Preview
THE TORKZADEH LAW FIRM
Reza Torkzadeh (SBN: 249550) E-FILED
Eugenia L. Steele (SBN: 149207) 4/20/2021 9:38 PM
Tracy R. Hom (SBN: 258170) Superior Court of California
18650 MacArthur Blvd., Ste. 300 County of Fresno
Irvine, CA 92612 By: R. Long, Deputy
Tel: 310.935.1111 / Fax: 310.935.0100
E-mail: Reza@ torklaw.com; Eugenia@ torklaw.com; Tracy@torklaw.com
Attomeys for Plaintiff,
Anita Reyes
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO
10 ANITA REYES, Case No. 19CECG03826
11
Plaintiff, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
12 SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA
Vv REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
13 STATE CENTER COMMUNITY
STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE COLLEGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR
14
DISTRICT; MADERA COMMUNITY SUMMARY ADJUDICATION;
15 COLLEGE CENTER; and DOES 1-20, DECLARATION OF TRACY R. HORN
Inclusive,
16 [Filed and Served Concurrently with
Defendants. Plaintiff's Separate Statement and
17
Compendium of Evidence]
18
Date: May 4, 2021
19 Time: 3:30 P.M.
20 Dept.: 403
21 Action Filed: October 21, 2019
Trial Date: July 19, 2021
22
23
24
25 Plaintiff ANITA REYES (hereinafter “Ms. Reyes” or “Plaintiff’) submits the following
26 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of her Opposition to Defendant STATE
27 CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT’S (hereinafter “SCCCD” or “Defendant’”) Motion
28 for Summary Adjudication as to Counts Three and Four of Plaintiffs Complaint, Fresno County
“1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Superior Court Case No. 19CECG03826. (See Plaintiffs Complaint (“Complaint”), attached as
Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of S. Nicole Tucker)
I
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff ANITA REY ES (“Reyes” or “Plaintiff’) seeks damages from Defendant STATE
CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT alleging: (1) Dangerous Condition on Public
Property (Gov. Code §835), (2) Violation of Califomnia’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code
§51-53), and (3) Violation of Califomia Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§54-55.32).
Defendant, has submitted its Motion for Summary Adjudication in demurrer fashion,
10 alleging that under the very recently decided Brennon B. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County
11 (2020) 57 Cal.App.Sth 367, Plaintiffs allegations regarding violations of the Unruh Act and
12 California Disabled Persons Act are not viable because the Defendant district is a public-school
13 entity. This reliance on Brennon B., however, is premature as the case has been certified for review
14 by the Califomia Supreme Court and the matter is far from decided. The entirety of Defendant’s
15 Motion is based on this recently decided case and the analysis and case reviews contained therein.
16 To make any decisions that would prematurely dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, especially in light of the
17 Califomia Supreme Court’s pending review of Defendant’s sole supporting case, would be a
18 violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and result in irreparable harm should she be prematurely
19 barred from presenting properly pled claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary
20 adjudication must be denied as a matter of law.
21 Il.
22 STATEMENT OF FACTS
23 Anita Reyes is a 38-year-old-woman, born with spina bifida and wheelchair dependent her
24 entire life. (PSUF No. 6) In March of 2019, Ms. Reyes was a registered student at Madera
25 Community College, which is within the moving Defendant’s district. (PSUF No. 7) On the da
26 of the incident, March 18, 2019, Ms. Reyes exited her classroom and attempted to proceed down
27 a purported handicap accessible ramp when her wheelchair accelerated due to the steep incline. Ag
28 her wheelchair quickly approached the end of the dilapidated ramp, Ms. Reyes fell forward while
-2-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
still belted into her wheelchair, striking her head on the pavement, and coming to rest with he
wheelchair on top of her. (PSUF No. 8) As a result of this fall, she was injured. (Complaint, pp. 3+
4, 914, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of S. Nicole Tucker)
Ms. Reyes subsequently filed the above captioned case on or about October 21, 2019 i
Fresno Superior Court, seeking damages against Defendant STATE CENTER COMMUNITY
COLLEGE alleging: 1) a dangerous conduction on public property, 2) violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 3) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and 4) violation of California
Disabled Persons Act. (PSUF No. 10). Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her Second Cause off
Action for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities A ct.
10 As referenced briefly above, Defendant relies solely on the very recently decided Brenno
11 B. case to support its assertion that the Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action are not viable]
12 By way of a brief timeline, Brennon B. was decided in the First
A ppellate District in Califomia o:
13 November 13, 2020. (PSUF No. 1). Soon thereafter, Defendant filed its present Motion o:
14 February 11, 2021. The California Supreme Court granted review of the First Appellate District’
15 ruling on February 24, 2021. (PSUF No. 2) The outcome of the Supreme Court’s review is|
16 currently unknown. (PSUF No. 3) Briefs have not yet been filed in the California Supreme Court]
17 and there is no disposition or opinion as of the filing of this Opposition. (PSUF Nos. 3, 4) The
18 questions posed to the California Supreme Court on review go to the heart of Defendant’s
19 argument for seeking a dismissal of Plaintiffs claims: (1) is a public school district a “business
20 establishment” within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51), and (2) eve
21 if a public school district is not a “business establishment” under that Act, can it nevertheless be|
22 sued under the Act when the alleged discriminatory conduct is actionable under the Americans
23 with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) (PSUF No. 5). Plaintiff respectfull
24 disagrees with the Defendant’s analysis of past and current case law, including the Brennon B|
25 court’s findings, and would ask that this Court deny Defendant’s Motion for the reasons discusse
26 below.
27
28
“3.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Ill.
ARGUMENT
A. Courts Must L ook at the Evidence in a Light Most Favorable to the Opposing Party
in Ruling on Summary J udgment/A djudication
A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either that the plaintiff cannot
establish one or more elements of a cause of action or that there is a complete defense to the
action. Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(o) and (p). If the defendant makes the required showing,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence that there is a triable issue of material fact.
Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780. There is a triable issue if the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of plaintiff.
10 Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. “[T]he party moving for summary
11 judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that
12 he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850. “All doubts
13 as to whether there are any triable issues of fact are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing
14 summary judgment.” Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049. In ruling on
15 the motion, a court must “consider all of the evidence” and “all” of the “inferences” reasonably
16 drawn there from, and must view such evidence and such inferences, in the light most favorable
17 to the opposing party. Code of Civil Procedure § 437(c)(c); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at p. 843.
18 B. The Brennon Case Is Not Controlling Law
19 Defendant’s sole reliance on the recent ruling in Brennon B. is premature and not
20 dispositive of the issues pending before the Court. Review of the nuling in the Brennon B. case
21 was granted on February 24, 2021, and the outcome of that review is not yet known. (Brennon v.
22 Superior Court, (2021), 480 P.3d 1199, PSUF No. 3) Specifically, the California Supreme Court
23 will review whether (1) a public school district is a “business establishment” within the meaning
24 of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51); and (2) even if a public school district is not a
25 “business establishment” under the Act, can it nevertheless be sued under the Act when the
26 alleged discriminatory conduct is actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
27 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).
28
“4.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Until there is a final ruling from the California Supreme Court, the validity of Plaintiff’s
third and fourth causes of action is not settled nor would it be appropriate to base a decision
summarily denying Plaintiff the right to proceed with these properly pled claims. Clearly
Defendant was aware of the fact that it is a public-school district when it was served with
Plaintiffs Complaint. Had there been a basis at that time to file a Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s third
and fourth causes of action, surely Defendant would have. However, Plaintiff submits that this
did not happen because until the Brennon B. decision, Courts were divided at best as to whether
a public school could be subject to the Unruh Act. Additionally, as described below, prior
decisions involving the application of the Unruh Act to public schools, including Brennon B.,
10 have focused solely on public school environments for grades K-12. To date, there has been no
11 such analysis for a situation such as the present one involving a community college, acting for
12 profit, and falling well within the criteria for a “business establishment” as discussed in further
13 detail below. With so many unknowns, and the outcome of the Brennon B. decision pending
14 before the California Supreme Court, it is premature to grant summary judgment to Defendant
15 when admittedly, as stated throughout its moving papers, this Motion is based in its entirety on
16 this very recent decision.
17 C. Defendant is a “Business Establishment”
18 In expanding the reach of California's prior public accommodation law through the
19 enactment of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Act”) in 1959, the Legislature chose to bring
20 within the reach of the Act “all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Burks v.
21 Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d, 463, 468. Past decisions have stressed that this
22 language indicates that the term "business establishments" must properly be interpreted "in the
23 broadest sense reasonably possible" (Id). Adhering to that principle, courts have applied the Act
24 to a variety of entities that ordinarily might not be thought of as a traditional business
25 establishment. Past decisions demonstrate that the Act clearly applies to any type of for-profit
26 commercial enterprise, and to nonprofit entities alike, and to this day, there is no decision as to
27 whether a community college, open to the public and charging the general public tuition in return!
28 for services and access to educational courses, should be considered a business establishment for
-5-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
purposes of the Act. At best, the only case law dealing with the Act and its potential application
to a public school district involves those public schools open to “school aged children” who are
constitutionally mandated to attend, i.e. grades K to 12. Beyond that limited scope, it is certainly
plausible and in fact highly likely, when viewing the facts in the broadest sense reasonably
possible, to determine that a community college, open to the public, accepting applications from
the general population, charging students tuition and administration fees, and charging students
for books and supplies, etc., would be found to be a “business enterprise” and subject to the Act.
The Brennon B. court spends a considerable amount of time addressing what may be
considered a business establishment. However, Plaintiff respectfully disagrees with Defendant’ s
10 assertion that it does not meet the defined criteria as laid out in that case and those coming before
11 it. Despite Defendant’s assertion that it cannot fall within the purview of the Act because it is a
12 public school district/government entity, courts have previously found that the A ct does extend to}
13 at least some governmental activities. The California Supreme Court has found that the Legislature,
14 desired to banish discrimination from Califomia’s community life and to interpret the Act’s
15 coverage in the broadest sense reasonably possible leading the Court to hold that it is reasonably
16 possible that “business establishments” as used in the statute would include public schools]
17 Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 952. There is simply no bright
18 line rule holding that all public-school districts are exempt from the Unruh Act, including the
19 Brennon B. ruling.
20 In reaching its decision that public school districts are not business establishments under
21 the Act, the Brennon B. court made some very poignant references giving insight into its
22 considerations and frankly giving Plaintiff the opportunity to point out why the facts of this current
23 case are simply not applicable to those at the root of the Brennon B. case. While the fact that the
24 district generates revenue is not the only deciding factor, it is certainly one to be given heavy|
25 consideration. Prior courts, and those relied on by the Brennon B. court, have based decisions in|
26 part regarding public school districts on the finding that these districts “do not involve the sale of|
27 access to the basic education that public school districts are charged by the state with delivering to
28 every school-age child pursuant
to state mandate”. Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts
-6-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 670, 700. Courts have further stated that those public-school districts taken into
consideration in prior decisions “do not sell the right to participate in the basic educational
programs and services they deliver”. (Randall v. Orange County Council (1998) 17 Cal.4” 736,
744).
The remainder of the cases cited regarding government entities are simply not applicable
to this case. The closest case cited by the Brennon B. court is Carter v. City of Los Angeles (2014)
224 Cal.App.4" 808, 825-826, where the court agreed recovery of damages was “unlikely” unde
the Unruh Acct, as a “public entity providing sidewalks and curbs to its citizens does so as a public|
servant, not a commercial enterprise”. The court further elaborated that “public school districts canl
10 well be described, in acting as the state’s agent in delivering constitutionally mandated, free]
11 primary and secondary education to the state’s school age children, as a “public servant”, not as <
12 commercial enterprise”. Id at 825. The distinction between the case at hand and those previously,
13 considered by the courts and discussed above is obvious. Madera Community College was not
14 offering constitutionally mandated, free primary and secondary education to the state’s school age|
15 children. Rather, it was offering optional and elective courses to adults for a fee. Tuition rates are
16 clearly published on the school’s website. (PSUF Nos. 12-13). The school is open to both district
17 residents and non-residents, with non-residents being charged a higher rate. (PSUF Nos. 12-13),
18 Additionally, students are charged a $21 “health fee” and advised to come prepared to spen
19 between $300-$400 at the beginning of each semester to purchase books, supplies and othey
20 required instructional materials. (PSOF 14). By no stretch could this be classified as acting as al
21 “public servant” as contemplated by those courts analyzing compulsory public schools and finding
22 that they were not business enterprises. The “public school districts” considered in Brennon B. an
23 its predecessors involved free, public school offerings, available to school aged children. It is
24 understandable why those districts might not be considered business establishments. However, al
25 public school district providing elective college courses, at a fee that differs for residents vs. non-
26 residents, requiring a $21 health fee, and $300-$400 needed to be spent on books, supplies an
27 required instructional materials (assumedly to be purchased at the school’s bookstore) is vastly
28 different than the free public-school districts discussed in prior cases.
-7-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
When read as a whole, even if Brennon B. was controlling and not currently under review]
by the California Supreme Court, it becomes abundantly clear that those few cases dealing with
public school districts, including the Brennon B. case, are dealing with grade school,
compulsory, public education systems for grades K-12, and not the voluntary admission,
participation in, and payment for college level courses. First, unlike compulsory grade schools, al
community college such as the one in this case does “sell the right to participate” in the
educational programs and services that it delivers. Students “purchase” this right to participate b
way of tuition unlike lower grade, compulsory public-school systems that are paid for by
taxpayers and free to all school aged children. There is no constitutional mandate to attend
10 college classes (unlike compulsory public schools) and each student must apply, be accepted,
11 and arrange for payment of tuition before being granted access to the educational offerings, none
12 of which would be considered the “basic educational offerings education that public school
13 districts are charged by the state with delivering to every school-age child pursuant to state
14 constitutional mandate ” as discussed in the Curran and Randall decisions and relied on by the
15 Brennon B. court.
16 As the Court can see, the issue of whether a public school district involving colleges is
17 far from being decided and while the Brennon holding may be persuasive as to certain
18 considerations, it is not binding, it is not persuasive, and the facts and circumstances surrounding
19 the case at hand are vastly different than those considered in Brennon B. and its predecessors.
20
D. Plaintiff has made no such assertion that mere violations of the Americans with
21 Disabilities A ct would entitle her to relief under the Unruh Act.
22 Plaintiff will briefly address this issue only to say that she has made no such claims.
23 Defendant appears to be arguing against what the Plaintiff asserted in Brennon B. and not what
24 Anita Reyes has asserted in the case at hand. While Plaintiff does believe that a violation of the
25 ADA may be used as an element in proving the Unruh Act has been violated, she has made no
26 such claim that a mere violation under the ADA would “guarantee relief under the Unruh Ac”
27 asserted by Defendant. Plaintiff is not trying to use Section 51(f) as a “backdoor” and she
28
-8-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
maintains there is sufficient evidence and inferences to conclude that the public school district in
this case is in fact a business enterprise.
E. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action Must Stand as Defendant is a Business
Establishment
Again, in support of its motion Defendant’s sole case supporting its position that it is
entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is a one sentence
reference to the Brennon B. case, that as discussed above is not controlling. Defendants offer no
additional support for this position and as it has done throughout the entirety of its motion, it
relies exclusively on a case that is not controlling and pending review by the California Supreme
10 Court. Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f) makes any violation of the ADA by a business
11 establishment a violation of the Unruh Act according to Brennon. Therefore, until the California
12 Supreme Court has definitively ruled on this issue, i.e. whether a public school beyond grades K-
13 12 could be a “business establishment”, then it is premature to rule on this issue and Defendant
14 has failed to meet its burden.
15 IV. CONCLUSION
16
17 Because the decision in Brennon B. is premature until the ruling has been reviewed by thd
18 California Supreme Court, it is improper to dismiss the plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action]
19 as a matter of law based on very new case law that might not be “law” in a year’s time. Doing so
20 would cause irreparable harm and deprive Plaintiff of her day in court. If the plaintiffs claims
21 were disposed of via summary adjudication at this point, the plaintiff would not have an]
22 opportunity to refile her claims in the future should the California Supreme Court reverse or strike
23 down the First Appellate District’s ruling (in whole or in part). She will have lost that opportunit
24 forever, based on case law that is not controlling. Conversely, should the California Supreme Court
25 establish definitively the ruling in Brennon B., then the only prejudice to be suffered by this moving
26 Defendant is that it will have had to wait to present the same arguments at the time of trial.
27
28
-9-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims must remain viable. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff
respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant’s motion in its entirety.
DATED: April 20, 2021 THE TORKZADEH LAW FIRM
By: (4
Tracy R.
lan
fe
D+.
Ly Esq.
Attomeys for Plaintiff, Anita Reyes
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-10-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
DECLARATION OF TRACY R. HORN
I, Tracy R. Horn, hereby declare:
I am over the age of 18 years and am the attorney of record for Plaintiff ANITA REY ES
(“Plaintiff”), in the above-captioned action. I make this declaration in support of
Plaintiffs Opposition to the Motion for Summary A djudication filed on February 11,
2021 by Defendant STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT
(“Defendant”). This declaration is based upon my personal knowledge. If called upon to
10 testify as to the matters set forth in this declaration, I could and would do so.
11 Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on October 21, 2019, alleging that Defendants
12 STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT; MADERA COMMUNITY
13 COLLEGE CENTER; and DOES 1-20, Inclusive, owned, operated and/or controlled the
14 subject property where Plaintiff encountered a dangerous condition in violation of the
15 Americans With Disabilities Act, the Unruh Civil Right Act, and the California Disabled
16 Persons Act.
17 A review of the current status of the Brennon v. Superior Court case in Westlaw reveals that|
18 it was decided in the First
A ppellate District of the State of California and is now up for
19 review at the Califomia Supreme Court. A true and correct copy of the published opinion is
20 attached to Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence as Exhibit 1. Additionally, a true and
21 correct copy of the order granting review is attached to Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence
22 as Exhibit 2. Both of these documents were downloaded directly from Westlaw after
23 searching for the case, as cited in defendant’s moving brief.
24 4 On or about April 16, 2021, I accessed the California Courts — A ppellate Court Case
25 Information website and downloaded a copy of the Case Summary and Docket for Supreme
26 Court Case Number $266254. This case number was discovered as listed on Exhibit 2. A
27 search of the docket revealed that Review was granted on February 24, 2021, after the filing
28 of the defendant’s motion for summary adjudication. Additionally, since then there has been
-11-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
some activity in the case, but briefs have not yet been filed, and there is no indication when
oral argument might be heard or when the Supreme Court will hand down a ruling. A true
and correct copy of the case information page as it existed on April 16, 2021 is attached to
Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence as Exhibit 3.
On April 20, 2021 I accessed the Madera Community College website and saved the
school’s page entitled “Cost of Attendance”. A true and correct copy of that page is attached
to Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence as Exhibit 4.
I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
10 foregoing is true and correct. This declaration was executed on April 20, 2021 by me in Irvine,
11 Califomia.
12
13 ——---_ fi SNE a UA ef DH
Tracy ‘orn, Esq., Declarant.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-12-
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
PROOF OF SERVICE
Tam employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not
a party to the within action. My business address is 18650 MacArthur Blvd., Ste. 300, Irvine,
California 92612.
On April 20, 2021, I served the foregoing documents described as:
1 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; DECLARATION OF
TRACY R. HORN
PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ COMPENDIUM OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
HER OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE CENTER COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS IN SUPPORT OF HER OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE
CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION
on the interested parties in this action as follows:
Anthony N. DeMaria, Esq.
DEMARIA LAW FIRM
1690 W. Shaw Avenue, Ste. 220
Fresno, CA 93711
E-Service:
Anthony N. DeMaria: ademaria@demarialawfirm.com
Crystal Watts: cwatts@demarialawfirm.com
Mayra Torres: mtorres@demarialawfirm.com
Nicole Tucker: ntucker@demarialawfirm.com
Teri Maxwell: tmaxwell@demarialawfirm.com
XX (Email) by transmitting via e-mail the documents listed above to the person(s) at
the e-mail address(es) set forth above.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on April 20, 2021, at Irvine, California.
Preview
THE TORKZADEH LAW FIRM Reza Torkzadeh (SBN: 249550) E-FILED Eugenia L. Steele (SBN: 149207) 4/20/2021 9:38 PM Tracy R. Hom (SBN: 258170) Superior Court of California 18650 MacArthur Blvd., Ste. 300 County of Fresno Irvine, CA 92612 By: R. Long, Deputy Tel: 310.935.1111 / Fax: 310.935.0100 E-mail: Reza@ torklaw.com; Eugenia@ torklaw.com; Tracy@torklaw.com Attomeys for Plaintiff, Anita Reyes SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO 10 ANITA REYES, Case No. 19CECG03826 11 Plaintiff, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 12 SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA Vv REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 13 STATE CENTER COMMUNITY STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE COLLEGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR 14 DISTRICT; MADERA COMMUNITY SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; 15 COLLEGE CENTER; and DOES 1-20, DECLARATION OF TRACY R. HORN Inclusive, 16 [Filed and Served Concurrently with Defendants. Plaintiff's Separate Statement and 17 Compendium of Evidence] 18 Date: May 4, 2021 19 Time: 3:30 P.M. 20 Dept.: 403 21 Action Filed: October 21, 2019 Trial Date: July 19, 2021 22 23 24 25 Plaintiff ANITA REYES (hereinafter “Ms. Reyes” or “Plaintiff’) submits the following 26 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of her Opposition to Defendant STATE 27 CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT’S (hereinafter “SCCCD” or “Defendant’”) Motion 28 for Summary Adjudication as to Counts Three and Four of Plaintiffs Complaint, Fresno County “1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Superior Court Case No. 19CECG03826. (See Plaintiffs Complaint (“Complaint”), attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of S. Nicole Tucker) I INTRODUCTION Plaintiff ANITA REY ES (“Reyes” or “Plaintiff’) seeks damages from Defendant STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT alleging: (1) Dangerous Condition on Public Property (Gov. Code §835), (2) Violation of Califomnia’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code §51-53), and (3) Violation of Califomia Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§54-55.32). Defendant, has submitted its Motion for Summary Adjudication in demurrer fashion, 10 alleging that under the very recently decided Brennon B. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County 11 (2020) 57 Cal.App.Sth 367, Plaintiffs allegations regarding violations of the Unruh Act and 12 California Disabled Persons Act are not viable because the Defendant district is a public-school 13 entity. This reliance on Brennon B., however, is premature as the case has been certified for review 14 by the Califomia Supreme Court and the matter is far from decided. The entirety of Defendant’s 15 Motion is based on this recently decided case and the analysis and case reviews contained therein. 16 To make any decisions that would prematurely dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, especially in light of the 17 Califomia Supreme Court’s pending review of Defendant’s sole supporting case, would be a 18 violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and result in irreparable harm should she be prematurely 19 barred from presenting properly pled claims. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary 20 adjudication must be denied as a matter of law. 21 Il. 22 STATEMENT OF FACTS 23 Anita Reyes is a 38-year-old-woman, born with spina bifida and wheelchair dependent her 24 entire life. (PSUF No. 6) In March of 2019, Ms. Reyes was a registered student at Madera 25 Community College, which is within the moving Defendant’s district. (PSUF No. 7) On the da 26 of the incident, March 18, 2019, Ms. Reyes exited her classroom and attempted to proceed down 27 a purported handicap accessible ramp when her wheelchair accelerated due to the steep incline. Ag 28 her wheelchair quickly approached the end of the dilapidated ramp, Ms. Reyes fell forward while -2- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION still belted into her wheelchair, striking her head on the pavement, and coming to rest with he wheelchair on top of her. (PSUF No. 8) As a result of this fall, she was injured. (Complaint, pp. 3+ 4, 914, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of S. Nicole Tucker) Ms. Reyes subsequently filed the above captioned case on or about October 21, 2019 i Fresno Superior Court, seeking damages against Defendant STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE alleging: 1) a dangerous conduction on public property, 2) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 3) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and 4) violation of California Disabled Persons Act. (PSUF No. 10). Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her Second Cause off Action for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities A ct. 10 As referenced briefly above, Defendant relies solely on the very recently decided Brenno 11 B. case to support its assertion that the Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action are not viable] 12 By way of a brief timeline, Brennon B. was decided in the First A ppellate District in Califomia o: 13 November 13, 2020. (PSUF No. 1). Soon thereafter, Defendant filed its present Motion o: 14 February 11, 2021. The California Supreme Court granted review of the First Appellate District’ 15 ruling on February 24, 2021. (PSUF No. 2) The outcome of the Supreme Court’s review is| 16 currently unknown. (PSUF No. 3) Briefs have not yet been filed in the California Supreme Court] 17 and there is no disposition or opinion as of the filing of this Opposition. (PSUF Nos. 3, 4) The 18 questions posed to the California Supreme Court on review go to the heart of Defendant’s 19 argument for seeking a dismissal of Plaintiffs claims: (1) is a public school district a “business 20 establishment” within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51), and (2) eve 21 if a public school district is not a “business establishment” under that Act, can it nevertheless be| 22 sued under the Act when the alleged discriminatory conduct is actionable under the Americans 23 with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) (PSUF No. 5). Plaintiff respectfull 24 disagrees with the Defendant’s analysis of past and current case law, including the Brennon B| 25 court’s findings, and would ask that this Court deny Defendant’s Motion for the reasons discusse 26 below. 27 28 “3. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Ill. ARGUMENT A. Courts Must L ook at the Evidence in a Light Most Favorable to the Opposing Party in Ruling on Summary J udgment/A djudication A defendant moving for summary judgment must show either that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of a cause of action or that there is a complete defense to the action. Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(o) and (p). If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence that there is a triable issue of material fact. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780. There is a triable issue if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of plaintiff. 10 Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. “[T]he party moving for summary 11 judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that 12 he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850. “All doubts 13 as to whether there are any triable issues of fact are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing 14 summary judgment.” Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049. In ruling on 15 the motion, a court must “consider all of the evidence” and “all” of the “inferences” reasonably 16 drawn there from, and must view such evidence and such inferences, in the light most favorable 17 to the opposing party. Code of Civil Procedure § 437(c)(c); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at p. 843. 18 B. The Brennon Case Is Not Controlling Law 19 Defendant’s sole reliance on the recent ruling in Brennon B. is premature and not 20 dispositive of the issues pending before the Court. Review of the nuling in the Brennon B. case 21 was granted on February 24, 2021, and the outcome of that review is not yet known. (Brennon v. 22 Superior Court, (2021), 480 P.3d 1199, PSUF No. 3) Specifically, the California Supreme Court 23 will review whether (1) a public school district is a “business establishment” within the meaning 24 of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51); and (2) even if a public school district is not a 25 “business establishment” under the Act, can it nevertheless be sued under the Act when the 26 alleged discriminatory conduct is actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 27 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). 28 “4. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Until there is a final ruling from the California Supreme Court, the validity of Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action is not settled nor would it be appropriate to base a decision summarily denying Plaintiff the right to proceed with these properly pled claims. Clearly Defendant was aware of the fact that it is a public-school district when it was served with Plaintiffs Complaint. Had there been a basis at that time to file a Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action, surely Defendant would have. However, Plaintiff submits that this did not happen because until the Brennon B. decision, Courts were divided at best as to whether a public school could be subject to the Unruh Act. Additionally, as described below, prior decisions involving the application of the Unruh Act to public schools, including Brennon B., 10 have focused solely on public school environments for grades K-12. To date, there has been no 11 such analysis for a situation such as the present one involving a community college, acting for 12 profit, and falling well within the criteria for a “business establishment” as discussed in further 13 detail below. With so many unknowns, and the outcome of the Brennon B. decision pending 14 before the California Supreme Court, it is premature to grant summary judgment to Defendant 15 when admittedly, as stated throughout its moving papers, this Motion is based in its entirety on 16 this very recent decision. 17 C. Defendant is a “Business Establishment” 18 In expanding the reach of California's prior public accommodation law through the 19 enactment of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Act”) in 1959, the Legislature chose to bring 20 within the reach of the Act “all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Burks v. 21 Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d, 463, 468. Past decisions have stressed that this 22 language indicates that the term "business establishments" must properly be interpreted "in the 23 broadest sense reasonably possible" (Id). Adhering to that principle, courts have applied the Act 24 to a variety of entities that ordinarily might not be thought of as a traditional business 25 establishment. Past decisions demonstrate that the Act clearly applies to any type of for-profit 26 commercial enterprise, and to nonprofit entities alike, and to this day, there is no decision as to 27 whether a community college, open to the public and charging the general public tuition in return! 28 for services and access to educational courses, should be considered a business establishment for -5- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION purposes of the Act. At best, the only case law dealing with the Act and its potential application to a public school district involves those public schools open to “school aged children” who are constitutionally mandated to attend, i.e. grades K to 12. Beyond that limited scope, it is certainly plausible and in fact highly likely, when viewing the facts in the broadest sense reasonably possible, to determine that a community college, open to the public, accepting applications from the general population, charging students tuition and administration fees, and charging students for books and supplies, etc., would be found to be a “business enterprise” and subject to the Act. The Brennon B. court spends a considerable amount of time addressing what may be considered a business establishment. However, Plaintiff respectfully disagrees with Defendant’ s 10 assertion that it does not meet the defined criteria as laid out in that case and those coming before 11 it. Despite Defendant’s assertion that it cannot fall within the purview of the Act because it is a 12 public school district/government entity, courts have previously found that the A ct does extend to} 13 at least some governmental activities. The California Supreme Court has found that the Legislature, 14 desired to banish discrimination from Califomia’s community life and to interpret the Act’s 15 coverage in the broadest sense reasonably possible leading the Court to hold that it is reasonably 16 possible that “business establishments” as used in the statute would include public schools] 17 Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 952. There is simply no bright 18 line rule holding that all public-school districts are exempt from the Unruh Act, including the 19 Brennon B. ruling. 20 In reaching its decision that public school districts are not business establishments under 21 the Act, the Brennon B. court made some very poignant references giving insight into its 22 considerations and frankly giving Plaintiff the opportunity to point out why the facts of this current 23 case are simply not applicable to those at the root of the Brennon B. case. While the fact that the 24 district generates revenue is not the only deciding factor, it is certainly one to be given heavy| 25 consideration. Prior courts, and those relied on by the Brennon B. court, have based decisions in| 26 part regarding public school districts on the finding that these districts “do not involve the sale of| 27 access to the basic education that public school districts are charged by the state with delivering to 28 every school-age child pursuant to state mandate”. Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts -6- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (1998) 17 Cal.4th 670, 700. Courts have further stated that those public-school districts taken into consideration in prior decisions “do not sell the right to participate in the basic educational programs and services they deliver”. (Randall v. Orange County Council (1998) 17 Cal.4” 736, 744). The remainder of the cases cited regarding government entities are simply not applicable to this case. The closest case cited by the Brennon B. court is Carter v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4" 808, 825-826, where the court agreed recovery of damages was “unlikely” unde the Unruh Acct, as a “public entity providing sidewalks and curbs to its citizens does so as a public| servant, not a commercial enterprise”. The court further elaborated that “public school districts canl 10 well be described, in acting as the state’s agent in delivering constitutionally mandated, free] 11 primary and secondary education to the state’s school age children, as a “public servant”, not as < 12 commercial enterprise”. Id at 825. The distinction between the case at hand and those previously, 13 considered by the courts and discussed above is obvious. Madera Community College was not 14 offering constitutionally mandated, free primary and secondary education to the state’s school age| 15 children. Rather, it was offering optional and elective courses to adults for a fee. Tuition rates are 16 clearly published on the school’s website. (PSUF Nos. 12-13). The school is open to both district 17 residents and non-residents, with non-residents being charged a higher rate. (PSUF Nos. 12-13), 18 Additionally, students are charged a $21 “health fee” and advised to come prepared to spen 19 between $300-$400 at the beginning of each semester to purchase books, supplies and othey 20 required instructional materials. (PSOF 14). By no stretch could this be classified as acting as al 21 “public servant” as contemplated by those courts analyzing compulsory public schools and finding 22 that they were not business enterprises. The “public school districts” considered in Brennon B. an 23 its predecessors involved free, public school offerings, available to school aged children. It is 24 understandable why those districts might not be considered business establishments. However, al 25 public school district providing elective college courses, at a fee that differs for residents vs. non- 26 residents, requiring a $21 health fee, and $300-$400 needed to be spent on books, supplies an 27 required instructional materials (assumedly to be purchased at the school’s bookstore) is vastly 28 different than the free public-school districts discussed in prior cases. -7- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION When read as a whole, even if Brennon B. was controlling and not currently under review] by the California Supreme Court, it becomes abundantly clear that those few cases dealing with public school districts, including the Brennon B. case, are dealing with grade school, compulsory, public education systems for grades K-12, and not the voluntary admission, participation in, and payment for college level courses. First, unlike compulsory grade schools, al community college such as the one in this case does “sell the right to participate” in the educational programs and services that it delivers. Students “purchase” this right to participate b way of tuition unlike lower grade, compulsory public-school systems that are paid for by taxpayers and free to all school aged children. There is no constitutional mandate to attend 10 college classes (unlike compulsory public schools) and each student must apply, be accepted, 11 and arrange for payment of tuition before being granted access to the educational offerings, none 12 of which would be considered the “basic educational offerings education that public school 13 districts are charged by the state with delivering to every school-age child pursuant to state 14 constitutional mandate ” as discussed in the Curran and Randall decisions and relied on by the 15 Brennon B. court. 16 As the Court can see, the issue of whether a public school district involving colleges is 17 far from being decided and while the Brennon holding may be persuasive as to certain 18 considerations, it is not binding, it is not persuasive, and the facts and circumstances surrounding 19 the case at hand are vastly different than those considered in Brennon B. and its predecessors. 20 D. Plaintiff has made no such assertion that mere violations of the Americans with 21 Disabilities A ct would entitle her to relief under the Unruh Act. 22 Plaintiff will briefly address this issue only to say that she has made no such claims. 23 Defendant appears to be arguing against what the Plaintiff asserted in Brennon B. and not what 24 Anita Reyes has asserted in the case at hand. While Plaintiff does believe that a violation of the 25 ADA may be used as an element in proving the Unruh Act has been violated, she has made no 26 such claim that a mere violation under the ADA would “guarantee relief under the Unruh Ac” 27 asserted by Defendant. Plaintiff is not trying to use Section 51(f) as a “backdoor” and she 28 -8- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION maintains there is sufficient evidence and inferences to conclude that the public school district in this case is in fact a business enterprise. E. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action Must Stand as Defendant is a Business Establishment Again, in support of its motion Defendant’s sole case supporting its position that it is entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is a one sentence reference to the Brennon B. case, that as discussed above is not controlling. Defendants offer no additional support for this position and as it has done throughout the entirety of its motion, it relies exclusively on a case that is not controlling and pending review by the California Supreme 10 Court. Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f) makes any violation of the ADA by a business 11 establishment a violation of the Unruh Act according to Brennon. Therefore, until the California 12 Supreme Court has definitively ruled on this issue, i.e. whether a public school beyond grades K- 13 12 could be a “business establishment”, then it is premature to rule on this issue and Defendant 14 has failed to meet its burden. 15 IV. CONCLUSION 16 17 Because the decision in Brennon B. is premature until the ruling has been reviewed by thd 18 California Supreme Court, it is improper to dismiss the plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action] 19 as a matter of law based on very new case law that might not be “law” in a year’s time. Doing so 20 would cause irreparable harm and deprive Plaintiff of her day in court. If the plaintiffs claims 21 were disposed of via summary adjudication at this point, the plaintiff would not have an] 22 opportunity to refile her claims in the future should the California Supreme Court reverse or strike 23 down the First Appellate District’s ruling (in whole or in part). She will have lost that opportunit 24 forever, based on case law that is not controlling. Conversely, should the California Supreme Court 25 establish definitively the ruling in Brennon B., then the only prejudice to be suffered by this moving 26 Defendant is that it will have had to wait to present the same arguments at the time of trial. 27 28 -9- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims must remain viable. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant’s motion in its entirety. DATED: April 20, 2021 THE TORKZADEH LAW FIRM By: (4 Tracy R. lan fe D+. Ly Esq. Attomeys for Plaintiff, Anita Reyes 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -10- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION DECLARATION OF TRACY R. HORN I, Tracy R. Horn, hereby declare: I am over the age of 18 years and am the attorney of record for Plaintiff ANITA REY ES (“Plaintiff”), in the above-captioned action. I make this declaration in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to the Motion for Summary A djudication filed on February 11, 2021 by Defendant STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT (“Defendant”). This declaration is based upon my personal knowledge. If called upon to 10 testify as to the matters set forth in this declaration, I could and would do so. 11 Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action on October 21, 2019, alleging that Defendants 12 STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT; MADERA COMMUNITY 13 COLLEGE CENTER; and DOES 1-20, Inclusive, owned, operated and/or controlled the 14 subject property where Plaintiff encountered a dangerous condition in violation of the 15 Americans With Disabilities Act, the Unruh Civil Right Act, and the California Disabled 16 Persons Act. 17 A review of the current status of the Brennon v. Superior Court case in Westlaw reveals that| 18 it was decided in the First A ppellate District of the State of California and is now up for 19 review at the Califomia Supreme Court. A true and correct copy of the published opinion is 20 attached to Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence as Exhibit 1. Additionally, a true and 21 correct copy of the order granting review is attached to Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence 22 as Exhibit 2. Both of these documents were downloaded directly from Westlaw after 23 searching for the case, as cited in defendant’s moving brief. 24 4 On or about April 16, 2021, I accessed the California Courts — A ppellate Court Case 25 Information website and downloaded a copy of the Case Summary and Docket for Supreme 26 Court Case Number $266254. This case number was discovered as listed on Exhibit 2. A 27 search of the docket revealed that Review was granted on February 24, 2021, after the filing 28 of the defendant’s motion for summary adjudication. Additionally, since then there has been -11- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION some activity in the case, but briefs have not yet been filed, and there is no indication when oral argument might be heard or when the Supreme Court will hand down a ruling. A true and correct copy of the case information page as it existed on April 16, 2021 is attached to Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence as Exhibit 3. On April 20, 2021 I accessed the Madera Community College website and saved the school’s page entitled “Cost of Attendance”. A true and correct copy of that page is attached to Plaintiff's Compendium of Evidence as Exhibit 4. I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 10 foregoing is true and correct. This declaration was executed on April 20, 2021 by me in Irvine, 11 Califomia. 12 13 ——---_ fi SNE a UA ef DH Tracy ‘orn, Esq., Declarant. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -12- MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION PROOF OF SERVICE Tam employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 18650 MacArthur Blvd., Ste. 300, Irvine, California 92612. On April 20, 2021, I served the foregoing documents described as: 1 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; DECLARATION OF TRACY R. HORN PLAINTIFF ANITA REYES’ COMPENDIUM OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HER OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN SUPPORT OF HER OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT STATE CENTER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION on the interested parties in this action as follows: Anthony N. DeMaria, Esq. DEMARIA LAW FIRM 1690 W. Shaw Avenue, Ste. 220 Fresno, CA 93711 E-Service: Anthony N. DeMaria: ademaria@demarialawfirm.com Crystal Watts: cwatts@demarialawfirm.com Mayra Torres: mtorres@demarialawfirm.com Nicole Tucker: ntucker@demarialawfirm.com Teri Maxwell: tmaxwell@demarialawfirm.com XX (Email) by transmitting via e-mail the documents listed above to the person(s) at the e-mail address(es) set forth above. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 20, 2021, at Irvine, California.