Motion-Secondary: Rajendra Bk v. The City Of New York, Consolidated Edison Company Of New York, Inc., Mah Realty Llc, Maria Hrynenko, Michael Mischou Hrynenko, Neighborhood Construction Corporation, Dilber Kukic, Athanasios Ioannidis, Andrew Trombettas, S.K. Piping & Heating Corporation

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 18, 2024 line 6. DEFENDANT AIRBNB, INC. DEMURRER to Amended COMPLAINT is continued to August 6, 2024 on Court's own motion. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

RG20058141: Anderson white VS Kidango, Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person with Disability; filed by Jayla Anderson White (Plaintiff) in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Hearing on Motion - Other Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person with Disability; filed by Jayla Anderson White (Plaintiff) scheduled for 07/18/2024 is continued to 09/05/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 24 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . The hearing on Defendants’ Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim of minor Plaintiff Jayla Anderson White is continued to September 5, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 24. Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem has not retained an attorney of record to represent Plaintiff in this case. In addition, Defendants filed a Case Management Conference Statement on June 20, 2024 indicating (on page 5, paragraph 15) that Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem passed away in May. If that is true, Plaintiff will need to have a new guardian ad litem appointed.. A guardian ad litem who is not an attorney cannot represent himself or herself (or the minor) in litigation, but instead must retain a duly licensed attorney to represent the minor. (See J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 965.) Defendants are directed to notify Plaintiff of this ruling. If Plaintiff has not obtained appointment of a guardian ad litem by August 15, 2024, Defendant shall submit a declaration describing their efforts to identify the present parent or guardian for Plaintiff, and to communicate with Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s guardian regarding appointment of Guardian ad Litem and retention of counsel.

Case Number: 23AHCV01967 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 17, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Zhiwei Chen v. Verizon Wireless Services, LLC CASE NO.: 23AHCV01967 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Zhiwei Chen RESPONDING PARTY : Defendant Verizon Wireless Services, LLC OPPOSITION: NO OPPOSITION FILED REPLY: None filed. RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Courts May 16, 2024 order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate ruling in favor of the defendants application for arbitration. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Zhiwei Chen filed this action against defendant Verizon Wireless Services, LLC on on August 28, 2023. Plaintiff has been self-represented since the outset of the suit. Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed an intentional tort wherein Defendant used technical means to take control of [Plaintiffs] phone ... [and] forged the plaintiffs signature with the intention of taking possession of plaintiffs property. (Compl., p. 4, ¶ IT-1.) On November 7, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motion to compel the parties to arbitrate their dispute. The Court stayed the action pending the completion of arbitration. On March 27, 2024, one hundred forty-one (141) days after the Courts November 2023 order, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Quash to vacate /quash the ruling of November 7, 2023, which he subsequently removed from calendar. On April 16, 2024, one hundred sixty-one (161) days after the Courts November 2023 order, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate ruling in favor of the defendants application for arbitration. On May 16, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion to vacate. On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the May 16, 2024 ruling. That motion is now before the Court. Defendant filed no opposition, although Plaintiff filed no proof of service indicating Plaintiff gave Defendant notice of his motion. Plaintiff filed no reply. TENTATIVE RULING The motion is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008 (c); see also Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1106-1107.) DISCUSSION As an initial matter: Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate was, in operation, a motion to reconsider, which the Court denied. (See 05-16-2024 Minute Order, p.2 [recharacterizing motion by relief sought].) The instant motion is a motion to reconsider the Courts ruling on a motion to reconsider. Any renewed motion, including a renewed motion for reconsideration, must be justified by new facts or law. (See Le Francois v. Goel , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1099.) Plaintiff objects that the Court did not consider evidence that was already available at the time of the May 16, 2024 ruling. This does not justify a renewed motion for reconsideration of the Courts November 2023 order, nor does it justify a motion to reconsider the motion to reconsider. For the same reason, reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a) is unwarranted. Plaintiff specified no new or different facts, circumstances etc. in his declaration(s) accompanying his motion. Reconsideration under section 1008(c) is similarly unwarranted. Plaintiff cites no relevant change in the law since November 2023, and the Court is aware of none. The Court declines to exercise its own discretion to reconsider either prior ruling. Plaintiffs motion is denied. Court to provide notice. Dated: July 17, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court

RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management, LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Victoria Kolakowski The Motion to Reclassify filed by ESA Management, LLC, Extended Stay America, Inc. on 06/13/2024 is Denied. I. Background Nahum Morales sued Extended Stay America, Inc. and ESA Management, LLC (“Defendants”), among others, for injuries allegedly sustained after being bit by bedbugs after staying an Extended Stay America hotel in Union City, California. (Compl. ¶ 1, May 11, 2020.) In his complaint—filed as an unlimited civil action—Morales requested to recover an unspecified amount of general, specific, and punitive damages, among other claims for relief. (Id. § 7.) Defendants filed an answer generally denying the allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses. (Answer, Feb. 16, 2021.) Following Morales’s responses to Defendants’ discovery requests and testimony from his deposition about his medical expenses and property damage, Defendants moved to reclassify the action as a limited civil action. (Mot., June 13, 2024.) Defendants argued Morales’s known medical expenses were under the $35,000.00 threshold and that Morales lacked evidence to support his property damage claim. (Id. 7:4–9:23, 10:19–11:13; see also Reply Mem. 2:4–11 (noting SB-71 (enacted October 13, 2023, raised amount in controversy to $35,000.00).) Morales opposed. (Opp’n Mem., July 3, 2024.) Morales noted that he sought $250,000.00 in general damages along with his claim for special damages for his medical expenses. (Id. 3:15– 4:9.) II. Legal Standard “[A] defendant . . . may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 403.040(a).) “If a party files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party . . . to respond to a complaint . . . , the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied: [¶] [t]he case is incorrectly classified[] [¶] [t]he moving party shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.” (§ 403.040(b)(1), (2).) “The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.” (§ 403.040(a); see also Ytuarte v. Super. Ct. (Kashani) (2005) 129 Cal. App. 4th 266, 277 (“[A] matter may be reclassified as a limited civil action ‘when (i) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint, petition, or related documents, or (ii) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will “necessarily” result in a verdict below the superior court’s jurisdictional amount . . . .”) (quoting Walker v. Super. Ct. (Slaton), 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262).) “This standard involves an SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management, LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518 evaluation of the amount fairly in controversy, not an adjudication of the merits of the claim, and according to Walker, requires a ‘high level of certainty that [the] damage award will not exceed $[3]5,000.’” (Id. (quoting Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 269.) III. Discussion The Court finds that Morales’s action does not necessarily involve less than $35,000.00. Defendants did not carry their burden of showing that the damage award cannot exceed the monetary threshold. Accordingly, the Court will not reclassify this action as a limited civil case. IV. Order The motion is DENIED. PLEASE NOTE: Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, subdivision (a)(1), this tentative ruling will become the order of the Court unless it is contested before 4:00 PM on the court day preceding the noticed hearing. To contest a tentative ruling, a party should do the following: First, the party must notify Department 518, by email at Dept518@alameda.courts.ca.gov and copy all counsel of record and self-represented parties. The contesting party must state in the subject line of the email the case name, case number and motion. Second, the party shall log into the eCourt Public Portal, search for this case (e.g., by case number), select the case name, select the "Tentative Rulings" tab, click the "Click to Contest this Ruling" button, enter the party's name and a brief statement of the party's reason for contesting the tentative, and click "Proceed." Parties may appear via videoconference, using the Zoom.com website or application. TO CONNECT TO ZOOM: Department 518 is inviting you to a scheduled ZoomGov meeting. Topic: Department 518's Personal Meeting Room Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16054307984 Meeting ID: 160 5430 7984 One tap mobile SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20061971: Morales VS Extended Stay America, Inc. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Reclassify (Walker Motion) filed by ESA Management, LLC (Defendant) + in Department 518 +16692545252,,16054307984# US (San Jose) +14154494000,,16054307984# US (US Spanish Line) --- Dial by your location • +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose)

Case Number: 22STCV29612 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 22STCV29612 MOTION Motion to Continue Trial MOVING PARTIES Defendant City of Los Angeles OPPOSING PARTY Unopposed MOTION Defendant City of Los Angeles (Defendant) moves to continue trial. No opposition has been filed. BACKGROUND The complaint was filed on September 12, 2022. Trial was initially set for March 11, 2024. Defendants answer was filed on November 15, 2022. On February 8, 2024, pursuant to stipulation, the Court continued trial and all related dates to September 17, 2024. On May 29, 2024, Defendant filed and electronically served a motion for summary judgment. The hearing for summary judgment is currently scheduled for September 24, 2024. ANALYSIS Legal Standard Continuances are granted only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring a continuance. ( In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.) A trial court has broad discretion in considering a request for a trial continuance. ( Pham v. Nguyen (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 11, 13-18.) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 sets forth factors for the Court to consider in ruling on a motion to continue trial. To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).) A party seeking a continuance of the date set for trial, whether contested or uncontested or stipulated to by the parties, must make the request for a continuance by a noticed motion or an ex parte application under the rules in chapter 4 of this division, with supporting declarations. The party must make the motion or application as soon as reasonably practical once the necessity for the continuance is discovered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b).) Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. Circumstances that may indicate good cause include: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new partys involvement in the case; (6) A partys excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to the determination. These may include: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested ; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The courts calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) A party may move for summary judgment at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)¿ Notice of the motion and supporting papers must be served on all other parties at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing.¿ ( Id. , subd. (a)(2).)¿ The motion must be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.¿ ( Id. , subd. (a)(3).)¿¿¿ Discussion Defendant requests the Court continue trial in this case to at least 30 days after the September 24, 2024 summary judgment hearing. A party that timely files a motion for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c has a right to have their motion heard before the start of trial. ( Cole v. Superior Court (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 84, 88.) If served electronically, a motion for summary judgment must be made at least 105 days before trial, plus two court days. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(2), (3).) Therefore, a motion for summary judgment in this case needed to be filed by May 31, 2024. Defendant timely served its motion for summary judgment on May 29, 2024. Defendant argues that the summary judgment hearing could not be reserved until September 24, 2024. (Lee Decl. ¶ 2.) Since that date is after trial, Defendant requests that the Court continue the trial date to allow for the motion for summary judgment to be heard. Therefore, since Defendant has filed a timely summary judgment motion, and seeing no opposition, the Court finds good cause to continue trial. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to continue trial. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court GRANTS Defendants motion to continue trial. The Final Status Conference is continued to October 17, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse. Trial is continued to October 31, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 32 of the Spring Street Courthouse. All discovery and pre-trial motion cut-off dates shall be in accordance with the new trial date. Defendant shall give notice of this order, and file a proof of service of such.

MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SINGH VS KPC GLOBAL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; CVSW2200991 MEDICAL CENTERS, INC. REQUEST MONETARY SANCTIONS BY KPC GLOBAL MEDICAL CENTERS, INC. Tentative Ruling: See 1.

22CV007747: ENRIGHT vs SUTTER BAY HOSPITALS DBA ALTA BATES SUMMIT MEDICAL CENTER, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by ELIZABETH ENRIGHT (Plaintiff) in Department 20 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Karin Schwartz The Motion to Compel the Deposition of Daniel Baer is DROPPED because no motion is on file. Plaintiff filed an ex parte application but did not file a motion. The Court's intention, when it granted the ex parte on 7/8/24, was to advance the hearing date on an already filed and scheduled motion. However, it appears that no motion with respect to Daniel Baer had been filed (i.e., only the ex parte). Separately, the Court, through a misunderstanding, advanced the hearing date on a separately pending motion to compel (i.e., CCP 1987 notice) to 7/18/24. However, per the Court's order of 7/12/24, any matters relating to that motion will be heard at the pretrial on 8/2/24. Accordingly, the Court is continuing the hearing on this motion, which the Court inadvertently advanced to 7/18/24, to the date before the the pretrial, which is an ordinary law and motion day for the Court. The Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by ELIZABETH ENRIGHT (Plaintiff) scheduled for 07/18/2024 is continued to 08/01/2024 at 03:00 PM in Department 20 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV007747: ENRIGHT vs SUTTER BAY HOSPITALS DBA ALTA BATES SUMMIT MEDICAL CENTER, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by ELIZABETH ENRIGHT (Plaintiff) in Department 20 BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.

Case Number: 21STCV19154 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: B RICHARD CABRERA-LARA V. ARBOL GRADING, INC., ET AL. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/Summary adjudication Date of Hearing: July 16, 2024 Trial Date: August 16, 2024 Department: B Case No.: 21STCV19154 Moving Party: Defendant and Cross-Complaint Melt De La Paz Inc. (Melt) Responding Party: Plaintiff Richard Cabrera-Lara (Plaintiff) and Plaintiff-in-Intervention State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) BACKGROUND This action arises from Plaintiff Richard Cabrera-Lara (Plaintiff) allegedly sustaining injuries while working on a construction project on May 12, 2020 at 2451 Summitridge Drive, Beverly Hills, California. Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries while assisting with the cleaning of a heavy-duty drill. On May 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants Arbol Grading, Inc. dba Arbol Construction (Arbol), Melt De La Paz, Inc. (Melt), Miguel Mitchell (Mitchell), and Does 1 to 100, inclusive (collectively, the Defendants), alleging a single cause of action for General Negligence. On April 15, 2022, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) filed a Motion for Leave to File a Complaint-in-Intervention. On June 24, 2022, Defendant Melt filed its Answer to the Complaint. Also, on such date, Defendant Melt filed a Cross-Complaint against Roes 1 through 10, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Indemnity; (2) Contribution; and (3) Declaratory Relief. On July 29, 2022, Defendant Arbol filed its Answer to the Complaint. On September 7, 2022, the Honorable Audra Mori sitting in Department 31 at Spring Street Courthouse granted State Farms Motion for Leave to Intervene. (09/07/22 Minute Order.) On September 9, 2022, State Farm filed a Complaint-in-Intervention against Defendants Arbol, Melt, and Mitchell alleging causes of action for: (1) General Negligence; and (2) Products Liability. On September 22, 2022, Defendant Melt filed its Answer to the Complaint-in-Intervention. On October 6, 2022, Defendant Arbol filed its Answer to the Complaint-in-Intervention. On April 30, 2024, Defendant Melt filed and served the instant Motion for Summary Judgment or, alternatively, Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the Complaint (the Motion). [1] The Motion is made on the grounds that Plaintiffs cause of action against Defendant Melt is barred the doctrine of workers compensation exclusivity. Specifically, Defendant Melt argues that, because Plaintiff was a special employee of Defendant Melt at the time of the alleged injury, Plaintiffs sole remedy is through the workers compensation scheme. If summary judgment cannot be granted, Defendant Melt moves for summary adjudication on the sole issue that Plaintiffs cause of action for negligence is barred by the workers compensation exclusivity rule. On July 1, 2024, State Farm filed an opposition to the Motion. On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff also filed an opposition to the Motion. On July 11, 2024, Defendant Melt filed respective reply briefs as to the oppositions filed by Plaintiff and State Farm. Given that the oppositions make similar and oftentimes overlapping arguments, the Court will address the respective oppositions collectively. The Court, however, will address the evidence presented by Plaintiff and State Farm separately where appropriate. Initially, the Court notes that Defendant Melt only presents 10 undisputed material facts in support of the Motion. State Farm does not dispute any of Defendant Melts undisputed material facts. [2] Plaintiff only disputes Defendant Melts UMF Nos. 3, 5, and 6. [Tentative] Ruling The Motion for Summary Judgment, or alternatively, Motion for Summary Adjudication (the Motion) filed by Defendant Melt De La Paz Inc. is DENIED in its entirety. DISCUSSION The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67.) A cause of action has no merit if [o]ne or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(1).) A defendant has met its burden in showing that a cause of action has no merit if the defendant has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant has met its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. ( Ibid .) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. ( Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the defendant has met its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , supra , 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) The summary judgment statute [is] not intended nor can it be used as a substitute for existing methods in the trial of issues of fact. ( Travelers Indemn. Co. v. McIntosh (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 177, 182.) The summary judgment procedure is drastic and should be used with caution. ( House v. Lala (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 412, 415.) Any doubt in granting summary judgment should be exercised against the moving party. ( Ibid .) Summary adjudication motions are procedurally identical to summary judgment motions. ( Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1290.) Evidentiary Objections The Court SUSTAINS Plaintiffs evidentiary objection number 1 to the declaration of Jonathan A. Termechi, Esq. in support of the Motion. Defendant Melt is improperly using its own interrogatory responses in support of the Motion. A partys own . . . interrogatory responses . . . cannot itself serve as competent evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. ( Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726, 740.) Issue No.1: The Workers Compensation Exclusivity Rule California Workers Compensation Act . . . provides an employees exclusive remedy against his or her employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. ( Melendrez v. Ameron Internat. Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638.) Under the workers compensation scheme, an employees remedy against an employer for a work-related injury isas a general ruleexclusively limited to the benefits provided by statute. ( Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 591, 597.) According to Labor Code section 3601 [w]here the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided in Section 3706 the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his employment . . . . ( Ibid .) An employee, however, retains the right to pursue any common law remedies he may have against third party tortfeasors. ( Id . at p. 598.) The claim of an employee for compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from such injury or death against any person other than the employer . . . . ( Ibid .) The workers compensation laws were not designed to relieve one other than the employer from any liability imposed by statute or by common law. ( Ibid .) Whether an employees injury arose out of and in the course of [his] employment is generally a question of fact to be determined in light of the circumstances of the particular case. ( Melendrez , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 639, citation omitted.) When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether an injury was suffered in the course of employment is one of law . . . . ( Ibid .) A special employment relationship arises when an employer lends an employee to another employer and relinquishes to the borrowing employer all right of control over the employees activities. ( Riley v. Southwest Marine, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1247.) The borrowed employee is held to have two employershis original or general employer and a second, the special employer. ( Id . at p. 1247-48.) In this dual employer situation, the employee is generally limited to a statutory workers compensation remedy for injuries he receives in the course of his employment with the special employer; he may not bring a separate tort action against either employer. ( Id . at p. 1248.) Whether an employment relationship existed is a question for the trier of fact [w]here the evidence, though not in conflict, permits conflicting inferences. ( Ibid .) However, if neither the evidence nor inferences are in conflict, then the question of whether an employment relationship exists becomes a question of law which may be resolved by summary judgment. ( Ibid .) The determination of whether a worker is a borrowed servant is accomplished by ascertaining who has the power to control and direct the servants in the performance of their work, distinguishing between authoritative direction and control, and mere suggestion as to details or the necessary cooperation, where the work furnished is part of a larger undertaking. ( Collins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 867, 879.) [W]here there is a dual employment the workman is barred from an action for damages against either employer. ( Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 168, 175.) In assessing the existence of a special employment relationship, the primary consideration is whether the employer has [t]he right to control and direct the activities of the alleged employee or the manner and method in which the work is performed, whether exercised or not. ( Id . at p. 175.) The following factors are analyzed in determining whether a special employment relationship exists: (1) whether the borrowing employers control over the employee and the work he is performing extends beyond mere suggestion of details or cooperation; (2) whether the employee is performing the special employers work; (3) whether there was an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds between the original and special employer; (4) whether the employee acquiesced in the new work situation; (5) whether the original employer terminated his relationship with the employee; (6) whether the special employer furnished the tools and place for performance; (7) whether the new employment was over a considerable length of time; (8) whether the borrowing employer had the right to fire the employee; and (9) whether the borrowing employer had the obligation to pay the employee. ( Riley , supra , 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1250.) Defendant Melts Evidence Defendant Melt presents the following undisputed material facts: Plaintiff generally alleges that, on May 12, 2020, he was working on a home construction site at or near 2451 Summitridge Drive, Beverly Hills, California. (Defendant Melts Separate Statement of Facts (DSSF) No. 1.) At the time of the subject incident, Plaintiff was an ironworker apprentice for Cruz Concrete Stone, Inc. (Cruz), a masonry and rebar contractor on the project. (DSSF No. 2.) Plaintiff was informed by his supervisor at Cruz that he needed to assist an employee of Defendant Melt named Miguel Mitchell (Mitchell), by measuring holes being drilled by Defendant Melt using a large drill with an auger. (DSSF No. 4.) When replacing the drill bit, the drill allegedly moved in an upward direction, which injured Plaintiffs fingers. (DSSF No. 7.) As a result of the subject incident, Plaintiff filed a workers compensation claim with Cruzs workers compensation insurance. (DSSF No. 8.) On or about May 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant Melt, alleging one cause of action for general negligence. (DSSF No. 9.) Based on his discovery responses, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Melt carelessly, recklessly and negligently screened, hired, employed, trained, supervised and monitored Defendant Mitchell which left an untrained, unsafe, unsupervised worker at the controls of a dangerous machine working with Plaintiff and ultimately caused the subject incident. (DSSF No. 10.) Defendant Melt presents evidence that Plaintiff accepted the request from his supervisor at Cruz to assist Defendant Mitchell. (Termechi Decl., Ex. H at p. 163:12-21, 164:16-21, and 165:18-19.) [3] Defendant Melt presents evidence that while assisting Defendant Mitchell, Plaintiff was asked to replace a drill bit. (Termechi Decl., Ex. E at Nos. 13, 15, 19, 21, and 27.) Analysis The Court finds that Defendant Melt has not met its burden to establish that a special employment relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant Melt, and therefore the burden does not shift to Plaintiff or State Farm to show a triable issue of fact. Defendant Melt presents no evidence that it had the right to control and direct the activities of Plaintiff or the manner and method in which Plaintiffs work was performed. All the evidence presented by Defendant Melt shows is that Plaintiff was asked by his supervisor at Cruz to assist an employee of Defendant Melt by measuring holes being drilled, and that Plaintiff was injured during such activity. Defendant Melt presents no evidence as to whether: (1) it had control over Plaintiffs work; (2) Plaintiff was performing the work of Defendant Melt; (3) there was an agreement between Cruz and Defendant Melt; (4) Cruz terminated its relationship with Plaintiff; (5) Defendant Melt furnished any tools to Plaintiff; (6) Plaintiff worked for or with Defendant Melt for a considerable period of time; (7) Defendant Melt had the right to fire Plaintiff; and (8) Defendant Melt had any obligation to pay Plaintiff. ( Riley , supra , 203 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1250.) Defendant Melt has made a showing of neither the primary factor nor secondary factors articulated in Riley , supra , 203 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1250. Summary judgment and summary adjudication are therefore inappropriate. Even if Defendant Melt had met its burden to show that there was a special employment relationship, the Court would have found that both State Farm and Plaintiff presented respective evidence to establish a triable issue of fact. State Farm presented evidence that the Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) at Defendant Melt testified at deposition that: (1) Defendant Melt never employed Plaintiff; (2) Defendant Melt never intended to hire Plaintiff even on a temporary basis; (3) Plaintiff never served as an agent or employee of Defendant Melt in any manner. (Salley Decl., ¶ 2; Ex. A at p. 91:25-92:21.) State Farm presented evidence that a supervisor from Cruz told Plaintiff to go help with the drilling machine. (Salley Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. B at p. 90:18-91:9.) Plaintiff presented the following evidence: he was working for Cruz on the day of the incident. (Upton Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. 1 at p. 28:18-21.) At the time of the incident, Plaintiff received a paycheck from Cruz. (Upton Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. 1 at p. 84:25-85:5.) Plaintiff was asked by a foreman from Cruz to measure holes being drilled in the ground. (Upton Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. 1 at p. 90:21-24.) Plaintiffs supervisor from Cruz provided him with instructions on how to measure. (Upton Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. 1 at p. 110:19-111:1 and 113:1-3.) There was no agreement between Cruz and Defendant Melt for Defendant Melt to temporarily hire one of Cruzs employees. (Upton Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 2 at p. 38:23-39:4.) Defendant Melt never intended to hire Plaintiff even on a temporary basis and never employed Plaintiff. (Upton Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 2 at p. 91:25-92:6.) Plaintiff has never served as an agent or employee of any kind for Defendant Melt. (Upton Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. 2 at p. 92:14-18.) Thus, even if Defendant Melt had met its initial burden to show the existence of a special employment relationship, the Court would have found that both Plaintiff and State Farm presented evidence to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Motion is DENIED in its entirety. Moving party is ordered to give notice. [1] The Motion has a reservation identification number ending in 8616. [2] State Farm only objected to Defendant Melts UMF No. 6 in its responsive separate statement; however, State Farm failed to file any separate evidentiary objections. As such, the Court deems State Farm to not have disputed Defendant Melts UMF No. 6. The Court reminds the parties that if it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist . ( San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 313, emphasis in original.) [3] Defendant Melt cites to non-existent pages of deposition testimony that are not included in Exhibit H. (See DSSF No. 5.) There is no page 90, 91, 94, 135, 238, or 242 in Exhibit H, which is attached to the declaration of Mr. Termechi in support of the Motion.