Motion for Preliminary Injunction in 33/34 West Owner Llc, Slg 315 West Llc v. Quik Park Truffles Llc, Rl Holdings Ii Llc, Rafael Llopiz, Abc Co., Xyz Corp.| Trellis.Law

On September 18, 2020 a Motion,Ex Parte was filed involving a dispute between 33 34 West Owner Llc, Slg 315 West Llc, and Abc Co., Quik Park Truffles Llc, Rafael Llopiz, Rl Holdings Ii Llc, Xyz Corp., for Real Property - Other (Ejectment,Damages, Etc.) in the District Court of New York County.

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FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/11/2020 04:34 PM INDEX NO. 157631/2020
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 26 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/11/2020

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------X
33/34 WEST OWNER LLC and SLG 315 WEST Index No.: 157631/2020
LLC,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

QUIK PARK TRUFFLES LLC, RL HOLDINGS II
LLC, RAFAEL LLOPIZ, “ABC CO.” and “XYZ
CORP.”,

Defendants.

------------------------------------X

DEFENDANT RAFAEL LLOPIZ’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR USE AND
OCCUPANCY AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1

FACTS .............................................................................................................................................2

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................4

A. Landlord Misapplies the Applicable Legal Standards ........................................................4

B. The OSC Should be Denied As It Seeks the Ultimate Relief in the Case ...........................6

C. Landlord Has Not Established a Likelihood of Success on the Merits................................7

D. Landlord Cannot Establish Irreparable Injury ....................................................................9

E. The Balance of the Equities on a Preliminary Injunction Favors Defendants ...................10

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................11

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE(s)

Cleo Realty Assocs., L.P. v. Papagiannakis,
151 A.D.3d 418 (1st Dep’t 2017) ............................................................................................... 9

Excelsior 57th Corp. v. Select Parking LLC,
Index No. 155922/2020 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Aug. 21, 2020) (NYSCEF Dkt. No. 30) ......... 4, 5

EdCia Corp. v. McCormack,
44 A.D.3d 991 (2d Dep’t 2007) ............................................................................................ 5, 10

Eli Haddad Corp. v. Cal Redmond Studio,
102 A.D.2d 730 (1st Dep’t 1984) ............................................................................................... 4

Family Affair Haircutters, Inc. v. Detling,
110 A.D.2d 745 (2d Dep’t 1985) ................................................................................................ 8

Findlay House, Inc. v. Zhang Hongliu,
61 Misc. 3d 644 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2018)......................................................................................... 4

Furriers Joint Council of New York v. Indep. Fur Contractors Ass'n,
No. 8269/77, 1979 WL 33261 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. July 2, 1979) ......................................... 7, 8

Long Island Tr. Co. v. Int'l Inst. for Packaging Ed., Ltd.,
38 N.Y.2d 493 (1976) ................................................................................................................. 9

Mushlam, Inc. v. Nazor,
80 A.D.3d 471 (1st Dep’t 2011) ................................................................................................. 4

Park Towers South Co. LLC v. Columbus Circle Parking LLC,
Index No. 653757/2020 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Dec. 3, 2020) (NYSCEF Dkt. No. 32) ................ 7

Reddy v. Mihos,
160 A.D.3d 510, leave to appeal denied, 32 N.Y.3d (1st Dep’t 2018) ....................................... 9

Sau Thi Ma v. Xaun T. Lien,
198 A.D.2d 186 (1st Dep’t 1993) ............................................................................................. 10

Second on Second Cafe, Inc. v. Hing Sing Trading, Inc.,
66 A.D.3d 255 (1st Dep’t 2009) ......................................................................................... 5, 6, 7

SHS Baisley, LLC v. Res Land, Inc.,
18 A.D.3d 727 (2d Dep’t 2005) .................................................................................................. 6

Spectrum Stamford, LLC v. 400 Atl. Title, LLC,
162 A.D.3d 615 (1st Dep’t 2018) ............................................................................................... 6

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CASES PAGE(s)

St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. York Claims Serv.,
308 A.D.2d 347 (1st Dep’t 2003) ....................................................................................... 5, 6, 7

Wall St. Garage Parking Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc.,
10 A.D.3d 223 (1st Dep’t 2004) ........................................................................................... 9, 10

Workbench, Inc. v. Syblin Realty Corp.,
140 A.D.2d 693 (2d Dep’t 1988) .............................................................................................. 10

STATUTES

CPLR 6301.............................................................................................................................. 2, 4, 5

CPLR 6311.................................................................................................................................. 2, 5

N.Y. Local. L. 1932-A (codified at N.Y.C. Admin. Code §22-1005) ............................................ 2

RPL §220 ........................................................................................................................................ 4

TREATISE

Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6301 (2020) ................................. 5

iii

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Defendant Rafael Llopiz (“Llopiz”), by his attorneys, Pryor Cashman LLP, respectfully

submits this memorandum of law in opposition to the motion brought by order to show cause (the

“OSC”) of plaintiffs 33/34 West Owner LLC and SLG 315 West LLC (collectively, “Landlord”)

seeking a preliminary injunction against Llopiz granting Landlord: (i) an order for the immediate

payment of all alleged rent arrears in the amount of $1,127,247.28, or a bond in that amount; and

(ii) an order of ongoing use and occupancy payments in the amount of $203,166.66, the default

rental rate set forth the lease1. For the following reasons, Landlord’s OSC should be denied.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Landlord prematurely and improperly seeks an award from this Court of all the relief to

which it claims to be entitled under a lease for a commercial parking garage premises located in

Landlord’s building in midtown Manhattan (the “Lease”). Landlord seeks from Tenant and the

other defendants, alleged guarantors of Tenant’s Lease obligations, a preliminary injunction

awarding Landlord – among other things – over $1 million in rent arrears that Landlord purports

have accrued during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Landlord also seeks an injunction

granting ongoing use and occupancy payments of double the monthly rent under the Lease, to

which it claims it is entitled due to Tenant’s purported uncured monetary default and Landlord’s

alleged subsequent termination of the Lease. Finally, Landlord seeks the issuance of an immediate

order of ejectment should Tenant fail to pay of the above.

The relief sought on this OSC is identical to the relief sought by Landlord in its first, second

and third causes of action in its Complaint. Under New York law, however, litigants may not be

1
Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause also seeks an immediate order of ejectment against defendant Quik Park Truffles
LLC (“Tenant”) in the event Tenant and the other defendants do not immediately pay the arrears, post an undertaking,
or fail to make any ongoing monthly installment of use and occupancy. As discussed herein, Llopiz has no knowledge
concerning the facts giving rise to the claims asserted in thisaction and, in any event, reliefon this branch of
Landlord’s motion is not sought against Llopiz.

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granted mandatory injunctions where the movant seeks, pendente lite, the ultimate relief in the

case. Further, Landlord has not (and cannot) establish that it has satisfied all the elements of a

preliminary injunction pursuant to CPLR 6301 and 6311—in fact, Landlord does not even cite to

those provisions in its OSC. Specifically, through its motion, Landlord explicitly seeks the

payment of money, which does not satisfy the requisite element of irreparable harm. Nor can

Landlord establish the likelihood of success on the merits, where defendants have raised

affirmative defenses as to the validity of the subject lease and the alleged existence of breaches.

To grant a preliminary injunction awarding Landlord everything it seeks in its Complaint before

any discovery at all has been taken and before the validity of Landlord’s claims can be evaluated

would operate especially to the prejudice of Llopiz, a personal guarantor who has had no

involvement with the premises, the Lease, or the parties for more than five years.2 Landlord’s

OSC should be denied.

FACTS

Landlord and Tenant entered the Lease on September 30, 2014, for a term of 10 years.

(Compl. ¶ 10.) In connection with the execution of the Lease, Defendant RL Holdings II, LLC

entered a limited corporate guaranty dated September 23, 2014 with Landlord, agreeing to

guarantee Tenant’s obligations under the Lease. Llopiz simultaneously entered a Good Guy

Guaranty with Landlord.

Llopiz is the former President and CEO of RL Holdings II, LLC, which operated numerous

“Quik Park” garages in the New York City area. (Llopiz Aff. ¶ 3.) For many years, in that

capacity, Llopiz entered personal and/or “good guy” guaranty agreements in connection with a

2
Indeed, underscoring the inequity of this result, the City of New York has, with respect to other businesses impacted
by the COVID-19 pandemic, suspended personal liability arising from guaranties of such businesses. See N.Y. Local.
L. 1932-A (codified at N.Y.C. Admin. Code §22-1005).

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number of underlying long-term garage leases throughout the region. In each case, the tenant

entity entering the lease was subject to Llopiz’s control. (Id. ¶ 4.) As is typical with “good guy”

guaranties, Llopiz could extinguish any personal liability by causing the tenant entity to vacate the

premises. (Id. ¶ 5.) He entered such a guaranty here on behalf of defendant Quik Park Truffles

LLC, the tenant entity on the lease in question. (Id. ¶ 6.)

In 2015, however, through a corporate transaction unrelated to this litigation, and not

involving either the landlord or tenant entities in this case, Llopiz sold his entire interest in the

Quik Park business to Citizens Icon Holdings LLC (“Citizens”). (Id. ¶ 7.) Llopiz has had no

ability to control the actions of the Tenant entity since 2015, such as causing Tenant to abide by

its obligations under the Lease. (Id. ¶ 8.) In fact, Llopiz has had no involvement at all with the

garage that is the subject of this litigation, nor with either the Landlord or Tenant in this case, since

2015.

As such, Llopiz has no way of knowing whether the default notice Landlord alleges to have

served upon Tenant was a valid and properly-served predicate notice sufficient to trigger the

default provisions under the Lease. Likewise, Llopiz has no way of knowing whether the

termination notice Landlord alleges to have served upon Tenant was a valid and properly-served

predicate notice sufficient to entitle Landlord to termination of the Lease. Accordingly, as the

parties have not yet had the benefit of any discovery whatsoever in this action to test and evaluate

the validity of Landlord’s claims, it is impossible to know whether any of the obligations in the

Good Guy Guaranty have even been triggered.

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ARGUMENT

A. Landlord Misapplies the Applicable Legal Standards

Landlord purports to seek relief pursuant to RPL §220 and CPLR 6301. In the first

instance, RPL § 220 by its own words governs an “action for use and occupation” (id.) (emphasis

added), yet Landlord’s only cause of action in this litigation for use and occupancy is against

nominal defendants that are not the subject of this motion. (See Compl. ¶¶47-49.) Contrary to

Landlord’s assertion, Section 220 permits, but does not mandate, use and occupancy payments.

See Findlay House, Inc. v. Zhang Hongliu, 61 Misc. 3d 644, 649 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2018) (declining

to grant Petitioner Mitchell-Lama housing corporation an award of back use and occupancy that

had accrued since the filing of the action). Further, where, as here, the amount of “reasonable . . .

use and occupation” is contested by the parties, “it is the landlord, not the tenant, who has the

burden of proving reasonable value of use and occupancy.” Mushlam, Inc. v. Nazor, 80 A.D.3d

471, 472 (1st Dep’t 2011) (citation omitted). The rent set forth in the lease is “probative,” but not

“conclusive” of the fair market value of the leasehold. Id. (reversing order directing payment of

use and occupancy where the amount sought by landlord was four times the amount set in the

lease), citing Eli Haddad Corp. v. Cal Redmond Studio, 102 A.D.2d 730, 731 (1st Dep’t 1984)

(granting use and occupancy payments where tenant sought simultaneously to have building

brought under the auspices of the Loft Law, and to avoid payment of rent as the building was

currently categorized as commercial space). Excelsior 57th Corp. v. Select Parking LLC, cited by

Landlord, is distinguishable primarily in that it was granted pre-answer on the tenant’s default.

Index No. 155922/2020 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Aug. 21, 2020) (NYSCEF Dkt. No. 30). Here, all

Defendants have answered and asserted affirmative defenses to Landlord’s allegations of breach

of the Lease.

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Further, as set forth in Tenant’s verified answer, the COVID pandemic has “completely

frustrated . . . the very purpose” for which Tenant entered the lease (Answer, NYSCEF Dkt. No.

25, at ¶16), and thus Landlord’s demand for $203,166.66 per month in use and occupancy is not

“reasonable.” Nor has Landlord met its burden to establish the current fair market value of the

Premises, which are located in midtown Manhattan, since the onset of a global pandemic that has

decimated businesses located in that formerly busy commercial district.3

Landlord also seeks preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to CPLR 6301 and 6311,

although it does not cite those statutes anywhere in its papers. “It is well settled that in order to be

entitled to a preliminary injunction, a movant must clearly demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success

on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent granting of the preliminary injunction, and (3) a

balancing of the equities in the movant's favor.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. York Claims

Serv., Inc., 308 A.D.2d 347, 348 (1st Dep’t 2003) (citation & quotations omitted). The movant

must meet demonstrate its entitlement by clear and convincing evidence. EdCia Corp. v.

McCormack, 44 A.D.3d 991, 993 (2d Dep’t 2007). Where the plaintiff seeks a mandatory

injunction compelling an affirmative act – rather than prohibiting an act – the movant risks altering

the status quo as opposed to preserving it, and further risks that the Court will grant the ultimate

relief sought in the case. See Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6301

(2020). As a result, the Court also requires plaintiffs seeking mandatory injunctions to demonstrate

that the mandatory injunction preserves the status quo. Id.; see also Second on Second Cafe, Inc.

v. Hing Sing Trading, Inc., 66 A.D.3d 255, 264 (1st Dep’t 2009) (vacating mandatory injunction

to install air conditioner on roof of landlord’s building).

3
See The Virus Turns Midtown Into a Ghost Town, Causing Economic Crisis, New York Times (July 26, 2020),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/26/nyregion/nyc-coronavirus-time-life-building.html.

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For the following reasons, Landlord cannot satisfy the standard for the granting of

preliminary mandatory injunction.

B. The OSC Should be Denied As It Seeks the Ultimate Relief in the Case

Although styled as a motion seeking interim relief, Landlord effectively seeks the ultimate

relief on Plaintiffs’ first three causes of action: for a declaratory judgment that Tenant breached

the Lease, entitling Landlord to terminate the Lease as of the alleged Termination Date; for an

order of ejectment; for damages in the amount of alleged unpaid rent; and for a finding that

Landlord is entitled to pendente lite relief in the form of use and occupancy awarded pursuant to

the default rate provision in the Lease.

“It is well settled that the ordinary function of a preliminary injunction is not to determine

the ultimate rights of the parties, but to maintain the status quo until there can be a full hearing on

the merits. Spectrum Stamford, LLC v. 400 Atl. Title, LLC, 162 A.D.3d 615, 616 (1st Dep’t

2018). “A mandatory injunction should not be granted, absent extraordinary circumstances, where

the status quo would be disturbed and the plaintiff would receive the ultimate relief sought,

pendente lite.” Id. at 617, quoting St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. York Claims Serv., 308 A.D.2d

347, 349 (1st Dep’t 2003) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction ordering defendant to transfer

disputed sum of money to plaintiff, where the ultimate relief sought in the case was the return of

the money); see also SHS Baisley, LLC v. Res Land, Inc., 18 A.D.3d 727, 728 (2d Dep’t 2005)

(reversing lower court’s grant of mandatory preliminary injunction compelling the defendant to

execute the documents for a building permit upon the condition that the plaintiff satisfy rent

arrears, finding that the injunction in effect granted the ultimate relief sought by plaintiff); Second

on Second, 66 A.D.3d at 264.

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New York Supreme Court, in considering the exact issue raised in this case, recently found

that a landlord was not entitled to a preliminary injunction for unpaid back rent and ongoing use

and occupancy, as that was the exact nature of the relief sought in the plaintiff’s complaint for

breach of the lease. See Park Towers South Co. LLC v. Columbus Circle Parking LLC, Index No.

653757/2020, at 1 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Dec. 3, 2020) (NYSCEF Dkt. No. 32) (“In other words,

this is not in the nature of an interlocutory application for pendente lite provisional relief; but rather,

a reiteration of plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract in which it is alleged that the

tenant’s ‘breach of the lease’ is ‘continuing each month that [the tenant] fails to pay rent or other

charges due under the lease.’”)

Because Landlord here in its motion merely “reiterat[es]” the ultimate relief sought in its

complaint, of both alleged rent arrears and ongoing use and occupancy payments, it is not entitled

to a mandatory injunction. See Park Towers South Co. LLC, Index No. 653757/2020, at 1; see

also St. Paul Fire, 308 A.D.2d at 349. It is likewise not entitled to interlocutory relief mirroring

the exact form of the ultimate relief it seeks in its second cause of action.

C. Landlord Has Not Established a Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Landlord has not, nor can it, establish a likelihood of success on the merits sufficient to

permit a preliminary injunction to issue for the payment of money, because Defendants have each

raised numerous affirmative defenses to the causes of action in Landlord’s unverified Complaint.

Courts will not find that a plaintiff has established the “heavy burden” of demonstrating its

likelihood of success on the merits where the “facts. .. are sharply disputed.” Furriers Joint

Council of New York v. Indep. Fur Contractors Ass'n, No. 8269/77, 1979 WL 33261, at *1 (Sup.

Ct., N.Y. Cty. July 2, 1979) (denying preliminary injunction) (“Resolution of disputed factual

issues as to whether the acts of the defendants constitute actionable tortious interference, or

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whether laches or waiver is applicable, will determine entitlement to ultimate injunctive relief.

This is best left to determination at a plenary trial.”); see also Family Affair Haircutters, Inc. v.

Detling, 110 A.D.2d 745, 747 (2d Dep’t 1985) (“Where the facts, as in the case at bar, are in sharp

dispute, a temporary injunction will not be granted.”) (citation omitted).

In support of its argument for likelihood of success, Landlord repeats the facts in its

unverified Complaint, without more. (OSC at 6-7.) Yet in their Verified Answer, defendant RL

Holdings II LLC ("RL Holdings II") and Tenant raise eleven affirmative defenses, including

defenses to the allegations that Tenant breached the Lease, such as frustration of purpose,

commercial impracticability, and Landlord’s failure to meet a condition precedent to bringing this

action. (See NYSCEF Dkt. No. 25 at ¶¶ 10-18, 25.) As such, the facts alleged by Landlord in

support of its claims that Tenant breached the Lease are “sharply disputed” by Tenant, and should

be resolved at trial. See Furriers Joint Council, 1979 WL 33261, at *1. As such, a preliminary

injunction should not be granted here. Id.; Family Affair, 110 A.D.2d at 747.

These sharp factual disputes also apply to Guarantor’s obligations. In the first instance, if

no rent arrears are owed by Tenant due to frustration of purpose or commercial impracticability,

Guarantor’s obligations have not yet been triggered. It follows that, if the Lease was not properly

terminated, the Default Rate for use and occupancy of twice the monthly rent under the Lease

certainly is not the correct measure of use and occupancy. Due to Guarantor’s lack of involvement

with this Lease in five years, he has no way of knowing whether either of those conditions are true,

and thus whether his obligations under the Personal Guaranty have been triggered.

Further, Guarantor has raised its own affirmative defenses pertaining to the applicability

of the Personal Guaranty, including lack of consideration and unenforceability. (See NYSCEF

Dkt. No. 24 ¶¶50-57.) Courts will not enforce personal guaranties where they are lacking in

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consideration. Reddy v. Mihos, 160 A.D.3d 510, 514, leave to appeal denied, 32 N.Y.3d (1st Dep’t

2018). Further, Courts will not enforce personal guaranties where there has not been compliance

with a condition precedent to the enforcement of the guaranty, such as the proper service of a

predicate notice on a tenant in an action to recover purported rent arrears. Long Island Tr. Co. v.

Int'l Inst. for Packaging Ed., Ltd., 38 N.Y.2d 493 (1976) (summary judgment to enforce personal

guarantees reversed where question of fact raised as to compliance with condition precedent); Cleo

Realty Assocs., L.P. v. Papagiannakis, 151 A.D.3d 418, 419 (1st Dep’t 2017) (questions of fact as

to whether predicate notices were properly served on tenant prevented summary judgment to

enforce personal guaranty). Guarantor cannot know whether Landlord’s alleged service of the

predicate notices here was proper, thus creating a factual dispute as to Landlord’s entitlement to

enforce the Personal Guaranty. Landlord cannot establish its likelihood of success on the merits

of its claims against Llopiz in the presence of affirmative defenses, and thus a preliminary

injunction should not be granted.

D. Landlord Cannot Establish Irreparable Injury

Landlord has not established by clear and convincing evidence that it will suffer irreparable

injury in the absence of an injunction, as it must to succeed on this OSC. The relief Landlord seeks

is purely monetary, as it seeks an order that Defendants shall pay:

(a) . . . all Fixed Rent, Additional Rent and holdover rent due under the Lease for the
period from and/or during April 1, 2020, through November 30, 2020, in the amount
of $1,127,247.28, or alternatively, to post an undertaking in the amount of
$1,127,247.28, without prejudice to the parties' rights and remedies; [and]

(b) . . . monthly use and occupancy pendente lite in the amount of $203,166.66 per month,
which represents the holdover rent set forth in the parties' terminated lease, without
prejudice to the parties' rights and remedies;

A party cannot demonstrate irreparable injury where the only harm it alleges is economic

loss, which is compensable by monetary damages. Wall St. Garage Parking Corp. v. New York

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Stock Exch., Inc., 10 A.D.3d 223, 228 (1st Dep’t 2004); EdCia Corp., 44 A.D.3d at 994. Here,

Landlord explicitly seeks the payment of money, which can clearly be satisfied by money

damages. Thus, it is irrefutable that Landlord cannot show that it will suffer any irreparable injury

absent an injunction.4

E. The Balance of the Equities on a Preliminary Injunction Favors Defendants

Finally, the balance of the equities in this case favors Defendants, especially Llopiz.

Should a preliminary injunction for the payment of all damages sought by Landlord in this case be

wrongfully granted against Llopiz, he may find himself personally liable and subject to contempt

if Tenant fails to pay, even though Llopiz has neither been involved with the garage at issue since

2015, nor exercised any control over the Tenant since that time. Landlord, on the other hand, has

not alleged any prejudice that will befall it if the total amount of damages is not awarded to

Landlord before the merits of itsclaims may be evaluated. As set forth above in §B, to grant

Landlord the ultimate relief in the case before any discovery has been taken or any evaluation of

the merits of Landlord’s claims has been done is inequitable. The preliminary injunction should

not be granted.

4
Landlord cites Workbench, Inc. v. Syblin Realty Corp., 140 A.D.2d 693, 697 (2d Dep’t 1988)
for the proposition that Owner’s risk “of losing its ability to meet its operating expenses and other
financial obligations with respect to the Premises . . . constitutes irreparable harm.” Workbench
states nothing of the sort. The case involved allegations that a signature on a lease was forged,
and the preliminary injunction was granted to prevent the landlord from selling or leasing the
premises while the validity of the signature was evaluated, as the “plaintiff ha[d] adduced sufficient
evidence indicating that the subject premises is uniquely suited to its needs in terms of size and
location.” Id. Landlord has not alleged any facts pertaining to the uniqueness of real property, a
quality that frequently renders real property susceptible to injunctive relief. Sau Thi Ma v. Xaun
T. Lien, 198 A.D.2d 186, 186 (1st Dep’t 1993) is likewise inapposite, as the Court found that
defendant had indicated his intent to dissipate the proceeds of a winning lottery ticket if not
restrained.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ OSC should be denied.

Dated: New York, New York
December 11, 2020
PRYOR CASHMAN LLP

By: _______________________________
Eric D. Sherman
Marion R. Harris
7 Times Square
New York, New York 10036
esherman@pryorcashman.com
mharris@pryorcashman.com
Attorneys for Defendant Rafael Llopiz

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Case Info

Judge

Shlomo Hagler Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

December 11, 2020

Case Filing Date

September 18, 2020

County

Parties

33/34 West Owner LLC Plaintiff
ABC Co. Defendant
BEERMAN, HAL N Attorney for the Plaintiff
Harris, Marion R Attorney for the Defendant
KOVACHEV, PLAMEN KIRILOV Attorney for the Plaintiff
PEDNEKAR, SUSHANT SUHAS Attorney for the Defendant
Quik Park Truffles LLC Defendant
Rafael Llopiz Defendant
RL Holdings II LLC Defendant
SHERMAN, ERIC D Attorney for the Defendant
SLG 315 West LLC Plaintiff
SOLORZANO, NOE Attorney for the Defendant
XYZ Corp. Defendant
JAMES GIORDANO Attorney
DAVID ARCELLA Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DANIEL ANSELL Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Motion,Ex Parte: 33/34 West Owner Llc, Slg 315 West Llc v. Quik Park Truffles Llc, Rl Holdings Ii Llc, Rafael Llopiz, Abc Co., Xyz Corp.

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