two or more States, and each may be a usual place of
abode” and that “[t]emporary absence does not destroy what would otherwise
be a ‘usual place
of abode’ if there is an intent to retum to that abode”) (intemal citations omitted); Ossorio v.
Faillance, 2006 WL 1359911, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2006) (“[O]ne
may have a home
and residence outside this State and yet have a usual place of abode
in this State
for service of
process.”) (intemal citation omitted); Schumann
v. Sylvester, 1991 WL 88489, at*1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 14, 1991) (“[C]alling
their residence outside the state a ‘permanent’ residence or
a‘domicile’ does not prove that [the Connecticut residence] is not a ‘usual’ place of abode.”)
(intemal citation omitted).
Nor does Mr. Vik’s attempt to manipulate
his tax status, by claiming residence in
Monaco as opposed to Connecticut, affect the jurisdictional analysis. (See Vik PJ Br. at 14, 18
(suggesting
Mr. Vik should not be subject to jurisdiction because he “has not filed. . a
Connecticut income tax retum’” since 2000).) It may well be that Mr. Vik has avoided paying
federal and state income taxes for over 20 years by claiming
to reside in Monaco. That issue is
not before this Court. Regardless of whether Mr. Vik has successfully been able to avoid
payment of Connecticut income taxes or to maneuver around certain visa-related federal statutes
-18-
when “visiting” this state (Vik PJ Br. at 15, n.3), this is the state where he and his wife “raised
[their] life” at 10 Ashton Drive, a home he has never abandoned (see Part I.B. supra), and he is
subject
to this Court’s jurisdiction.
2. Mr. Vik’s Purported Intenmittent Presence in Connecticut Is Irrelevant
Mr. Vik’s unswom claim that he only “occasionally visits Connecticut” whenever “the
fancy strikes him” for inconsistent lengths of time is not only contrary to the undisputed.
evidence referenced above, but even if correct would not negate abode jurisdiction. (Vik PJ Br.
at 14-15.) Connecticut courts commonly permit abode service on individuals who are
intermittently present
in the state. Plonski v. Halloran, 36 Conn. Supp. 335, 336 (1980); Clegg,
105 Comn. at 570. Indeed, the Plonski court held a defendant
to have been properly served where
the Marshal
left papers at a hotel in which the defendant
was only temporarily staying. 36 Conn.
Supp. at 336. The fact that the defendant “retumed to Connecticut for business purposes
approximately four times in the last year” was sufficient to establish an abode for service
because the defendant received actual notice. Id. Moreover, Clegg, which Mr. Vik’s counsel
describes
as the “seminal case on abode service of a person who is domiciled outside the state”
(Vik PJ Br. at 18), is frequently cited by Connecticut courts for the proposition
that a defendant’ s
intermittent presence in Connecticut does not negate abode service. 105 Comn. at 564; see e.g.,
Remondi v. Girard, 2008 WL 1914252, *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2008); Enfield National
Bank, 1992 WL 11185; Gondek, 1991 WL 112880, at*1-2. Instead, the Clegg court held abode
service proper, where the defendant stayed at a house in Connecticut for part of August and for
three days a week in the fall. 105 Comn. at 564. In other words, it would be sufficient
for abode
service that Mr. Vik stayed
at 10 Ashton Drive for longer than in past years because of pandemic
travel restrictions. If a defendant's residence in Connecticut in August and a portion of the
weeks through the fall are sufficient
for abode service, as in Clegg, ora defendant's
stay ina
-19-
Connecticut hotel four times a year is sufficient, as in Plonski, then certainly Mr. Vik’s
continuous, or near-continuous, residence at 10 Ashton Drive from fall 2019 through June 2020
is sufficient for abode service here.
Further, Mr. Vik’s ability to come and go whenever he wishes supports, rather than
undenmines, the basis for abode jurisdiction. See Gregori v. Ganser, 2017 WL 3470687, at *4-5
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 5, 2017) (abode service on defendant, a Virginia resident, at her parents’
home in Connecticut was proper where “defendant had lived [in Connecticut] with her parents
and siblings for many years and continues [her] ties of blood and affection by visiting during the
time she claims to have left the state”); Capitol Light & Supply Co., 24 Conn. Supp. at 327-28
(home of defendant’ s parents remained abode of defendant who left the home and the state but
visited on holidays).
The authority on which Mr. Vik relies does not alter this analysis. For example, in Bell &
Stanton, Inc. v. Laughlin (Vik PJ Br. at 9, 17), this Court held abode service improper where the
Preview
DOCKET NO.: FS2-FST-CV20-6047029-S SUPERIOR COURT DEUTSCHE BANK AG, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF STAMFORD/NORWALK Plaintiff, AT STAMFORD Vv. December 18, 2020 CAROLINE VIK and ALEXANDER VIK, Defendants. DEUTSCHE BANK AG’S OPPOSITIONTO DEFENDANT ALEXANDER VIK’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION (DOC. 109.00) Plaintiff Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank”) respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss Deutsche Bank’ s Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. 109.00 (the “PJ Motion”); Doc. 110.00 (the “Vik PJ Br.”)).! PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Complaint alleges that Mr. Vik’ s “primary residence and domicile is located at 10 Ashton Drive in Greenwich, Connecticut, where he has lived with his wife, Carie Vik, since 1988.” (Doc. 100.00 (“Compl.”) 27.) In recent testimony before this Court in a related case,” addressing Mr. Vik’ s status as the alter ego of Turks and Caicos shell company and judgment debtor Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (“SHI”), Mr. and Mrs. Vik each identified 10 Ashton Drive in Greenwich, Connecticut (“10 Ashton Drive”) as their home, where they raised their four children, including Defendant Caroline Vik: “THE CLERK: Please state your name and address for the Court’s record. MR. VIK: Alexander M. Vik, 10 Ashton Drive, Greenwich, Connecticut. Mr. Vik’s daughter, Defendant Caroline Vik, does not contest personal jurisdiction here. Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., FST-CV13-5014167-S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013) (the “Alter-Ego Action”). MR. JANUSZEWSKL. . . . I would like to just cover a little of your background . . . . you said you are a resident of Greenwich, Connecticut?” MR. VIK: I live in Monaco too . . . but right now I am at 10 Ashton Drive- MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Ok. MR. VIK: -Greenwich, Connecticut. MR. JANUSZEWSKI: And you talked about Greenwich. You have raised your family there, correct? MR. VIK: Most of the time, yes. MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Y ou have four children? MR. VIK: Yes. MR. JANUSZEWSKI: And those four children have grown up in Greenwich, correct? MR. VIK: Pretty much.” (Dec. 18, 2020 Affidavit of Sheila C. Ramesh (“Ramesh PJ Aff.”) Ex. 1 (Trial Transcript from the Alter Ego Action (“CT Trial Tr.”), Day 1) 54:7-10, 55:5-13, 56:7-16.) Mrs. Vik went on to testify. “THE COURT: Ms. Vik, if you don’t mind, I’d like you to give us alittle personal background. MRS. VIK: Okay. . . I met Alex when we were in college in our sophomore years . . .. So we got married in ‘82. . . [and] I - - we decided to have children. . . . Finally, in 1987 our first daughter was bom. . . And when she was just about two, just before her second birthday, we moved to 10 Ashton. Drive, where we subsequently, luckily had three more children and raised them. in Greenwich, or in the school in Greenwich and doing sports in Greenwich. And so we pretty much raised our life in Greenwich.” (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr, Day 3) 25:21-27:4) (emphasis added).) -2 Faced with overwhelming evidence that Mr. Vik caused SHI to avoid its debts by fraudulently transferring approximately $1 billion in assets to accounts controlled by Mr. Vik, his family, and related entities, the Viks sought in the Alter Ego Action to cast themselves in a sympathetic light, as alocal family with Greenwich roots who had been mistreated by a large financial institution. Mr. Vik even conceded this Court's jurisdiction over him in that action. But because the narrative of Mr. Vik as a Connecticut family man no longer suits his interests, he has altered course here. Hoping to escape the jurisdiction of this Court, Mr. Vik now offers a strikingly contradictory narrative in which he claims to have “resided in Greenwich for a relatively brief portion of his life,” which was “two decades ago.” (Vik PJ Br. at 13.) As set forth below, Mr. Vik’s motion to dismiss Deutsche Bank’ s Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction is untenable. The allegations in the Complaint, and an extensive factual record including information submitted with this Opposition, establish that 10 Ashton Drive is Mr. Vik’s “usual place of abode” within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57(a), and thus that the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over Mr. Vik. If Mr. Vik truly wished to contest those allegations, it was incumbent upon him to introduce supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts rebutting them. Otherwise, the Court “must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in amanner most favorable to the pleader. . .. The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.” Cogswell v. American Transit Insurance Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516 (2007) (emphasis added) (intemal citations omitted). Mr. Vik failed to offer such evidence. Thus, while Mr. Vik’s memorandum asserts that “Alexander Vik has not resided in Connecticut for twenty years” (Vik PJ Br. 1), that assertion not only contradicts his and his wife's recent testimony in the Alter Ego Action, but is 3 entitled to no weight because Mr. Vik has declined to submit an affidavit, swom declaration, or other cognizable evidence substantiating it. The sole evidence that Mr. Vik submits in support of his motion is a photograph of a Monaco residence card. Even if that document were properly authenticated (which it is not), it would establish at most that Mr. Vik has a residence in Monaco, just as his Connecticut driver's license establishes that he also has a residence in Connecticut. The unrebutted allegations in the Complaint, construed as they must be in their most favorable light, are more than sufficient to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Vik under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57(a). To the extent there could be any doubt, the evidentiary record submitted herewith (see Ramesh PJ Aff. Exs.) substantiates the allegations.? Not only does the Court have general jurisdiction over Mr. Vik, it also has jurisdiction over Mr. Vik under the Connecticut long-arm statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-59b, because Mr. Vik has transacted business in this state and because he committed tortious acts in this state. There are no due process obstacles to exercising that jurisdiction here. For all these reasons, Mr. Vik’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be denied. BACKGROUND Alexander Vik and His Fanily Built Their Home in Connecticut Alexander Vik is a sophisticated billionaire investor who frequently travels the world on business and uses various offshore companies to hold his assets and make trades and investments on his behalf. In 1988, Mr. Vik and his wife Camie Vik moved to Greenwich, Connecticut. Mr. Vik asserts a purported technical defect in the form of the Marshal’s service on his abode and the retum of service, but Mr. Vik waived any such defect - which in any event would not be disqualifying- when he moved for a second extension of time in which to file aresponsive pleading. (See Doc. 107.00 (Motion for Extension of Time on Consent to Respond to Complaint, at 1 (“Defendants have agreed not to contest service while otherwise reserving the right to move to dismiss on any other grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction.”).) -4 (Ramesh PJ. Aff. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr, Day 3) 26:24-27:4).) They have based their lives around their Greenwich home, raising four children there through adulthood and operating multiple businesses from the estate. (Id.; see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 56:7-16).) Mr. Vik and Mrs. Vik jointly purchased 10 Ashton Drive, and subsequently transferred full ownership to Mrs. Vik, who currently owns the home. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 3 Jan. 22, 2013 Vik Dep. Tr.) 55:5-11.) The Viks’ adult daughter Caroline Vik currently lives in the house at 10 Ashton Drive. (Vik PJ Br. 14; see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 2 CT Trial Day 3 Tr. 26:25-27:4.) Mr. Vik has frequently and publicly acknowledged Connecticut as his home. For example, in a 2014 interview, he stated that he and his family live in Greenwich, Connecticut, and in swom testimony before this Court in 2019, he and his wife reaffirmed that statement. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 7 (Jan. 25, 2014 Interview of Alexander Vik); id. Ex. 8 (Translation of Jan. 25, 2014 interview of Alexander Vik) at 1 (“We would love to stay [in Uruguay], but [the children] have to go back to school in Greenwich, Connecticut, where we live.”); id. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr, Day 3) 25:21-27:4.) Moreover, Mr. Vik has a Connecticut driver's license that lists 10 Ashton Drive as his address (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 4 (Alexander Vik’s DMV Records)), has maintained memberships at local gyms and sports clubs (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 5 (Apr. 28, 2015 Hearing Transcript in the matter of Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, No. 161257/13 (N-Y. Sup. Ct.) (“April 2015 Hearing Tr.”)) at 55:11-21), and regularly attends services at alocal church (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 6 June 19, 2019 Hearing Transcript in the Alter-Ego Action (“June 2019 Hearing Tr.”) at 2:1-5). These facts demonstrate Mr. Vik’s long-standing and deep ties to Connecticut. 5 ‘The Viks Have Long Conducted Business from Their Connecticut Home In 2006, Mr. Vik, through his alter ego, SHI, opened a foreign exchange (“FX”) prime brokerage account with Deutsche Bank to conduct FX trading. Mr. Vik and at least six others, including administrative assistants and third-party managers who made trades and investments on behalf of Mr. Vik or SHI, regularly did business from an office annex to the Vik family home at 10 Ashton Drive. See Sebastian Holdings, Inc. v. Kugler, 2012 WL 1190837, at*1 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2012); (see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 3 (Jan. 22, 2013 Vik Dep. Tr.) 42:24-44:25, 47:15- 16, 50:5-51:1; 58:8-59:16; id. Ex. 9 (Jan. 30, 2012 Said Dep. Tr.) 77:2-78:25; id. Ex. 10 (Feb. 5, 2014 Affidavit of Kelsey Wells (“Wells Aff.”)) 113; id. Ex. 11 (Mar. 14, 2013 VanEerten Dep. Tr) 25:9-29:6; id. Ex. 12 (Feb. 27, 2013 Johansson Dep. Tr.) 49:23-52:5; id. Ex. 13 (Sept. 29, 2008 Affidavit of Michael Kugler) 1116-17.) In Connecticut, Mr. and Mrs. Vik established another corporate entity, a Connecticut corporation originally named Vik Real Estate Management, Inc., and currently known as Ashton Capital Management (“Ashton Capital”). The Viks claim to have established Ashton Capital for the sole purpose of managing the office annex at 10 Ashton Drive, which included paying the salaries and benefits of third-party managers and administrative assistants who worked on behalf of SHI (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 11 (Mar. 14, 2013 VanEerten Dep. Tr.) 13:24-14:2; id. Ex. 9 (Jan. 30, 2012 Said Dep. Tr.) 79:19-80:18; id. Ex. 12 (Feb. 27, 2013 Johansson Dep. Tr.) 21:22-22:9; 24:3-7, id. Ex. 10 (Feb. 5, 2014 Affidavit of Kelsey Wells) 415), and the Viks (id. Ex. 3 (Jan. 22, 2013 Vik Dep. Tr.) 58:8-59:16; 64:3-67:8). From this same office annex in Greenwich, Mr. Vik has regularly conducted business, including, upon information and belief, dealings from which Deutsche Bank’ s claims here arise. (Vik PJ Br. 2, 22; see also Compl. 29, 101-108; Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 14 (Johansson 1st 6 Witness Statement) 919, 15.) SHI engaged in highly profitable, but risky, FX trading out of 10 Ashton Drive until the global financial crisis stuck. (Compl. 134; see also Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 127:19-128:2, 140:23-141:12.) SHI accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars in losses in October 2008 and, immediately thereafter, Mr. Vik caused SHI to fraudulently transfer its hundreds of millions of dollars of assets to himself, family members, and entities that he controls. (Compl. {f] 35-37.) Among the assets that Mr. Vik caused SHI to fraudulently transfer in 2008 were shares in the Norwegian software company Confirmit AS (“Confimnit”). (Id. 17.) In 2009, Deutsche Bank commenced an action in London against SHI to recover hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid margin calls. (Id. 139.) In 2013, the Commercial Court, Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales issued a 431- page judgment awarding Deutsche Bank $235,646,355 in damages, plus interest and costs, from SHI (the “English Judgment”). (Id. 1140-41.) SHI claimed that it lacked funds sufficient to satisfy the judgment, leaving Deutsche Bank to pursue various enforcement actions. In 2019, Mr. and Mrs. Vik Reaffinmed Their Connecticut Residency Among those enforcement actions is a 2014 suit that Deutsche Bank commenced in this Connecticut Superior Court - the Alter Ego Action - seeking a declaration that, as SHI’s alter ego, Mr. Vik is personally liable for its debts. In connection with that action, Mr. Vik consented to personal jurisdiction in Connecticut. (Id. 128.) On November 19, 2019, the parties appeared fora trial in the Alter Ego Action* Both Mr. Vik and his wife identified their current address Post-trial briefing in that action concluded in April 2020, in the midst of the pandemic. Judge Lee recently asked for supplemental briefing on an issue of foreign law with memoranda due on January 15, 2021 and reply memoranda due on January 22, 2021. (See Alter Ego Action, Doc. 420.01.) -7 as’ 10 Ashton Drive, Greenwich Connecticut.” (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 54:7-10; id. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr, Day 3) 2:4-7), with Mrs. Vik noting that her family had “raised [their] life” in their Greenwich home. (Id. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr., Day 3) 26:25-27:4.) Mr. and Mts. Vik attended the entire trial, which ended in December 2019. Fraudulent Transfers and Forced Sale of Confinmit Shares In 2015, while defending the Alter-Ego Action and multiple other enforcement actions, which sought to, inter alia, to unwind fraudulent transfers from SHI to Mr. Vik, Mr. Vik purported again to transfer SHI’s ownership of the Confirmit shares. This time, from his personal account to the account of his father, Erik Martin Vik (“Vik Sr.”). (Compl. {ff 7-8.) On December 21, 2016, a Norwegian Court invalidated both the 2008 and 2015 transfers of the Confinmit shares into and out of Mr. Vik’s personal account. (Id. §9157-58.) The shares revertedto SHI and became subject to enforcement in partial satisfaction of the English Judgment. (Id.) In 2017, Deutsche Bank filed a petition seeking a forced sale of the Confimmit shares. (Id. 59.) While living in Connecticut, Mr. Vik attempted to participate in the Confirmit sale process by submitting an “all-cash” indicative bid of $325 million for the Confimmit shares to ABG Sundal Collier ASA (“ABG”), the corporation named as sales assistant responsible for conducting the court-ordered sale. (Id. 99.) The bid was 400% higher than the average of other indicative bids. (Id. 1109.) Concemed about the potential for improper interference with the sale, ABG told Mr. Vik that he could only continue to participate in the bidding process under certain uncontroversial conditions. (Id. 4106.) While still in Connecticut, Mr. Vik wrote a letter refusing to comply with ABG’s conditions. (Vik PJ Br. 2, 22; see also Compl. 1107). In the same letter, Mr. Vik asked ABG how it would “deal with the rights of first refusal that exist on the Confinnit shares.” (Compl. 1107.) -& ‘The Fraudulent Right of First Refusal On November 1, 2019, only days after Mr. Vik’ s letter and at Mr. Vik’s direction, Caroline Vik, a Connecticut resident, provided ABG with a copy of a purported right of first refusal agreement (“ROFR”), which she claimed to have entered into with SHI two years prior. (Id. 4194, 123.) The ROFR purports to grant Caroline Vik an irrevocable right to purchase 100% of Confinmit’s shares within 30 days of any competing bid. (Id. 190.) In seeking to enforce the ROFR, Caroline Vik claimed that the document was contracted for and intended to be performed in Connecticut. (Id. 31.) It appears that Hans Eirik Olav, a personal friend of Mr. Vik, signed the ROFR on behalf of SHI (id. {1 92), though Mr. Olav has submitted that his signature may have been forged. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 15 (Mar. 5, 2020 Hans Firik Olav Pleading Attachment (Oslo Court of Probate, Bankruptcy, and Enforcement) (referring to the ROFR and voicing concem as to the possibility that “we are faced with a document that has been fabricated. I suggest that we appoint an independent third party with the necessary expertise to ascertain whether or not we are dealing with a forged document.”).) The Federal Action Seeking to Enforce the Fraudulent Right of First Refusal On November 19, 2019, again at Mr. Vik’s direction, Caroline Vik commenced litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the “Connecticut District Court”) seeking to enforce the fraudulent ROFR and enjoin the Confinnit sale (the “Federal Action”). (Compl. 189, 122.) In support of that action, Mr. Vik submitted a declaration in which he claimed to have been in Connecticut fora “substantial portio: of his efforts to involve himself in the sale. (Id. 129.) After the Comnecticut District Court denied Caroline Vik’s application for “fail[ure] to make a showing of likelihood of success on the merits of her claim,” 9 she voluntarily dismissed the Federal Action. (Id. 4130.) The Confinnit sale closed on February 14, 2020, at a price substantially lower than ABG and initial bids had predicted. The Instant Aciion. InJune 2020, Deutsche Bank commenced the instant action, seeking damages reflecting Confirmit’s depressed sale price and asserting claims against Mr. Vik and Caroline Vik for tortious interference with business expectancy and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. (Id. 91 151-63, 164-73.) On June 2, 2020, a Connecticut Marshal effected service on Mr. Vik by: (1) serving him at his 10 Ashton Drive abode; and (2) serving him via the Secretary of State and the mail. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 16 (Marshal’s Retum of Service).) That same day, the Marshal effected service on Caroline Vik by serving her at the 10 Ashton Drive abode. (Id.) The Marshal submitted a single retum of service, which describes identical efforts to serve both Mr. Vik and Caroline Vik at 10 Ashton Drive. (Id.) The retum contains a scrivener’s error, which in one place substitutes Mr. Vik’s name with Caroline Vik’s. (Id. at 1.) Deutsche Bank also notified Mr. Vik’s long-time attomeys, who represent him in the Alter-Ego Action and who represented Caroline Vik at her deposition in a related action, that it had commenced this action against Mr. Vik and Caroline Vik, both by phone and with courtesy copies by e-mail. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 17 (June 1, 2020 e-mail from D. Januszewski).) Deutsche Bank had hoped that Defendants would accept service in light of the global pandemic, but they did not. While Defendants originally retained their long-time attomeys in this matter, they replaced them with their current counsel in September 2020. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 18 (Sept. 10, 2020 Appearance by Pullman & Comley LLC).) On August 7, 2020, Defendants moved fora second extension of time within which to move to dismiss or otherwise respond to the Complaint. (Doc. 107.00 at 1.) Deutsche Bank -10- consented to the requested extension, and in exchange, Defendants agreed “not to contest service.” (Id. at 1.) ARGUMENT I. THE COURT HASJURISDICTION OVER MR. VIK PURSUANT TO CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-57(4) BECAUSE MR. VIK HAS A USUAL PLACE OF ABODE INCONNECTICUT A. Legal Standard As Defendants acknowledge (Vik PJ Br. at 8), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-57(a) “provides the courts of this state with general in personamjurisdiction over individuals who maintain a usual place of abode in this state.” Jancaterino v. Karban, 65 Conn. L. Rptr. 254, 2017 WL 5015217, at*2 (Conn. Super. Sep. 7, 2017) (citing Cleggv. Bishop, 105 Comn. 564, 570 (1927)). A “usual Place of abode” need not be the individual’s domicile, or even his primary residence. Argent Mortgage Co. v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 573 (2008). Rather, “a usual place of abode has been defined as a place of residence within the state.” Id. at 577-78 (emphasis added). One “may have two or more places of residence within a [s]tate, or in two or more [s]tates, and each may be ausual place of abode.” Id. at 578 (quoting Clegg, 105 Conn. at 570). “[A] usual place of abode . .. bas been determined to be a residence signifying a temporary place of habitation rather than a permanent place where one lives with the intention to remain... . A person may be a part-time or full-time resident of the state and he may have a ‘usual place of abode’ outside the state and may have one within the state at the same time and each be sufficient for service.” Capitol Light & Supply Co. v. Gunning Electric Co., 24 Conn. Supp. 324, 326 (Conn. Super. 1963). Where, as here, jurisdiction is premised on abode service pursuant to § 52-57(a), the defendant bears the burden of disproving personal jurisdiction. Cogswell, 282 Conn. at 515, “(When] the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may -11- consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed. on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion. to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the Plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings... If, however, the defendant submits either no Hoof to rebut the plaintiff s jurisdictional allegations or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question .. . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint ... but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein.” Designs for Health, Inc. v. Miller, 187 Conn. App. 1, 8 (2019) (emphasis added) Mr. Vik’s failure to submit a swom affidavit in support of his motion renders his factual Claims irrelevant, as they may not be considered on this motion. Id. at 6 (“Ordinarily, the defendant has the burden to disprove personal jurisdiction.”). The matters stated in the Marshal’ s retum are given a presumption of truth and, if true, conferjurisdiction. Fine Honebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, 911 A.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). “General Stabutes 52-57(a), authorizing abode service, should be construed liberally in cases in which the defendant received actual notice.” Id. at 1154; see also Gondekv. Haugwitz-Reventlow, 1991 WL 112880, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1991) (finding that the chief purpose of abode jurisdiction is “to ensure actual notice to the defendant that the action is pendig”) B. 10Ashton Drive Is a “Usual Place of Abode” of Mr. Vik's As athreshold matter, by failing to offer a swom affidavit or other evidence rebutting either the allegations conceming his abode or the substance of the Marshal’s retum, Mr. Vik has failed to carry his burden of rebutting the existence of personal jurisdiction over him. See, eg., Compl. {127 (alleging that Mr. Vik’s “primary residence and domicile is located at 10 Ashton Drive in Greenwich, Connecticut”); Marjam Supply Co. v. Gorss, 1990 WL 271015, at*1 -12- (Conn. Super. Ct. May 21, 1990) (“[I]n situations of abode or personal service, the defendant has the burden to prove the court lacks personal jurisdiction.”). Notably, in contrast to his decision here not to submit any swom statement, in 2019, Mr. Vik submitted a swom declaration in support of the Federal Action in Connecticut, describing in detail his many contacts with Connecticut. (Compl. 1108.) Even if this Court were inclined to look past Mr. Vik’s failure to introduce any competent evidence, however, the arguments that Mr. Vik does set forth are insufficient to undermine the existence of jurisdiction. Mr. Vik’s primary argument in opposition to abode jurisdiction is his claim that he only lived in Connecticut from 1989 until the year “2000 when he, his wife, and their four then-minor children moved to the Principality of Monaco.” (Vik PJ Br. at 13.) But like many stories that begin with the phrase “[o]nce upon a time,” Mr. Vik’s tale of permanently abandoning his Greenwich home in 2000 is make-believe. (Vik PJ Br. at 13 (“Once upon a time, Alexander Vik did reside in Greenwich. That was two decades ago.”).) As described above, both Mr. Vik and his wife testified in November 2019 that after having raised four children in Greenwich, Connecticut, they still consider it to be their home. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 54:7-10; see also id. at 55:5-11 (Mr. Vik describing himself as a resident of and living in both Greenwich and Monaco). Prior testimony from Mr. Vik, as well as closely associated individuals, all of which post-dates the year 2000, confirms the same. For example, in 2015, Mr. Vik admitted to maintaining a membership at the Stanwich Golf Club and New Y ork Sports Club, both in Greenwich. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 5 (April 2015 Hearing Tr.) 55:11-21.) In addition, individuals working out of the office annex testified that 10 Ashton Drive was Mr. Vik’s “home and office.” (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 9 Jan. 30, 2012 Said Dep. Tr.) 51:16-52:13 (a separate third-party manager testified that 10 Ashton Drive is Mr. Vik’s -13- home and his office “where he lives and works”); id. Ex. 11 (Mar. 14, 2013 VanEerten Dep. Tr.) 33:6-19; id. Ex. 14 (Johansson 1st Witness Statement) 419, 15 (a longtime Vik associate testified that from 2000 to 2012 he worked at a desk in an office at 10 Ashton Drive immediately adjacent to Mr. Vik’s own work desk).) Confronted with this testimony, Mr. Vik cannot seriously assert that he permanently abandoned 10 Ashton Drive in the year 2000. Nor can Mr. Vik reconcile his argument here with repeated and public acknowledgements that 10 Ashton Drive is his home. He told an interviewer in 2014 that he and. his family live in Greenwich. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 7 Jan. 25, 2014 Interview of Alexander Vik); id. Ex. 8 (Translation of Jan. 25, 2014 Interview of Alexander Vik) at 1 (“With my wife, Canie, and our children, we enjoy coming [to Uruguay] at the beginning of the year, when they have vacations, and stay a couple of weeks. We would like to stay longer, but they must retum to school in Greenwich, Connecticut, where we live.”).) In his 2010 Harvard University alumni directory, he listed 10 Ashton Drive as his home address, after changing it froma Monaco address listed in 2005. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 19 (2005 Harvard Alunmi Directory); id. Ex. 20 (2010 Harvard Alunmi Directory).) Even Mr. Vik’s Connecticut driver's license, possession of which, under Connecticut law, is a privilege only available to residents of the state, lists 10 Ashton Drive as his address. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 4 (Alexander Vik’s DMV Records); id. Ex. 21 (Connecticut Driver's License Checklist)); see also Baylis v. Commissioner, Department of Motor Vehicles, 2000 WL 327416, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2000) (“A Connecticut driver's license always contains a Connecticut address, so it is reasonable to infer that plaintiff must have had a Connecticut address when he obtained the license.”); Capitol Light & Supply Co., 24 Conn. Supp. at 327-28 (home of defendant’ s parents remained abode of defendant who left the home and the state but maintained a Connecticut driver’ s license). -14 Most significantly, Mr. Vik does not dispute that at the time of service he in fact was residing at 10 Ashton Drive, and had been doing so for at least eight months. In his memorandum, Mr. Vik asserts that: “Recently, Mr. Vik stayed longerin Connecticut than he has in past years because pandemic travel restrictions made it difficult for him to depart, but he retumed to Monaco as soon as he was able.” (Vik PJ Br. at 15.) That bare statement, together with the timeline presented by Mr. Vik’s own motion, corroborates the allegation that 10 Ashton Drive was a usual place of abode when the Marshal effected service. (a) October 2019: While in Connecticut, Mr. Vik submitted an all-cash indicative bid to acquire the Confinnit shares for $325 million (an amount 400% percent higher than the average of the other indicative bids), and exchanged “email communications with ABG.° (Vik PJ Br. at 2, 22.) (b) November and December 2019: Mr. Vik visited his grandchild and participated in a Connecticut trial. (Vik PJ Br. at2, 14-15, 22.) At trial, he testified under oath that he lives at 10 Ashton Drive. (Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 1 (CT Trial Tr, Day 1) 54:7-10.) Testimony in the Connecticut trial concluded on December4, 2019. So taking at face value the unswom contention that pandemic restrictions caused Mr. Vik to stay in Connecticut longer than he otherwise would have, Mr. Vik either (1) remained in Connecticut of his own choice for the next few months or (2) departed at some point but Mr. Vik may have communicated with ABG from Connecticut as early as August 2019. (Vik PJ Br. at 2, 22; Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 23 (Nov. 26, 2019 Declaration of Alexander Vik) 1118-9) (dating exchanges with ABG on August 12 and 15, 2019); id. Ex. 24 (Dec. 4, 2019 Supplemental Declaration of AlexanderVik ) 1/6) (Mr. Vik “was located in Connecticut fora substantial portion of [his] interactions with ABG.”).) To the extent the Court believes any doubt might exist as to its abode jurisdiction over Mr. Vik, it should await the results of Deutsche Bank’ s jurisdictional discovery to leam more about the regularity of Mr. Vik’s life in Connecticut. -15 retumed to Connecticut of his own choice before pandemic-related travel restrictions were imposed. ( February 2, 2020: Global air travel was restricted for the first time due to the COVID-19 global pandemic. A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF MANAGED CARE (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a- timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020. @ une 25, 2020: Certain restrictions on travel to Monaco are lifted. See Procedure for Travelers Entering Monaco as of June 25, 2020, EMBASSY OF MONACO IN WASHINGTON, D.C., https://monacodc.org/0625covid1 9en. pdf. Inshort, Mr. Vik has proffered nothing to rebut the presumption that 10 Ashton Drive was his home at the time of service. Indeed, in the months leading up to service in early June 2020, itis hard to imagine another place where Mr. Vik would be more likely “to have knowledge of a service by copy.” Pozzi v. Hamey, 24 Conn. Supp. 488, 490 (1963); see also Cohen v. Bayne, 28 Conn. Supp. 233, 237 (1969) (defining abode as the “habitation of an individual”); Jimenez v. DeRosa, 109 Conn. App. 332, 338-39 (2008) (defining abode as the presumptive“ me” of the defendant at the time service is made). C. 10Ashton Drive Is Mr. Vik’s Family Home Even if this Court were to credit Mr. Vik’s claim that 10 Ashton Drive is not his “primary residence” (Vik PJ Br. at 3), Mr. Vik’s concessions that the house “belongs to his wife” Carrie Vik, and that Caroline Vik, one of his four adult children, lives there, are sufficient for abode jurisdiction. (Vik PJ Br. at 14; Ramesh PJ Aff. Ex. 2 (CT Trial Tr., Day 3) 3:13-16; Compl., Ex. A a 1 (listing 10 Ashton Drive in Greenwich, Connecticut as Caroline Vik’ s domicile); see, eg., Gondekv. Haugwitz-Reventlow, 1991 WL 112880, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1991) (defining usual place of abode as “the place in which a married man’s family resides”) (intemal -16- citation and quotation marks omitted); Source One Mortgage Services Corp. v. Puglisi, 1995 WL 356760, at*1 (Comn. Super. Ct. June 9, 1995) (“One of the earliest definitions of ‘place of abode’ was ‘the place in which a married man’s family resides.’”) (intemal citation omitted).) In am effort to sidestep case law establishing that he may be served at the home of his wife and children, Mr. Vik claims to have “abandoned” 10 Ashton Drive in the year 2000. (Vik PJ Br. at 9 (quoting the 1836 case, Grant v. Dalliber, for the proposition that “a place of abode [is] a “place in which a married man’s family resides ... and where he has voluntarily resided. with them, as his home, and which he has never abandoned’) (emphasis in original).) Even setting aside his and Mrs. Vik’s recent testimony that their family “raised a life” in Greenwich together, the record confirms that Mr. Vik is not estranged from his wife or family and has evinced no intent to permanently abandon the Vik family home at 10 Ashton Drive. It therefore remains a usual place of abode. See, e.g., Capitol Light & Supply Co., 24 Conn. Supp. at 327 (citing Husband v. Crockett, 115 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1938)) (“A person may be absent a considerable period of time froma house where his wife and children are living, but such place has been held to be a usual place of abode” even if the wife and children only reside there seasonally); Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Saturno, 2007 WL 2245821, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2007) (defendant's usual place of abode was where his daughter and family lived and where he had resided for a time); Source One Mortgage Services Corp., 1995 WL 356760, at *2 (abode service was proper because defendant had not established that his absence from his family home was “anything other than temporary”); Enfield National Bankv. Baum, 1992 WL 11185, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1992) (approving of abode service at the house owned by defendant’ s wife and stating that “[i]tis noteworthy that husband and wife are not estranged”). -17- D. Mr. Vik’ s Foreign Connections and Intermittent Presence in Connecticut Do Not Affect the Jurisdictional Analysis Mr. Vik’s attempt to distance himself from Connecticut by invoking izrelevant foreign connections and his intermittent presence in Connecticut does not alter this analysis. 1. Mr. Vik’s Purported Monaco Residency Is Inelevant Mr. Vik’s current claim that he is a resident of Monaco (Vik PJ Br. at 14) does not nullify his testimony and public statements confirming that he also lives in Connecticut. See National Mortgage Corp. v. Benet, 2001 WL 838206, at*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 27, 2001) (“One may have two or more places of residence. . . in two or more States, and each may be a usual place of abode” and that “[t]emporary absence does not destroy what would otherwise be a ‘usual place of abode’ if there is an intent to retum to that abode”) (intemal citations omitted); Ossorio v. Faillance, 2006 WL 1359911, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2006) (“[O]ne may have a home and residence outside this State and yet have a usual place of abode in this State for service of process.”) (intemal citation omitted); Schumann v. Sylvester, 1991 WL 88489, at*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 14, 1991) (“[C]alling their residence outside the state a ‘permanent’ residence or a‘domicile’ does not prove that [the Connecticut residence] is not a ‘usual’ place of abode.”) (intemal citation omitted). Nor does Mr. Vik’s attempt to manipulate his tax status, by claiming residence in Monaco as opposed to Connecticut, affect the jurisdictional analysis. (See Vik PJ Br. at 14, 18 (suggesting Mr. Vik should not be subject to jurisdiction because he “has not filed. . a Connecticut income tax retum’” since 2000).) It may well be that Mr. Vik has avoided paying federal and state income taxes for over 20 years by claiming to reside in Monaco. That issue is not before this Court. Regardless of whether Mr. Vik has successfully been able to avoid payment of Connecticut income taxes or to maneuver around certain visa-related federal statutes -18- when “visiting” this state (Vik PJ Br. at 15, n.3), this is the state where he and his wife “raised [their] life” at 10 Ashton Drive, a home he has never abandoned (see Part I.B. supra), and he is subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. 2. Mr. Vik’s Purported Intenmittent Presence in Connecticut Is Irrelevant Mr. Vik’s unswom claim that he only “occasionally visits Connecticut” whenever “the fancy strikes him” for inconsistent lengths of time is not only contrary to the undisputed. evidence referenced above, but even if correct would not negate abode jurisdiction. (Vik PJ Br. at 14-15.) Connecticut courts commonly permit abode service on individuals who are intermittently present in the state. Plonski v. Halloran, 36 Conn. Supp. 335, 336 (1980); Clegg, 105 Comn. at 570. Indeed, the Plonski court held a defendant to have been properly served where the Marshal left papers at a hotel in which the defendant was only temporarily staying. 36 Conn. Supp. at 336. The fact that the defendant “retumed to Connecticut for business purposes approximately four times in the last year” was sufficient to establish an abode for service because the defendant received actual notice. Id. Moreover, Clegg, which Mr. Vik’s counsel describes as the “seminal case on abode service of a person who is domiciled outside the state” (Vik PJ Br. at 18), is frequently cited by Connecticut courts for the proposition that a defendant’ s intermittent presence in Connecticut does not negate abode service. 105 Comn. at 564; see e.g., Remondi v. Girard, 2008 WL 1914252, *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2008); Enfield National Bank, 1992 WL 11185; Gondek, 1991 WL 112880, at*1-2. Instead, the Clegg court held abode service proper, where the defendant stayed at a house in Connecticut for part of August and for three days a week in the fall. 105 Comn. at 564. In other words, it would be sufficient for abode service that Mr. Vik stayed at 10 Ashton Drive for longer than in past years because of pandemic travel restrictions. If a defendant's residence in Connecticut in August and a portion of the weeks through the fall are sufficient for abode service, as in Clegg, ora defendant's stay ina -19- Connecticut hotel four times a year is sufficient, as in Plonski, then certainly Mr. Vik’s continuous, or near-continuous, residence at 10 Ashton Drive from fall 2019 through June 2020 is sufficient for abode service here. Further, Mr. Vik’s ability to come and go whenever he wishes supports, rather than undenmines, the basis for abode jurisdiction. See Gregori v. Ganser, 2017 WL 3470687, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 5, 2017) (abode service on defendant, a Virginia resident, at her parents’ home in Connecticut was proper where “defendant had lived [in Connecticut] with her parents and siblings for many years and continues [her] ties of blood and affection by visiting during the time she claims to have left the state”); Capitol Light & Supply Co., 24 Conn. Supp. at 327-28 (home of defendant’ s parents remained abode of defendant who left the home and the state but visited on holidays). The authority on which Mr. Vik relies does not alter this analysis. For example, in Bell & Stanton, Inc. v. Laughlin (Vik PJ Br. at 9, 17), this Court held abode service improper where the