Motion,Ex Parte: STEED HAMMOND PAUL INC Vs BERARDI PARTNERS INC VS.BERARDI PARTNERS INC

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

						
                                
Preview
                                Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K31

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
STEED HAMMOND PAUL, INC, Case No.: CV 17-001032
Plaintiff, JUDGE JEFFREY M. BROWN
v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BERARDI PARTNERS, INC.,

Defendants.

Now comes Defendant Berardi Partners, Inc., (“Berardi”), by and through counsel, and
respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter an Order granting Summary Judgment pursuant
to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 56(C). There is no genuine issue of fact and Berardi is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law.

As is more fully set out in the attached Memorandum in Support, this case involves the
construction of two campuses for the Ohio School for the Deaf and Blind (the “Project’””). As the
architect of record for the Project, SHP was hired by non-party the Ohio School Facilities
Commission (“OSFC”), From the start, the Project was plagued by issues and deficiencies which
ultimately resulted in SHP being sued by OSFC in the Court of Claims. SHP then filed fourth-
party claims against Berardi in the Court of Claims. See Id.

After a trial, a judgment was rendered against OSFC and in favor of TransAmerica in a
sum in excess of 1,800,000.00, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. ‘The third and fourth party
claims involving SHP and Berardi were bifurcated and not tried. Before any direct claims against
SHP were litigated, SHP voluntarily contributed towards the settlement with TransAmerica in a
sum totaling $971,700.00. Am. Comp. §f{[ 5-6. Now, without any basis or merit, SHP seeks re-
payment of its own voluntary payment of settlement monies from Berardi.

1Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K32

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Bradley J. Barmen

Bradley J. Barmen (0076515)

Theresa A. Sherman (0090971)

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith, LLP
1375 E. 9th Street, Suite 2250

Cleveland, OH 44114

T: 216-344-9422 F; 216-344-9421
Brad.Barmen@lewisbrisbois.com

Tera. Sherman@lewisbrisbois.com

Counsel for Defendant Berardi Partners, Inc.Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K33

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
I. Facts

A. Background

On December 20, 2010, in order to begin work on the Project, the following non-parties
entered into a contract:

a, the OSFC as the “Owner”;

b. Jutte Electric, Ltd, the electrical contractor;

ce. TransAmerica, the general trades prime contractor;

d, Vaughn Industries, LLC, the mechanical and plumbing contractor;

e. Hall Aluminum Products, the exterior doors and windows contractor;

f. TP Mechanical Contractors, Inc., the fire protection contractor; and

g. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., the project construction manager. See Affidavit of Brad
Barmen (attached as Exhibit A); September 17, 2015 Decision of the Referee (attached as
Exhibit A-1).

SHP, the Plaintiff in this case, also entered into the December 20, 2010, contract as the
lead architect for the Project. See Jd.; Am. Comp. at 3. Berardi was not a party to the December
20, 2010, contract. See Id.

In the spring, 2011, the Project commenced, which was a campus wide construction of
academic and dormitory buildings for the OSFC. See Affidavit of Brad Barmen (attached as
Exhibit A); September 17, 2015 Decision of the Referee (attached as Exhibit A-1). The Project
was fraught with issues from the beginning stemming from poor planning, scheduling,

administration and performance. See id.Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K34

B. Court of Claims Case No.: 2013-00349

In 2013, TransAmerica filed suit against the OSFC in the Court of Claims, Case No.:
2013-00349, for its claimed losses as a result of various deficiencies and issues with the Project.
See Id. Subsequently, SHP was named as a third-party defendant in the Court of Claims action.
See Id. SHP then filed fourth-party claims against Berardi in the Court of Claims action, See Id.

After a trial, judgment was rendered against OSFC and in favor of TransAmerica in
excess of 1,800,000.00, plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The third and fourth party claims
were bifurcated and not tried. Sometime thereafter, but before any direct claims against SHP
were even litigated, SHP made a voluntary payment contributing toward the TransAmerica
settlement. SHP paid a total of $971,700.00, See Am. Comp. at 6.

Now, despite the fact TransAmerica never asserted any claims against SHP, SHP has
filed the instant action seeking indemnification from Berardi in an effort to attempt to collect the
monies it voluntarily paid to contribute to the TransAmerica settlement; a decision SHP made
without any legal obligation to do so and without any involvement of Berardi. See Am. Comp.
Moreover, there is zero evidence to suggest SHP’s voluntary payment of more than half of the
TransAmerica verdict was fair and reasonable.

Cc. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Case No.: CV 17-001032

On January 30, 2017, SHP filed the instant action against Berardi alleging: 1) breach of
written contract; 2) professional negligence; and 3) indemnification. See Complaint. On March
20, 2017, following Berardi’s Motion for More Definite Statement, SHP amended its Complaint.
On July 20, 2017, after the matter was fully briefed by both parties, the Court granted Berardi’s

motion to dismiss SHP’s claim for breach of written contract. See Entry. In its Entry, the CourtFranklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K35

determined the sole remaining claims pending against Berardi were professional negligence and
indemnification “the remaining claims set forth in the Amended Complaint.” See Entry.

On July 26, 2017, SHP again moved this Court for leave to amend its Complaint, alleging
Berardi breached an oral contract with SHP. See Motion for Leave. On August 2, 2017, Berardi
filed its Motion to Strike and/or Deny SHP’s Motion for Leave arguing, SHP’s claim for breach
of an oral contract fails as a matter of law due to the statue of frauds. See Motion to Strike. On
February 9, 2018, this Court granted Berardi’s Motion and denied SHP’s Motion for Leave. See
Entry.

On July 9, 2018, well beyond the January 18, 2018, discovery cut-off and less than
twelve weeks before Trial, SHP has once again attempted to amend its Complaint, this time
adding an entirely new claim of contribution against Berardi. See Motion for Leave; Berardi’s
Motion to Strike or Deny (filed on July 13, 2018). However SHP’s March 20, 2017, Amended
Complaint remains pending against Berardi, in conjunction with this Court’s July 20, 2017,
Entry stating:

Count I of SHP’s Amended Complaint is accordingly Dismissed.
This case should proceed on the remaining claims set forth in the
Amended Complaint. See Entry.
As a result of this Court’s Entry, the only pending claims against Berardi are: 1) professional
negligence; and 2) indemnification. See Jd.
IL. Law & Argument
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 56(C) supplies the standard for granting summary judgment

and provides:Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K36

Summary Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions,
affidavits, transcripts of evidence in a pending case, written
stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation
may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary
judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or
stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse
to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is
made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation
construed most strongly in the party’s favor.

Civil Rule 56(E) further provides:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s
response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against the party.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating there are no genuine issues of
material fact concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. See Dresher v Burt,
75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).

Summary judgment is appropriate when a review of the pleadings and other evidentiary
materials demonstrate:

1) There is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
2) The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
3) Reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that
conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion is
made.
Civ.R, 56(C); Harless v Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46

(1978). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is there be no

6Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K37

genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v, Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is “genuine” where reasonable minds could
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. /d. A factual dispute is “material” if it might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.
If the evidence is so one sided a party must prevail as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be granted. See Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 617 N.E.2d 1123 (1993).
Summary judgment is a favored “procedural device to terminate litigation and to avoid a formal
trial where there is nothing to try.” Norris v. Ohio Standard Oil Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 433
N.E.2d 615 (1982). The granting of summary judgment “should be encouraged in proper cases.”
See North y. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 9 Ohio St.2d 169, 171, 224 N.E.2d 757 (1967).
B. SHP’s Claim for Professional Negligence Fails as a Matter of Law
1. Economic Loss Doctrine
SHP alleges Berardi was to “perform its work reasonably and in accordance with
professional standards of care applicable in the architectural profession.” See Am. Comp. at 16.
Moreover, SHP alleges:
Berardi breached that duty, because its work on the Project fell
below the applicable standards of care in several respects as set
forth above. By way of example, Berardi was negligent in failing
to provide accurate plans and specifications, failing to timely
correct plans and specifications that were incomplete or inaccurate
when provided, and failing to provide information requested by
contractors regarding its design. Am. Comp. at 4 17.
It is well established, for actions sounding in negligence, a plaintiff who has suffered only
economic loss due to another’s negligence has not been injured in a manner which is legally
cognizable or compensable. See floor Craft Floor Covering v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp.

Assn., 54 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 560 N.E.2d 206 (1990); Waverly City School Dist. Bd. Of Edn, v.
7Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K38

Triad Architects, Inc., 10" Dist. Franklin No. O8AP-329, 2008-Ohio-6917, ¥ 26; See also Black’s
Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 531 (defining “economic loss rule” as, inter alia, “the principle that
a plaintiff cannot sue in tort to recover for purely monetary loss — as opposed to physical injury
or property damage — caused by the defendant”). In this case, on July 20, 2017, this Court
determined SHP’s claim: for breach of contract failed as a matter of law. See Entry. As SHP’s
only alleged damages against Berardi consist of their voluntary settlement monies it paid to
TransAmerica in the sum of $971,700.00, SHP’s claim for professional negligence against
Berardi fails as a matter of law.
2. Statute of Limitations

The four-year statute of limitations for professional negligence applies in light of this
Court’s ruling SHP has no claim against Berardi for breach of contract. See Id.; Fronczak vy.
Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 124 Ohio App.3d 240, 245, 705 N.E.2d 1283 (10" Dist.1997); R.C.
2305.09(D). Therefore, SHP was required to have filed its claims against Berardi within four
years after the cause of action accrued. See Id.

Here, SHP’s claims are based on Berardi’s alleged failure to comply with the applicable
standard of care in performing architectural services while working on the Project, This Project
was “fraught with issues” from the beginning, including:

a. the Project started in March, 2011, months later than planned;

b. the Project’s drawings were never completed by Berardi;

c. requests for information were answered on the average thirteen. days late;

d, most of the project managers could not get along with each other which created friction

between Jutte, Lend Lease, TransAmerica, and SHP;Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K39

e. TransAmerica failed to complete work in sequence, recovery schedules and
specifications were never met;

f. contractor job performances were poor; and

g. “Kenneth Jutte, President of Jutte, testified as to the project issues:....the whole job
was messed up. So Imean, that’s a tricky, tricky question for me. [What did the State do to cause
you damage?] It started off messed up right out of the gate. It was like walking up on a train
wreck, It never got really in line, as far as | am concerned.” See Affidavit of Brad Barmen
(attached as Exhibit A); December 13, 2016, Decision of the Referee (attached as Exhibit A-1).

There is no question SHP, as the architect of record of the Project, was fully aware of the
foregoing issues with the Project in 2011, well before suit was filed in the Court of Claims. See
Jd. However, even construing the evidence most strongly in favor of SHP, SHP cannot deny it
was well aware of the Project’s deficiencies and its potential claims against Berardi by February
17, 2011. See Jd. On February 17, 2011, after several attempts by TransAmerica to obtain
updated construction drawings, TransAmerica sent an Article 8 Letter consistent with the
requirements of the prime contract between OSFC and TransAmerica, notifiying OSFC, Lend
Lease, and SHP the lack of revised drawings had impacted and would continue to negatively
impact TransAmerica’s work. See Affidavit of Brad Barmen (attached as Exhibit A); September
15, 2017, Decision in Case No.: 2013-0049 (attached as Exhibit A-2).

Ultimately, SHP failed to file suit until January 30, 2017, the date of the filing of the
original Complaint in this case. The applicable four-year statute of limitations barred the filing of
suit in 2017 as there is no question SHP, the architect of record for the Project, was well aware of

the Project’s issues from the beginning, and certainly, by February 17, 2011, the date ofFranklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K40

TransAmerica’s Article 8 Letter. See Jd’ Thus, SHP’s claim for professional negligence fails as a
matter of law.

Cc, SHP’s Claim for Indemnification Fails as a Matter of Law

SHP alleges: “Given the significant risks associated with a trial in the TransAmerica
lawsuit, because of the evidence that demonstrated the deficient nature of Berardi’s work, SHP
entered into settlement negotiations with TransAmerica...” See Am. Comp. at J 22. Further, SHP
admits it’s “damages consist of the settlement funds it had to pay...in the sum of $971,700.00” to
TransAmerica. See Jd. at | 25. Ultimately, SHP voluntarily agreed to contribute to the
TransAmerica settlement before the third party claims against SHP were litigated and without
the legal obligation to do so.

Indemnification occurs when one who is primarily liable is required to reimburse another
who has discharged a liability for which that other is only secondarily liable. See Prosser Keeton
on Torts (5 Ed, 1984) 341, Section 51. Krasny-Kaplan Corp., v. Flo-Tork, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d
75, 1993-Ohio-11, 609 N.E.2d 152. It is well settled Ohio law:

the one seeking indemnity, after making a voluntary settlement,
must prove that he has given proper and timely notice to the one
from whom it is sought, that he was legally liable to respond and
that the settled effected was fair and reasonable. Globe Indemn.
Co. v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 603-604, 53 N.E.2d 790 (1944).

In this case, the direct claims against SHP were never even litigated before SHP
voluntarily agreed to contribute to the TransAmerica settlement for an amount more than half of
the judgment rendered in favor of TransAmerica in the Court of Claims action, For unknown

reasons, SHP determined on its own, a $971,700.00 contribution towards the TransAmerica

settlement was in its best interest despite the fact there was no legal compulsion or obligation to

‘As it is undisputed that construction was completed by August, 2012, even using that date, SHP’s Complaint
against Berardi was untimely.

10Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K4l

contribute to such a settlement. SHP’s internal determination to voluntarily contribute to a
settlement, without any finding of liability against them, is their own decision, but to compel
Berardi to now pay SHP monies SHP willingly paid to contribute to the TransAmerica settlement
is in direct contradiction of established Ohio law.

Ohio Courts have held: “one who, with knowledge of the facts and without legal liability
makes a payment of money, thereby becomes a volunteer.” See CNH Capital v. Janson
Excavating, Inc., 171 Ohio App.3d 694, 2007-Ohio-2127, 872 N.E.2d 980, 12-14 (1, Dist.),
Thus, SHP, the architect of record and party primarily liable for deficiencies found on the
Project, made a voluntary payment in order to extinguish what it perceived as its own potential
liability despite the fact there was no legal compulsion to make such a contribution. SHP was
under no legal obligation to contribute to any settlement with TransAmerica; it voluntarily chose
to do so. Given SHP’s $971,700.00 contribution payment to the TransAmerica settlement was
made by SHP as a volunteer, where there was no legal obligation to do so, SHP is barred as a
matter of law from a right of recovery of any part thereof from Berardi. See Globe Indemn. Co. v.
Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 603-604, 53 N.E.2d 790 (1944); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buckeye
Union Cas. Co., 157 Ohio St. 385, 105 N.E.2d 568 (1952).

Moreover, there is zero evidence to suggest SHP’s voluntary payment of more than half
of the TransAmerica verdict was fair and reasonable, This is especially important given the fact
the direct claims against SHP had not been litigated at the time SHP voluntarily paid
$971,700.00 in contribution to the TransAmerica settlement. Ultimately, in construing the
evidence most strongly in favor of SHP, the record is entirely devoid of any evidence
establishing the elements necessary for SHP to prove entitlement to indemnification as a matter

of law.

11Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K42

Cc SHP’s Claim for Contribution Fails as a Matter of Law
While Berardi understands there is no pending claim for contribution, in the event this
.Court permits SHP to amend its Complaint at this untimely stage of the proceedings, Berardi is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R.C, 2307.25(B) states:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not
entitled to contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for
the injury or loss to person or property or the wrongful death is not
extinguished by the settlement, or in respect to any amount paid in
a settlement that is in excess of what is reasonable.

In other words, when two tortfeasors have been sued, if:

1} only one joint tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff, contribution is not available; and

2) both tortfeasors settle with the plaintiff, contribution is available. See R.C.
2307.25; Husni v. Meden, 94 Ohio App.3d 465, 467, 640 N.E.2d 1207 (8" Dist.1994).

Further, a release does not discharge a joint tortfeasor unless the release specifically
identifies the party to be released. Beck v, Cianchetti, 1 Ohio St.3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982)
syllabus, {| 1. Thus, a release discharges liability only to the parties who sign the release. See Id.;
Simpson v. Sowers, 2™ Dist, Montgomery No. 14496, 1994 WL 73 1469, *3-4 (Dec, 28, 1994).

General or broad release language between a plaintiff and one tortfeasor, which does not
name, or specifically describe or identify the second alleged tortfeasor, does not discharge and
extinguish the second tortfeasor’s liability. See Husni v, Meden, 94 Ohio App.3d 465, 467, 640
N.E.2d 1207 (8" Dist.1994).

In Simpson v. Sowers, the Second District Court of Appeals In interpreted R.C.

2307.31(B),’ and held:

7On April 9, 2003, R.C. 2307.25(B) was enacted. R.C. 2307.25(B) is identical to the provisions in 2307.31(B).

12Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K43

(In order for a joint tortfeasor to be liable for contribution to a
settlement agreement, the joint tortfeasor’s liability must have been
extinguished by that agreement.

Simpson y. Sowers, 2" Dist, Montgomery No. 14496, 1994 WL 731469, *3-4 (Dec. 28, 1994).

In this case, TransAmerica did not sue Beradi. SHP sued the Berardi. Prior to the filing of
suit, TransAmerica and SHP settled. Am Comp. at §{] 22-25. Presumably, a release between
TransAmerica and SHP was signed; SHP did not:

1) Negotiate the settlement;

2) Settle with TransAmerica; or

3) Sign the release between TransAmerica and SHP. See Id.

As a release discharges only the tortfeasors named in or party to the release, Berardi’s liability
cannot be extinguished by the release and settlement between TransAmerica and SHP. See
Simpson v. Sowers, 2™ Dist. Montgomery No. 14496, 1994 WL 731469, *3-4 (Dec. 28, 1994);
Husni v, Meden, 94 Ohio App.3d 465, 467, 640 N.B.2d 1207 (8" Dist.1994). Therefore, the
settlement between TransAmerica and SHP did not extinguish Berardi’s liability, if any.
However, the settlement between TransAmerica and SHP did eliminate SHP’s right to
contribution from Berardi, See Id.

Further, SHP is not entitled to contribution from Berardi as a result of its voluntary
payment made to TransAmerica as the “right to equitable subrogation is never accorded in equity
to one who is a mere volunteer in paying a debt of one person to another.” Fed Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins, Co., 415 F.3d 487, 494 (6" Cir.2005). To avoid being a
mere volunteer, SHP, the party seeking contribution from Berardi, must have made payment to
TransAmerica in order to fulfill a legal or equitable duty owed to TransAmerica. See Id. In this

case, SHP voluntarily made its $971,700.00 settlement payment to TransAmerica without any
13Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K44

legal compulsion to do so. In fact, SHP could not have had any legal or equitable duty owed to
TransAmerica as it is undisputed TransAmerica never asserted any claims against SHP.
Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to SHP, reasonable minds can only conclude
Berardi cannot be forced to now SHP monies SHP voluntarily paid to TransAmerica. Therefore,

Berardi respectfully requests summary judgment be granted-as a matter of law.

I. Conclusion
Wherefore, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of SHP, Berardi is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as no genuine issue of fact exists. Berardi respectfully requests this

Honorable Court grant its motion for summary judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Bradley J. Barmen

Bradley J. Barmen (0076515)

‘Theresa A. Sherman (0090971)

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith, LLP
1375 E. 9th Street, Suite 2250

Cleveland, OH 44114

T: 216-344-9422 F: 216-344-9421

Brad. Barmen@lewisbrisbois.com
Tera.Sherman@lewisbrisbois.com

Counsel for Defendant Berardi Partners, Inc.

14Franklin County Ohio Clerk of Courts of the Common Pleas- 2018 Jul 13 6:03 PM-17CV001032
0E237 - K45

TE OF SERVICE

Thereby certify on this 13" day of July, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been
sent vie electronic mail to the following counsel of record:

David M. Rickert, Esq.
Dunlevey Mahan & Furry

110 North Main Street, Suite 1000
Dayton, Ohio 45402
dmr@dmfdayton.com

Counsel for Plaintiff

/s/ Bradley J. Barmen

Bradley J. Barmen (0076515)

Theresa A. Sherman (0090971) ao
~ Counsel for Defendant Berardi Partners, Inc.

15