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  • 15 CV 002027 document preview
  • 15 CV 002027 document preview
  • 15 CV 002027 document preview
  • 15 CV 002027 document preview
  • 15 CV 002027 document preview
  • 15 CV 002027 document preview
  • 15 CV 002027 document preview
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Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2015 Apr 07 4:53 PM-15CV002027 0C427 - G74 FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO COMMON PLEAS COURT NORTH AMERICAN VAN LINES, INC. CASE NO. 15CV2027 PLAINTIFF, VS. ACCELERATED MOVING AND STORAGE, INC., DEFENDANT. MOTION OF DEFENDANT ACCELERATED MOVING AND STORAGE, INC. TO DISMISS In accordance with the provisions of Ohio R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Defendant, Accelerated Moving and Storage, Inc., (hereinafter “Accelerated”) respectfully moves to dismiss this action. A memorandum in support is attached. S/Leo Ross, Esq. Leo Ross, Esq. (0031061) 915 S. High Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 jeoross @ sheglobal net Attorney for DefendantFranklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2015 Apr 07 4:53 PM-15CV002027 0C427 - G75 MEMORANDUM Plaintiff North American Van Lines, (hereinafter “North American”) has filed a breach of contract action against Accelerated. The contract attached to the Complaint purports to be between Accelerated and Global Van Lines for a term beginning April 1, 2000 and ending March 31, 2005. The Complaint alleges that Global Van Lines is owned by North American. The Complaint does not allege when North American became the owner of Global or include an assignment or any other evidence of ownership.The contract and attachments represent matters outside the pleadings. The purported account attached to the contract lists charges beginning in 2007, a point in time outside of the terms of the purported contract. Based on these allegations,assuming the truth of the matters alleged in the Complaint, the Complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated in relation to standing the following: The Ohio Constitution provides in Article IV, Section 4(B): "The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law " (Emphasis added.) In Cleveland vy. Shaker Hts., 30 Ohio St.3d 49, 51, 507 N E.2d 323 (1987), we stated: " "Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the question of standing to sue. Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends on whether the party has alleged * * * a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy "'" Id., quoting Middletown v. Ferguson, 2.5 Ohio St 3d 71, 75, 495 N.E..2d 380 (1986), quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 40.5 U.S. 727, 731-732, 92 S..Ct.. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U S. 186, 204, 82 S..Ct. 691, 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962) Similarly, the United States Supreme Court observed in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S 83, 102, 118 S Ct. 1003, 140Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2015 Apr 07 4:53 PM-15CV002027 0C427 - G76 L.Ed,2d 210 (1998), that [s]tanding to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case "... We recognized that standing is a "jurisdictional requirement" in State ex rel. Dallman y. Franklin Cry. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St 2d 176, 179, 298 N E 2d 515 (1973), and we stated "It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action " (Emphasis added.) See also New Boston Coke Corp. v Tyler, 32 Ohio St 3d 216, 218, 513 N E 2d 302 (1987) ("the issue of standing, inasmuch as it is jurisdictional in nature, may be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceedings"), Steinglass & Scarselli, The Ohio State Constitution: A Reference Guide 180 (2004) (noting that the jurisdiction of the common pleas court is limited to justiciable matters) Because standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, "standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U S 555, 570-571, 112 S Ct, 2130, 119 L Ed.2d 3.51 (1992), fn. 5, see also Friends of the Earth, Inc v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs,. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 14.5 L.Ed..2d 610 (2000); Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154-1155 (10th Cir.2005), Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir 2003), Perry v. Arlington Hts., 186 F 3d 826, 830 (7th Cir.1999); Carr v. Alta Verde Industries, Inc., 931 F 2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir 1991). Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio- 5017. In this case North American has failed to provide any evidence of a link between it and Global as required by Schwartzwald. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017. North American therefore lacks standing and this action must be dismissed. s/Leo Ross, Esq. Leo Ross, Esq. (0031061) 915 S. High Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 lcoress @sheglobal net Attorney for DefendantFranklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2015 Apr 07 4:53 PM-15CV002027 0Cc427 - G77 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The foregoing was served upon the following counsel of record via the court’s electronic filing system, upon counsel of record on April 7, 2015. Emest V. Thomas, IIT Aaron M Cole Thomas & Thomas Attorneys at law 2323 Park Avenue Cincinnati, OH 45206 Rick, Thomas @ tt-law com s/Leo Ross, Esq. Leo Ross, Esq. (0031061)