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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. a 4 |
ESSEX, SS. SUPERIOR COURT
C.A.NO. 1677CV01419
. SABA HASHEM, individually rn as Manager
of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC,
> Plaintiff/Defendant-In-Counterclaim
LLC; and D’Angelo Law Group, LLC.
Defendants Plaintffs-In-Counterclaims
)
}
\G
v )
) )
Stephen D’Angelo, individually|and as a }
Member of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC and )
N D'Angelo Law Group; D’, ‘Angelp & Hashem, )
)
g :
)
® Jennifer M. Carion, )
Plaintiff-Intervenor, )
& )
v. )
XN N : )
Y stephen D’Angclo, D'Angelo Law Gtoup, LLC)
\ D'Angelo & Hashem LLC, )
Defendant-Intervenors )
)
v. )
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Heffler Claims Group, John Doe, )
)
Trustee-Defendants
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PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR’S, JENNIFER M. CARRION’S, EMERGENCY MOTION '
i.
>
FOR TRUSTEE PR SS ATTACHMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO BE
DISBURSED TO D’ANGELO LAW GROUP LLC IN COLUMBIA GAS CASE, ESSEX
SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET # 1877CV01343-G.
1S
Tg
Pr > NOW COMES the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Jennifer M. Carrion (“Carrion”), who moves this
. 3 Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 4.2 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, to issue an
Fy > order approving attachments of trustee process in Ms. Carrion’s Judgment amount of
g 3 $672,995.92 (and more) upon the scheduled disbursement of attomey’s fees to the Defendant,
D’Angelo Law Group, LLC (“DLG”), in the hands of the Trustee-Defendants, Heffler Claims
:Group (“Heffler”), John Doe. Administrator, from the In Re: Columbia Gas Cases Settlement,
Superior Court Civil. Action Number 1877CV.01343-G.
AS GROUNDS THEREFORE, the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Carrion, avers that the attomey’s
fees awarded inthe Columbia Gas Cases Settlement to the Defendant, DLG, are nedded to
satisfy or substantially satisfy Ms, Cartion’s Judgment against DLG. DLG, its sole managing
member, Stephen D’Angelo, and predecessor law firm, D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC, have a
nearly a decade long history of dissipating assets, defrauding, and hindering payment ‘from the.
Judgment.Creditor, Carrion, in her crusade to recover her civil rights judgment awarded.in
November 29, 2011. Ex. A, B.O, D, E,G,H.1. DLG, and its sole managing member Mr.
D’Angelo cannot be trusted to have full and exclusive possession, control, and custody of the
attomey’s fees, once disbursed by Heffler, or John Doe Class Action Administrator, for which
reason Plaintiff-Intervenor moves this court for trustee process attachment over any and all
attomieys’ fees to be paid to Judgment Debtor, DLG, to be held by intervenor-Plaintiff’s Counsel
or this Honorable Court.
IN FURTHER SUPPORT HEREOE, this Court has entered judgment on April 8", 2020,
in favor of Ms. Carrion against DLG. Ex. A —Summary Judgment & Ex. B — Rule 56 Decision.
DLG and D&H have completely disregarded the order of Preliminary Injunction from December
6%, 2018 requiting an escrow Le from DLG and Mr, Stephen D’Angelo (“Mr. D’Angelo’’),
as Carrion has.a highly likelihodd of prevailing on inter alia successor liability. Ex: C ~
Memorandum and Order of Preliminary Injunction at Pagés 9-10, D&H and Mr. D’Angelo have
also completely ignored and defied the original Preliminary Injunction #0784CV2073 to not
dissipate the partnerships assets pending appeals of the underlying judgment. Ex. D = 2007 Suffolk
Sup. Ct Docket #0784CV2073 at File Ref #53-54.
Page 2 of9 :Because, without limitation, (1) the subject Columbia Gas attorneys’ fees disbursement to
DLG is scheduled for this month, (2) the Judgment Debtor, and its sole managing member, Mr.
D'Angelo, continues defying, ignoring, disregarding Ms. Carrion’s 2012 & 2018 preliminary
injunctions and recent Trustee [Process Attachment Motion served under Rule 9A, and (3) the
Judginent Debtor, and its sole managing membet, Mr. D*Angelo, refiiseto even offer a. demand of
-settlement pursuant to Ms. Carripn’s Chapter 93 A letter, dated April L7, 2020; Justice so requires
the tequested award of Trustee Process attachment. WHEREFORE, and without limitation, this
Court MUST ALLOW Trustee Ce Attachment on the attorney's fees award to DLG as a result
of the Columbia Gas Cases Settlement, in the hands of Trustee-Defendants, Heffler'Claims Group
and/or John Doc.
Factual-Summary
1. On May 14,.2007, Carrion Brough suit charging Hashem and D&H with wrongfully
terminating her after she. notified Hashem that she was pregnant. Ex, B ~ Rule 56 Decision,
2. On November 22,2011, a jury retumed a verdict awarding Carrion $109,000.00 and on
attomey fees and costs $142,215.00 and $115, 954.00, totaling $252,742.54. These were
entered against D&H. Id. :
3. On July. 12, 2012, Carrion la preliminary Injunction against D&H where'the Suffolk
Superior Court, after notice: 7 hearing, ordered:
“Defendants, their associates, their partners, members, employees, and agents are prohibited from:
1. Taking any unlawfid action to hinder, ov delay, or defraud the plaintiff from collecting the
plaintiff's judgment in this action, 2. Transferring, alienating or encunibering any assets of the
Defendants other than in the ordinary course of business.” Ex. D - Suffolk Sup.Ct Docket at File
Ref. Number 54,
4, On September 16, 2016, Hashem filed a lawsuit against D'Angelo. Ex. B — Court’s Summary
Judgment Opinion, (J. Deakin) Issued 4/8/2020.
5, On November 22, 2016, " action was removed to the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, Rastern Division, Id at'5.
6. On July 27, 2017, Ms. Carrion was allowed to intervene in the case and the case was remanded
to the Superior Court on Jaquary 24, 2019. Id at 5
Page3.of 9 '7. During or around November 2018 after extensive discovery, the Massachusetts U.S. District
Court issued a Preliminary Injunction in favor of Carrion against D’Angelo and DLG on ground
of successor liability. Ex. C.lat 9.
8. Specifically, the Federal Court ordered inter alia in its Memorandum and Order on Page 9:
“Court concludes that Ms. Carrion has met her burden to show that a preliminary Injunction is
warranted in this matter to avoid an otherwise irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Defendants
Stephen D’Angelo and the "ee Law Group, LLC are hereby ordered to:
a. Promptly provide Intervention Plaintiff with an accounting relating to the settlement
in Lopez-Maldonando etal. v. Toll Brothers Inc, Suffolk Superior Court Case No.
1484-CV-01440-G (.1.)
b. Hold the balance of attomey’s fees and costs in Lopez-Maldonando et al. v. Toll
Brothers Inc, Suffolk Superior Court Case No. 1484-CV-01440-G in an escrow
account;
c. Hold the balance andjattomeys’ fees and costs, from all other cases that originated
with D'Angelo & Hashem LLC, still held by or received by D’Angelo Law Group
LLC, or Stephen D’Angelo, while this Injunction remains in effect, in a escrow
account
d. Defendants, Stephen D'Angelo and D’Angelo Law Group, LLC, are enjoined,
directly, or indirectly; alone or in concert with others, effective immediately, from
making any distributions of amounts from such escrow accounts or obtained from any
cases originating from D’Angelo.& Hashem LLC, except that D’Angelo' Law Group
LLC maintains the right to pay normal and customary expenses occurred in the
normal course of business. Such expenses may not include distributions'to Stephen
D’Angelo, payments toward credit card balances, or for car leases.
“The above-restrictions shall rernain in place pending further order of this Court, or if the matter
is remanded, of the Superior Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This order is
subject 10 modification by order bf the Court upon Motion by any party. IT IS SO ORDERED.”
Ex. C- Memo & Order PI at pg. 9-10.
9. DLG and D’Angelo admitesly failed to hold the amounts in escrow as ordered by the Federal
Court and continued to receive six figuré incomes in 2016, 2017, 2018 &; 2019 without
compensating a single cent to the Judgment Creditor, Carrion, Ex. E - Email from T. LaPorte,
dated 03.10.2020. ' ,
10. On April 8, 2020, Summary] Judgment was granted to Carrion and DLG was ordered to pay
Carrion a total of $672,995.92, Ex. A.
11. In consequence of the forego ing and absent an order of trustee process, Ms. Carrion has suffered,
and will continue to suffer, great financial losses as well as incurring considerable expenses;. in
addition to having been greatly damaged by the course of this.case which has spanned almost a
decade,
Page 4 of 9 112. On February 27, 2020, the Court held a hearing. on two motions filed by Class Counsel: (1)
Plaintiffs” Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Paper #72); and (2)
Plaintiff” Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees, Costs and Incentive Payments (Paper #73).
Both Papers are part of Ex. F —In Re: Columbia Gas Cases, Docket #1877CV01343-G.
13, On March 12, 2020, the os for final approval of the Settlement was allowed and the
motion for approval of requested attorney’s feés and costs were allowed. Id at 3.
14. The total amount of the sen is $143 million, The settlement provides for cash
payments to class members #s well as provides attamey’s fees not exceeding 16:5% of the
settlement fund, ie. $23,595,000.00. Id at 3-4.
15. Heffler is in charge of disbursing lumpsum payments to class. members followed by itemized
payments for commercial businesses and with the final settlement amount approved, tooks to
begin making disbursements as éarly as June 30,2020, Id-at 9-10.
1
16, With the award of attorney's fees in the amount of $23,595,000.00, DLG are one of fourteen
firnis ‘who are entitled and will be receiving the disbursement of attomey’s fees.in ani
undisclosed amount “es the disbursements to class members. Id.
17. On April. 17, 2020, Ms. Carrion issued Chapter 93 A Demand Letter against, DLG, and its
sole -managing member, Mr.|D’Angelo; for their willful disregard of a known liability, Ms.
Carrion’s-civil right judgment against predecessor law firm D&H, of which Mr. D’Angelo
was a managing member, and received millions of dollars therefrom D&H and later DLG.
. G,.Ms Carrion’s 93 A Demand Letter,4/17/2020 ’
18. On June-[0, 2020, this Honorable Court awarded Ms. Carrion her attorneys’ fees and costs
for her entire intervention in|collecting her civil rights judgment. Ex. [- Honorable Deakin’s
Award of Attorney’s Fees, :
19. Notwithstanding this Honorable Court’s Judgment and award of this Intervention’s attomey’s
fees, DLG and its sole managing member, Mr. D’Angelo, refused to offer a reasonable
demand of settlement to Ms! Carrion as required by M.G.L. Chapter 93A, Section 11, and
aceused Ms. Carrion and her counsel of unfair deceptive collection practices.
20. On June'12,.2020,.Ms. Cartion’s counsel served DLG and Mr. D’Angelo’s counsel witha
Motion for Trustee Process a d in reach & apply pursuant to Rule‘9A, which still remains
without response and will be filed with this court on July 14, 2020.
Argument in Support of Motion for Trustee Process Attachment against D’Angelo Law Group,
LLC and D*Angelo & Hasheth, LLC
A. This Honorable Court Must ALLOW Carrion’s Emergency Motion for Trustee
Process-over Attoméys* fees Disbursements scheduled to DLG, because she has.
Page of 9unsatisfied Executions against D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC and Judgment against
D’Angelo Law Group on Successor Liability.
Rule 4.2 “Trustee Process” of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure states that
“...trustee process may be used, in the manner and to the:extent. provided by law, bit subject to the
requirements of this rule, to secure satisfaction of the judgment for damages and costs which the
plaintiff may recover,... and in no event shall the attachment exceed the limitations prescribed by
law.” Mass. R. Civ. P. 4. 2
Absent this Honorable Court's Award of Trustee Process, the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Ms.
Carrion, shall be irreparably: hat , because the facts of this case show, and the subsequent actions
of DLG‘affirm that there is a cl and present danger and history that the Defendants will move,
dissipate or transfer away from Ms. Carrion’s reach, the assets, monies, goods, credits, and effects
in which Ms. Carrion has an interést and right to recover.
As the attached Exhibits | +B, C,D, E, G,H, I prove, the Court has repeatedly confirmed and
agreed that the full amount on the account is owed to Carrion. However, despite the:clear DLG and
D&H liability to pay its debt to Carrion, DLG, D&H, & their managing: member, : ‘Mr. D'Angelo;
have repeatedly made outright refusals to make payment on the ariount owed. DLG and D&H claim
to not be liable or able to pay Carrion, but the discovery production of DLG and D&H shows the
firm having a total worth of over a million dollars. The account owed by D&H, DLG, and its
Member, Mr. D’Angelo to ae Carrion is a decade overdue.
B. There is a-clear and present danger that, absent award of the subject Trustee Process
Attachment, Motion over Attomeys" fees soon to be disbursed to DLG in the Columbia
insurance available to.satisfy her Judgments and Executions,
_ The Jidgments, Executions, and facts of this matter clearly demonstrate the likelihood that
the Plaintiff-Intervenor was successful on the merits of its claim’ for the amount owed, of
$672,995.92, interest, casts of collection, and attomey fees. Ms. Carrion continues to be harmed by
the Defendants’ and Judgment Debtors’ refusal to pay the account owed to the Plainitiff-Intervenor,
As such, there is a clear and present danger that if Ms. Carrion is not granted this motion, the
Defendant will seek to. conceal jor remove the goods, effects, and credits, which Ms. Carrion has
‘interest in, out.of the state.
Upon information and belief, the Defendant does not maintain a policy of liability
insurance available to satisfy the Plaintiff-Intervénor’s Judgments. Therefore, absent the issuance
of attachmeiit by Trustee Process, it is unlikely that the Plaintiff-Intervenor will recover or
collect amounts it is owed by the Defendant.
Furthermore, the Defendant ‘has had this judgment against D&H since 2011 and its
successor law firm.and member! Mr. D’ Angelo, have not paid a singlé dime to Ms. ‘Carrion. Ms.
Carrion has spent years fighting to receive justice. It is quite clear that the Defendant has no
Page 6.of9intention whatsoever to pay Ms.
trustee process,
Carrion the debt to which she is owed without an award of
DLG and its sole managing member, Mr. D’Angelo, will be paid attomey’s fees from the
Columbia Gas Cases Settlement,
Carzion, or at least, a substantial!
Carrion to finally receive some
and DLG have actively hindere
as-Exhibits G, H, & [ show, Ms,
accordance with Massachusetts
WHEREFORE, the Plait
award in her favor of : (1) the ti
which will either fully cover the judgment debt owed to Ms.
portion of the judgment amount owed. This would-allow Ms.
‘orm justice after 13 years of exhausting litigation in which D&H
her abilities in collection on the judgment owed to her. Further,
Cartion’s Judgment and Execution are highly to be trebled in
General Laws, Chapter 93 A, Section 11.
tiff-Intervenor respectfully requests this Honorable Court’s
tee process attachment in the amount of $672,995.92, or up to
the amount of attomey’s fees being g awarded to DLG as a result of the Columbia Gas Cases, (2)
an order that the attorneys’ fees
to DLG from the Columbia Gas Cases # [877 CV1343-G be
held in escrow with Plaintitf-Intervenor 's counsel, or with the Court, and together with (3) an
order of any other relief this Honorable Court deems fair and just.
Dated: July 7, 2020
Respectfully Submitted,
The Plaintiff-Intervenor,
Jennifer M. Carrion
Mernaysa Rivera-Bujosa, Esquire
Rivera-Bujosa Law, PC
Shipway Place, Suite C2
Charlestown Navy Yard
Boston, Massachusetts 02129
Telephone: (617) 398 - 6728
Facsimile: (617) 398 - 6730
E-mail: Memaysa@riverabujosalaw.com
BBO no.: 665965
Page 7 of 9CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Mernaysa Rivéra-Bujosa, Esq.| do herewith certify that I have on this 7 day of July 2020, I served
a copy of the within document by email and first-class mail, postage prepaid upon counsel appeared
in this action, to wit:
Kenneth Cossingham, Esq.
Thomas C. LaPorte, Esq.
Cossingham Law Office, PC
30 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 404
North Andover, MA 01845
tlaporté@cossinghamlaw.com
kcossingham@cossinghamlaw.com
Albert L. Farrah, Jr., Farrah & Harrah
800-Boylston Street, Suite 1601
Boston, MA 02199
alf@farrah-law.com
AND
Claims Administrator In re: Columbia Gas Settlement,
cfo Settlement Administrator
PO Box 58729, Philadelphia PA;19102-8729
info@ColumbiaGasExplosionS¢tdement.com
7s Memaysa 9
Mernaysa Rivera-Bujosa, Esq,
PageB8.ofSCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
ESSEX, SS. SUPERIOR COURT
C.A.NO. 1677CV01419
a
SABA HASHEM, individually and as Manager
of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC,
Plaintiff/Defendant-In-Countertlaim
v
Stephen D’Angelo, individually, and as a
Member of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC and
D’Angelo Law Group; D’Angelo & Hashem,
LLC; and D'Angelo Law Group, LLC.
Defendants/Plaintiffs-In-Counterclaims,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
Vv
Stephen D'Angelo, D’Angelo Law Group, LLC
D'Angelo & Hashem LLC,
Defendant-litervenors
Vv.
Heffler Claims Group, John Doe,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
}
Jennifer M. Carrion, )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Trustee-Defendants )
TABLE OF EXHIBITS FOR PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR’S, JENNIFER M.
OEE EAN EE INTER ENOR'S, JENNIFER M,
CARRION’S, EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TRUSTEE PROCESS ATTACHMENT OF
ATTORNEY’S FEES TOBE DISBURSED TO D’ANGELO LAW GROUP LLC IN
ASC. ESSE: iC. 3.
Exhibit A - Summary Judgment Attested to Judgment —M.R.C-P. Rule 56
Exhibit B — Honorable Judge Deakin’s Decision in support of Summary Judgment, Apmil 8, 2020
Exhibit C —- Honorable Judge Talwani’s Court Order for Preliminary Injunction, Dec. 6, 2018,
Exhibit D - 2007 Suffolk Supe ior Court Docket with Preliminary Injunction, July 12, 2012,
Exhibit E - Email from Defendant’s Counsel Thomas LaPorte, March 10, 2020,
Exhibit F - Columbia Gas Docket # [877CV1343G Papers 72 & 73,
Exhibit G -Ms. Carrion M.G.L; Ch, 93 A Demand with Certified Mail Card, April 17, 2020,
Exhibit H - DLG & Mr. D'Angelo Response to M.G.L. Ch, 93 A Demand, June 30, 2020,
Exhibit I - Notice of Attomey's Fees Award in favor of Ms. Carrion, June 10, 2020.
Page 9 of 9EXHIBIT A: ‘Trial Court of Massachusétie
SUMMARY JUDGMENT e i oO q
. {Pursuant to MASS. R. CIV, P, 66) The Superior Court :
DOCKET NuMBER ‘Thomas H. Driscoll, Jr, Clerk of Courts
~ 1877CV01419
CASE NAME
Saba Hashem individually and 48a member of And derivatively on
behalf of. D'Angelo and Hashem, Lic
Manaaln an
inhanl at al
JUDGMENT FOR THE FOLLOWING PLAINTIFFS)
‘COURT NAME B ADDRESS
Essex County Superior Court - Satem
J. Michael Rizéna Judiciat Center
56 Federal Street
Salem, MA 04970
Jennifer M Carrion
} AUDGMENT AGAINST THE FOLLOWING DEFENDANT(S)
D'Angelo Law Group LLC. and nominalty, yangeto and Hashem, LLC
This action cams on before the Court, Hon!
0 ourt, David A Geaktn, presiding, and upen motion of the above nated Piaintifi(s), for
Summary Judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Clv.P.68, the parties having been heard, and the Court having Considered the
pleadings and submissions, finds there Is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the Plaintiff is entitled tn a Judgment
8S a matter of law. .
After Heating, itis ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
‘That the plaintifis) named-aboue recover of the defendant(s) named above,
theJudgihent Tolar ‘with Interest thereon 8S outlined below as Provided by law
1. Date of Breach, Demand or Complaint | 9/16/2016
2. Date Judgment Entered . 94/08/2020
3. Nuriber of Days of Prejudgment Inferast fine 2- linet) 4300
4, Annual Interest Rate Of 0.12/365.55 = Dai lly Interest rate — -900329 ;
5. Single’ Damages. $471,384.69
6 Prejudgment Interest Woes Sxaxgy - $201,614 23
?. Double or Treble Damages Awarded by Court fwhere authofized by law) $
3. Statutory Costs . | $.00
9. Altomey Fees Awarded by Court (where authorized by Taw) $
10, JUDGMENT TOTAL PAYABLE TO PLAINTIFF{(S) (nes 5+6+7+8+9) | $672,958.92
DATE. UOGENT ENTERED GLERK OF COURTS/AgST. a
ame Xun FLEE
DateTime Printed: 04-08-2020 17.1144+XHIBIT BESSEX, ss. SUPERIOR COURT
, CIVIL ACTION
NO. 1677CV01419
SABA HASHEM!
Xs
Ss INL. D’ANGELO & OTHERS?
The plaintiff-interveno “ Jennifer Carrion, intervened in this case to enforce a judgment
that she obtained in 2011 the plaintiff, Saba Hashem, and his former jaw firm; 1, D’ Angelo
& Hashem, LLC (D'Angelo & Hashem”). In 2011, a jury awarded her $100,000. 00 for sex
discrimination based on pregnancy and retaliation, and a series of sizeable awatds for costs and
attorney?s fees — both trial and pellate — — have entered since, Three eas into her adysey to
enforce the judgment, ‘Carrion ‘confionted with the sudden demise of D’Angeto & Hashem,
after Hashem was arrested and incarcerated? The firn’s closure resulted in the undediying
action in this case, broughi-by Hashem against his former partner, Stephen L. D’Angelo, their
former firm, and D’Angelo’ 'snew firm, the D"Angelo Law Group, LLC (D’Angelo. Law
“Individually and as a member pf and derivatively on behalf of D*Angelo and Hashem, LLC
? D'Angelo Law Group, LLC, and D’Angelo and Hashem, LLC
3 For a detailed summary of the demise 0 of D'Angelo & Hashem; LLC @’Angelo & Hashem), -
and:the ensuing litigation between i its principals, sec the court’s Memorandum and Order on
Defendants Stephen L, D*Angelo and D’Angelo Law Group, LLC’s Motion for recta
Summaty Adjudication, alsé isi on April 7, 2020.
A
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS a :2
Group”). After the renioval r™ ‘underlying action to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Massachusetts, Carrion intervened, Her suit seeks the retovery of, ‘the
Judgments against Hashem, D’Angelo, and their former firm.
Defendants Stephen D’Angelo-and the D’ Angelo Law Group maintain that they are
entitled to summary ji
because Cartion has no cause of action against either D’Angelo or
his present firm. As the undisputed facts establish that the D’Angelo Law Group is the
continuation of ‘D’Angelo’s previous law firm, D'Angelo & Hashem, Carrion is entitled to
‘Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore ALLOWED IN aR, as to Cot IL, successor
liability. As to the Temaining counts of Carrion's Cross-Complaint, the court concludes that
there are disputed issues of material fact that preclude entry of judgment for either patty.
‘Carrion's cross-motion for summary judgment is therefore DENTED IN PART, as to: Counts I,
Violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; and IL, reach and apply. The detentions
Motion for Summary Judgment! is DENTED,
1
Facts‘
Jn 2000, the plaintif& Saba Hashem, and the defendant, Stephen L, D'Angelo, formed a
Jew firm, D'Angelo & Hashem. ‘They ware the only two members of the LLC throught its
existence. The firm handied personal injury and workers compensation cages:>
a
4 Facts sot outin thisisection are
facts are set out in the Analysis
Gantested, unless otherwise noted inthe text. Somie ddditional
ion as necessary to supply context, .3
The firm hited Carri nas a receptionist in July 2008; Shortly after being hired, she “took
on additional clerical duties, and received a promotion.” Carrion v. Hashem, 86 Mass. App.-Ct,
1123 at p. 1 (2014) Rule 1:28 Opinion). In October 2005, Carrion told Hashem that she was
Pregnant. Sec id. Sometime thereafter, Carrion was terminated under disputed circumstances.
See id. She brought suit on y 14, 2007, charging Hashem and the firm with wrongfilly
terminating her after she notified Hashem that she was ‘Pregnant and then retaliating against her
after her termination by opposing her application for unemployment benefits, See Carrion v.
Hashem; 0784C-V02073, Mem orandum anid Order on Plaintiff's Petition for an Award of
Attorneys Fees and Costs Pursuant to Ch. 151B, Section 9 @aper No, 50), 2012 WL 2335297
(May 24, 2012, Connolly, 3.) On November 22, 2011, the jury returned a verdict awarding
Carrion $14,000.00 in damages from Hashem and.$86,000 from D?Angélo & Hashem.6 4 series
of awards of attorney’s foes antf costs entered thereafter. These were entered apainst both
Hashem and D’Angelo & Hashem Jointly and severally. Carrion has'since obtained a series of
executions against both ashen; and the firm. Appended to her motion for summary judginent
are executions against D'Angely & Hashem totaling $471,384.69,
5 The record is not clear as to whether the firm handled other types of cases, as well. appears,
however, that these two areas werethe firm’s Primary area of focus. In any.event, nothing tums
* On July 17, 201 the court (Leibensperper, J.) entered an order forbidding Hashem and
D'Aigelo.@ Hasieas ELC, “froin: 1. [flaking any unlawful action to hinder, or delay, or defraud
the plaintiff from collecting pl[ainti]ff*s judgment in this action. 2. [(lransfercing alienating
or enctimbering any asseis Gf the \deffendanjts other than in the normal course of business.”
7 Catrion has obtained executions for: $185,592.71 (the Judgment against D*Angelo & Hashem,
plus interest), $220,484,23 (the award oF appellate [Appeals. Court} fees and costs against,
Hashem and the firm jointly and severally, plus interest), $61 909.71 (he award of appellate:
[petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for further appellate review] fees and costs against
Hashem dnd the firm jointly.and Severally, with interést),D'Angelo & Hashem op:
October 13, 2015, and renng
erated continuously until sometime. after Hashem’s arrest on
incareeration.* On October 23, 2015, D'Angelo established a
new firm, the D’ Angelo Law Group, of which he was “president and sole sharcholder.” Letter of
October 30, 2015, from Stephen D’Angela to EM.L-M,, Joint Appendix to Cross-Mpoticns for
Summary Judgment (‘Joint Appendix”) (Paper No. 80.10), Exhibit 15, The DrAngelo Law
Group began with the same employees as D'Angelo & Hashem, with the obvious exception of
the plaintiff, Saba Hashem. See Deposition of Stephen D'Angelo Angelo Deposition) at p.
152; 1h. 17-19, Joint Appentix, ban 16. The office address, telephoné numbers, atid fax
numbers:also remained the same. See Consolidated (Response To) Statenient of Undisputed
Facts in Support of Jennifer M. Carrion’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (@aper No.
80.14) at p. 9, para. 35; Letter of October 30, 2015, from Stephen D’Angelo to E.M.L-M, Joint
Appendix: Exhibit 15,
After Hashem’s arrest an
Office of Bar Counsel for advi
d incarceration, D’Angelo represents that he contacted the:
Bar Counsel advised D’Angelo that, among other
requitements, he was obligated to notify all D’Angelo.& Hashern clients that Hashem had becn
stispended and that, therefore, the firm was no longer representing clients. D'Angelo represents
that he did so, advising clients that they could be represented by his new fim or, instead, could
choose other counsel, “Many” f
represented by the D’ Angelo Lay
_—
ormer D'Angelo & Hashem clients apparently chose tobe
Group; others did not. Affidavit of Stephen L. D'Angelo in
5 Hashem was arrested on October 13, 2015, and the following day was held without bail
pending trial, According to D*
lo’s affidavit, Hashem changed his plea to guilty “in
December 2015.” Affidavit of Stephen L. D’Angelo in Support of Stephen L. D'Angelo and
D'Angelo Law Group, ELC’s M
Exhibit A, On hily27, 2016, H:
December. 29, 2015." Jn:re Saba
appéar to have been reinstated,
1 ee ds, . . «ws
ption for Summary Adjudication (D’Angela Affidavit) at
hem was “suspended for eighteen months, retroactive to
. Hashem, No. BD-2015-114 (SIC, Spina, J.), Hedoes notJadgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on January 3, 2020. The hearing in this
Matter was held on January 7, 2020,6
A party is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c) if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. See
* Baazava v. Safety Ins. Co, ” Mass. 233,237 (2012). The moving party bears “the burden of
initially showing that there is an absence of eviderice to Support the case of the nonmoving party
shouldering the burden of proof at trial.” Kourowvacilis y. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass.
706, 714 (1991). The moving fe can mect this burden by “demonstralfing]; by reference to
material desoribed in Mass. . Civ, P, 56(¢), unmet by countervailing materials, that the party
‘Opposing the miotion has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element ofthat
party’s case.” Jd at 716. Ifthe moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the
‘on-tnoving party to provide specific facts to demonstrate that thete is a genuine issue of
material fact. See Drakopoulos v. U.S. Rank Nat. Ass’i, 465 Mass. 71S, 777-778 (2013). A
court reviewing a motion for summary judgment must “draw all reasonable inferences ini the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Jd., quoting Premier Capital, LLC v. KMZ, Ine.,
464 Mass. 467, 474-475 (2013)
I. Successor LiaBiiry
At the heart of Carrion’s claims is her contention that the D’ Angelo Law Group is
effectively a continuation of, and therefore the successor in interest to, D’Angelo & Hashem.
‘Carrion asserts that the D’ Angelo Law Group ‘therefore is liable for the predecessor firm's
obligations, including her judgment against it, The defendants dispute that the D'Angelo Law
Group is a mere continuation ofp’ Ando & Hashem and therefore contend that imposing
Successor liability on the D'Angelo Law Group would be unjustified. The court concludes that
Clartior has established that there are no material facts in dispute-0s t6 the DAngelo Law7
Group's status as successor in interest 10 D’Angelg & Hashem. She has further detnonstrated
that the undisputed facts establish that she is entitled, as a matter of law, to a judgment against
the D'Angelo Law Group based on her judgments against its predecessor.
Generally, the febiides of a business entity? “are not imposed on its successor” Smith
¥. Kelley, 484 Mass. 111, 120 2020), citing Milliten & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass,
347, 556 (2008). The doctrine of successor liability, however, exists to prevent a business entity
from avoiding its debt obligations “by merely changing its form without significantly changing
tts substance.” Jd. There are four situations in which courts will apply the doctrine: They are
cases in which: “(1) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes liability of the predecessor, (2)
the irinsdction is a de facto merger or Consolidation, (3) the successor is a mere continuation of
thé predecessor, or 4 the transaction is.a fraudulent-effort to avoid liabilities of the,
predecessor.” id., quoting Milliken, 451 Mass. at 556. It is the third of these situations that is-at
issue in this case,'° Applying the “mere continuation” exception requires the court to look at the
“seal nature™ of a change in businegs form, “looking through its form to its substance and intent.”
Hd, quoting Milliken, 451 Mass, ot 560,
°*'Thé successor Hability ion to the general ruie. against imposing corporate obligations on.a
successor “is no less applicable to professional corporations, which are afforded the same
protections against liability as corporations formed under G. Lic. 156D.” Smith v, Kelley, 484
Mass. 111, 120 2020) citing G. L. e, 156A, § 6(2).
10 The plaintiff-intervenor’s Pleadings do not make entirely clear whether she contends that both
the de fact6 merger exception and the mete contiqwation exception apply in this case, In light of
the court's ruling that the mere continuation exception applies in this case, it need not reach the
argument for de facto merger. Ifthe court were to reach the de facts merger analysis, it seems
unlikely that it would bé persuasive. For one thing, a de facto merger generally requires the
-Porchase and sale ‘of assets, wick did not occur in this case. See Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal &
Oil Co., Inc., 424 Mass. 356, 359 (1997) (listing “the factors that courts generally consider in
determining whether to characierize an asset sale as.a de facto merger”). As it is clear that the
D'Angelo Law Group, LLC, merely a continuation of D’Angelo’s law practice, albeit
without his former partner, the [distinction between the de facto merger and mere continuation
exceptions, if there ts one, is not significant in this case, ,: To determine whether
against successor liability, the
management, Personnel, assets, and Operations of; the two
entities,” J The inquiry is. fact-specific, and “no § Single factor i is dispositive.”
Snir emt
dd, quoting
Milliken, 451 Mass, at 558. an
¢ id, quoting Milliken, 45) Mass, at 556 CUttimately
order to avoid paying its debts
has become another for the Purpose of | eliminating j its
In this case, there are only two discernible differences between D'Angelo & Hashem and
D'Angelo Law Group, at the time of the laters formation. CE id at 324 (The. most
‘relevant time frame of, ‘comparison here i 1S not the entire lifespai Of the predecessor entity, but the
time i immediately Preceding its dissofution, "). ‘The first difference is that Hashem was no.longer
& member; insicad, D* Angelo was the sole member of the j new firm. The second difference i ig
that, apparently, not all of tlic.old|firm’s clients signed on with the new firm. In all other
Significant respects, however, the firms were indistinguishable. They were both Operated ‘by
D’Angelo. They were in the same tine of pmeticc. They shated a large number of clients. They
employed the same personnel and operated oul of the same office. Even their email: addresses
and telephons numbers were the same."
© Carrion also maintain thatthe two firms used the same web site URI. address, See Plaintiff.
Intervesior[] Jennifer Carrion’s Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion fr Summary,
Judgment and Opposition to Defendant’ 's Motion for Summary Judgment (Carrion tee vith the -
Memorandum”) (Paper No. 80. 9) lat p. 15. There Fema the record that complies with 1 ic
requirements of Mass: R. Civ. P. 56(c) that spporis this ieim. Itis rely sated emwn
He Coaalnc toposes 1) Staiemaat oF ‘Undisputed Facts in Support of Jennifer M.
Carri Gross Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 80.14) at p. 9, para. 35. The;court,
jon’s
theicfore, disregards this representation.This case is similar, factually, to the case of Columbia State Bank y. Invicta Law Group
PLLC, 199 Wash. App. 306 (2017), retied upon recently by the SIC in Smith, 484 Mass, at 123. °
in Columbia State Bank, su liability was found where an attomey ceased operating a
professional limited liability company (@PLLC) and the next day began operating a sole
Proprietorship. As the Supreme Judicial Court noted,
Despite this, [the attorney] . . . continued fo use engagement letters with the
letterhead of his old PLLC for six months, He also continued to nse. ‘the same.
” name, website, signage, telephone number, offices, insurance, employees, and
equipment,” and continued to represent the same clients.
Smith, 484 Mass. a 123, quoting Columbia State Bank, 199 Wash. App. at 314. Many of the
same factors are present in this'case,
It is true that, unlike the attorney in Cohanbia State Bank, D’ Angelo did notity clients of
“the change in legal structure."{Id. Additionally, it appears tobe disputed in this case whether
D'Angelo & Hashem funds were commingled with those from tlie successor firm. As ia
Columbia State Bank, however! there was in this case a
continuity of individuals in contrél of the business. ... [One of t]he individual{s]
at the helm of both entities was the same, the clients were the same, and the
business at issue (law) was the same.
dd., quoting Columbia State Bank, 199 Wash. App. at 320 (citation omitted). The.court is unable .
to distinguish the holding in Cot State Bank.—as telied upon by the Supreme Judicial Court
in Seaith ~ from tlic facts of this|case in @ way that would warrant the Opposite ming in this'case.
Under these circumstances, the court concludes that D'Angelo Law Group was a continuation of
D'Angelo & Hashem and is therefore liable for judgments against the predecessor firm.10
The shift ftom two members, D'Angelo and Hashem, to one in the new firm’ does not
require a contrary conclusion,| As the defendants note in another context,’ after his arrest and
detention, Hasheni Practically|could not practice law, atid.after his suspension, legally could not
oso. Asa résutt; he could not be a member of an LLC engaged in the practice of law, See
controlling the LLC to the sol mernber. AS a practical matter, the only change in the controlling
membership was the loss of one member (of two) who was no Jonger entitled to be a member,
This is the minimum change that the circumstances Permit. Just as “there is no requirement that
there be complete shareholder identity between the seller and a buyer before corporate successor
liability will attach,” Cargill, v. Beaver Coal. & Oil Co,, Ine., 424 Mass. 356, 361,(1997), ‘the:
involimtary withdrawal of one pe does not preclude a finding of successor liability.
The same reasoning applies to the change resulting from the decision of some of the old
firm’s clients not to retain thie ni firm. The defendants argue that because clients are not
transferrable, they are not “assets.” From this Proposition, they argue that, therefore, ‘the
*etention of many of the former|firm’s clients cannot be described as a transfer of assets. It is
certainly true that law firms cannot transftr clients among one another in the way other business
entities can transfer tangible assets, ‘That does not impty, however, that agreements a firm has
with its clients are not assets, though Massachusetts courts do riot ‘appear to have addréssed
the iseue, courts in other jurisdictions have held that ‘pending contingent es are firm assets
except when the partnership has/apreed onan alternative method. of distribution.” Sanialucia v.
Sebright Transp., Inc., 232 -| 298 (2" Cir. 2000). See also Due-v. Due, 342 So.2d 161,
!2-See Memorandum of Law in ‘apport of Defendants Stephen L. D’Angelo and D'Angelo Law
Group, LLC’s Motion for Summary Adjudication @aper No. 77.2), at p. 9.iW
166'n.5 (La:1977) (“In the everyday world, when a partnership dissolves or a partner withdraws
fiom his law firm, the valuation of the interest ofa lawyer in the contingent fee contracts and the
appropriate accounting has usually been accomplished by agreement, without undue difficulty,
on the basis of informed estimates as to the prospective recovery or settlement value ofeach
case, the chances of loss, and the amount of work involved before and after the dissolution or
withdrawal.”)
In any event, the-defendants? argument that clients are not assets has no significances. If
the court were to accept this proposition, it would mean merely that the assets that were common
to.D’Angelo & Hashem and the D’Arigelo Law Group did not incnde clients, Otherwise, the
assets appear to be essentially ‘pense ‘The undisputed facts establish the extent to which the
Operations of D’Angelo & Hashem were carried forward by the D’Angelo Law Group, and the
defendants either concede or do not contest the point. Thus, whether clients and/or their cases
are properly viewed as assets in' the context of successor liability has no impact on the analysis,
As the successor in interest to D’Angelo & Hashem, the D’Angclo Law Group is liable
‘for legal obligations of its pred or firm. See Smith, 484 Mass. at 125.
Ti. CaRRion’s CLAIM UNDER THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, G.L'c. 169A,
§§5,6
Count | of Carrion’s Cross-Complaint alleges that Hashem and D*Angelo violated the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, G. L. . 109A, §§ 5, 6 (“Uniform Act”) when they paid
themselves excessive draws to avoid paying the judgments in her favor against the firm. The
‘Uniform Act’s purpose is to prevent debtors from unfairly avoiding their obligations by
transferring assets to another ech, See Jn re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55, 58 C1" Cir. 2019) The
concept underlying fraudulent: fer ts easily graspéd. Where a person cannot reasonably
expect to pay his debts,in due i that person's transfer of his assets to.another person,12
'
Without Tecelving equivalent! value in return, can if done With bad
shonest wick that ought to ke civilly ado,
motive be viewed asa
me and perhaps criminally Panisted.”) ‘Subsection
5(@) of the Uniform Act provides, in relevant part, that
by adebtor is fraudulent as to creditor, whether the credifor’s slaim arose before or after the
Uansfer was made Or the si
obligation . . - With actual intent
i
i
e
|
[
it to hinder, delay, or deftand any creditor of the debtor...» G.
Lc, 109A, § 5a). Additionally » @ transfer made by a-debtor “ig fraudulent as {0 a creditor
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receiving a Teasonably equivaleg t value in exchange for the trausfir OF obligation and the debtor
Was insolvent at that time or the lebtor became insolvent aS a result ofthe transfer. |» GLic
TODA, § 6(a).
Hashem and D'Angelo caused the firm to make-to them “with actual intent to hinder [anit]
delay” Carrion in collecting her jatlement from the firm. Carrion notes, in this Context, that
Subsection 460) of G.L«. 1560 fyems the “witiding up ofa limited lability company.” It
Provides that assets be distributed [ “creditors.” id, Subsection 46(b) provides that “[a] limited
. liability company which has dissol ed shall pay Sriaks reasonable provision to pay ail elis
and obligaijons... known to the lthined Uability company..." G.L. ©. 156C, § 46(), 7
Carrion contends that, in light of this duty, D'Angelo’s failure to dissolve D'Angelo & “sien
was intended to avoid thie obligation to sat|sfy her Judgment. A jury certainly could find thls to
be the case:
S
i
i
8
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:
i13
Siniilarly, Carrion alleges that the D'Angelo Law Group collected recoverics that were, at
least in:part, the assets of D*,
lo & Hashem without crediting any of the proceeds to the
former firm. She alleges thistwas done in order to render D'Angelo & Hashem insdlvent and/or
maintain its insolvency, If proved, this would be a violation of § G(a) of the Uniform Act and
would render the transfers fralsdulent as to Carrion, a judgment creditor of D'Angelo & Hashem.
The defendants’ legal challenges to this claim are not persuasive, D’ Augelo argues that
there is wo judgment age
argument fails for two reasons
‘im, and therefore he cannot have violated the Uniform Act. This
. First, when D'Angelo & Hashem made the transfers in question,
D’Angelo was one of its two tnemibers, He was therefore one of the two members who both
authorized and received the
legedly fraudulent transfers. “The [Uniform Act] .. - provides for
a range of possible remedies and forms of judgment to be entered against a fraudulent transferor
or transferee in order to aid a
tor in obtaining repayment of'a debt." Balwin v
Mardirosian, 467 Mass. 631, 638 (2014), citing G. Lc. 109A, § 8. Thus, as both allegedly
Saudulent transferor and transferee, defendant D' Angelo can be liable to Carrion even though he
was not petsonally:the subject
Hashem (see Section J, supra),
its predecessor firm.
of her original judgment. Second, as successor to D'Angelo &
the D’Angelo Law Group is liable for Carrion’s judgment against
The defendatit’s contention that Carrion's Cross-Complaint does not comply with Mass,
R. Civ. P. 9(b) is without merit
. Rule 9(b) provides that “(ijn all averments of fraud,,. . . the
Circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity.” Mass, R. Civ. B, 9(b),
365 Mass. 751 (1974). See Bi
ings v. GTFM, 449 Mass. 281, 294 (2007). A plaintiffatleging
fraud must, “at a minitnum ... ,|particularize the identity of the person(s) making the:
representation, the contents of the misrepresentation and where and when it took place.”4,
Equipment & Sys. For Inthis., Inc: v. Northmeadows Constr., Inc., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 931-
932 (2003). Also required are specifics regatding the “materiality of the misrepresentation, (the
plaintiffs] - . . place there, and resniting harm.” Jd. The short answer to the defendants?
argument is that the detail in Carrion’s Cross-Complaint meets these. requirements. ‘The Cross-
Complaint identifies: the person/identities who made'the allegedly fraudulent transfers
(Angelo, Hashem, and D’Angelo & Hashem), the nature of the transfers, and tlie location and
time when the transfers took place. The Cross-Complaint clearly identifies the impact of the
allegedly fraudulent transfers on Carrion.
Finally, the defendants’ argument that “clients are not assets who can be transferred or
conveyed,” Memorandum of aw in Support of Stephen D*Angelo's and D'Angelo Law Group,
LLC's Motion for Summary J | dgment Against Intervention Plaintitt ‘Defendants’
Memorandum) misses the man Although the contention may be.at least partially correct, it is
Clear from a reading of the C: iplaint that the fraudulent conveyances to which Carrion
objects are not the transfer of cases from one firm to the other. Rather, it is the transfer of
D*Angelo & Hashem, finds from the firm to the members that Carrion alleges violates the
Uniform Act. That the Cros omplaint may not be a model of drafting in this regard does not
entitle the defendants to summary judgment. “A complaint is not subject to dismissal if it would
support relief on ary theory of law.” Pontremoliv. Spaulding Rehab. Hosp., 5} Mass. App. ct
622, 626 n4 (2001) (emphasis'in original), quoting Whitinsville Plaza, inc. v. Kotseas, 378
Mass, 85, 89 (1979).1s
IL Carrion’s remaining claims for Summary judgment
A. The claim for recovery under the Uniform Fraudulent Transter Act, G. Lie
1094
Although Carrion’s case is Strong as to both D'Angelo’s and Hashem’s violation of the
Uniform Act, she has not mee her burden, on a motion for Suminary judgment, of establishing
that there are no material fot, in dispute and that, therefore, she is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. To establish a violation of the Uniform Act, Catrion must prove that transfers
made by D'Angelo — and Hashem, in some cases — were made with the intent to deny her
recovery of her judgment against Hashem and the firm. That her evidence on this points
persuasive does not establish, as a matter of law, that the defendants have no defense on the
merits. Issues such as appropriate compensation for the members are issues of fact that must be
resolved bya jury. Similarly, the assets subject to.a Teach-and-apply action involve
determination of plausibly disputed facts.'2
, Conciusion
For the foregoing reasoy 8, the court concludes that Carrion-has established that there are
no-material facts fn dispute as tp her claim thet the D'Angelo Law Group, LLC, as successor in
interest of D'Angelo & Hashem, LLC, is liable for her judgment against the Predecessor firm.
Carrion’s Crogs-Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore ALLOWED IN PART, as to Count
TH, successor liability, Judgment shall enter for Carrion against the D’Angelo Law Group for
5 The defendants contend, without citation to authority, that a reach-and-apply action is not an
independent cause of action, but, rather, ao equitable remedy. This is incorrect. See Cavadt v.
De¥eso, 458 Mass. 615, 624-625 (2011), citing, inter alia, G,L. 0. 214, §3 (6) (Statutory
action to reach and apply, and (8) (statutory action to Teach and apply fraudulently conveyed
property). Because Carrion’s action to reach and‘apply the defendants’ assets is an equitable
cause of action, however —and pcause there are disputed factual issue’as to the identity and
extent of the assets that are subject to the equitable action — it is riot suitable for summary
judgment,$8471,384.69, plus smamatory
16
prejudgment interest. AS to the remaining counts of the Cross-
Complaint, neither Carrion nor the defendants have met their burden of establishing that there
.2f nO material ‘facts in disp
and that they are entitled ‘0 judgment as a matter of law, The
Defendants’ Motion for Sumrpary Judgment Against the Intervention Plaiowiff is thus DENIED,
and Carrion’s Cross-Motion f Summary Judgment is DENIED IN PART, as10 Counts J, and
i,
ORDER
Judgment shall ¢nter for the plaintiff intervenor, Jennifer Carrion, for $471,384.69, plus
Statutory pre-judgment interest! on Count Hi of the Cross-Complaint.
April 7, 2020
David Deakin:
David A. Deakin
Associate Justice
4 Signed electronically becausé of the COVID-19 public health sthergency, See Supreme
Judicial Court Ord
25,2020, at p, 2.
ler OE-144, Concerning Electronic Signatures of Judges and Clerks, MarchEXHIBIT CCasé 1:16-cv-12383!IT Document 183 Filed 12/06/18 Page 1 of 10
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SABA HASHEM, individually and as a ‘
member of, and. . devivatively on! behalf of, «
D'Angelo and Hashem, LLC, :
Plaintiff / Defendant-in-Counterclaim, ”
. *
¥, * Civ, Action No, 16-cv-12383-IT
+
STEPHEN D’ANGELO, ae *
amember of D'Angelo & e
and D'Angelo Law Group; D’. CELO *
LAW GROUP, LLC, and D’ANGELO *
AND HASHEM, LLC, ’
*
Defendants / Plaintiff in-Countecsiita *
*
.
Intecvention-Piaintiff, »
. a
¥v. ¥
*
SABA HASHEM, STEPHEN D'ANGELO, .
D’ANGELO &. HASHEM, LLC, D'ANGELO *
LAW GROUP; LLC,. ,
Tntervention-Defendants! »
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 6, 2018
TALWANE DJ.
1 Introduction
The undetiying civil action before the court is between two former law partners, Saba
Hashem and 1 Stephen D’ Angelo, regarding, inter alia, the assets of their firm, D’ Angelo and.
Hashem, LLC (‘D&H”"). On July 28, 2017, Intervention-Plaintiff Jeunifer Carrion, whe holdsCase 1:16-cv-12383-IT Document 183 Filed 12/06/18 Page 2-of 10
Judgments aginst Mr. Hiishem and DAH, was allowed to intervene. Mem. & Onder [#39}, Mi.
Carton seins aginst Me. Hasen, MD’ Angel, DAH, and D'Angelo Law
Coep CD asee aw) ne cms fo Dang
nn arn escent en cpt se ly. ever
Crose-Compl. 27-46 [H49),
Bee
Preview
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. a 4 | ESSEX, SS. SUPERIOR COURT C.A.NO. 1677CV01419 . SABA HASHEM, individually rn as Manager of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC, > Plaintiff/Defendant-In-Counterclaim LLC; and D’Angelo Law Group, LLC. Defendants Plaintffs-In-Counterclaims ) } \G v ) ) ) Stephen D’Angelo, individually|and as a } Member of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC and ) N D'Angelo Law Group; D’, ‘Angelp & Hashem, ) ) g : ) ® Jennifer M. Carion, ) Plaintiff-Intervenor, ) & ) v. ) XN N : ) Y stephen D’Angclo, D'Angelo Law Gtoup, LLC) \ D'Angelo & Hashem LLC, ) Defendant-Intervenors ) ) v. ) ) Heffler Claims Group, John Doe, ) ) Trustee-Defendants 5 | PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR’S, JENNIFER M. CARRION’S, EMERGENCY MOTION ' i. > FOR TRUSTEE PR SS ATTACHMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO BE DISBURSED TO D’ANGELO LAW GROUP LLC IN COLUMBIA GAS CASE, ESSEX SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET # 1877CV01343-G. 1S Tg Pr > NOW COMES the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Jennifer M. Carrion (“Carrion”), who moves this . 3 Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 4.2 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, to issue an Fy > order approving attachments of trustee process in Ms. Carrion’s Judgment amount of g 3 $672,995.92 (and more) upon the scheduled disbursement of attomey’s fees to the Defendant, D’Angelo Law Group, LLC (“DLG”), in the hands of the Trustee-Defendants, Heffler Claims :Group (“Heffler”), John Doe. Administrator, from the In Re: Columbia Gas Cases Settlement, Superior Court Civil. Action Number 1877CV.01343-G. AS GROUNDS THEREFORE, the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Carrion, avers that the attomey’s fees awarded inthe Columbia Gas Cases Settlement to the Defendant, DLG, are nedded to satisfy or substantially satisfy Ms, Cartion’s Judgment against DLG. DLG, its sole managing member, Stephen D’Angelo, and predecessor law firm, D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC, have a nearly a decade long history of dissipating assets, defrauding, and hindering payment ‘from the. Judgment.Creditor, Carrion, in her crusade to recover her civil rights judgment awarded.in November 29, 2011. Ex. A, B.O, D, E,G,H.1. DLG, and its sole managing member Mr. D’Angelo cannot be trusted to have full and exclusive possession, control, and custody of the attomey’s fees, once disbursed by Heffler, or John Doe Class Action Administrator, for which reason Plaintiff-Intervenor moves this court for trustee process attachment over any and all attomieys’ fees to be paid to Judgment Debtor, DLG, to be held by intervenor-Plaintiff’s Counsel or this Honorable Court. IN FURTHER SUPPORT HEREOE, this Court has entered judgment on April 8", 2020, in favor of Ms. Carrion against DLG. Ex. A —Summary Judgment & Ex. B — Rule 56 Decision. DLG and D&H have completely disregarded the order of Preliminary Injunction from December 6%, 2018 requiting an escrow Le from DLG and Mr, Stephen D’Angelo (“Mr. D’Angelo’’), as Carrion has.a highly likelihodd of prevailing on inter alia successor liability. Ex: C ~ Memorandum and Order of Preliminary Injunction at Pagés 9-10, D&H and Mr. D’Angelo have also completely ignored and defied the original Preliminary Injunction #0784CV2073 to not dissipate the partnerships assets pending appeals of the underlying judgment. Ex. D = 2007 Suffolk Sup. Ct Docket #0784CV2073 at File Ref #53-54. Page 2 of9 :Because, without limitation, (1) the subject Columbia Gas attorneys’ fees disbursement to DLG is scheduled for this month, (2) the Judgment Debtor, and its sole managing member, Mr. D'Angelo, continues defying, ignoring, disregarding Ms. Carrion’s 2012 & 2018 preliminary injunctions and recent Trustee [Process Attachment Motion served under Rule 9A, and (3) the Judginent Debtor, and its sole managing membet, Mr. D*Angelo, refiiseto even offer a. demand of -settlement pursuant to Ms. Carripn’s Chapter 93 A letter, dated April L7, 2020; Justice so requires the tequested award of Trustee Process attachment. WHEREFORE, and without limitation, this Court MUST ALLOW Trustee Ce Attachment on the attorney's fees award to DLG as a result of the Columbia Gas Cases Settlement, in the hands of Trustee-Defendants, Heffler'Claims Group and/or John Doc. Factual-Summary 1. On May 14,.2007, Carrion Brough suit charging Hashem and D&H with wrongfully terminating her after she. notified Hashem that she was pregnant. Ex, B ~ Rule 56 Decision, 2. On November 22,2011, a jury retumed a verdict awarding Carrion $109,000.00 and on attomey fees and costs $142,215.00 and $115, 954.00, totaling $252,742.54. These were entered against D&H. Id. : 3. On July. 12, 2012, Carrion la preliminary Injunction against D&H where'the Suffolk Superior Court, after notice: 7 hearing, ordered: “Defendants, their associates, their partners, members, employees, and agents are prohibited from: 1. Taking any unlawfid action to hinder, ov delay, or defraud the plaintiff from collecting the plaintiff's judgment in this action, 2. Transferring, alienating or encunibering any assets of the Defendants other than in the ordinary course of business.” Ex. D - Suffolk Sup.Ct Docket at File Ref. Number 54, 4, On September 16, 2016, Hashem filed a lawsuit against D'Angelo. Ex. B — Court’s Summary Judgment Opinion, (J. Deakin) Issued 4/8/2020. 5, On November 22, 2016, " action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Rastern Division, Id at'5. 6. On July 27, 2017, Ms. Carrion was allowed to intervene in the case and the case was remanded to the Superior Court on Jaquary 24, 2019. Id at 5 Page3.of 9 '7. During or around November 2018 after extensive discovery, the Massachusetts U.S. District Court issued a Preliminary Injunction in favor of Carrion against D’Angelo and DLG on ground of successor liability. Ex. C.lat 9. 8. Specifically, the Federal Court ordered inter alia in its Memorandum and Order on Page 9: “Court concludes that Ms. Carrion has met her burden to show that a preliminary Injunction is warranted in this matter to avoid an otherwise irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Defendants Stephen D’Angelo and the "ee Law Group, LLC are hereby ordered to: a. Promptly provide Intervention Plaintiff with an accounting relating to the settlement in Lopez-Maldonando etal. v. Toll Brothers Inc, Suffolk Superior Court Case No. 1484-CV-01440-G (.1.) b. Hold the balance of attomey’s fees and costs in Lopez-Maldonando et al. v. Toll Brothers Inc, Suffolk Superior Court Case No. 1484-CV-01440-G in an escrow account; c. Hold the balance andjattomeys’ fees and costs, from all other cases that originated with D'Angelo & Hashem LLC, still held by or received by D’Angelo Law Group LLC, or Stephen D’Angelo, while this Injunction remains in effect, in a escrow account d. Defendants, Stephen D'Angelo and D’Angelo Law Group, LLC, are enjoined, directly, or indirectly; alone or in concert with others, effective immediately, from making any distributions of amounts from such escrow accounts or obtained from any cases originating from D’Angelo.& Hashem LLC, except that D’Angelo' Law Group LLC maintains the right to pay normal and customary expenses occurred in the normal course of business. Such expenses may not include distributions'to Stephen D’Angelo, payments toward credit card balances, or for car leases. “The above-restrictions shall rernain in place pending further order of this Court, or if the matter is remanded, of the Superior Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This order is subject 10 modification by order bf the Court upon Motion by any party. IT IS SO ORDERED.” Ex. C- Memo & Order PI at pg. 9-10. 9. DLG and D’Angelo admitesly failed to hold the amounts in escrow as ordered by the Federal Court and continued to receive six figuré incomes in 2016, 2017, 2018 &; 2019 without compensating a single cent to the Judgment Creditor, Carrion, Ex. E - Email from T. LaPorte, dated 03.10.2020. ' , 10. On April 8, 2020, Summary] Judgment was granted to Carrion and DLG was ordered to pay Carrion a total of $672,995.92, Ex. A. 11. In consequence of the forego ing and absent an order of trustee process, Ms. Carrion has suffered, and will continue to suffer, great financial losses as well as incurring considerable expenses;. in addition to having been greatly damaged by the course of this.case which has spanned almost a decade, Page 4 of 9 112. On February 27, 2020, the Court held a hearing. on two motions filed by Class Counsel: (1) Plaintiffs” Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Paper #72); and (2) Plaintiff” Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees, Costs and Incentive Payments (Paper #73). Both Papers are part of Ex. F —In Re: Columbia Gas Cases, Docket #1877CV01343-G. 13, On March 12, 2020, the os for final approval of the Settlement was allowed and the motion for approval of requested attorney’s feés and costs were allowed. Id at 3. 14. The total amount of the sen is $143 million, The settlement provides for cash payments to class members #s well as provides attamey’s fees not exceeding 16:5% of the settlement fund, ie. $23,595,000.00. Id at 3-4. 15. Heffler is in charge of disbursing lumpsum payments to class. members followed by itemized payments for commercial businesses and with the final settlement amount approved, tooks to begin making disbursements as éarly as June 30,2020, Id-at 9-10. 1 16, With the award of attorney's fees in the amount of $23,595,000.00, DLG are one of fourteen firnis ‘who are entitled and will be receiving the disbursement of attomey’s fees.in ani undisclosed amount “es the disbursements to class members. Id. 17. On April. 17, 2020, Ms. Carrion issued Chapter 93 A Demand Letter against, DLG, and its sole -managing member, Mr.|D’Angelo; for their willful disregard of a known liability, Ms. Carrion’s-civil right judgment against predecessor law firm D&H, of which Mr. D’Angelo was a managing member, and received millions of dollars therefrom D&H and later DLG. . G,.Ms Carrion’s 93 A Demand Letter,4/17/2020 ’ 18. On June-[0, 2020, this Honorable Court awarded Ms. Carrion her attorneys’ fees and costs for her entire intervention in|collecting her civil rights judgment. Ex. [- Honorable Deakin’s Award of Attorney’s Fees, : 19. Notwithstanding this Honorable Court’s Judgment and award of this Intervention’s attomey’s fees, DLG and its sole managing member, Mr. D’Angelo, refused to offer a reasonable demand of settlement to Ms! Carrion as required by M.G.L. Chapter 93A, Section 11, and aceused Ms. Carrion and her counsel of unfair deceptive collection practices. 20. On June'12,.2020,.Ms. Cartion’s counsel served DLG and Mr. D’Angelo’s counsel witha Motion for Trustee Process a d in reach & apply pursuant to Rule‘9A, which still remains without response and will be filed with this court on July 14, 2020. Argument in Support of Motion for Trustee Process Attachment against D’Angelo Law Group, LLC and D*Angelo & Hasheth, LLC A. This Honorable Court Must ALLOW Carrion’s Emergency Motion for Trustee Process-over Attoméys* fees Disbursements scheduled to DLG, because she has. Page of 9unsatisfied Executions against D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC and Judgment against D’Angelo Law Group on Successor Liability. Rule 4.2 “Trustee Process” of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure states that “...trustee process may be used, in the manner and to the:extent. provided by law, bit subject to the requirements of this rule, to secure satisfaction of the judgment for damages and costs which the plaintiff may recover,... and in no event shall the attachment exceed the limitations prescribed by law.” Mass. R. Civ. P. 4. 2 Absent this Honorable Court's Award of Trustee Process, the Plaintiff-Intervenor, Ms. Carrion, shall be irreparably: hat , because the facts of this case show, and the subsequent actions of DLG‘affirm that there is a cl and present danger and history that the Defendants will move, dissipate or transfer away from Ms. Carrion’s reach, the assets, monies, goods, credits, and effects in which Ms. Carrion has an interést and right to recover. As the attached Exhibits | +B, C,D, E, G,H, I prove, the Court has repeatedly confirmed and agreed that the full amount on the account is owed to Carrion. However, despite the:clear DLG and D&H liability to pay its debt to Carrion, DLG, D&H, & their managing: member, : ‘Mr. D'Angelo; have repeatedly made outright refusals to make payment on the ariount owed. DLG and D&H claim to not be liable or able to pay Carrion, but the discovery production of DLG and D&H shows the firm having a total worth of over a million dollars. The account owed by D&H, DLG, and its Member, Mr. D’Angelo to ae Carrion is a decade overdue. B. There is a-clear and present danger that, absent award of the subject Trustee Process Attachment, Motion over Attomeys" fees soon to be disbursed to DLG in the Columbia insurance available to.satisfy her Judgments and Executions, _ The Jidgments, Executions, and facts of this matter clearly demonstrate the likelihood that the Plaintiff-Intervenor was successful on the merits of its claim’ for the amount owed, of $672,995.92, interest, casts of collection, and attomey fees. Ms. Carrion continues to be harmed by the Defendants’ and Judgment Debtors’ refusal to pay the account owed to the Plainitiff-Intervenor, As such, there is a clear and present danger that if Ms. Carrion is not granted this motion, the Defendant will seek to. conceal jor remove the goods, effects, and credits, which Ms. Carrion has ‘interest in, out.of the state. Upon information and belief, the Defendant does not maintain a policy of liability insurance available to satisfy the Plaintiff-Intervénor’s Judgments. Therefore, absent the issuance of attachmeiit by Trustee Process, it is unlikely that the Plaintiff-Intervenor will recover or collect amounts it is owed by the Defendant. Furthermore, the Defendant ‘has had this judgment against D&H since 2011 and its successor law firm.and member! Mr. D’ Angelo, have not paid a singlé dime to Ms. ‘Carrion. Ms. Carrion has spent years fighting to receive justice. It is quite clear that the Defendant has no Page 6.of9intention whatsoever to pay Ms. trustee process, Carrion the debt to which she is owed without an award of DLG and its sole managing member, Mr. D’Angelo, will be paid attomey’s fees from the Columbia Gas Cases Settlement, Carzion, or at least, a substantial! Carrion to finally receive some and DLG have actively hindere as-Exhibits G, H, & [ show, Ms, accordance with Massachusetts WHEREFORE, the Plait award in her favor of : (1) the ti which will either fully cover the judgment debt owed to Ms. portion of the judgment amount owed. This would-allow Ms. ‘orm justice after 13 years of exhausting litigation in which D&H her abilities in collection on the judgment owed to her. Further, Cartion’s Judgment and Execution are highly to be trebled in General Laws, Chapter 93 A, Section 11. tiff-Intervenor respectfully requests this Honorable Court’s tee process attachment in the amount of $672,995.92, or up to the amount of attomey’s fees being g awarded to DLG as a result of the Columbia Gas Cases, (2) an order that the attorneys’ fees to DLG from the Columbia Gas Cases # [877 CV1343-G be held in escrow with Plaintitf-Intervenor 's counsel, or with the Court, and together with (3) an order of any other relief this Honorable Court deems fair and just. Dated: July 7, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, The Plaintiff-Intervenor, Jennifer M. Carrion Mernaysa Rivera-Bujosa, Esquire Rivera-Bujosa Law, PC Shipway Place, Suite C2 Charlestown Navy Yard Boston, Massachusetts 02129 Telephone: (617) 398 - 6728 Facsimile: (617) 398 - 6730 E-mail: Memaysa@riverabujosalaw.com BBO no.: 665965 Page 7 of 9CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Mernaysa Rivéra-Bujosa, Esq.| do herewith certify that I have on this 7 day of July 2020, I served a copy of the within document by email and first-class mail, postage prepaid upon counsel appeared in this action, to wit: Kenneth Cossingham, Esq. Thomas C. LaPorte, Esq. Cossingham Law Office, PC 30 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 404 North Andover, MA 01845 tlaporté@cossinghamlaw.com kcossingham@cossinghamlaw.com Albert L. Farrah, Jr., Farrah & Harrah 800-Boylston Street, Suite 1601 Boston, MA 02199 alf@farrah-law.com AND Claims Administrator In re: Columbia Gas Settlement, cfo Settlement Administrator PO Box 58729, Philadelphia PA;19102-8729 info@ColumbiaGasExplosionS¢tdement.com 7s Memaysa 9 Mernaysa Rivera-Bujosa, Esq, PageB8.ofSCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ESSEX, SS. SUPERIOR COURT C.A.NO. 1677CV01419 a SABA HASHEM, individually and as Manager of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC, Plaintiff/Defendant-In-Countertlaim v Stephen D’Angelo, individually, and as a Member of D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC and D’Angelo Law Group; D’Angelo & Hashem, LLC; and D'Angelo Law Group, LLC. Defendants/Plaintiffs-In-Counterclaims, Plaintiff-Intervenor, Vv Stephen D'Angelo, D’Angelo Law Group, LLC D'Angelo & Hashem LLC, Defendant-litervenors Vv. Heffler Claims Group, John Doe, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) } Jennifer M. Carrion, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Trustee-Defendants ) TABLE OF EXHIBITS FOR PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR’S, JENNIFER M. OEE EAN EE INTER ENOR'S, JENNIFER M, CARRION’S, EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TRUSTEE PROCESS ATTACHMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TOBE DISBURSED TO D’ANGELO LAW GROUP LLC IN ASC. ESSE: iC. 3. Exhibit A - Summary Judgment Attested to Judgment —M.R.C-P. Rule 56 Exhibit B — Honorable Judge Deakin’s Decision in support of Summary Judgment, Apmil 8, 2020 Exhibit C —- Honorable Judge Talwani’s Court Order for Preliminary Injunction, Dec. 6, 2018, Exhibit D - 2007 Suffolk Supe ior Court Docket with Preliminary Injunction, July 12, 2012, Exhibit E - Email from Defendant’s Counsel Thomas LaPorte, March 10, 2020, Exhibit F - Columbia Gas Docket # [877CV1343G Papers 72 & 73, Exhibit G -Ms. Carrion M.G.L; Ch, 93 A Demand with Certified Mail Card, April 17, 2020, Exhibit H - DLG & Mr. D'Angelo Response to M.G.L. Ch, 93 A Demand, June 30, 2020, Exhibit I - Notice of Attomey's Fees Award in favor of Ms. Carrion, June 10, 2020. Page 9 of 9EXHIBIT A: ‘Trial Court of Massachusétie SUMMARY JUDGMENT e i oO q . {Pursuant to MASS. R. CIV, P, 66) The Superior Court : DOCKET NuMBER ‘Thomas H. Driscoll, Jr, Clerk of Courts ~ 1877CV01419 CASE NAME Saba Hashem individually and 48a member of And derivatively on behalf of. D'Angelo and Hashem, Lic Manaaln an inhanl at al JUDGMENT FOR THE FOLLOWING PLAINTIFFS) ‘COURT NAME B ADDRESS Essex County Superior Court - Satem J. Michael Rizéna Judiciat Center 56 Federal Street Salem, MA 04970 Jennifer M Carrion } AUDGMENT AGAINST THE FOLLOWING DEFENDANT(S) D'Angelo Law Group LLC. and nominalty, yangeto and Hashem, LLC This action cams on before the Court, Hon! 0 ourt, David A Geaktn, presiding, and upen motion of the above nated Piaintifi(s), for Summary Judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Clv.P.68, the parties having been heard, and the Court having Considered the pleadings and submissions, finds there Is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the Plaintiff is entitled tn a Judgment 8S a matter of law. . After Heating, itis ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: ‘That the plaintifis) named-aboue recover of the defendant(s) named above, theJudgihent Tolar ‘with Interest thereon 8S outlined below as Provided by law 1. Date of Breach, Demand or Complaint | 9/16/2016 2. Date Judgment Entered . 94/08/2020 3. Nuriber of Days of Prejudgment Inferast fine 2- linet) 4300 4, Annual Interest Rate Of 0.12/365.55 = Dai lly Interest rate — -900329 ; 5. Single’ Damages. $471,384.69 6 Prejudgment Interest Woes Sxaxgy - $201,614 23 ?. Double or Treble Damages Awarded by Court fwhere authofized by law) $ 3. Statutory Costs . | $.00 9. Altomey Fees Awarded by Court (where authorized by Taw) $ 10, JUDGMENT TOTAL PAYABLE TO PLAINTIFF{(S) (nes 5+6+7+8+9) | $672,958.92 DATE. UOGENT ENTERED GLERK OF COURTS/AgST. a ame Xun FLEE DateTime Printed: 04-08-2020 17.1144+XHIBIT BESSEX, ss. SUPERIOR COURT , CIVIL ACTION NO. 1677CV01419 SABA HASHEM! Xs Ss INL. D’ANGELO & OTHERS? The plaintiff-interveno “ Jennifer Carrion, intervened in this case to enforce a judgment that she obtained in 2011 the plaintiff, Saba Hashem, and his former jaw firm; 1, D’ Angelo & Hashem, LLC (D'Angelo & Hashem”). In 2011, a jury awarded her $100,000. 00 for sex discrimination based on pregnancy and retaliation, and a series of sizeable awatds for costs and attorney?s fees — both trial and pellate — — have entered since, Three eas into her adysey to enforce the judgment, ‘Carrion ‘confionted with the sudden demise of D’Angeto & Hashem, after Hashem was arrested and incarcerated? The firn’s closure resulted in the undediying action in this case, broughi-by Hashem against his former partner, Stephen L. D’Angelo, their former firm, and D’Angelo’ 'snew firm, the D"Angelo Law Group, LLC (D’Angelo. Law “Individually and as a member pf and derivatively on behalf of D*Angelo and Hashem, LLC ? D'Angelo Law Group, LLC, and D’Angelo and Hashem, LLC 3 For a detailed summary of the demise 0 of D'Angelo & Hashem; LLC @’Angelo & Hashem), - and:the ensuing litigation between i its principals, sec the court’s Memorandum and Order on Defendants Stephen L, D*Angelo and D’Angelo Law Group, LLC’s Motion for recta Summaty Adjudication, alsé isi on April 7, 2020. A COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS a :2 Group”). After the renioval r™ ‘underlying action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Massachusetts, Carrion intervened, Her suit seeks the retovery of, ‘the Judgments against Hashem, D’Angelo, and their former firm. Defendants Stephen D’Angelo-and the D’ Angelo Law Group maintain that they are entitled to summary ji because Cartion has no cause of action against either D’Angelo or his present firm. As the undisputed facts establish that the D’Angelo Law Group is the continuation of ‘D’Angelo’s previous law firm, D'Angelo & Hashem, Carrion is entitled to ‘Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore ALLOWED IN aR, as to Cot IL, successor liability. As to the Temaining counts of Carrion's Cross-Complaint, the court concludes that there are disputed issues of material fact that preclude entry of judgment for either patty. ‘Carrion's cross-motion for summary judgment is therefore DENTED IN PART, as to: Counts I, Violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; and IL, reach and apply. The detentions Motion for Summary Judgment! is DENTED, 1 Facts‘ Jn 2000, the plaintif& Saba Hashem, and the defendant, Stephen L, D'Angelo, formed a Jew firm, D'Angelo & Hashem. ‘They ware the only two members of the LLC throught its existence. The firm handied personal injury and workers compensation cages:> a 4 Facts sot outin thisisection are facts are set out in the Analysis Gantested, unless otherwise noted inthe text. Somie ddditional ion as necessary to supply context, .3 The firm hited Carri nas a receptionist in July 2008; Shortly after being hired, she “took on additional clerical duties, and received a promotion.” Carrion v. Hashem, 86 Mass. App.-Ct, 1123 at p. 1 (2014) Rule 1:28 Opinion). In October 2005, Carrion told Hashem that she was Pregnant. Sec id. Sometime thereafter, Carrion was terminated under disputed circumstances. See id. She brought suit on y 14, 2007, charging Hashem and the firm with wrongfilly terminating her after she notified Hashem that she was ‘Pregnant and then retaliating against her after her termination by opposing her application for unemployment benefits, See Carrion v. Hashem; 0784C-V02073, Mem orandum anid Order on Plaintiff's Petition for an Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs Pursuant to Ch. 151B, Section 9 @aper No, 50), 2012 WL 2335297 (May 24, 2012, Connolly, 3.) On November 22, 2011, the jury returned a verdict awarding Carrion $14,000.00 in damages from Hashem and.$86,000 from D?Angélo & Hashem.6 4 series of awards of attorney’s foes antf costs entered thereafter. These were entered apainst both Hashem and D’Angelo & Hashem Jointly and severally. Carrion has'since obtained a series of executions against both ashen; and the firm. Appended to her motion for summary judginent are executions against D'Angely & Hashem totaling $471,384.69, 5 The record is not clear as to whether the firm handled other types of cases, as well. appears, however, that these two areas werethe firm’s Primary area of focus. In any.event, nothing tums * On July 17, 201 the court (Leibensperper, J.) entered an order forbidding Hashem and D'Aigelo.@ Hasieas ELC, “froin: 1. [flaking any unlawful action to hinder, or delay, or defraud the plaintiff from collecting pl[ainti]ff*s judgment in this action. 2. [(lransfercing alienating or enctimbering any asseis Gf the \deffendanjts other than in the normal course of business.” 7 Catrion has obtained executions for: $185,592.71 (the Judgment against D*Angelo & Hashem, plus interest), $220,484,23 (the award oF appellate [Appeals. Court} fees and costs against, Hashem and the firm jointly and severally, plus interest), $61 909.71 (he award of appellate: [petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for further appellate review] fees and costs against Hashem dnd the firm jointly.and Severally, with interést),D'Angelo & Hashem op: October 13, 2015, and renng erated continuously until sometime. after Hashem’s arrest on incareeration.* On October 23, 2015, D'Angelo established a new firm, the D’ Angelo Law Group, of which he was “president and sole sharcholder.” Letter of October 30, 2015, from Stephen D’Angela to EM.L-M,, Joint Appendix to Cross-Mpoticns for Summary Judgment (‘Joint Appendix”) (Paper No. 80.10), Exhibit 15, The DrAngelo Law Group began with the same employees as D'Angelo & Hashem, with the obvious exception of the plaintiff, Saba Hashem. See Deposition of Stephen D'Angelo Angelo Deposition) at p. 152; 1h. 17-19, Joint Appentix, ban 16. The office address, telephoné numbers, atid fax numbers:also remained the same. See Consolidated (Response To) Statenient of Undisputed Facts in Support of Jennifer M. Carrion’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (@aper No. 80.14) at p. 9, para. 35; Letter of October 30, 2015, from Stephen D’Angelo to E.M.L-M, Joint Appendix: Exhibit 15, After Hashem’s arrest an Office of Bar Counsel for advi d incarceration, D’Angelo represents that he contacted the: Bar Counsel advised D’Angelo that, among other requitements, he was obligated to notify all D’Angelo.& Hashern clients that Hashem had becn stispended and that, therefore, the firm was no longer representing clients. D'Angelo represents that he did so, advising clients that they could be represented by his new fim or, instead, could choose other counsel, “Many” f represented by the D’ Angelo Lay _— ormer D'Angelo & Hashem clients apparently chose tobe Group; others did not. Affidavit of Stephen L. D'Angelo in 5 Hashem was arrested on October 13, 2015, and the following day was held without bail pending trial, According to D* lo’s affidavit, Hashem changed his plea to guilty “in December 2015.” Affidavit of Stephen L. D’Angelo in Support of Stephen L. D'Angelo and D'Angelo Law Group, ELC’s M Exhibit A, On hily27, 2016, H: December. 29, 2015." Jn:re Saba appéar to have been reinstated, 1 ee ds, . . «ws ption for Summary Adjudication (D’Angela Affidavit) at hem was “suspended for eighteen months, retroactive to . Hashem, No. BD-2015-114 (SIC, Spina, J.), Hedoes notJadgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on January 3, 2020. The hearing in this Matter was held on January 7, 2020,6 A party is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c) if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. See * Baazava v. Safety Ins. Co, ” Mass. 233,237 (2012). The moving party bears “the burden of initially showing that there is an absence of eviderice to Support the case of the nonmoving party shouldering the burden of proof at trial.” Kourowvacilis y. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 714 (1991). The moving fe can mect this burden by “demonstralfing]; by reference to material desoribed in Mass. . Civ, P, 56(¢), unmet by countervailing materials, that the party ‘Opposing the miotion has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element ofthat party’s case.” Jd at 716. Ifthe moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the ‘on-tnoving party to provide specific facts to demonstrate that thete is a genuine issue of material fact. See Drakopoulos v. U.S. Rank Nat. Ass’i, 465 Mass. 71S, 777-778 (2013). A court reviewing a motion for summary judgment must “draw all reasonable inferences ini the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Jd., quoting Premier Capital, LLC v. KMZ, Ine., 464 Mass. 467, 474-475 (2013) I. Successor LiaBiiry At the heart of Carrion’s claims is her contention that the D’ Angelo Law Group is effectively a continuation of, and therefore the successor in interest to, D’Angelo & Hashem. ‘Carrion asserts that the D’ Angelo Law Group ‘therefore is liable for the predecessor firm's obligations, including her judgment against it, The defendants dispute that the D'Angelo Law Group is a mere continuation ofp’ Ando & Hashem and therefore contend that imposing Successor liability on the D'Angelo Law Group would be unjustified. The court concludes that Clartior has established that there are no material facts in dispute-0s t6 the DAngelo Law7 Group's status as successor in interest 10 D’Angelg & Hashem. She has further detnonstrated that the undisputed facts establish that she is entitled, as a matter of law, to a judgment against the D'Angelo Law Group based on her judgments against its predecessor. Generally, the febiides of a business entity? “are not imposed on its successor” Smith ¥. Kelley, 484 Mass. 111, 120 2020), citing Milliten & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass, 347, 556 (2008). The doctrine of successor liability, however, exists to prevent a business entity from avoiding its debt obligations “by merely changing its form without significantly changing tts substance.” Jd. There are four situations in which courts will apply the doctrine: They are cases in which: “(1) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes liability of the predecessor, (2) the irinsdction is a de facto merger or Consolidation, (3) the successor is a mere continuation of thé predecessor, or 4 the transaction is.a fraudulent-effort to avoid liabilities of the, predecessor.” id., quoting Milliken, 451 Mass. at 556. It is the third of these situations that is-at issue in this case,'° Applying the “mere continuation” exception requires the court to look at the “seal nature™ of a change in businegs form, “looking through its form to its substance and intent.” Hd, quoting Milliken, 451 Mass, ot 560, °*'Thé successor Hability ion to the general ruie. against imposing corporate obligations on.a successor “is no less applicable to professional corporations, which are afforded the same protections against liability as corporations formed under G. Lic. 156D.” Smith v, Kelley, 484 Mass. 111, 120 2020) citing G. L. e, 156A, § 6(2). 10 The plaintiff-intervenor’s Pleadings do not make entirely clear whether she contends that both the de fact6 merger exception and the mete contiqwation exception apply in this case, In light of the court's ruling that the mere continuation exception applies in this case, it need not reach the argument for de facto merger. Ifthe court were to reach the de facts merger analysis, it seems unlikely that it would bé persuasive. For one thing, a de facto merger generally requires the -Porchase and sale ‘of assets, wick did not occur in this case. See Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., Inc., 424 Mass. 356, 359 (1997) (listing “the factors that courts generally consider in determining whether to characierize an asset sale as.a de facto merger”). As it is clear that the D'Angelo Law Group, LLC, merely a continuation of D’Angelo’s law practice, albeit without his former partner, the [distinction between the de facto merger and mere continuation exceptions, if there ts one, is not significant in this case, ,: To determine whether against successor liability, the management, Personnel, assets, and Operations of; the two entities,” J The inquiry is. fact-specific, and “no § Single factor i is dispositive.” Snir emt dd, quoting Milliken, 451 Mass, at 558. an ¢ id, quoting Milliken, 45) Mass, at 556 CUttimately order to avoid paying its debts has become another for the Purpose of | eliminating j its In this case, there are only two discernible differences between D'Angelo & Hashem and D'Angelo Law Group, at the time of the laters formation. CE id at 324 (The. most ‘relevant time frame of, ‘comparison here i 1S not the entire lifespai Of the predecessor entity, but the time i immediately Preceding its dissofution, "). ‘The first difference is that Hashem was no.longer & member; insicad, D* Angelo was the sole member of the j new firm. The second difference i ig that, apparently, not all of tlic.old|firm’s clients signed on with the new firm. In all other Significant respects, however, the firms were indistinguishable. They were both Operated ‘by D’Angelo. They were in the same tine of pmeticc. They shated a large number of clients. They employed the same personnel and operated oul of the same office. Even their email: addresses and telephons numbers were the same." © Carrion also maintain thatthe two firms used the same web site URI. address, See Plaintiff. Intervesior[] Jennifer Carrion’s Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion fr Summary, Judgment and Opposition to Defendant’ 's Motion for Summary Judgment (Carrion tee vith the - Memorandum”) (Paper No. 80. 9) lat p. 15. There Fema the record that complies with 1 ic requirements of Mass: R. Civ. P. 56(c) that spporis this ieim. Itis rely sated emwn He Coaalnc toposes 1) Staiemaat oF ‘Undisputed Facts in Support of Jennifer M. Carri Gross Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 80.14) at p. 9, para. 35. The;court, jon’s theicfore, disregards this representation.This case is similar, factually, to the case of Columbia State Bank y. Invicta Law Group PLLC, 199 Wash. App. 306 (2017), retied upon recently by the SIC in Smith, 484 Mass, at 123. ° in Columbia State Bank, su liability was found where an attomey ceased operating a professional limited liability company (@PLLC) and the next day began operating a sole Proprietorship. As the Supreme Judicial Court noted, Despite this, [the attorney] . . . continued fo use engagement letters with the letterhead of his old PLLC for six months, He also continued to nse. ‘the same. ” name, website, signage, telephone number, offices, insurance, employees, and equipment,” and continued to represent the same clients. Smith, 484 Mass. a 123, quoting Columbia State Bank, 199 Wash. App. at 314. Many of the same factors are present in this'case, It is true that, unlike the attorney in Cohanbia State Bank, D’ Angelo did notity clients of “the change in legal structure."{Id. Additionally, it appears tobe disputed in this case whether D'Angelo & Hashem funds were commingled with those from tlie successor firm. As ia Columbia State Bank, however! there was in this case a continuity of individuals in contrél of the business. ... [One of t]he individual{s] at the helm of both entities was the same, the clients were the same, and the business at issue (law) was the same. dd., quoting Columbia State Bank, 199 Wash. App. at 320 (citation omitted). The.court is unable . to distinguish the holding in Cot State Bank.—as telied upon by the Supreme Judicial Court in Seaith ~ from tlic facts of this|case in @ way that would warrant the Opposite ming in this'case. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that D'Angelo Law Group was a continuation of D'Angelo & Hashem and is therefore liable for judgments against the predecessor firm.10 The shift ftom two members, D'Angelo and Hashem, to one in the new firm’ does not require a contrary conclusion,| As the defendants note in another context,’ after his arrest and detention, Hasheni Practically|could not practice law, atid.after his suspension, legally could not oso. Asa résutt; he could not be a member of an LLC engaged in the practice of law, See controlling the LLC to the sol mernber. AS a practical matter, the only change in the controlling membership was the loss of one member (of two) who was no Jonger entitled to be a member, This is the minimum change that the circumstances Permit. Just as “there is no requirement that there be complete shareholder identity between the seller and a buyer before corporate successor liability will attach,” Cargill, v. Beaver Coal. & Oil Co,, Ine., 424 Mass. 356, 361,(1997), ‘the: involimtary withdrawal of one pe does not preclude a finding of successor liability. The same reasoning applies to the change resulting from the decision of some of the old firm’s clients not to retain thie ni firm. The defendants argue that because clients are not transferrable, they are not “assets.” From this Proposition, they argue that, therefore, ‘the *etention of many of the former|firm’s clients cannot be described as a transfer of assets. It is certainly true that law firms cannot transftr clients among one another in the way other business entities can transfer tangible assets, ‘That does not impty, however, that agreements a firm has with its clients are not assets, though Massachusetts courts do riot ‘appear to have addréssed the iseue, courts in other jurisdictions have held that ‘pending contingent es are firm assets except when the partnership has/apreed onan alternative method. of distribution.” Sanialucia v. Sebright Transp., Inc., 232 -| 298 (2" Cir. 2000). See also Due-v. Due, 342 So.2d 161, !2-See Memorandum of Law in ‘apport of Defendants Stephen L. D’Angelo and D'Angelo Law Group, LLC’s Motion for Summary Adjudication @aper No. 77.2), at p. 9.iW 166'n.5 (La:1977) (“In the everyday world, when a partnership dissolves or a partner withdraws fiom his law firm, the valuation of the interest ofa lawyer in the contingent fee contracts and the appropriate accounting has usually been accomplished by agreement, without undue difficulty, on the basis of informed estimates as to the prospective recovery or settlement value ofeach case, the chances of loss, and the amount of work involved before and after the dissolution or withdrawal.”) In any event, the-defendants? argument that clients are not assets has no significances. If the court were to accept this proposition, it would mean merely that the assets that were common to.D’Angelo & Hashem and the D’Arigelo Law Group did not incnde clients, Otherwise, the assets appear to be essentially ‘pense ‘The undisputed facts establish the extent to which the Operations of D’Angelo & Hashem were carried forward by the D’Angelo Law Group, and the defendants either concede or do not contest the point. Thus, whether clients and/or their cases are properly viewed as assets in' the context of successor liability has no impact on the analysis, As the successor in interest to D’Angelo & Hashem, the D’Angclo Law Group is liable ‘for legal obligations of its pred or firm. See Smith, 484 Mass. at 125. Ti. CaRRion’s CLAIM UNDER THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, G.L'c. 169A, §§5,6 Count | of Carrion’s Cross-Complaint alleges that Hashem and D*Angelo violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, G. L. . 109A, §§ 5, 6 (“Uniform Act”) when they paid themselves excessive draws to avoid paying the judgments in her favor against the firm. The ‘Uniform Act’s purpose is to prevent debtors from unfairly avoiding their obligations by transferring assets to another ech, See Jn re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55, 58 C1" Cir. 2019) The concept underlying fraudulent: fer ts easily graspéd. Where a person cannot reasonably expect to pay his debts,in due i that person's transfer of his assets to.another person,12 ' Without Tecelving equivalent! value in return, can if done With bad shonest wick that ought to ke civilly ado, motive be viewed asa me and perhaps criminally Panisted.”) ‘Subsection 5(@) of the Uniform Act provides, in relevant part, that by adebtor is fraudulent as to creditor, whether the credifor’s slaim arose before or after the Uansfer was made Or the si obligation . . - With actual intent i i e | [ it to hinder, delay, or deftand any creditor of the debtor...» G. Lc, 109A, § 5a). Additionally » @ transfer made by a-debtor “ig fraudulent as {0 a creditor — z ; x Ef & g 5 ¥ 5 i Z & 3 z e E A receiving a Teasonably equivaleg t value in exchange for the trausfir OF obligation and the debtor Was insolvent at that time or the lebtor became insolvent aS a result ofthe transfer. |» GLic TODA, § 6(a). Hashem and D'Angelo caused the firm to make-to them “with actual intent to hinder [anit] delay” Carrion in collecting her jatlement from the firm. Carrion notes, in this Context, that Subsection 460) of G.L«. 1560 fyems the “witiding up ofa limited lability company.” It Provides that assets be distributed [ “creditors.” id, Subsection 46(b) provides that “[a] limited . liability company which has dissol ed shall pay Sriaks reasonable provision to pay ail elis and obligaijons... known to the lthined Uability company..." G.L. ©. 156C, § 46(), 7 Carrion contends that, in light of this duty, D'Angelo’s failure to dissolve D'Angelo & “sien was intended to avoid thie obligation to sat|sfy her Judgment. A jury certainly could find thls to be the case: S i i 8 é E : i13 Siniilarly, Carrion alleges that the D'Angelo Law Group collected recoverics that were, at least in:part, the assets of D*, lo & Hashem without crediting any of the proceeds to the former firm. She alleges thistwas done in order to render D'Angelo & Hashem insdlvent and/or maintain its insolvency, If proved, this would be a violation of § G(a) of the Uniform Act and would render the transfers fralsdulent as to Carrion, a judgment creditor of D'Angelo & Hashem. The defendants’ legal challenges to this claim are not persuasive, D’ Augelo argues that there is wo judgment age argument fails for two reasons ‘im, and therefore he cannot have violated the Uniform Act. This . First, when D'Angelo & Hashem made the transfers in question, D’Angelo was one of its two tnemibers, He was therefore one of the two members who both authorized and received the legedly fraudulent transfers. “The [Uniform Act] .. - provides for a range of possible remedies and forms of judgment to be entered against a fraudulent transferor or transferee in order to aid a tor in obtaining repayment of'a debt." Balwin v Mardirosian, 467 Mass. 631, 638 (2014), citing G. Lc. 109A, § 8. Thus, as both allegedly Saudulent transferor and transferee, defendant D' Angelo can be liable to Carrion even though he was not petsonally:the subject Hashem (see Section J, supra), its predecessor firm. of her original judgment. Second, as successor to D'Angelo & the D’Angelo Law Group is liable for Carrion’s judgment against The defendatit’s contention that Carrion's Cross-Complaint does not comply with Mass, R. Civ. P. 9(b) is without merit . Rule 9(b) provides that “(ijn all averments of fraud,,. . . the Circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity.” Mass, R. Civ. B, 9(b), 365 Mass. 751 (1974). See Bi ings v. GTFM, 449 Mass. 281, 294 (2007). A plaintiffatleging fraud must, “at a minitnum ... ,|particularize the identity of the person(s) making the: representation, the contents of the misrepresentation and where and when it took place.”4, Equipment & Sys. For Inthis., Inc: v. Northmeadows Constr., Inc., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 931, 931- 932 (2003). Also required are specifics regatding the “materiality of the misrepresentation, (the plaintiffs] - . . place there, and resniting harm.” Jd. The short answer to the defendants? argument is that the detail in Carrion’s Cross-Complaint meets these. requirements. ‘The Cross- Complaint identifies: the person/identities who made'the allegedly fraudulent transfers (Angelo, Hashem, and D’Angelo & Hashem), the nature of the transfers, and tlie location and time when the transfers took place. The Cross-Complaint clearly identifies the impact of the allegedly fraudulent transfers on Carrion. Finally, the defendants’ argument that “clients are not assets who can be transferred or conveyed,” Memorandum of aw in Support of Stephen D*Angelo's and D'Angelo Law Group, LLC's Motion for Summary J | dgment Against Intervention Plaintitt ‘Defendants’ Memorandum) misses the man Although the contention may be.at least partially correct, it is Clear from a reading of the C: iplaint that the fraudulent conveyances to which Carrion objects are not the transfer of cases from one firm to the other. Rather, it is the transfer of D*Angelo & Hashem, finds from the firm to the members that Carrion alleges violates the Uniform Act. That the Cros omplaint may not be a model of drafting in this regard does not entitle the defendants to summary judgment. “A complaint is not subject to dismissal if it would support relief on ary theory of law.” Pontremoliv. Spaulding Rehab. Hosp., 5} Mass. App. ct 622, 626 n4 (2001) (emphasis'in original), quoting Whitinsville Plaza, inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass, 85, 89 (1979).1s IL Carrion’s remaining claims for Summary judgment A. The claim for recovery under the Uniform Fraudulent Transter Act, G. Lie 1094 Although Carrion’s case is Strong as to both D'Angelo’s and Hashem’s violation of the Uniform Act, she has not mee her burden, on a motion for Suminary judgment, of establishing that there are no material fot, in dispute and that, therefore, she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To establish a violation of the Uniform Act, Catrion must prove that transfers made by D'Angelo — and Hashem, in some cases — were made with the intent to deny her recovery of her judgment against Hashem and the firm. That her evidence on this points persuasive does not establish, as a matter of law, that the defendants have no defense on the merits. Issues such as appropriate compensation for the members are issues of fact that must be resolved bya jury. Similarly, the assets subject to.a Teach-and-apply action involve determination of plausibly disputed facts.'2 , Conciusion For the foregoing reasoy 8, the court concludes that Carrion-has established that there are no-material facts fn dispute as tp her claim thet the D'Angelo Law Group, LLC, as successor in interest of D'Angelo & Hashem, LLC, is liable for her judgment against the Predecessor firm. Carrion’s Crogs-Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore ALLOWED IN PART, as to Count TH, successor liability, Judgment shall enter for Carrion against the D’Angelo Law Group for 5 The defendants contend, without citation to authority, that a reach-and-apply action is not an independent cause of action, but, rather, ao equitable remedy. This is incorrect. See Cavadt v. De¥eso, 458 Mass. 615, 624-625 (2011), citing, inter alia, G,L. 0. 214, §3 (6) (Statutory action to reach and apply, and (8) (statutory action to Teach and apply fraudulently conveyed property). Because Carrion’s action to reach and‘apply the defendants’ assets is an equitable cause of action, however —and pcause there are disputed factual issue’as to the identity and extent of the assets that are subject to the equitable action — it is riot suitable for summary judgment,$8471,384.69, plus smamatory 16 prejudgment interest. AS to the remaining counts of the Cross- Complaint, neither Carrion nor the defendants have met their burden of establishing that there .2f nO material ‘facts in disp and that they are entitled ‘0 judgment as a matter of law, The Defendants’ Motion for Sumrpary Judgment Against the Intervention Plaiowiff is thus DENIED, and Carrion’s Cross-Motion f Summary Judgment is DENIED IN PART, as10 Counts J, and i, ORDER Judgment shall ¢nter for the plaintiff intervenor, Jennifer Carrion, for $471,384.69, plus Statutory pre-judgment interest! on Count Hi of the Cross-Complaint. April 7, 2020 David Deakin: David A. Deakin Associate Justice 4 Signed electronically becausé of the COVID-19 public health sthergency, See Supreme Judicial Court Ord 25,2020, at p, 2. ler OE-144, Concerning Electronic Signatures of Judges and Clerks, MarchEXHIBIT CCasé 1:16-cv-12383!IT Document 183 Filed 12/06/18 Page 1 of 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS SABA HASHEM, individually and as a ‘ member of, and. . devivatively on! behalf of, « D'Angelo and Hashem, LLC, : Plaintiff / Defendant-in-Counterclaim, ” . * ¥, * Civ, Action No, 16-cv-12383-IT + STEPHEN D’ANGELO, ae * amember of D'Angelo & e and D'Angelo Law Group; D’. CELO * LAW GROUP, LLC, and D’ANGELO * AND HASHEM, LLC, ’ * Defendants / Plaintiff in-Countecsiita * * . Intecvention-Piaintiff, » . a ¥v. ¥ * SABA HASHEM, STEPHEN D'ANGELO, . D’ANGELO &. HASHEM, LLC, D'ANGELO * LAW GROUP; LLC,. , Tntervention-Defendants! » MEMORANDUM AND ORDER December 6, 2018 TALWANE DJ. 1 Introduction The undetiying civil action before the court is between two former law partners, Saba Hashem and 1 Stephen D’ Angelo, regarding, inter alia, the assets of their firm, D’ Angelo and. Hashem, LLC (‘D&H”"). On July 28, 2017, Intervention-Plaintiff Jeunifer Carrion, whe holdsCase 1:16-cv-12383-IT Document 183 Filed 12/06/18 Page 2-of 10 Judgments aginst Mr. Hiishem and DAH, was allowed to intervene. Mem. & Onder [#39}, Mi. Carton seins aginst Me. Hasen, MD’ Angel, DAH, and D'Angelo Law Coep CD asee aw) ne cms fo Dang nn arn escent en cpt se ly. ever Crose-Compl. 27-46 [H49), Bee