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DOCKET NO.: LLI-CV20-6024698-S : SUPERIOR COURT
: JUDICIAL DISTRICT
U.S. BANK TRUST N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR : OF LITCHFIELD
LSF8 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST : AT TORRINGTON
V.
PATRICK RICHARDSON, JANE DOE I,
JOHN DOE I, JANE DOE II, JOHN DOE II : MARCH 30, 2020
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PATRICK RICHARDSON'S REQUEST TO REVISE
Comes now, the Plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust N.A., as Trustee for LSF8 Master Participation Trust (the
“Plaintiff”) and hereby serves this, its Response to Defendant Patrick Richardson’s (“Defendant Richardson”)
Request to Revise, dated February 28, 2020.
ARGUMENT
I. First Request to Revise (Relating to Paragraph 2 of the Complaint):
Defendant Richardson has requested that the Plaintiff revise Paragraph 2 of the Complaint “to specify
whether Defendant Richardson or the Does were or are tenants or were the homeowners of the [p]roperty” at
issue in this case. In support of this request, Defendant Richardson reasons that the Complaint “is vague as to
the relationship that the Defendants in this matter are [sic] to the Plaintiff or the Owner of Record.”
The Plaintiff objects to Defendant Richardson’s first requested revision to the Complaint, as itis
unnecessary and goes beyond the scope permitted by Practice Book §§ 10-1 and 10-20. “The purpose of a
request to revise is to secure a statement of the material facts upon which the adverse party bases his
complaint . . . The test is not whether the pleadings disclose all that the adversary desires to know in aid of
his own cause, but whether itdiscloses the material facts which constitute the cause of action.” Kileen v.
General Motors Corp., 36 Conn. Sup. 347, 348 (1980). Indeed, “a request to revise is permissible to obtain
information so that a defendant may intelligently plead and prepare his case for trial but it is never
appropriate where the information sought is merely evidential . . . The defendant is not entitled to know the
plaintiff's proof but only what he claims as his cause of action.” Summit Bank v. Riverview East Associates,
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2000 WL 1207295, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 2000); Fleet National v. Suares, 2000 WL 347788, *1
(Conn. Super. Ct., Mar. 21, 2000).
Defendant Richardson’s first request to revise merely seeks unnecessary evidential information and,
therefore, should be denied. The Plaintiff’s Complaint, as plead, contains a concise, sufficient statement of
the facts constituting the Plaintiff’s cause of action and provides Defendant Richardson with the necessary
information under Connecticut law: The Plaintiff became the legal owner of the property at issue through a
Certificate of Foreclosure while Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants were in possession of the
property, a Notice to Quit Possession of the property subsequently was properly served on Defendant
Richardson and the Doe Defendants, and Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants failed to comply
with the Notice to Quit Possession, leading to the Complaint. Further demonstrating that Defendant
Richardson already has the material facts constituting Plaintiff’s cause of action, the Plaintiff filed both the
Certificate of Foreclosure and Notice to Quit Possession into the record along with the Complaint, which
clearly confirm that title to the property at issue has become absolute in Plaintiff, identify the previous owner
of the property at issue, and specifically refer to Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants as tenants in
the property at issue. Simply put, Defendant Richardson has all he needs under Connecticut law in Paragraph
2.
The improper nature of this request for revision is perhaps most evident in that not only does it seek
unnecessary revision of the Complaint, but Defendant Richardson claims to require clarification of
information squarely within his own personal knowledge before he can admit or deny the contents of
Paragraph 2. It is axiomatic that once a plaintiff states its cause of action, a defendant must specifically
admit or deny the substance of the plaintiff's allegations, especially where the answers are within that
defendant’s personal knowledge. See Tolland Bank v. Larson, 28 Conn. App. 332 (1992) (superseded by
rule on other grounds). Defendant Richardson’s requested revision, however, appears to claim ignorance as
to the straightforward fact of whether he owned the property at issue in this case or was a tenant in same.
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Certainly, this information is within the scope of his personal knowledge and, therefore, is not properly
within the scope of a request to revise.
Finally, the first request to revise is improper because Defendant Richardson lacks standing to
challenge issues on behalf of the Doe Defendants. Whether the Doe Defendants are tenants or otherwise has
no impact on the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Richardson, and therefore, Defendant Richardson has no
standing to make requests to revise regarding claims against the Doe Defendants.
As a result, Defendant Richardson’s first requested revision does not call for admissible evidence or facts
necessary for him to respond to the allegations Complaint, nor does it seek admissible evidence or facts which
shed any light on whether Defendant Richardson admits or denies the substance of the Plaintiff's
allegations in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint. Rather, it inappropriately seeks unnecessary evidential details.
Therefore, the Plaintiff requests that the Court sustain its objection to Defendant Richardson’s First
Request to Revise.
II. Second Request to Revise (Relating to Paragraph 2 of the Complaint):
Defendant Richardson has also requested that the Plaintiff further revise Paragraph 2 of the
Complaint “to specify what the serving of the Notice to Quit was based upon, and the meaning of the ‘10
Day’ language.” In support of this request, Defendant Richardson simply states that the “Complaint is vague
as to the Notice to Quit.”
The Plaintiff objects to the Defendant’s second requested revision to Paragraph 2 of the Complaint
because, like the first requested revision, it is unnecessary and goes beyond the scope permitted by Practice
Book §§ 10-1 and 10-20. Again, “a request to revise is permissible to obtain information so that a defendant
may intelligently plead and prepare his case for trial but it is never appropriate where the information sought
is merely evidential.” Summit Bank, 2000 WL 1207295 at *1; Fleet National, 2000 WL 347788 at *1.
It simply cannot be said that Defendant Richardson’s second request to revise seeks material facts
regarding the Plaintiff’s claims, the omission of which has rendered the Plaintiff’s cause of action unclear
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and has left Defendant Richardson incapable to intelligently plead and prepare his case for trial.Indeed, as
noted above, the Plaintiff's Complaint, as plead, contains a concise and complete statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action: The Plaintiff became the legal owner of the property at issue through a
Certificate of Foreclosure while Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants were in possession of the
property, a Notice to Quit Possession of the property at issue subsequently was properly served on Defendant
Richardson and the Doe Defendants, and Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants failed to comply
with the Notice to Quit Possession, leading to the Complaint. Further demonstrating that Defendant
Richardson has all the information necessary to comprehend the cause of action against him, the Plaintiff
attached the precise Notice to Quit Possession that is the subject of Defendant Richardson’s second request to
revise—and which provides the information sought by the requested revision—as an exhibit to the
Complaint. Because Defendant Richardson’s second requested revision does not call for facts necessary to aid
him in understanding the Plaintiff’s cause of action, but rather improperly seeks solely evidential information, the
Plaintiff requests that the Court sustain its objection to Defendant Richardson’s Second Request to Revise.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff respectfully prays this Court sustain its objection and
deny the Defendant's Request to Revise.
PLAINTIFF,
U.S. BANK TRUST N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR LSF8 MASTER
PARTICIPATION TRUST,
By: /s/434359
Kevin P. Polansky (Juris No. 434359)
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
One Post Office Square, 30th Floor
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
p. (617) 217-4700
f. (617) 217-4710
e. kevin.polansky@nelsonmullins.com
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CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the above document was mailed or electronically delivered on this day,
March 30, 2020, to the following:
Daniel S. DiBartolomeo
DIBARTOLOMEO LAW FIRM, LLC
300 Federal Road, Suite 108
Brookfield, CT 06804
/s/ 434359
Kevin P. Polansky
5
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DOCKET NO.: LLI-CV20-6024698-S : SUPERIOR COURT : JUDICIAL DISTRICT U.S. BANK TRUST N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR : OF LITCHFIELD LSF8 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST : AT TORRINGTON V. PATRICK RICHARDSON, JANE DOE I, JOHN DOE I, JANE DOE II, JOHN DOE II : MARCH 30, 2020 PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PATRICK RICHARDSON'S REQUEST TO REVISE Comes now, the Plaintiff, U.S. Bank Trust N.A., as Trustee for LSF8 Master Participation Trust (the “Plaintiff”) and hereby serves this, its Response to Defendant Patrick Richardson’s (“Defendant Richardson”) Request to Revise, dated February 28, 2020. ARGUMENT I. First Request to Revise (Relating to Paragraph 2 of the Complaint): Defendant Richardson has requested that the Plaintiff revise Paragraph 2 of the Complaint “to specify whether Defendant Richardson or the Does were or are tenants or were the homeowners of the [p]roperty” at issue in this case. In support of this request, Defendant Richardson reasons that the Complaint “is vague as to the relationship that the Defendants in this matter are [sic] to the Plaintiff or the Owner of Record.” The Plaintiff objects to Defendant Richardson’s first requested revision to the Complaint, as itis unnecessary and goes beyond the scope permitted by Practice Book §§ 10-1 and 10-20. “The purpose of a request to revise is to secure a statement of the material facts upon which the adverse party bases his complaint . . . The test is not whether the pleadings disclose all that the adversary desires to know in aid of his own cause, but whether itdiscloses the material facts which constitute the cause of action.” Kileen v. General Motors Corp., 36 Conn. Sup. 347, 348 (1980). Indeed, “a request to revise is permissible to obtain information so that a defendant may intelligently plead and prepare his case for trial but it is never appropriate where the information sought is merely evidential . . . The defendant is not entitled to know the plaintiff's proof but only what he claims as his cause of action.” Summit Bank v. Riverview East Associates, 1 2000 WL 1207295, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 2000); Fleet National v. Suares, 2000 WL 347788, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct., Mar. 21, 2000). Defendant Richardson’s first request to revise merely seeks unnecessary evidential information and, therefore, should be denied. The Plaintiff’s Complaint, as plead, contains a concise, sufficient statement of the facts constituting the Plaintiff’s cause of action and provides Defendant Richardson with the necessary information under Connecticut law: The Plaintiff became the legal owner of the property at issue through a Certificate of Foreclosure while Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants were in possession of the property, a Notice to Quit Possession of the property subsequently was properly served on Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants, and Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants failed to comply with the Notice to Quit Possession, leading to the Complaint. Further demonstrating that Defendant Richardson already has the material facts constituting Plaintiff’s cause of action, the Plaintiff filed both the Certificate of Foreclosure and Notice to Quit Possession into the record along with the Complaint, which clearly confirm that title to the property at issue has become absolute in Plaintiff, identify the previous owner of the property at issue, and specifically refer to Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants as tenants in the property at issue. Simply put, Defendant Richardson has all he needs under Connecticut law in Paragraph 2. The improper nature of this request for revision is perhaps most evident in that not only does it seek unnecessary revision of the Complaint, but Defendant Richardson claims to require clarification of information squarely within his own personal knowledge before he can admit or deny the contents of Paragraph 2. It is axiomatic that once a plaintiff states its cause of action, a defendant must specifically admit or deny the substance of the plaintiff's allegations, especially where the answers are within that defendant’s personal knowledge. See Tolland Bank v. Larson, 28 Conn. App. 332 (1992) (superseded by rule on other grounds). Defendant Richardson’s requested revision, however, appears to claim ignorance as to the straightforward fact of whether he owned the property at issue in this case or was a tenant in same. 2 Certainly, this information is within the scope of his personal knowledge and, therefore, is not properly within the scope of a request to revise. Finally, the first request to revise is improper because Defendant Richardson lacks standing to challenge issues on behalf of the Doe Defendants. Whether the Doe Defendants are tenants or otherwise has no impact on the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Richardson, and therefore, Defendant Richardson has no standing to make requests to revise regarding claims against the Doe Defendants. As a result, Defendant Richardson’s first requested revision does not call for admissible evidence or facts necessary for him to respond to the allegations Complaint, nor does it seek admissible evidence or facts which shed any light on whether Defendant Richardson admits or denies the substance of the Plaintiff's allegations in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint. Rather, it inappropriately seeks unnecessary evidential details. Therefore, the Plaintiff requests that the Court sustain its objection to Defendant Richardson’s First Request to Revise. II. Second Request to Revise (Relating to Paragraph 2 of the Complaint): Defendant Richardson has also requested that the Plaintiff further revise Paragraph 2 of the Complaint “to specify what the serving of the Notice to Quit was based upon, and the meaning of the ‘10 Day’ language.” In support of this request, Defendant Richardson simply states that the “Complaint is vague as to the Notice to Quit.” The Plaintiff objects to the Defendant’s second requested revision to Paragraph 2 of the Complaint because, like the first requested revision, it is unnecessary and goes beyond the scope permitted by Practice Book §§ 10-1 and 10-20. Again, “a request to revise is permissible to obtain information so that a defendant may intelligently plead and prepare his case for trial but it is never appropriate where the information sought is merely evidential.” Summit Bank, 2000 WL 1207295 at *1; Fleet National, 2000 WL 347788 at *1. It simply cannot be said that Defendant Richardson’s second request to revise seeks material facts regarding the Plaintiff’s claims, the omission of which has rendered the Plaintiff’s cause of action unclear 3 and has left Defendant Richardson incapable to intelligently plead and prepare his case for trial.Indeed, as noted above, the Plaintiff's Complaint, as plead, contains a concise and complete statement of the facts constituting the cause of action: The Plaintiff became the legal owner of the property at issue through a Certificate of Foreclosure while Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants were in possession of the property, a Notice to Quit Possession of the property at issue subsequently was properly served on Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants, and Defendant Richardson and the Doe Defendants failed to comply with the Notice to Quit Possession, leading to the Complaint. Further demonstrating that Defendant Richardson has all the information necessary to comprehend the cause of action against him, the Plaintiff attached the precise Notice to Quit Possession that is the subject of Defendant Richardson’s second request to revise—and which provides the information sought by the requested revision—as an exhibit to the Complaint. Because Defendant Richardson’s second requested revision does not call for facts necessary to aid him in understanding the Plaintiff’s cause of action, but rather improperly seeks solely evidential information, the Plaintiff requests that the Court sustain its objection to Defendant Richardson’s Second Request to Revise. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff respectfully prays this Court sustain its objection and deny the Defendant's Request to Revise. PLAINTIFF, U.S. BANK TRUST N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR LSF8 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST, By: /s/434359 Kevin P. Polansky (Juris No. 434359) Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP One Post Office Square, 30th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02109 p. (617) 217-4700 f. (617) 217-4710 e. kevin.polansky@nelsonmullins.com 4 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that a copy of the above document was mailed or electronically delivered on this day, March 30, 2020, to the following: Daniel S. DiBartolomeo DIBARTOLOMEO LAW FIRM, LLC 300 Federal Road, Suite 108 Brookfield, CT 06804 /s/ 434359 Kevin P. Polansky 5