Preview
Filed 13 J uly 1 P2:46
Chris Daniel - District Clerk
Harris Coun!
ED101) 017: 3008
By: Rhonda M. Momon
CAUSE NO. 2012-75581
MEMORIAL HERMANN HEALTH IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
SYSTEM F/K/A MEMORIAL HERMANN
HOSPITAL SYSTEM
Plaintiff, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
Vv.
IGNACIO ALANIZ,
125TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF/COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT MEMORIAL HERMANN'S
OBJECTIONS TO EXPERT REPORT OF MARC CHAPMAN
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Memorial Hermann Health System f/k/a Memorial
Hermann Hospital System (“Memorial Hermann”) hereby files these Objections to the Expert
Report of Marc Chapman submitted by Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Ignacio Alaniz
(“Alaniz”).
INTRODUCTION
Alaniz alleges that his counterclaim against Memorial Hermann is governed by Chapter
74 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Under Section 74.351, Alaniz would be required to
submit an expert report to support his claims against Memorial Hermann. TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 74.351(a). In an attempt to satisfy this requirement, Alaniz submitted a report
from Mare Chapman (“Chapman”), a non-physician, who purports to an expert regarding the
reasonableness of charges for medical services. Memorial Hermann takes no position at this
time as to whether Chapter 74 applies to the counterclaim. However, out of an abundance of
caution, Memorial Hermann notes that, to the extent that Alaniz’s counterclaim is governed by
Chapter 74, Chapman’s report fails to meet the requirements set forth in the statute. Specifically,
it does not establish that he is qualified to render the opinions set forth in his report. To make
matters worse, Chapman’s report is entirely silent on the appropriate standard of care, how
Memorial Hermann breached that standard, and how that breach caused Alaniz’s alleged injuries.
Therefore, as explained in more detail below, Memorial Hermann objects to Chapman’s report
under Chapter 74.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Memorial Hermann brought this lawsuit because Alaniz has refused and failed to pay for
medical services he received from Memorial Hermann. See Original Petition at { 6-8. Alaniz
sought treatment from Memorial Hermann for serious, life-threatening injuries, whereby he
incurred a total of $456,675.23 in fees and expenses. Id. at Sec. IX.A. The fees and expenses
charged by Memorial Hermann were usual, customary, and reasonable. Id. at 19. Nevertheless,
Alaniz has refused to pay what he owes to Memorial Hermann. Jd. at 6. As a result, Memorial
Hermann brought claims for a suit on a sworn account and quantum meruit against Alaniz. Jd. at
4 6-9.
On June 10, 2013, Alaniz filed a counterclaim against Memorial Hermann, alleging that
Memorial Hermann billed him for services at rates that were grossly in excess of the usual,
customary, and reasonable rates for such services. See Original Counterclaim at ¥ 19. Alaniz
claims that Memorial Hermann violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by allegedly
(1) engaging in false, misleading, and deceptive acts, and (2) taking advantage of Alaniz’s lack
of knowledge and ability to a grossly unfair degree, Id. at {{ 12-19.
Alaniz alleges that his counterclaim is governed by Chapter 74. Jd. at (24. In an attempt
to meet the requirement of Section 74.351, Alaniz provided the report and curriculum vitae of
Chapman. See Ex. 1,2. In his report, Chapman purports to determine what a reasonable amount
would be for the services provided by Memorial Hermann. Ex. 1 at 2. He concludes that the
reasonable charge for Memorial Hermann’s services is only $218,286.96. Id.
To the extent that Alaniz’s counterclaim is governed by Chapter 74, the report of
Chapman is insufficient under the statute. For the reasons set forth below, Memorial Herman
objects to Chapman’s report.
ARGUMENT
Under Chapter 74, within 120 days from filing suit, a claimant is required to serve on
each physician or health care provider at least one expert report in support of the claims. TEX.
Civ. Prac. & REM. CODE § 74.351(a). This requirement is designed to promptly identify
frivolous lawsuits while preserving meritorious claims. Constancio v. Bray, 266 S.W.3d 149,
163 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). Objections to the sufficiency of the report must be made
no later than the twenty-first day after the date the report was served or all objections are waived.
Id. § 74.351(a). By filing this motion within the prescribed period, Memorial Hermann hereby
objects to the sufficiency of Chapman’s report under Chapter 74.
A Requirements Under Chapter 74 for an Expert Report.
Under Chapter 74, and expert report is defined as:
a written report by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert’s
opinions ... regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which
the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet
the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the
injury, harm, or damages claimed.
Id. § 74.351(1)(6). Thus, the expert report must include the expert’s opinions on the standard of
care, breach, and causation. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d
873, 878-79 (Tex. 2001).
In detailing these elements, the report must provide enough information to fulfill two
purposes. Gray v. CHCA Bayshore L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, no pet.). The report must (1) inform the defendant of the specific conduct the plaintiff has
called into question; and (2) provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have
merit. Id. (citing Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879); see also Patel v. Williams, 237 S.W.3d 901, 906
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
Importantly, the report must set forth more than just the expert’s conclusions. The expert
must explain the basis for his statements and link his conclusions to the facts. Gray, 189 S.W.3d
at 859 (citing Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002)). In assessing the
report’s sufficiency, the trial court must refrain from drawing inferences and must instead rely
only on the information contained within the report itself. Jd. The report cannot merely state the
expert’s conclusions about the statutory elements. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d
at 879. “[RJather, the expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to
the facts.” Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52 (quoting Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. 1999)).
B Chapman’s Report is Inadequate Under Chapter 74 Because it Fails to
Establish the Requisite Qualifications for His Opinions.
Alaniz has not made the requisite showing that Chapman is qualified to offer an opinion
regarding the applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by Memorial
Hermann failed to meet the standards, or the causal relationship between that failure and the
injury, harm or damages claimed by Alaniz.
Chapter 74 prescribes standards for qualifying an “expert” to render an expert report.
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 74.351(1)(5)(C); 74.403(a). To be so qualified, an expert must
have knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific issue before the
court that would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject. Broders v.
Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996).
In assessing whether a witness is qualified on the basis of training or experience to render
expert opinions, a trial court shall consider whether the proffered witness (1) is board certified or
has other substantial training or experience “in an area of medical practice relevant to the claim,”
and (2) is actively practicing “in rendering medical care services relevant to the claim.” TEX.
Civ. Prac. & REM. CODE § 74.401(c).
Here, Chapman fails to state within the four corners of his report that (1) he has
knowledge of the accepted standards of hospital billing practices, or (2) he is qualified on the
basis of training or experience to offer opinions as to those standards. Chapman merely makes a
global and conclusory assertion in his report that “[f]rom my education, background, and
experience, I am familiar with the accepted standards for hospital billing practices.” Ex. 1 at 1.
However, Chapman’s report fails to state his qualifications to offer an opinion regarding the
causal relationship between any alleged departure from the accepted standards of care of
Memorial Hermann’s billing practices and the alleged injuries experienced by Alaniz.
Texas courts routinely hold reports like Chapman’s fail to pass muster under Chapter 74.
See, e.g., Methodist Health Care Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd. v. Rangel, 2005 WL 3445994, at * 2-3
(Tex. App—San Antonio Dec. 14, 2005, pet. denied) (holding doctor was not qualified under
section 74.402 where expert report failed to state how the doctor’s experience on a peer review
committee and as an administrative director constituted training or experience which qualified
him to opine about the standard of care at issue); In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d 507, 513-14 & n.11
(Tex. App—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding) (holding conclusory statements referencing an
expert’s qualifications are insufficient to show the expert is qualified on the particular subject
5
matter at hand when the expert report only tracks the language of the statute and does not bridge
the gap between his experience and the medical procedure at issue).
Further, Chapman is not a physician; nor does he have any medical training. He has
failed to show that he is qualified to render opinions concerning the reasonableness of Memorial
Hermann’s charges for medical services. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.401(c); see also
Marks y. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 671 (Tex. 2010) (requiring the plaintiff to
have a physician opine on the proper maintenance and construction of a hospital bed).
Cc Chapman’s Report is Inadequate Under Chapter 74 Because it Fails to Set
Forth the Standard of Care, Breach, and Causation.
In addition to Chapman’s complete lack of stated qualifications, his report wholly fails to
meet the statutory requirements of Chapter 74. Specifically, Chapman’s report fails to set forth
in sufficient detail the standard of care, breach, or causation. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878-79.
To begin, Chapman’s report fails explain the standard of care applicable to Memorial
Hermann’s billing practices. “The standard of care for a hospital is what an ordinarily prudent
hospital would do under the same or similar circumstances.” Jd. at 880. Chapman’s report fails
to articulate what an ordinary prudent hospital would do under the same or similar
circumstances. This defect is fatal to his report. Jd. (“Identifying the standard of care is
critical”).
Chapman’s report similarly fails to explain how Memorial Herman breached the
applicable standard of care. At a minimum, the report is required to identify “specific
information about what the defendant should have done differently.” Jd. Chapman’s report is
entirely silent on this required element.
Chapman’s report also fails to explain the causal relationship between any alleged
breaches of the standard of care and Alaniz’s alleged injuries. In addition to failing to set forth
the required elements, the report is plagued by conclusory statements. The seminal Texas case
on causation is Bowie Memorial Hospital v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. 2002). In Wright, the
Supreme Court held that an expert report must express the causal relationship in terms of
reasonable medical probability and must summarize the causal relationship between the failure to
meet the applicable standard of care and injury. Jd. at 53. Ultimately, the Court held the expert
report lacked information linking the expert’s conclusion to the alleged breach. Id.
Following Wright, most courts require the expert to “explain the basis of his statements to
link his conclusions to the facts.” Jd. at 52. In other words, the expert must link the breach of
the standard of care to the alleged injury. Jd. That link cannot be speculative or conclusory, and
must be rooted in facts. /d.
Chapman’s report does not state with any specificity how Memorial Hermann’s alleged
departure from the standard of care caused Alaniz’s injury. Instead, the report provides only the
conclusory statement that “hospital prices have risen disproportionally to their cost.” Ex. 1 at 1.
This conclusory statement is followed by another that states “hospital charges are so
disproportionate to the cost of care and the actual reimbursement rates that they do not come
close to reflecting the true market value for medical services, good, and supplies.” Id.
Chapman does not state how he arrives at these conclusions. Instead of providing the
underlying analyses for his opinions, he simply stacks one conclusory statement upon another.
By not fleshing out any details, the report does not tie the alleged departure from the standard of
care to specific facts of the case. Such a failure renders his report statutorily inadequate. See
Bowie Mem’ Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should sustain Memorial Hermann’s objections
to the expert report of Mare Chapman.
Respectfully submitted,
BECK REDDEN LLP
By
A. Gannaway
‘ate Bar No. 24036617
Jas Brar
State Bar No. 24059483
1221 McKinney Street, Suite 4500
Houston, Texas 77010
Tel: 713-951-3700
Fax: 713-951-3720
Email: ggannaway@beckredden.com
jbrar@beckredden.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
MEMORIAL HERMANN HEALTH SYSTEM F/K/A
MEMORIAL HERMANN HospPITAL SYSTEM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be
served on counsel of record in accordance with Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure on this Ist day of July, 2013, by facsimile:
Robert W. Painter Dan Johnston
PAINTER LAW FIRM, PLLC Jared Johnson
12750 Champion Forest Dr. SULLINS, JOHNSTON, ROHRBACH & MAGERS
Houston, Texas 777066 3200 Southwest Freeway
Via Facsimile: 281-580-8802 Houston, Texas 77027
Via Facsimile: 713-521-3242
Richard R. Morrison
Kenneth W. Burch
LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD MORRISON
1100 Highway 146, Suite A
Kemah, Texas 77565
Via Facsimile: 281-535-0458
By
RAR
Preview
Filed 13 J uly 1 P2:46 Chris Daniel - District Clerk Harris Coun! ED101) 017: 3008 By: Rhonda M. Momon CAUSE NO. 2012-75581 MEMORIAL HERMANN HEALTH IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SYSTEM F/K/A MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSPITAL SYSTEM Plaintiff, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS Vv. IGNACIO ALANIZ, 125TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Defendant. PLAINTIFF/COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT MEMORIAL HERMANN'S OBJECTIONS TO EXPERT REPORT OF MARC CHAPMAN Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Memorial Hermann Health System f/k/a Memorial Hermann Hospital System (“Memorial Hermann”) hereby files these Objections to the Expert Report of Marc Chapman submitted by Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Ignacio Alaniz (“Alaniz”). INTRODUCTION Alaniz alleges that his counterclaim against Memorial Hermann is governed by Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Under Section 74.351, Alaniz would be required to submit an expert report to support his claims against Memorial Hermann. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(a). In an attempt to satisfy this requirement, Alaniz submitted a report from Mare Chapman (“Chapman”), a non-physician, who purports to an expert regarding the reasonableness of charges for medical services. Memorial Hermann takes no position at this time as to whether Chapter 74 applies to the counterclaim. However, out of an abundance of caution, Memorial Hermann notes that, to the extent that Alaniz’s counterclaim is governed by Chapter 74, Chapman’s report fails to meet the requirements set forth in the statute. Specifically, it does not establish that he is qualified to render the opinions set forth in his report. To make matters worse, Chapman’s report is entirely silent on the appropriate standard of care, how Memorial Hermann breached that standard, and how that breach caused Alaniz’s alleged injuries. Therefore, as explained in more detail below, Memorial Hermann objects to Chapman’s report under Chapter 74. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Memorial Hermann brought this lawsuit because Alaniz has refused and failed to pay for medical services he received from Memorial Hermann. See Original Petition at { 6-8. Alaniz sought treatment from Memorial Hermann for serious, life-threatening injuries, whereby he incurred a total of $456,675.23 in fees and expenses. Id. at Sec. IX.A. The fees and expenses charged by Memorial Hermann were usual, customary, and reasonable. Id. at 19. Nevertheless, Alaniz has refused to pay what he owes to Memorial Hermann. Jd. at 6. As a result, Memorial Hermann brought claims for a suit on a sworn account and quantum meruit against Alaniz. Jd. at 4 6-9. On June 10, 2013, Alaniz filed a counterclaim against Memorial Hermann, alleging that Memorial Hermann billed him for services at rates that were grossly in excess of the usual, customary, and reasonable rates for such services. See Original Counterclaim at ¥ 19. Alaniz claims that Memorial Hermann violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by allegedly (1) engaging in false, misleading, and deceptive acts, and (2) taking advantage of Alaniz’s lack of knowledge and ability to a grossly unfair degree, Id. at {{ 12-19. Alaniz alleges that his counterclaim is governed by Chapter 74. Jd. at (24. In an attempt to meet the requirement of Section 74.351, Alaniz provided the report and curriculum vitae of Chapman. See Ex. 1,2. In his report, Chapman purports to determine what a reasonable amount would be for the services provided by Memorial Hermann. Ex. 1 at 2. He concludes that the reasonable charge for Memorial Hermann’s services is only $218,286.96. Id. To the extent that Alaniz’s counterclaim is governed by Chapter 74, the report of Chapman is insufficient under the statute. For the reasons set forth below, Memorial Herman objects to Chapman’s report. ARGUMENT Under Chapter 74, within 120 days from filing suit, a claimant is required to serve on each physician or health care provider at least one expert report in support of the claims. TEX. Civ. Prac. & REM. CODE § 74.351(a). This requirement is designed to promptly identify frivolous lawsuits while preserving meritorious claims. Constancio v. Bray, 266 S.W.3d 149, 163 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). Objections to the sufficiency of the report must be made no later than the twenty-first day after the date the report was served or all objections are waived. Id. § 74.351(a). By filing this motion within the prescribed period, Memorial Hermann hereby objects to the sufficiency of Chapman’s report under Chapter 74. A Requirements Under Chapter 74 for an Expert Report. Under Chapter 74, and expert report is defined as: a written report by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert’s opinions ... regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed. Id. § 74.351(1)(6). Thus, the expert report must include the expert’s opinions on the standard of care, breach, and causation. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878-79 (Tex. 2001). In detailing these elements, the report must provide enough information to fulfill two purposes. Gray v. CHCA Bayshore L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The report must (1) inform the defendant of the specific conduct the plaintiff has called into question; and (2) provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit. Id. (citing Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879); see also Patel v. Williams, 237 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Importantly, the report must set forth more than just the expert’s conclusions. The expert must explain the basis for his statements and link his conclusions to the facts. Gray, 189 S.W.3d at 859 (citing Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002)). In assessing the report’s sufficiency, the trial court must refrain from drawing inferences and must instead rely only on the information contained within the report itself. Jd. The report cannot merely state the expert’s conclusions about the statutory elements. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879. “[RJather, the expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts.” Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52 (quoting Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. 1999)). B Chapman’s Report is Inadequate Under Chapter 74 Because it Fails to Establish the Requisite Qualifications for His Opinions. Alaniz has not made the requisite showing that Chapman is qualified to offer an opinion regarding the applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by Memorial Hermann failed to meet the standards, or the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm or damages claimed by Alaniz. Chapter 74 prescribes standards for qualifying an “expert” to render an expert report. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 74.351(1)(5)(C); 74.403(a). To be so qualified, an expert must have knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific issue before the court that would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject. Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996). In assessing whether a witness is qualified on the basis of training or experience to render expert opinions, a trial court shall consider whether the proffered witness (1) is board certified or has other substantial training or experience “in an area of medical practice relevant to the claim,” and (2) is actively practicing “in rendering medical care services relevant to the claim.” TEX. Civ. Prac. & REM. CODE § 74.401(c). Here, Chapman fails to state within the four corners of his report that (1) he has knowledge of the accepted standards of hospital billing practices, or (2) he is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer opinions as to those standards. Chapman merely makes a global and conclusory assertion in his report that “[f]rom my education, background, and experience, I am familiar with the accepted standards for hospital billing practices.” Ex. 1 at 1. However, Chapman’s report fails to state his qualifications to offer an opinion regarding the causal relationship between any alleged departure from the accepted standards of care of Memorial Hermann’s billing practices and the alleged injuries experienced by Alaniz. Texas courts routinely hold reports like Chapman’s fail to pass muster under Chapter 74. See, e.g., Methodist Health Care Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd. v. Rangel, 2005 WL 3445994, at * 2-3 (Tex. App—San Antonio Dec. 14, 2005, pet. denied) (holding doctor was not qualified under section 74.402 where expert report failed to state how the doctor’s experience on a peer review committee and as an administrative director constituted training or experience which qualified him to opine about the standard of care at issue); In re Windisch, 138 S.W.3d 507, 513-14 & n.11 (Tex. App—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding) (holding conclusory statements referencing an expert’s qualifications are insufficient to show the expert is qualified on the particular subject 5 matter at hand when the expert report only tracks the language of the statute and does not bridge the gap between his experience and the medical procedure at issue). Further, Chapman is not a physician; nor does he have any medical training. He has failed to show that he is qualified to render opinions concerning the reasonableness of Memorial Hermann’s charges for medical services. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.401(c); see also Marks y. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 671 (Tex. 2010) (requiring the plaintiff to have a physician opine on the proper maintenance and construction of a hospital bed). Cc Chapman’s Report is Inadequate Under Chapter 74 Because it Fails to Set Forth the Standard of Care, Breach, and Causation. In addition to Chapman’s complete lack of stated qualifications, his report wholly fails to meet the statutory requirements of Chapter 74. Specifically, Chapman’s report fails to set forth in sufficient detail the standard of care, breach, or causation. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878-79. To begin, Chapman’s report fails explain the standard of care applicable to Memorial Hermann’s billing practices. “The standard of care for a hospital is what an ordinarily prudent hospital would do under the same or similar circumstances.” Jd. at 880. Chapman’s report fails to articulate what an ordinary prudent hospital would do under the same or similar circumstances. This defect is fatal to his report. Jd. (“Identifying the standard of care is critical”). Chapman’s report similarly fails to explain how Memorial Herman breached the applicable standard of care. At a minimum, the report is required to identify “specific information about what the defendant should have done differently.” Jd. Chapman’s report is entirely silent on this required element. Chapman’s report also fails to explain the causal relationship between any alleged breaches of the standard of care and Alaniz’s alleged injuries. In addition to failing to set forth the required elements, the report is plagued by conclusory statements. The seminal Texas case on causation is Bowie Memorial Hospital v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. 2002). In Wright, the Supreme Court held that an expert report must express the causal relationship in terms of reasonable medical probability and must summarize the causal relationship between the failure to meet the applicable standard of care and injury. Jd. at 53. Ultimately, the Court held the expert report lacked information linking the expert’s conclusion to the alleged breach. Id. Following Wright, most courts require the expert to “explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts.” Jd. at 52. In other words, the expert must link the breach of the standard of care to the alleged injury. Jd. That link cannot be speculative or conclusory, and must be rooted in facts. /d. Chapman’s report does not state with any specificity how Memorial Hermann’s alleged departure from the standard of care caused Alaniz’s injury. Instead, the report provides only the conclusory statement that “hospital prices have risen disproportionally to their cost.” Ex. 1 at 1. This conclusory statement is followed by another that states “hospital charges are so disproportionate to the cost of care and the actual reimbursement rates that they do not come close to reflecting the true market value for medical services, good, and supplies.” Id. Chapman does not state how he arrives at these conclusions. Instead of providing the underlying analyses for his opinions, he simply stacks one conclusory statement upon another. By not fleshing out any details, the report does not tie the alleged departure from the standard of care to specific facts of the case. Such a failure renders his report statutorily inadequate. See Bowie Mem’ Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court should sustain Memorial Hermann’s objections to the expert report of Mare Chapman. Respectfully submitted, BECK REDDEN LLP By A. Gannaway ‘ate Bar No. 24036617 Jas Brar State Bar No. 24059483 1221 McKinney Street, Suite 4500 Houston, Texas 77010 Tel: 713-951-3700 Fax: 713-951-3720 Email: ggannaway@beckredden.com jbrar@beckredden.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF MEMORIAL HERMANN HEALTH SYSTEM F/K/A MEMORIAL HERMANN HospPITAL SYSTEM CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served on counsel of record in accordance with Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this Ist day of July, 2013, by facsimile: Robert W. Painter Dan Johnston PAINTER LAW FIRM, PLLC Jared Johnson 12750 Champion Forest Dr. SULLINS, JOHNSTON, ROHRBACH & MAGERS Houston, Texas 777066 3200 Southwest Freeway Via Facsimile: 281-580-8802 Houston, Texas 77027 Via Facsimile: 713-521-3242 Richard R. Morrison Kenneth W. Burch LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD MORRISON 1100 Highway 146, Suite A Kemah, Texas 77565 Via Facsimile: 281-535-0458 By RAR