Preview
FILED
3/19/2021 1:38 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Margaret Thomas DEPUTY
CAUSE NO. DC-21-01489
MORGAN BERTRAND, IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff
vs.
134™ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES USA, INC
HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL
DRILLING CO.; AERION RENTAL SERVICES,
LL. ; AND AERION, L.L.C.,
Defendants. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
No material ties exist between this lawsuit and Dallas County. Defendants Pioneer Natural
Resources USA, Inc. (“Pioneer”) and Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. (“H&P”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) file this Joint Motion to Transfer Venue to Midland County, Texas pursuant to Tex. Civ. PRAC.
& Rem. Cope Section 15.002(b) for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of
justice. Enacted as a meaningful reform to promote fairness and balance in our venue laws and end venue
gamesmanship, Section 15.002(b) gives the trial court the ability to balance the competing interests
involved in finding a fair place to try a lawsuit and the power to transfer cases to the venue in which they
sensibly belong. This lawsuit is Plaintiff's second attempt to litigate this matterin a venue wholly unrelated
to the facts underlying his claims. Plaintiff previously filed an identical lawsuit in Bexar County, Texas—.
venue likewise wholly unrelated to the underlying facts—but nonsuited that case (on the day of the venue
hearing) after Pioneer and H&P moved to transfer venue. In the meantime, he refiled in Dallas County,
which, like Bexar County, has no meaningful relationship to any aspect of this case. This is a personal-
injury case in which Plaintiff alleges he suffered injuries after stepping in a hole near a “drying shaker”
machine at “a land-based oil and gas drilling site in Midland County, Texas.” (PI.’s Orig. Pet. at 4] 4.1)
(emphasis added). On information and belief, everything relative to this lawsuit happened or is located in
Midland County—over 300 miles from Plaintiff's [second] chosen venue. Section 15.002(b) was enacted
to prevent forum shopping and provide an avenue for common-sense relief in circumstances where, as
here, there are no material ties to the Plaintiff's choice of forum. Accordingly, the Court should transfer
venue to Midland County.
I
FACTUAL BACKG ROUND
Plaintiff filed this personal injury action as the result of an alleged incident on November 17, 2019.
Plaintiff claims he fell into an unmarked hole cut into the grating around a “drying shaker” (“the Incident”)
t “a land-based oil and gas drilling site in Midland County, Texas” (“the Premises”).1 Plaintiff filed this
lawsuit against Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc., the operator of the well site (“Pioneer”); Helmerich
& Payne International Drilling Co., (the drilling contractor) (“H&P”), Aerion Rental Services, L.L.C., and
Aerion, L.L.C., (the provider of the drying shaker) (collectively “Aerion”), alleging ordinary negligence and
premises liability claims against all defendants.”
Ih.
THE BEXAR COUNTY LAWSUIT, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND NONSUIT
On November 16, 2020 (before filing the instant lawsuit), Plaintiff first filed an identical lawsuit
against Defendants, among others (including Aerion), in Bexar County, Texas—another venue over 300
miles away from the Premises and, upon information and belief, the bulk of the evidence and witnesses
(“the Bexar County Lawsuit”). The propriety of Plaintiff's venue choice in Bexar County, Texas depended
exclusively upon his joinder of several entities (“the Non-Related Entities”) that had no involvement with
Plaintiff, the Incident, or the Premises.*
On January 8, 2021, Pioneer, H&P, and the Non-Related Entities (not sued herein) filed a Joint
Motion to Transfer Venue under Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE Section 15.002(b).> Plaintiff did not respond
1 See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at p. 2, 91 4.1 (emphasis added).
2 See id. at pp. 3- 6, 115.1 - 5.3.
3 See 11/16/20 PI.’s Orig. Pet. in Cause No. 2020-Cl-22255, Morgan Bertrand v. Pioneer Energy Services, Corp.,
Pioneer Well Services, LLC, Pioneer Coiled Tubing Services, LLC, Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., Aerion
Rental Services, L.L.C., and Aerion, L.L.C. in the 73rd Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas (hereafter, “the
Bexar County Lawsuit”), attached hereto as Exhibit A; see also 11/20/20 PI.’s 1st Am. Pet. filed in the Bexar County
Lawsuit, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4 In the Bexar County Lawsuit, Plaintiff also sued Pioneer Energy Services, Corp., Pioneer Drilling Services, LTD,
Pioneer Well Services, LLC, Pioneer Wireline Services, LLC, and Pioneer Coiled Tubing Services, LLC (hereafter,
collectively, “the non-related ‘Pioneer’ entities”) which may have maintained principal offices in Bexar County,
Texas. Although the non-related “Pioneer” entities have a similar name as Defendant Pioneer Natural Resources
USA, Inc., Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. is an entirely separate and unrelated company.
5 See 1/8/21 Defs.’ Joint. Mot. to Transfer Venue and Notice of Hearing filed in the Bexar County Lawsuit, attached
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 2
to the Motion to Transfer Venue but instead, on January 21, 2021 filed a Notice of Nonsuit dismissing
without prejudice his Bexar County Lawsuit claims against all named defendants therein except Pioneer.®
On February 2, 2021, while his claims were still pending against Pioneer in Bexar County, Plaintiff filed the
instant lawsuit in Dallas County, Texas against all the same Bexar-County Defendants except the Non-
Related Entities, alleging identical claims as in the Bexar County Lawsuit.’
As a result, for a month, Plaintiff
was litigating two identical lawsuits in two different Texas counties, neither of which had any material
connection to the case. On the day of the hearing on the Motion to Transfer Venue in Bexar County,
Texas—still without ever filing a response to the Motion—Plaintiff nonsuited Pioneer while the Motion to
Transfer Venue was still pending.®
i.
SPECIFIC DENIAL OF VENUE FACTS
In support of this Motion to Transfer Venue, Defendants make the following specific denials,
which establish that Dallas County, even if technically “proper,” is not the appropriate venue for this
lawsuit and, that instead, Midland County is both proper and convenient:
(1) Defendants specifically deny that the incident made the basis of this lawsuit occurred
in Dallas County, Texas. Instead, it occurred in Midland County.
(2) Defendants specifically deny, upon information and belief, that the persons with
knowledge of the incident made the basis of this lawsuit reside in Dallas County,
Texas—including Plaintiff, involved personnel of Defendants, and third-party fact and
medical witnesses, if any. Instead, upon information and belief, many are believed to
reside or be found in or around Midland County.
(3) Defendants specifically deny, upon information and belief, that any property or
physical evidence involved in the incident made the basis of this lawsuit is located in
Dallas County, Texas. Instead, upon information and belief, most if not all of the
relevant physical evidence is located in Midland County.
hereto as Exhibit C.
© See 1/21/21 PI.’s Notice of Nonsuit Without Prejudice filed in the Bexar County Lawsuit, attached hereto as
Exhibit D.
7 See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. herein.
8 See 3/3/21 Pl.’s Notice of Nonsuit Without Prejudice filed in the Bexar County Lawsuit, attached hereto as Exhibit
E.
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 3
(4) Lastly, Defendants specifically deny that Plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana who was
present in Midland County at the times relevant to this incident and lawsuit, would
be prejudiced or burdened by a transfer to Midland County—particularly in light of
his willingness to litigate this case in two Texas counties over 300 miles away from his
place of residence and which bear no relation to the underlying incident.
IV.
ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITY
A. The General Venue Rules.
No mandatory venue statute applies in this case. Absent an applicable mandatory venue
provision, the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides that “all lawsuits shall be brought: (1) in the
county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) in
the county of defendant’s residence at the time the cause of action accrued if defendant is a natural
person; (3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural
person; or (4) if Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) do not apply, in the county in which the plaintiff resided at
the time of the accrual of the cause of action.° As there are no defendants who are natural persons and
Plaintiff is a resident of Louisiana, only subsections (1) and (3) apply in this matter.
B. Section 15.002(b) Provides for Transfer on the Basis of Convenience in the Interest of Fairness and
Common Sense.
In 1995, the Texas Legislature undertook comprehensive venue reform. As part of this reform, the
legislature amended the Texas venue statutory framework to include Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE Sec.
15.002(b). That section, under which Defendants now seek relief, was enacted to prevent forum shopping
and provide an avenue for common-sense relief in circumstances where, as here, there are no material
ties to Plaintiff’s choice of forum.?° Section 15.002(b) provides:
“For the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, a court
may transfer an action from a county of proper venue under this subchapter... to any
other county of proper venue on motion of a defendant filed and served concurrently
with or before the filing of the answer, where the court finds: (1) maintenance of the
action in the county of suit would work an injustice to the movant considering the
° Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(a).
1° See Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex. 2004).
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 4
movant’s economic and personal hardship; (2) the balance of interests of all the parties
predominates in favor of the action being brought in the other county; and (3) the transfer
of the action would not work an injustice to any other party. wid
Proponents of the amendment described section 15.002(b) as a “meaningful reform” to promote
“fairness and balance in our venue laws,” giving the trial court the ability to balance all the competing
interests involved in determining a fair place within the venue statute to try a lawsuit.’? The legislative
history likewise indicates that the “transfer[-]for[-]convenience statute was intended ‘to make sure that
venue is not a game any longer’ by giving trial judges some power to ensure cases were tried where they
sensibly belonged...”
Defendants do not dispute that both Midland County and Dallas County are procedurally proper
venues in this case.'* Between those, however, Midland County is the only sensible and convenient choice.
All of the Section 15.002(b) factors weigh heavily in favor of a transfer to Midland County. Further,
Subsection (c) provides “[a] court’s ruling or decision to grant or deny a transfer under Subsection (b) is
not grounds for appeal or mandamus and is not reversible error.”15
C. Venue is Proper in Midland County, Texas.
It is undisputed that the entirety of the Incident giving rise to the claim occurred in Midland
County, Texas—over 300 miles from Dallas County.’® Therefore, Midland County is a county of proper
venue for this matter under Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE 15.002(a)(1) (“the county in which all or a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”).
D. All Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer of the Action to Midland County.
All three Section 15.002(b) factors point toward transferring venue to Midland. First, transferring
11 Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(b).
22 Lawrence Morales II, Comment, /sn’t That Convenient? Texas Venue Transfers Based on Convenience After Garza
v. Garcia, S7 Baylor L. Rev. 905, 912 (2005) (citing Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 44 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (citing An Act
Relating to Venue for Civil Actions: Debate on Tex. $.B. 32 on the Floor of the House, 74th Leg., R.S. 4 (May 3, 1995)
(testimony of Rep. Duncan) (transcript available at the Texas State Law Library))).
33 See id. (citing at 40 (majority opinion)).
14 Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(a)(1), (3).
15 Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(c).
16 Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at p. 2, 114.1.
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 5
venue to Midland County will not work an injustice to any other party. Plaintiff is a resident of Louisiana.
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff worked in Midland County. Moreover, Plaintiff previously
attempted to litigate this case in Bexar County, Texas. Plaintiff is no more burdened litigating the case in
Midland County than he is litigating in Bexar or Dallas County. Likewise, Defendants perceive no injustice
to themselves and there is no evidence that Defendant Aerion would be prejudiced by transferring the
case to Midland County, Texas.
Second, the balance of interests of all the parties weighs in favor of transfer. Upon information
and belief, no persons with relevant knowledge regarding the incident in question reside in Dallas County,
Texas. Nor is any relevant, material physical evidence or property located in Dallas County, Texas. On the
contrary, upon information and belief, most (if not all) material evidence and witnesses are in Midland
County:
The well-site where the accident happened is in Midland County.
Plaintiff was acting in the course and scope of his work in Midland County at the time of
the accident.””
Plaintiff was treated for his injuries, at least initially, by medical providers in Midland
County.
Operations and involved personnel for Defendants’ relative to the subject premises
were/are based primarily out of their Midland offices.
As such (and third), maintenance of the action in Dallas County would work an injustice to
Defendants as it will require the Defendants’ involved personnel still living and/or working in or around
Midland County to travel to Dallas for trial.
Put simply, Midland County is the more convenient forum for access to proof. The ancillary costs
to all parties, third-party witnesses and the Court for discovery and trial (including, for example, the
expense of transporting evidence, property, witnesses, and possibly members of the jury for inspections,
depositions, trial, and/or jury views) will be reduced by moving suit to Midland County, which is the
7 Id.
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 6
County where, upon information and belief, most of those witnesses, evidence, and property are already
located.
V.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. and
Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. respectfully pray that venue in this matter be transferred
from Dallas County, Texas to Midland County, Texas under Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(b) for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. Defendants further pray for such
other and further relief that they may show themselves justly entitled, in law or in equity.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/DonnaC.Peavier
Donna C. Peavler
State Bar No. 00783887
dpeavler: eavierbriscoe.com
Sara Kimbrough Scudday
State Bar No. 24073675
scudday@peavlerbriscoe.com
PEAVLER| BRISCOE
2215 Westgate Plaza
Grapevine, Texas 76051
(214) 999-0550 (telephone)
(214) 999-0551 (facsimile)
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PIONEER NATURAL
RESOURCES USA, INC.
And
BAKER & MCKENZIE, LLP
/s/ Meghan Hausler (with permission
Michelle Hartmann
State Bar No. 24032402
Michelle. hartmann@bakermckenzie.com
Meghan Hausler
State Bar No. 24074267
Meghan.hausler@bakermckenzie.com
1900 North Pearl Street, Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 978-3000 (telephone)
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 7
(214) 978-3099 (facsimile)
Katie L. Zinecker
State Bar No. 24106623
Katie.zinecker@bakermckenzie.com
700 Louisiana, Suite 3000
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 427-5000 (telephone)
(713) 427-5099 (facsimile)
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT HELMERICH & PAYNE
INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
| hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to all
counsel of record pursuant to and in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on March 19,
2021.
/s/ Donna C. Peavler
Donna C. Peavler
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 8
EXHIBIT A
Exhibit A
FILED
11/16/2020 11:54 AM
Mary Angie Garcia
Bexar County District Clerk
Accepted By: Maria Jackson
2020C122255
CAUSE NO.
MORGAN BERTRAND IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiff,
VS.
PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES,
CORP.; PIONEER DRILLING
SERVICES, LTD; PIONEER WELL BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
SERVICES, LLC; PIONEER
WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC;
PIONEER COILED TUBING
SERVICES, LLC; HELMERICH &
PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING
CO.; AERION RENTAL SERVICES,
L.L.C.; AND AERION, L.L.C.
Defendants. 73rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, Plaintiff MORGAN BERTRAND, complaining of PPONEER ENERGY
SERVICES, CORP.; PIONEER DRILLING SERVICES, LTD; PIONEER WELL SERVICES,
LLC; PIONEER WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC; PIONEER COILED TUBING SERVICES, LLC;
HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO.; AERION RENTAL SERVICES,
L.L.C.; AND AERION, L.L.C.; collectively the “Defendants”, and files this Original Petition and
for cause of action would respectfully show the following:
1. DISCOVERY LEVEL
1.1 Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery in this matter under Level 3 of Rule 190 of
the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II. PARTIES
21 Plaintiff, MORGAN BERTRAND, is a resident of Jefferson Davis Parish, State of
Louisiana.
2.2 Defendant, PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES, CORP., a Texas corporation, is
registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital
Corporate Services, Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation
is requested at this time.
2.3 Defendant, PIONEER DRILLING SERVICES, LTD, a Texas corporation, is
registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital
Corporate Services, Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation
is requested at this time.
24 Defendant, PPONEER WELL SERVICES, LLC, a Texas corporation, is registered
to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital Corporate Services,
Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation is requested at thi:
time.
2.5 Defendant, PIONEER WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC, a Texas corporation, is
registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital
Corporate Services, Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation
is requested at this time.
2.6 Defendant, HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO., a
Oklahoma corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its
registered agent, Corporation Service Company d/b/a CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service
Company, 211 E. 7 Street, Ste. 620, Austin, Texas 78701-3218. Issuance of citation is requested
at this time.
2.7 Defendant, AERION RENTAL SERVICES, LLC, a Louisiana corporation, is
registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Gary W. Miller,
Page 2
2925 Richmond Ave., 14" Floor, Houston, Texas 77098. Issuance of citation is requested at thi:
time.
2.8 Defendant, AERION, LLC, a Louisiana corporation, is registered to do business in
Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Gary W. Miller, 2925 Richmond Ave., 14"
Floor, Houston, Texas 77098. Issuance of citation is requested at this time.
I. VENUE
el Venue is proper and maintainable in Bexar County, Texas, under the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.
IV. BACKGROUND FACTS
4.1 On November 17, 2019, Plaintiff, MORGAN BERTRAND, was working in the
course and scope of his employment as a Technician/Operator with Tier One Rental and
Distribution on a land-based oil and gas drilling site in Midland County, Texas. The Plaintiff was
working on an AERION Drying Shaker when suddenly and without warning, Plaintiff fell into an
unmarked hole, which had been previously cut into grating on the equipment.
42 At all times mentioned herein, Defendants, PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES,
CORP., PIONEER DRILLING SERVICES, LTD, PIONEER WELL SERVICES, LLC,
PIONEER WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC, and/or PONEER COILED TUBING SERVICES, LLC
(hereinafter “PIONEER”) were the operators and/or leaseholders of the oil and gas well upon
which the work was being performed.
43 Furthermore, PIONEER, employed the Company Man and/or Person in Charge
(PIC) of the operations on the jobsite. PIONEER was responsible for planning, overseeing, and/or
supervising the work being performed on the jobsite
Page 3
44 At all times mentioned herein, defendant, HELMERICH & PAYNE
INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO. (hereinafter “H&P”), owned and operated H&P Drilling Rig
641 which was positioned and operating on the jobsite. H&P was responsible for planning,
overseeing, and/or supervising the work being performed on the jobsite.
4.5 Atall times mentioned herein, Defendants, AERION RENTAL SERVICES, L.L.C.
and/or AERION, L.L.C. (hereinafter “AERION”) owned and operated various Closed-Loop Waste
Management Systems (Drying Shaker) which were equipment integral to and incorporated into
H&P Drilling Rig 641. AERION was responsible for planning, overseeing, and/or supervising the
work being performed on the jobsite.
4.3 Nothing Plaintiff did, or failed to do, caused the incident in question. Rather, it was
the negligence of the Defendants, individually and collectively, named herein which proximately
caused the occurrence and Plaintiff's resulting injuries and damages.
¥V. CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE
Sel Said accident, resulting in injuries and damages to Plaintiff, MORGAN
BERTRAND, was a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or fault of Defendant,
PIONEER, its employees, agents or others for whom it is responsible in the following non-
exclusive particulars:
A Failure to provide a safe place to work;
B Negligent job planning, coordination and/or communication;
Negligent training;
Negligent supervision;
Failure to properly inspect site before authorizing the commencement of work;
Negligent authorization of work when it was unsafe to do so;
Page 4
Creating and/or permitting the existence of unreasonably dangerous conditions
upon the job site;
Failure to remedy unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site for which it
had actual and/or constructive knowledge;
Failure to warn of a condition which it knew or should have known to present an
unreasonable risk of harm;
Improper, inadequate equipment;
Negligent maintenance, inspection and/or repair of equipment on job site;
Violation of state and federal safety rules and regulations;
Violation of company rules and regulations created for the safety of individuals
working on its job site;
Any other acts of negligence which may be revealed at or before the trial of this
matter.
5.2 Said accident, resulting in injuries and damages to Plaintiff, MORGAN
BERTRAND, was a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or fault of Defendant, H&P,
its employees, agents or others for whom it is responsible in the following non-exclusive
particulars:
A Failure to provide a safe place to work;
B Negligent job planning, coordination and/or communication;
Negligent training;
Negligent supervision;
Failure to properly inspect site before authorizing the commencement of work;
Negligent authorization of work when it was unsafe to do so;
Creating and/or permitting the existence of unreasonably dangerous conditions
upon the job site;
Failure to remedy unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site for which it
had actual and/or constructive knowledge;
Page 5
Failure to warn of a condition which it knew or should have known to present an
unreasonable risk of harm;
Improper, inadequate equipment;
Negligent maintenance, inspection and/or repair of equipment on job site;
Violation of state and federal safety rules and regulations;
Violation of company rules and regulations created for the safety of individuals
working on its job site;
Any other acts of negligence which may be revealed at or before the trial of this
matter.
a) Said accident, resulting in injuries and damages to Plaintiff, MORGAN
BERTRAND, was a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or fault of Defendant,
AERION, its employees, agents or others for whom it is responsible in the following non-exclusive
particulars:
A Failure to provide a safe place to work;
B Negligent job planning, coordination and/or communication;
Negligent training;
Negligent supervision;
Failure to properly inspect site before authorizing the commencement of work;
Negligent authorization of work when it was unsafe to do so;
Creating and/or permitting the existence of unreasonably dangerous conditions
upon the job site;
Failure to remedy unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site for which it
had actual and/or constructive knowledge;
Failure to warn of a condition which it knew or should have known to present an
unreasonable risk of harm;
Improper, inadequate equipment;
Page 6
Negligent maintenance, inspection and/or repair of equipment on job site;
Violation of state and federal safety rules and regulations;
Violation of company rules and regulations created for the safety of individuals
working on its job site;
Any other acts of negligence which may be revealed at or before the trial of this
matter.
VI. MISNOMER AND ASSUMED NAME
6.1 In the event any parties are misnamed and/or not included herein, such entities
are/were “alter egos." Plaintiff relies on Texas Civil Statutes Article 6133 Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 28 to properly identify the corporate Defendants herein.
VII. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
dell The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case because the event is of a kind which
does not ordinarily occur in the absence negligence; other responsible causes are sufficiently
eliminated by the evidence; and the negligence is with the scope of Defendants’ duties.
VIII. DAMAGES
8.1 Plaintiff seeks all available damages within the jurisdictional limits of this Court in
excess of $1 million including but not limited to:
Compensatory damages
Actual damages
Consequential damages
Lost future income
Lost past income
Past medical care
Future medical care
Past pain and suffering
Future pain and suffering
Past mental anguish
Future mental anguish
Past impairment
Future impairment
Page 7
Past disfigurement
Future disfigurement
Past loss of household services
Future loss of household services
Past loss of consortium
Future loss of consortium
Interest on damages (pre- and post-judgment)
Court costs
Deposition costs
Exemplary damages
Other relief as the Court may deem just and proper
IX. PRE- AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
91 Plaintiff will additionally show that he is entitled to recover pre and post-judgment
interest in accordance with law and equity as part of his damages herein, and Plaintiff here and
now sues for recovery of pre and post-judgment interest as provided by law and equity, under the
applicable provision of the laws of the State of Texas.
X. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSU!
10.1 Pursuant to Rule 194 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants are
requested to disclose the information and material described in Rule 194.2 within fifty (50) days
of the service of this request.
XI. PRAYER
11.1 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Defendants be
cited to appear and answer and that, upon final trial hereof, Plaintiff have judgment against
Defendants, jointly and severally, that he recover damages in accordance with the evidence, that
he recover costs of Court herein expended, that he recover interest, both pre- and post-judgment
to which he is entitled under the law, and for such other and further relief, both general and special,
legal and equitable, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled.
Page 8
Respectfully submitted,
FARRAR & BALL, LLP
/s/ David J. Romagosa
DAVID J. ROMAGOSA
State Bar No. 24047493
1117 Herkimer Street
Houston, Texas 77008
Telephone: 713.221.8300
Telecopier: 713.221.8301
Email: david@fbtrial.com
~and~
ANDERSON DOZIER BLANDA & SALTZMAN
/s/ Nicholas A. Blanda
NICHOLAS A. BLANDA (La. Bar No. 29093)
Pending admission Pro Hac Vice
P.O. Box 82008
Lafayette, LA 70598-2008
(337) 233-3366 — phone
(337) 233-3163 — fax
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
Page 9
EXHIBIT B
Exhibit B
° CT Corporation Service of Process
Transmittal
12/02/2020
CT Log Number 538681801
TO: Jeff Rees
Pioneer Natural Resources Usa, Inc.
777 HIDDEN RI
IRVING, TX 75038-3802
RE: Process Served in Texas
FOR: PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY (Domestic State: DE)
ENCLOSED ARE COPIES OF LEGAL PROCESS RECEIVED BY THE STATUTORY AGENT OF THE ABOVE COMPANY AS FOLLOWS:
TITLE OF ACTION: MORGAN BERTRAND, PLTF. vs. PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES, CORP., ET AL., DFTS. //
TO: PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY
DOCUMENT(S) SERVED:
COURTIAGENCY: None Specified
Case # 2020C122255
NATURE OF ACTION: Personal Injury - Failure to Maintain Premises in a Safe Condition
ON WHOM PROCESS WAS SERVED: CT Corporation System, Dallas, TX
DATE AND HOUR OF SERVICE: By Process Server on 12/02/2020 at 03:28
JURISDICTION SERVED: Texas
APPEARANCE OR ANSWER DUE: None Specified
ATTORNEY(S) | SENDER(S): None Specified
ACTION ITEMS: CT has retained the current log, Retain Date: 12/02/2020, Expected Purge Date:
12/07/2020
Image SOP
Email Notification, Jeff Rees jeff.rees@pxd.com
Email Notification, Doug Wall Douglas.Wall@pxd.com
Email Notification, Kimberly Turvan kimberly.turvan@pxd.com
‘SIGNED: CT Corporation System
ADDRESS: 1999 Bryan Street
Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75201
For Questions: 866-665-5799
SouthTeam2@wolterskluwer.com
Page1 of 1/ VN
Information displayed on this transmittal is for CT
Corporation's record keeping purposes only and is provided to
the recipient for quick reference. This information does not
constitute a legal opinion as to the nature of action, the
amount of damages, the answer date, or any information
contained in the documents themselves. Recipient is
responsible for interpreting said documents and for taking
appropriate action. Signatures on certified mail receipts
confirm receipt of package only, not contents.
d. Wolters Kluwer
PROCESS SERVER DELIVERY DETAILS
Date: Wed, Dec 2, 2020
ao a
Server Name: Anthony Collins
Entity Served PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY
Agent Name CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
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‘Case Number 2020-Cl-22255
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2020CI22255 saoe08
MORGAN BERTRAND
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
VS.
73rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES CORP ET AL BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
(Note:Attached Document May Contain Additional Litigants.)
CITATION
“THE STATE OF TEXAS”
Directed To: PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY
BY SERVING ITS REGISTERED AGENT, CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
"You have been sued. You may employ an attorney. If you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the clerk who issued this
citation by 10:00 am. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days after you were served this CITATION and FIRST
AMENDED PETITION , a default judgment may be taken against you." Said FIRST AMENDED PETITION was filed on the 20th day of
November, 2020.
'SSUED UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT ON THIS 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER A.D., 2020.
DAVID J ROMAGOSA oF BE ay Mary Angie Garcia
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF Bexar County District Clerk
1117 HERKIMER ST ofaof 101 W. Nueva, Suite’ 217
5h San Antonio, Texas 78205
HOUSTON, TX 77008-6745
By: Laura Castillo, Deputy
ae BERTRAND Case Number: 2026-CI-22255
Officer's Return Court: 73rd Judicial District Court
PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES CORP ET AL
| received this CITATION on at o'clock __M. and:( ) executed it by delivering a copy of the CITATION with attached FIRST AMENDED
PETITION the date of delivery endorsed on it to the defendant, in person on the
at o'clock aM al: or ( ) ‘not executed because
Fees: Badge/PPS #: Date certification expires:
County, Texas
By
OR: VERIFICATION OF RETURN (If not served by a peace officer) SWORN TO THIS
NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF TEXAS
OR: Hy nano 18 , my date of birth 1s and my address is
County.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing 1s true and correct. Executed in County, State of Texas, on
the day of. . 28. .
Declarant
RETURN TO COURT (DK802)
‘
.~——! PRIVATE PROCESS
Case Number: 2020-Cl-22255
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20200122265 seeces
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MORGAN> BERTRAND IN THE DISTRICT COURT
vs.
73rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES CORP ET AL BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
(Note:Attached Document Hay Contain Additiona] Litigants.)
CITATION
“THE STATE OF TEXAS’
Directed To; PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY
BY SERVING ITS REGISTERED AGENT, CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
“You have been sued. You may employ an attorney. If you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the clerk who issued this
citation by 10:00 a.m. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days after you were served this CITATION and FIRST
AMENDED PETITION , a default judgment may be taken against you.” Said FIRST AMENDED PETITION was filed on the 20th day of
Nove
Preview
FILED 3/19/2021 1:38 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Margaret Thomas DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-21-01489 MORGAN BERTRAND, IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff vs. 134™ JUDICIAL DISTRICT PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES USA, INC HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO.; AERION RENTAL SERVICES, LL. ; AND AERION, L.L.C., Defendants. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE No material ties exist between this lawsuit and Dallas County. Defendants Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. (“Pioneer”) and Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. (“H&P”) (collectively, “Defendants”) file this Joint Motion to Transfer Venue to Midland County, Texas pursuant to Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Cope Section 15.002(b) for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice. Enacted as a meaningful reform to promote fairness and balance in our venue laws and end venue gamesmanship, Section 15.002(b) gives the trial court the ability to balance the competing interests involved in finding a fair place to try a lawsuit and the power to transfer cases to the venue in which they sensibly belong. This lawsuit is Plaintiff's second attempt to litigate this matterin a venue wholly unrelated to the facts underlying his claims. Plaintiff previously filed an identical lawsuit in Bexar County, Texas—. venue likewise wholly unrelated to the underlying facts—but nonsuited that case (on the day of the venue hearing) after Pioneer and H&P moved to transfer venue. In the meantime, he refiled in Dallas County, which, like Bexar County, has no meaningful relationship to any aspect of this case. This is a personal- injury case in which Plaintiff alleges he suffered injuries after stepping in a hole near a “drying shaker” machine at “a land-based oil and gas drilling site in Midland County, Texas.” (PI.’s Orig. Pet. at 4] 4.1) (emphasis added). On information and belief, everything relative to this lawsuit happened or is located in Midland County—over 300 miles from Plaintiff's [second] chosen venue. Section 15.002(b) was enacted to prevent forum shopping and provide an avenue for common-sense relief in circumstances where, as here, there are no material ties to the Plaintiff's choice of forum. Accordingly, the Court should transfer venue to Midland County. I FACTUAL BACKG ROUND Plaintiff filed this personal injury action as the result of an alleged incident on November 17, 2019. Plaintiff claims he fell into an unmarked hole cut into the grating around a “drying shaker” (“the Incident”) t “a land-based oil and gas drilling site in Midland County, Texas” (“the Premises”).1 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc., the operator of the well site (“Pioneer”); Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., (the drilling contractor) (“H&P”), Aerion Rental Services, L.L.C., and Aerion, L.L.C., (the provider of the drying shaker) (collectively “Aerion”), alleging ordinary negligence and premises liability claims against all defendants.” Ih. THE BEXAR COUNTY LAWSUIT, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND NONSUIT On November 16, 2020 (before filing the instant lawsuit), Plaintiff first filed an identical lawsuit against Defendants, among others (including Aerion), in Bexar County, Texas—another venue over 300 miles away from the Premises and, upon information and belief, the bulk of the evidence and witnesses (“the Bexar County Lawsuit”). The propriety of Plaintiff's venue choice in Bexar County, Texas depended exclusively upon his joinder of several entities (“the Non-Related Entities”) that had no involvement with Plaintiff, the Incident, or the Premises.* On January 8, 2021, Pioneer, H&P, and the Non-Related Entities (not sued herein) filed a Joint Motion to Transfer Venue under Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE Section 15.002(b).> Plaintiff did not respond 1 See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at p. 2, 91 4.1 (emphasis added). 2 See id. at pp. 3- 6, 115.1 - 5.3. 3 See 11/16/20 PI.’s Orig. Pet. in Cause No. 2020-Cl-22255, Morgan Bertrand v. Pioneer Energy Services, Corp., Pioneer Well Services, LLC, Pioneer Coiled Tubing Services, LLC, Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., Aerion Rental Services, L.L.C., and Aerion, L.L.C. in the 73rd Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas (hereafter, “the Bexar County Lawsuit”), attached hereto as Exhibit A; see also 11/20/20 PI.’s 1st Am. Pet. filed in the Bexar County Lawsuit, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 4 In the Bexar County Lawsuit, Plaintiff also sued Pioneer Energy Services, Corp., Pioneer Drilling Services, LTD, Pioneer Well Services, LLC, Pioneer Wireline Services, LLC, and Pioneer Coiled Tubing Services, LLC (hereafter, collectively, “the non-related ‘Pioneer’ entities”) which may have maintained principal offices in Bexar County, Texas. Although the non-related “Pioneer” entities have a similar name as Defendant Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc., Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. is an entirely separate and unrelated company. 5 See 1/8/21 Defs.’ Joint. Mot. to Transfer Venue and Notice of Hearing filed in the Bexar County Lawsuit, attached DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 2 to the Motion to Transfer Venue but instead, on January 21, 2021 filed a Notice of Nonsuit dismissing without prejudice his Bexar County Lawsuit claims against all named defendants therein except Pioneer.® On February 2, 2021, while his claims were still pending against Pioneer in Bexar County, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in Dallas County, Texas against all the same Bexar-County Defendants except the Non- Related Entities, alleging identical claims as in the Bexar County Lawsuit.’ As a result, for a month, Plaintiff was litigating two identical lawsuits in two different Texas counties, neither of which had any material connection to the case. On the day of the hearing on the Motion to Transfer Venue in Bexar County, Texas—still without ever filing a response to the Motion—Plaintiff nonsuited Pioneer while the Motion to Transfer Venue was still pending.® i. SPECIFIC DENIAL OF VENUE FACTS In support of this Motion to Transfer Venue, Defendants make the following specific denials, which establish that Dallas County, even if technically “proper,” is not the appropriate venue for this lawsuit and, that instead, Midland County is both proper and convenient: (1) Defendants specifically deny that the incident made the basis of this lawsuit occurred in Dallas County, Texas. Instead, it occurred in Midland County. (2) Defendants specifically deny, upon information and belief, that the persons with knowledge of the incident made the basis of this lawsuit reside in Dallas County, Texas—including Plaintiff, involved personnel of Defendants, and third-party fact and medical witnesses, if any. Instead, upon information and belief, many are believed to reside or be found in or around Midland County. (3) Defendants specifically deny, upon information and belief, that any property or physical evidence involved in the incident made the basis of this lawsuit is located in Dallas County, Texas. Instead, upon information and belief, most if not all of the relevant physical evidence is located in Midland County. hereto as Exhibit C. © See 1/21/21 PI.’s Notice of Nonsuit Without Prejudice filed in the Bexar County Lawsuit, attached hereto as Exhibit D. 7 See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. herein. 8 See 3/3/21 Pl.’s Notice of Nonsuit Without Prejudice filed in the Bexar County Lawsuit, attached hereto as Exhibit E. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 3 (4) Lastly, Defendants specifically deny that Plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana who was present in Midland County at the times relevant to this incident and lawsuit, would be prejudiced or burdened by a transfer to Midland County—particularly in light of his willingness to litigate this case in two Texas counties over 300 miles away from his place of residence and which bear no relation to the underlying incident. IV. ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITY A. The General Venue Rules. No mandatory venue statute applies in this case. Absent an applicable mandatory venue provision, the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides that “all lawsuits shall be brought: (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) in the county of defendant’s residence at the time the cause of action accrued if defendant is a natural person; (3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person; or (4) if Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) do not apply, in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.° As there are no defendants who are natural persons and Plaintiff is a resident of Louisiana, only subsections (1) and (3) apply in this matter. B. Section 15.002(b) Provides for Transfer on the Basis of Convenience in the Interest of Fairness and Common Sense. In 1995, the Texas Legislature undertook comprehensive venue reform. As part of this reform, the legislature amended the Texas venue statutory framework to include Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE Sec. 15.002(b). That section, under which Defendants now seek relief, was enacted to prevent forum shopping and provide an avenue for common-sense relief in circumstances where, as here, there are no material ties to Plaintiff’s choice of forum.?° Section 15.002(b) provides: “For the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, a court may transfer an action from a county of proper venue under this subchapter... to any other county of proper venue on motion of a defendant filed and served concurrently with or before the filing of the answer, where the court finds: (1) maintenance of the action in the county of suit would work an injustice to the movant considering the ° Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(a). 1° See Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex. 2004). DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 4 movant’s economic and personal hardship; (2) the balance of interests of all the parties predominates in favor of the action being brought in the other county; and (3) the transfer of the action would not work an injustice to any other party. wid Proponents of the amendment described section 15.002(b) as a “meaningful reform” to promote “fairness and balance in our venue laws,” giving the trial court the ability to balance all the competing interests involved in determining a fair place within the venue statute to try a lawsuit.’? The legislative history likewise indicates that the “transfer[-]for[-]convenience statute was intended ‘to make sure that venue is not a game any longer’ by giving trial judges some power to ensure cases were tried where they sensibly belonged...” Defendants do not dispute that both Midland County and Dallas County are procedurally proper venues in this case.'* Between those, however, Midland County is the only sensible and convenient choice. All of the Section 15.002(b) factors weigh heavily in favor of a transfer to Midland County. Further, Subsection (c) provides “[a] court’s ruling or decision to grant or deny a transfer under Subsection (b) is not grounds for appeal or mandamus and is not reversible error.”15 C. Venue is Proper in Midland County, Texas. It is undisputed that the entirety of the Incident giving rise to the claim occurred in Midland County, Texas—over 300 miles from Dallas County.’® Therefore, Midland County is a county of proper venue for this matter under Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE 15.002(a)(1) (“the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”). D. All Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer of the Action to Midland County. All three Section 15.002(b) factors point toward transferring venue to Midland. First, transferring 11 Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(b). 22 Lawrence Morales II, Comment, /sn’t That Convenient? Texas Venue Transfers Based on Convenience After Garza v. Garcia, S7 Baylor L. Rev. 905, 912 (2005) (citing Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 44 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (citing An Act Relating to Venue for Civil Actions: Debate on Tex. $.B. 32 on the Floor of the House, 74th Leg., R.S. 4 (May 3, 1995) (testimony of Rep. Duncan) (transcript available at the Texas State Law Library))). 33 See id. (citing at 40 (majority opinion)). 14 Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(a)(1), (3). 15 Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(c). 16 Pl.’s Orig. Pet. at p. 2, 114.1. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 5 venue to Midland County will not work an injustice to any other party. Plaintiff is a resident of Louisiana. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff worked in Midland County. Moreover, Plaintiff previously attempted to litigate this case in Bexar County, Texas. Plaintiff is no more burdened litigating the case in Midland County than he is litigating in Bexar or Dallas County. Likewise, Defendants perceive no injustice to themselves and there is no evidence that Defendant Aerion would be prejudiced by transferring the case to Midland County, Texas. Second, the balance of interests of all the parties weighs in favor of transfer. Upon information and belief, no persons with relevant knowledge regarding the incident in question reside in Dallas County, Texas. Nor is any relevant, material physical evidence or property located in Dallas County, Texas. On the contrary, upon information and belief, most (if not all) material evidence and witnesses are in Midland County: The well-site where the accident happened is in Midland County. Plaintiff was acting in the course and scope of his work in Midland County at the time of the accident.”” Plaintiff was treated for his injuries, at least initially, by medical providers in Midland County. Operations and involved personnel for Defendants’ relative to the subject premises were/are based primarily out of their Midland offices. As such (and third), maintenance of the action in Dallas County would work an injustice to Defendants as it will require the Defendants’ involved personnel still living and/or working in or around Midland County to travel to Dallas for trial. Put simply, Midland County is the more convenient forum for access to proof. The ancillary costs to all parties, third-party witnesses and the Court for discovery and trial (including, for example, the expense of transporting evidence, property, witnesses, and possibly members of the jury for inspections, depositions, trial, and/or jury views) will be reduced by moving suit to Midland County, which is the 7 Id. DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 6 County where, upon information and belief, most of those witnesses, evidence, and property are already located. V. PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Inc. and Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. respectfully pray that venue in this matter be transferred from Dallas County, Texas to Midland County, Texas under Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0002(b) for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. Defendants further pray for such other and further relief that they may show themselves justly entitled, in law or in equity. Respectfully submitted, /s/DonnaC.Peavier Donna C. Peavler State Bar No. 00783887 dpeavler: eavierbriscoe.com Sara Kimbrough Scudday State Bar No. 24073675 scudday@peavlerbriscoe.com PEAVLER| BRISCOE 2215 Westgate Plaza Grapevine, Texas 76051 (214) 999-0550 (telephone) (214) 999-0551 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES USA, INC. And BAKER & MCKENZIE, LLP /s/ Meghan Hausler (with permission Michelle Hartmann State Bar No. 24032402 Michelle. hartmann@bakermckenzie.com Meghan Hausler State Bar No. 24074267 Meghan.hausler@bakermckenzie.com 1900 North Pearl Street, Suite 1500 Dallas, Texas 75201 (214) 978-3000 (telephone) DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 7 (214) 978-3099 (facsimile) Katie L. Zinecker State Bar No. 24106623 Katie.zinecker@bakermckenzie.com 700 Louisiana, Suite 3000 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 427-5000 (telephone) (713) 427-5099 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to all counsel of record pursuant to and in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on March 19, 2021. /s/ Donna C. Peavler Donna C. Peavler DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 8 EXHIBIT A Exhibit A FILED 11/16/2020 11:54 AM Mary Angie Garcia Bexar County District Clerk Accepted By: Maria Jackson 2020C122255 CAUSE NO. MORGAN BERTRAND IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiff, VS. PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES, CORP.; PIONEER DRILLING SERVICES, LTD; PIONEER WELL BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS SERVICES, LLC; PIONEER WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC; PIONEER COILED TUBING SERVICES, LLC; HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO.; AERION RENTAL SERVICES, L.L.C.; AND AERION, L.L.C. Defendants. 73rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, Plaintiff MORGAN BERTRAND, complaining of PPONEER ENERGY SERVICES, CORP.; PIONEER DRILLING SERVICES, LTD; PIONEER WELL SERVICES, LLC; PIONEER WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC; PIONEER COILED TUBING SERVICES, LLC; HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO.; AERION RENTAL SERVICES, L.L.C.; AND AERION, L.L.C.; collectively the “Defendants”, and files this Original Petition and for cause of action would respectfully show the following: 1. DISCOVERY LEVEL 1.1 Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery in this matter under Level 3 of Rule 190 of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. II. PARTIES 21 Plaintiff, MORGAN BERTRAND, is a resident of Jefferson Davis Parish, State of Louisiana. 2.2 Defendant, PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES, CORP., a Texas corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital Corporate Services, Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation is requested at this time. 2.3 Defendant, PIONEER DRILLING SERVICES, LTD, a Texas corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital Corporate Services, Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation is requested at this time. 24 Defendant, PPONEER WELL SERVICES, LLC, a Texas corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital Corporate Services, Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation is requested at thi: time. 2.5 Defendant, PIONEER WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC, a Texas corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Capital Corporate Services, Inc, 206 E. 9th St., Ste. 1300, Austin, Texas 78701-4411. Issuance of citation is requested at this time. 2.6 Defendant, HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO., a Oklahoma corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Corporation Service Company d/b/a CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service Company, 211 E. 7 Street, Ste. 620, Austin, Texas 78701-3218. Issuance of citation is requested at this time. 2.7 Defendant, AERION RENTAL SERVICES, LLC, a Louisiana corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Gary W. Miller, Page 2 2925 Richmond Ave., 14" Floor, Houston, Texas 77098. Issuance of citation is requested at thi: time. 2.8 Defendant, AERION, LLC, a Louisiana corporation, is registered to do business in Texas and may be served through its registered agent, Gary W. Miller, 2925 Richmond Ave., 14" Floor, Houston, Texas 77098. Issuance of citation is requested at this time. I. VENUE el Venue is proper and maintainable in Bexar County, Texas, under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. IV. BACKGROUND FACTS 4.1 On November 17, 2019, Plaintiff, MORGAN BERTRAND, was working in the course and scope of his employment as a Technician/Operator with Tier One Rental and Distribution on a land-based oil and gas drilling site in Midland County, Texas. The Plaintiff was working on an AERION Drying Shaker when suddenly and without warning, Plaintiff fell into an unmarked hole, which had been previously cut into grating on the equipment. 42 At all times mentioned herein, Defendants, PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES, CORP., PIONEER DRILLING SERVICES, LTD, PIONEER WELL SERVICES, LLC, PIONEER WIRELINE SERVICES, LLC, and/or PONEER COILED TUBING SERVICES, LLC (hereinafter “PIONEER”) were the operators and/or leaseholders of the oil and gas well upon which the work was being performed. 43 Furthermore, PIONEER, employed the Company Man and/or Person in Charge (PIC) of the operations on the jobsite. PIONEER was responsible for planning, overseeing, and/or supervising the work being performed on the jobsite Page 3 44 At all times mentioned herein, defendant, HELMERICH & PAYNE INTERNATIONAL DRILLING CO. (hereinafter “H&P”), owned and operated H&P Drilling Rig 641 which was positioned and operating on the jobsite. H&P was responsible for planning, overseeing, and/or supervising the work being performed on the jobsite. 4.5 Atall times mentioned herein, Defendants, AERION RENTAL SERVICES, L.L.C. and/or AERION, L.L.C. (hereinafter “AERION”) owned and operated various Closed-Loop Waste Management Systems (Drying Shaker) which were equipment integral to and incorporated into H&P Drilling Rig 641. AERION was responsible for planning, overseeing, and/or supervising the work being performed on the jobsite. 4.3 Nothing Plaintiff did, or failed to do, caused the incident in question. Rather, it was the negligence of the Defendants, individually and collectively, named herein which proximately caused the occurrence and Plaintiff's resulting injuries and damages. ¥V. CAUSE OF ACTION: NEGLIGENCE Sel Said accident, resulting in injuries and damages to Plaintiff, MORGAN BERTRAND, was a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or fault of Defendant, PIONEER, its employees, agents or others for whom it is responsible in the following non- exclusive particulars: A Failure to provide a safe place to work; B Negligent job planning, coordination and/or communication; Negligent training; Negligent supervision; Failure to properly inspect site before authorizing the commencement of work; Negligent authorization of work when it was unsafe to do so; Page 4 Creating and/or permitting the existence of unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site; Failure to remedy unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site for which it had actual and/or constructive knowledge; Failure to warn of a condition which it knew or should have known to present an unreasonable risk of harm; Improper, inadequate equipment; Negligent maintenance, inspection and/or repair of equipment on job site; Violation of state and federal safety rules and regulations; Violation of company rules and regulations created for the safety of individuals working on its job site; Any other acts of negligence which may be revealed at or before the trial of this matter. 5.2 Said accident, resulting in injuries and damages to Plaintiff, MORGAN BERTRAND, was a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or fault of Defendant, H&P, its employees, agents or others for whom it is responsible in the following non-exclusive particulars: A Failure to provide a safe place to work; B Negligent job planning, coordination and/or communication; Negligent training; Negligent supervision; Failure to properly inspect site before authorizing the commencement of work; Negligent authorization of work when it was unsafe to do so; Creating and/or permitting the existence of unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site; Failure to remedy unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site for which it had actual and/or constructive knowledge; Page 5 Failure to warn of a condition which it knew or should have known to present an unreasonable risk of harm; Improper, inadequate equipment; Negligent maintenance, inspection and/or repair of equipment on job site; Violation of state and federal safety rules and regulations; Violation of company rules and regulations created for the safety of individuals working on its job site; Any other acts of negligence which may be revealed at or before the trial of this matter. a) Said accident, resulting in injuries and damages to Plaintiff, MORGAN BERTRAND, was a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or fault of Defendant, AERION, its employees, agents or others for whom it is responsible in the following non-exclusive particulars: A Failure to provide a safe place to work; B Negligent job planning, coordination and/or communication; Negligent training; Negligent supervision; Failure to properly inspect site before authorizing the commencement of work; Negligent authorization of work when it was unsafe to do so; Creating and/or permitting the existence of unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site; Failure to remedy unreasonably dangerous conditions upon the job site for which it had actual and/or constructive knowledge; Failure to warn of a condition which it knew or should have known to present an unreasonable risk of harm; Improper, inadequate equipment; Page 6 Negligent maintenance, inspection and/or repair of equipment on job site; Violation of state and federal safety rules and regulations; Violation of company rules and regulations created for the safety of individuals working on its job site; Any other acts of negligence which may be revealed at or before the trial of this matter. VI. MISNOMER AND ASSUMED NAME 6.1 In the event any parties are misnamed and/or not included herein, such entities are/were “alter egos." Plaintiff relies on Texas Civil Statutes Article 6133 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28 to properly identify the corporate Defendants herein. VII. RES IPSA LOQUITUR dell The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case because the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence negligence; other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and the negligence is with the scope of Defendants’ duties. VIII. DAMAGES 8.1 Plaintiff seeks all available damages within the jurisdictional limits of this Court in excess of $1 million including but not limited to: Compensatory damages Actual damages Consequential damages Lost future income Lost past income Past medical care Future medical care Past pain and suffering Future pain and suffering Past mental anguish Future mental anguish Past impairment Future impairment Page 7 Past disfigurement Future disfigurement Past loss of household services Future loss of household services Past loss of consortium Future loss of consortium Interest on damages (pre- and post-judgment) Court costs Deposition costs Exemplary damages Other relief as the Court may deem just and proper IX. PRE- AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST 91 Plaintiff will additionally show that he is entitled to recover pre and post-judgment interest in accordance with law and equity as part of his damages herein, and Plaintiff here and now sues for recovery of pre and post-judgment interest as provided by law and equity, under the applicable provision of the laws of the State of Texas. X. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSU! 10.1 Pursuant to Rule 194 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants are requested to disclose the information and material described in Rule 194.2 within fifty (50) days of the service of this request. XI. PRAYER 11.1 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that Defendants be cited to appear and answer and that, upon final trial hereof, Plaintiff have judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, that he recover damages in accordance with the evidence, that he recover costs of Court herein expended, that he recover interest, both pre- and post-judgment to which he is entitled under the law, and for such other and further relief, both general and special, legal and equitable, to which Plaintiff may be justly entitled. Page 8 Respectfully submitted, FARRAR & BALL, LLP /s/ David J. Romagosa DAVID J. ROMAGOSA State Bar No. 24047493 1117 Herkimer Street Houston, Texas 77008 Telephone: 713.221.8300 Telecopier: 713.221.8301 Email: david@fbtrial.com ~and~ ANDERSON DOZIER BLANDA & SALTZMAN /s/ Nicholas A. Blanda NICHOLAS A. BLANDA (La. Bar No. 29093) Pending admission Pro Hac Vice P.O. Box 82008 Lafayette, LA 70598-2008 (337) 233-3366 — phone (337) 233-3163 — fax ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF Page 9 EXHIBIT B Exhibit B ° CT Corporation Service of Process Transmittal 12/02/2020 CT Log Number 538681801 TO: Jeff Rees Pioneer Natural Resources Usa, Inc. 777 HIDDEN RI IRVING, TX 75038-3802 RE: Process Served in Texas FOR: PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY (Domestic State: DE) ENCLOSED ARE COPIES OF LEGAL PROCESS RECEIVED BY THE STATUTORY AGENT OF THE ABOVE COMPANY AS FOLLOWS: TITLE OF ACTION: MORGAN BERTRAND, PLTF. vs. PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES, CORP., ET AL., DFTS. // TO: PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY DOCUMENT(S) SERVED: COURTIAGENCY: None Specified Case # 2020C122255 NATURE OF ACTION: Personal Injury - Failure to Maintain Premises in a Safe Condition ON WHOM PROCESS WAS SERVED: CT Corporation System, Dallas, TX DATE AND HOUR OF SERVICE: By Process Server on 12/02/2020 at 03:28 JURISDICTION SERVED: Texas APPEARANCE OR ANSWER DUE: None Specified ATTORNEY(S) | SENDER(S): None Specified ACTION ITEMS: CT has retained the current log, Retain Date: 12/02/2020, Expected Purge Date: 12/07/2020 Image SOP Email Notification, Jeff Rees jeff.rees@pxd.com Email Notification, Doug Wall Douglas.Wall@pxd.com Email Notification, Kimberly Turvan kimberly.turvan@pxd.com ‘SIGNED: CT Corporation System ADDRESS: 1999 Bryan Street Suite 900 Dallas, TX 75201 For Questions: 866-665-5799 SouthTeam2@wolterskluwer.com Page1 of 1/ VN Information displayed on this transmittal is for CT Corporation's record keeping purposes only and is provided to the recipient for quick reference. This information does not constitute a legal opinion as to the nature of action, the amount of damages, the answer date, or any information contained in the documents themselves. Recipient is responsible for interpreting said documents and for taking appropriate action. Signatures on certified mail receipts confirm receipt of package only, not contents. d. Wolters Kluwer PROCESS SERVER DELIVERY DETAILS Date: Wed, Dec 2, 2020 ao a Server Name: Anthony Collins Entity Served PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY Agent Name CT CORPORATION SYSTEM ~ ——— = —-} —-— ‘Case Number 2020-Cl-22255 NI Jurisdiction ™ ae Of! TIKE 74FROCESS ' 4500-2 ‘wet ; PRIVATE PROCESS I2- Z nn "Woly AO!e : SSip Case ee 2020-Cl-22255 II OR Bet ieee PB Il 2020CI22255 saoe08 MORGAN BERTRAND IN THE DISTRICT COURT VS. 73rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES CORP ET AL BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS (Note:Attached Document May Contain Additional Litigants.) CITATION “THE STATE OF TEXAS” Directed To: PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY BY SERVING ITS REGISTERED AGENT, CT CORPORATION SYSTEM "You have been sued. You may employ an attorney. If you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the clerk who issued this citation by 10:00 am. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days after you were served this CITATION and FIRST AMENDED PETITION , a default judgment may be taken against you." Said FIRST AMENDED PETITION was filed on the 20th day of November, 2020. 'SSUED UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT ON THIS 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER A.D., 2020. DAVID J ROMAGOSA oF BE ay Mary Angie Garcia ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF Bexar County District Clerk 1117 HERKIMER ST ofaof 101 W. Nueva, Suite’ 217 5h San Antonio, Texas 78205 HOUSTON, TX 77008-6745 By: Laura Castillo, Deputy ae BERTRAND Case Number: 2026-CI-22255 Officer's Return Court: 73rd Judicial District Court PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES CORP ET AL | received this CITATION on at o'clock __M. and:( ) executed it by delivering a copy of the CITATION with attached FIRST AMENDED PETITION the date of delivery endorsed on it to the defendant, in person on the at o'clock aM al: or ( ) ‘not executed because Fees: Badge/PPS #: Date certification expires: County, Texas By OR: VERIFICATION OF RETURN (If not served by a peace officer) SWORN TO THIS NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF TEXAS OR: Hy nano 18 , my date of birth 1s and my address is County. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing 1s true and correct. Executed in County, State of Texas, on the day of. . 28. . Declarant RETURN TO COURT (DK802) ‘ .~——! PRIVATE PROCESS Case Number: 2020-Cl-22255 Ell OA Eh iF 20200122265 seeces | [ll MORGAN> BERTRAND IN THE DISTRICT COURT vs. 73rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT PIONEER ENERGY SERVICES CORP ET AL BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS (Note:Attached Document Hay Contain Additiona] Litigants.) CITATION “THE STATE OF TEXAS’ Directed To; PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY BY SERVING ITS REGISTERED AGENT, CT CORPORATION SYSTEM “You have been sued. You may employ an attorney. If you or your attorney do not file a written answer with the clerk who issued this citation by 10:00 a.m. on the Monday next following the expiration of twenty days after you were served this CITATION and FIRST AMENDED PETITION , a default judgment may be taken against you.” Said FIRST AMENDED PETITION was filed on the 20th day of Nove