On January 15, 2014 a
Answer
was filed
involving a dispute between
Basil J. Latorre Carol Latorre, As Administratrix For The Estate Of Basil J. Latorre, And Carol Latorre, Individually,,
and
Air & Liquid Systems Corporation,,
Amchem Products, Inc.,,
A.O. Smith Water Products Co.,,
Armstrong Pumps, Inc.,
Aurora Pump Company,
Azrock Industries,,
Bell & Gossett Company,
Bryant Heating & Cooling Systems,
Burnham, Llc,,
Carrier Corporation,,
Cbs Corporation, F K A Viacom Inc.,,
Certainteed Corporation,
Cleaver Brooks Company, Inc,
Crane Co.,,
Flowserve Us, Inc.,
Fmc Corporation,,
Gardner Denver, Inc,
General Electric Company,
Georgia Pacific Llc,
Goodyear Canada, Inc,
Goulds Pumps, Inc.,,
Grinnell Llc,,
Hammond Valve Company,
Imo Industries, Inc,
Itt Industries, Inc.,,
Jenkings Bros.,
Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc,
Kennedy Valve Manufacturing Co., Inc.,,
Lennox Industries, Inc,
New Yorker Boiler Company, Inc.,
Oakfabco, Inc.,,
Owens-Illinois, Inc,
Peerless Industries, Inc,
Pfizer, Inc.,
Red White Valve Corp.,
Spence Engineering Company, Inc. Individually And As A Division Of Circor International Inc.,
Taco, Inc.,
The Fairbanks Company,
The Goodyear Tire And Rubber Company,
Union Carbide Corporation,
U.S. Rubber Company,
Utica Boilers, Inc.,,
Viking Pump, Inc.,,
Warren Pumps, Llc,
Weil-Mclain, A Division Of The Marley-Wylain Company,,
for Asbestos
in the District Court of New York County.
Preview
INDEX NO. 190004/2014
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 1270372014 02:35 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 58 RECEIVED NYSCEF 12/03/2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK.
X
CAROL LATORRE, as Administratrix for the Estate of BASIL J.
LATORRE and CAROL LATORRE, Individually,
Index No.: 190004/14
Plaintiffs,
- against - VERIFIED ANSWER
TO PLAINTIFF’S
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUMMONS AND AMENDED
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
A.O. SMITH WATER PRODUCTS CO., et al,
Defendants,
xX
Defendant, JENKINS BROS., by its attorneys McGivney & Kluger, P.C. answering
the Plaintiff's Supplemental Summons and Amended Verified Complaint upon information and
belief, alleges as follows:
1 Defendant, JENKINS BROS. denies the allegations of Paragraph “1” and leaves
Plaintiff's to their proofs.
2 Defendant, JENKINS BROS. denies any knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph “2” through “18” as it pertains
to the remaining defendants in this Complaint.
3 Defendant, JENKINS BROS. denies the allegation contained in Paragraph “19” of
the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint and leaves Plaintiffs’ to their proofs.
{NO359228-1}
4. Defendant, JENKINS BROS. denies any knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph “20” through “30” as it pertains
to the remaining defendants in this Complaint.
Defendant, JENKINS BROS. repeats, reiterates and realleges each and every answer
and affirmative defense set forth in Defendant’s Answer to NYAL-Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.
Standard Asbestos Complaint for Wrongful Death No. 7.
* * *
FIRST SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to the damages claimed or to the relief
demanded.
SECOND SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Each and every Count of Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
THIRD SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
There is an insufficiency of service of process upon this Defendant.
FOURTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each and every count contained in
Plaintiff's Complaint.
FIFTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant with respect to each and
every Count contained in Plaintiff's Complaint.
SIXTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Court lacks venue over the defendant with respect to each and every Count
contained in Plaintiff's Complaint.
{N0359228-1}
SEVENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Court is considered a forum non conveniens the Defendant with respect to each
and every Count contained in Plaintiff's Complaint.
EIGHTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The causes of action alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint are barred by the applicable
Statue of Limitations.
NINTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiff has failed to join a party or parties necessary for a just adjudication of
this matter and have further omitted to state any reasons for such failure.
TENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The claims presented by Plaintiff's Complaint are barred by the contributing fault of
Plaintiff's which fault is greater than that of each Defendant or all of the Defendants.
ELEVENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Any injuries or damages suffered by the Plaintiff were caused by the negligence of
the Plaintiff and any recovery therefore is barred.
TWELFTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Any injuries or damages suffered by the Plaintiff were caused by the negligence of
the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's and any recovery therefore must be proportionately diminished.
{NO359228-1}
THIRTEENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Any negligence on the part of Defendant was superseded by the new and independent
conduct, including negligence of Plaintiff's employer and/or other third parties, who owed a duty to
Plaintiff and over whom Defendant had no control and which conduct Defendant could neither
anticipate nor reasonably foresee and which superseding conduct was not a consequence of
defendant’s alleged negligence but which was the efficient cause of the injuries allegedly sustained
by Plaintiff.
FOURTEENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The injuries complained of by the Plaintiff are wholly or partially caused by
independent means, including, inter alia, the conduct and habits of Plaintiff and exposure to other
particulates in the environment.
FIFTEENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff was a habitual smoker, and such smoking caused any lung disease from
which the Plaintiff suffered.
SIXTEENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Defendant had no duty to give instructions to Plaintiff or to warn Plaintiff of any
hazards attendant to the contract with, use of, or exposure to its products containing asbestos,
whether known or constructively known by Defendant, because those hazards were known by
plaintiff and/or other persons who controlled or supervised Plaintiff in the course of or incidental to
his employment.
SEVENTEENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiff's claims, to the extent that they include a prayer for equitable relief, are
barred on account of /aches in that Plaintiff failed or neglected to maintain this action in a swift,
diligent and timely fashion, all to the detriment of Defendant.
{N0359228-1}
EIGHTEENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
There was no privity of contract between Defendant and Plaintiff, so Plaintiff may not
recover upon any alleged breach of any express or implied warranty.
NINETEENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claims if based upon the allegations of express or implied warranty are
barred because no sale of goods occurred.
TWENTIETH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant cannot be held liable under principles of strict tort liability because
products manufactured and/or products which left Defendant’s possession did so prior to the
enactment of New York law regarding strict liability.
TWENTY-FIRST SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
At all times and places mentioned in the Complaint, the Plaintiff and/or other persons
used this defendant’s products, if indeed any were used, in an unreasonable manner, not reasonably
foreseeable to this Defendant, and for a purpose for which the products were not intended,
manufactured, or designed; Plaintiff's injuries and damages, if any, were directly and proximately
caused by said misuse and abuse, and Plaintiff's recovery herein, if any is barred or must be
diminished in proportion to the fault attributable to the Plaintiff and/or such other parties and
persons.
TWENTY-SECOND SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
An action for breach of warranty was not available to Plaintiff during the period of
the allegedly injurious exposure to, use of, or contact with products allegedly manufactured by
Defendant.
-
TWENTY-THIRD SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
No warranty of any kind was extended to Plaintiff in this matter.
{NO359228-1}
TWENTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If the Defendant, its servants or agents made any express warranties (allegations
which the Defendant specifically denies) then the Plaintiff did not rely on the express warranties and,
further, there was no such reliance by any person or entity authorized to represent the Plaintiff.
TWENTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Defendant or its agents or servants made any warranties express or implied
(allegations which the Defendant specifically denies) then the Defendant denies that it breached any
of the warranties.
TWENTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Defendant were liable, negligent or in breach of warranty, all of which it expressly
denies, the Defendant’s liability in any or all of those events has been terminated by the intervening
acts, omissions or negligence of others over whom this Defendant had neither control, nor the right
of control and for whose conduct the Defendant is not legally responsible.
TWENTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant denies that there was any defect or negligent mining, processing,
manufacture, designed, testing, investigation, fashioning, packaging, distributing, delivery, and/or
sale, in any asbestos product or material referred to in the Plaintiff's Complaint, but if there was any
defect or negligence as alleged, then the Defendant is not liable as it justifiably relied upon
inspection by others in the regular course of trade and business.
TWENTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The utility of the products manufactured by Defendant outweighs the danger
allegedly involved and, therefore, Plaintiff's claim is barred as a matter of public policy.
TWENTY-NINTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's employer or employees were negligent with respect to the matters set forth
{NO359228-1}
in the Complaint, and such negligence caused in whole or in part whatever disease, injury or
disability, if any, which Plaintiff may have sustained, as set forth in the Complaint. Therefore, even
is Plaintiff is entitled to recover against Defendant, which Defendant specifically denies, he is not
entitled to recover in the amount set forth in the Complaint because Defendant is entitled to set off
any and all workers compensation payments against any judgment which might be rendered in
Plaintiff's favor.
THIRTIETH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Plaintiff establishes any exposure to Defendant’s products, said exposure would
have been so minimal as to be insufficient to establish to a reasonable degree of probability that its
product caused Plaintiff's claimed injuries.
THIRTY-FIRST SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiff has released, settled, entered into an accord and satisfaction or otherwise
compromised his claims herein, and accordingly, said claims are barred by operations of law.
THIRTY-SECOND SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant expressly denies that it manufactured, designed, and/or sold any products
referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint which caused injury to Plaintiff. Notwithstanding, at all times
and places mentioned in the Complaint, Plaintiff's and/or other persons without this Defendant’s
knowledge and approval redesigned, modified, altered, and used this defendant’s products contrary
to instruction and contrary to the custom and practice of the industry. This redesign, modification,
alteration, and use so substantially changed the product’s characier that if there was a defect in the
product, which Defendant specifically denies, such defect resulted solely from the redesign,
modification, alteration, or other such treatment or change and not from any act or omission by this
Defendant. Therefore, said defect, if any, was created by Plaintiff and/or other persons, as the case
may be, and was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries and damages, if any, that Plaintiff
{N0359228-1}
allegedly suffered.
THIRTY-THIRD SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive, exemplary or enhanced damages for the following
reasons:
(a) Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is barred by the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(b) Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is barred by the proscription of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as supplied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibiting the imposition of excessive fines.
() Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is barred by the “double jeopardy” clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
THIRTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Punitive damages cannot be awarded against this Defendant for any of the alleged actions or
omissions of any of these Defendant’s predecessors because there is not a sufficient degree of
identity between this Defendant and any of its predecessors to justify such an award.
THIRTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
At all times and places mentioned in the Complaint, the Plaintiff failed to make reasonable
efforts to mitigate his injuries and damages, if any.
THIRTY-SIXTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
There was no negligence, gross negligence, willful, wanton or malicious misconduct,
reckless indifference or reckless disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff, or malice (actual, legal or
otherwise) on the part of this Defendant as to the Plaintiff of the Plaintiff herein.
{N0359228-1}
THIRTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Plaintiff has waived any and all claims which he seeks to assert in this action and
is estopped both to assert and to recover upon such claims.
THIRTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Defendant states that if it supplied any asbestos product, either directly or
indirectly, to the Plaintiff's employer, this product was supplied in accordance with specifications
established and promulgated by that employer, agencies or departments of the United States of
America, other persons and/or entities.
THIRTY-NINTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Defendant states that any asbestos containing products manufactured or sold by
the Defendant which give rise to Plaintiffs claims herein were designed and manufactured pursuant
to and in accordance with specifications mandated by the United States Government or its agencies.
The knowledge of the United States Government and its agencies of any possible health hazards
from use of such products were equal or superior to that of the Defendant and by reason thereof, the
Defendant is entitled to such immunity from liability as exists in favor of the United States
Government or its agencies.
FORTIETH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If the Plaintiff is unable to identify the manufacturer or manufacturers of the products
which allegedly caused injury, the causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, for, if relief be granted, such relief would constitute a taking of this
defendant’s property for a public use without just compensation, a violation of this Defendant’s
constitutional rights.
{NO359228-1}
FORTY-FIRST SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If the Plaintiff is unable to identify the manufacturer or manufacturers of the products
which allegedly caused the injury, the causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted because such relief would constitute a denial by this Court of
Defendant’s constitutional right of equal protection under the law.
FORTY-SECOND SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Defendant alleges that any sales of asbestos-containing products made by it were
made to sophisticated users of such products, and that sale to a sophisticated user of the products
bars any claim of liability against this Defendant.
FORTY-THIRD SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If the Plaintiff is barred from recovery, the action of his wife is also barred because it
is a derivative action.
FORTY-FOURTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant avails itself of, and adopts such other defenses raised by any other
defendants as may be applicable.
FORTY-FIFTH SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Defendant reserves the right to assert any and/or all applicable affirmative
defense which discovery may reveal appropriate.
CROSS-CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION
Defendant, JENKINS BROS. hereby makes claim for contribution against each and
every Defendant in this action.
{N0359228-1}
CROSS-CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION
While denying liability to Plaintiff's as well as the damages and injuries alleged, if
this Defendant is found liable to the Plaintiff's for damages by reason of the alleged acts complained
of, this Defendant’s alleged negligence was merely constructive, technical and passive or vicarious
and plaintiff(s) damages and injuries arose with direct and primary negligence, strict liability, breach
of contract and implied warranties of the said Co-Defendants listed in this action.
ANSWERS TO ALL CROSS-CLAIMS
This defendant answers all cross-claims of Co-Defendant’s, saying:
1 All cross-claims for contribution alleged are denied.
2. All cross-claims for indemnification alleged are denied.
WHEREFORE, Defendant JENKINS BROS. requests judgment in its favor
dismissing Plaintiff's Verified Complaint against it together with the costs and disbursements of this
action and for any expenses incurred in the defense thereof, including this Defendant’s attorney’s
fees.
{NO359228-1}
FURTHERMORE, Defendant JENKINS BROS. demands judgment over and
against co-Defendants on its cross-claim for the amount of any judgment or verdict which may be
obtained herein by the Plaintiffs against this Defendant, together with costs and disbursements of
this action, plus any and all attorney’s fees, costs of investigation and disbursements.
Dated: NEW YORK, NEW YORK
2014
Yours, etc.
McGIVNEY & KLUGER, P.C.
Attorneys for, fendant
J KINSB 8.7 4
Z
By:
RA B. HO! IAN, ESQ
0 Broad Street, Floor
New York, N ork 10004
212.509.3456
(2979-0023)
TO: WEITZ & LUXENBERG, P.C.
700 Broadway
New York, New York 10003
212.558.5500
{N0359228-1}
ATTORNEY’S VERIFICATION
STATE OF NEW YORK )
2 SS:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
LAURA B. HOLLMAN, ESQ., being duly sworn, deposes and says that I am a
member of the law firm of McGivney & Kluger, P.C., that I have read the foregoing Verified
Answer to Plaintiff's Supplemental and Amended Verified Complaint by JENKINS BROS.,
and know the contents thereof, and that the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to
matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I
believe them to be true. Defendant is a dissolved and liquidated corporation and the sources of
my information are documents and catalogs of the defendant. The reason this verification is
made by deponent and not by defendant is because defendant is a dissolved and liquidated
corporation.
Dated: New York, New York
3 » 2014
4+)
Qs
NN
a
LAURA B. HOLLMAN, ESS
{N0359228-1}
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~3
~~ day of Vee 2014, a copy of the foregoing
Answer of JENKINS BROS. to Supplemental Summons and Amended Verified Answer to
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint was filed electronically this day and is available for viewing from the
Court’s ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to all counsel of record via the court’s ECF
system.
Wo
Marilyn Mercado
{N0359228-1}
Index No.: 190004/14
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK X
CAROL LATORRE, as Administratrix for the Estate of BASIL J. LATORRE and CAROL
LATORRE, Individually,
Plaintiffs,
- against -
A.O. SMITH WATER PRODUCTS CO., et al,
Defendants,
VERIFIED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENTAL SUMMONS AND AMENDED
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Attorneys for Defendant:
JENKINS BROS.
McGIVNEY & KLUGER, P.C
COUNSELORS AT LAW
80 Broad Street, 23" Floor
New York, New York 10004
(212) 509-3456
{N0359228-1}
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incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the
tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in
accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the
prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is
simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of
sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.
Ruling
DALILAH VILLALOBOS, ET AL. VS FINAL TOUCH CONSTRUCTION & DESIGN, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 |
20STCV40002
Case Number:
20STCV40002
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
28
Having set an order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement), the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2020, Plaintiffs Dalilah Villalobos, by and through her guardian ad litem Laura Eggleston, and Catalina Villalobos, by and through her guardian ad litem Maria Dominguez, filed this action against Defendants Final Touch Construction & Design, Luis Anthony Echeverria, Luis M. Echeverria, Chantra Sun, Lorraine Garcia, Gus Garcia, and Does 1-50 for wrongful death (motor vehicle negligence).
On October 20, 2020, the Court appointed Laura Eggleston to serve as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff Dalilah Villalobos.
On October 29, 2020, the Court appointed Maria Dominguez to serve as guardian ad litem for Catalina Villalobos.
On May 6, 2022, Defendants and Cross-Complainants
Final Touch Construction & Design, Luis Anthony Echeverria, and Luis M. Echeverria
filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Roes 1-25 for equitable/implied indemnity, apportionment and contribution, and declaratory relief.
On May 31, 2022, Defendant Chantra Sun filed an answer.
In addition, Cross-Complainant Chantra Sun, individually and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Katrina Ariana Wilkins-Sun, filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants
Final Touch Construction & Design, Luis Anthony Echeverria, Luis M. Echeverria, and Roes 1-100 for
negligence, wrongful death and survival action damages, equitable/implied indemnity, comparative contribution, apportionment, and tort of another.
On November 29, 2022 and January 4, 2023, the Court dismissed Defendants Lorraine Garcia and Gus Garcia without prejudice at Plaintiffs request.
On June 14, 2023, Cross-Complainant Chantra Sun filed a notice of unconditional settlement of the entire case on June 5, 2023.
On August 28, 2023, Plaintiffs counsel asked the Court for additional time to submit petitions for approval of minors compromises.
In response, the Court set an order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement) and a status conference re: filing of a petition to approve minors compromise for November 28, 2023.
On November 28, 2023, Plaintiffs counsel asked the Court for a continuance to finish negotiations on the Medi-Cal lien and to file petitions to approve minors compromises.
The Court continued the order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement) and the status conference re: filing of a petition to approve minor's compromise to March 8, 2024.
On March 8, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel did not appear, contact the Court to explain the non-appearance, file a petition to approve minors compromise, or submit a declaration showing good cause.
The Court continued the order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement) and status conference re: filing of a petition to approve minor's compromise to April 24, 2024 and ordered counsel to file a declaration at least two court days before April 24, 2024 regarding the status of the petitions and counsel's failure to appear.
On April 22, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a declaration stating his failure to appear at the March 8, 2024 hearing was due to mistake, inadvertence and/or excusable neglect.
Counsel stated: (1) the matter had settled, (2) he was filing petitions to approve minors compromises, and (3) he had reserved hearings on the petitions for May 21, 2024.
Counsel asked the Court to continue the order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement) and status conference re: filing of a petition to approve minor's compromise for 90 days.
On April 24, 2024, the Court continued the order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement) and status conference re: filing of a petition to approve minor's compromise to May 28, 2024.
The Court ordered that the hearings on petitions to confirm minors compromise reserved for May 28, 2024 were to go forward and moving papers were to be filed timely.
On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a declaration stating that he did not file the petitions to approve minors compromise timely because
"the guardian ad litems were still selecting the annuity structure for the respective claimants" and counsel was still waiting for fully executed annuity documents.
On
May 28, 2024
, the Court continued the order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement) and status conference re: filing of a petition to approve minor's compromise to July 10, 2024.
Plaintiffs have not filed petitions to approve minors compromises and have not submitted a new declaration showing good cause why the Court should not dismiss the action.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410 provides:
(a) The court may in its discretion dismiss an action for delay in prosecution pursuant to this article on its own motion or on motion of the defendant if to do so appears to the court appropriate under the circumstances of the case.
(b) Dismissal shall be pursuant to the procedure and in accordance with the criteria prescribed by rules adopted by the Judicial Council.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 583.410.)
A discretionary dismissal under [Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410] (or for other delay in prosecution) is without prejudice to renewed litigation.
(L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 11:190.2, p. 11-83.)
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385, provides in part:
(b) Dismissal of case
Except as provided in (c) or (d), each plaintiff or other party seeking affirmative relief must serve and file a request for dismissal of the entire case within 45 days after the date of settlement of the case. If the plaintiff or other party required to serve and file the request for dismissal does not do so, the court must dismiss the entire case 45 days after it receives notice of settlement unless good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.
* * *
(d) Compromise of claims of a minor or disabled person
If the settlement of the case involves the compromise of the claim of a minor or person with a disability, the court must not hold an order to show cause hearing under (b) before the court has held a hearing to approve the settlement, provided the parties have filed appropriate papers to seek court approval of the settlement.
(e) Request for additional time to complete settlement
If a party who has served and filed a notice of settlement under (a) determines that the case cannot be dismissed within the prescribed 45 days, that party must serve and file a notice and a supporting declaration advising the court of that party's inability to dismiss the case within the prescribed time, showing good cause for its inability to do so, and proposing an alternative date for dismissal. The notice and a supporting declaration must be served and filed at least 5 court days before the time for requesting dismissal has elapsed. If good cause is shown, the court must continue the matter to allow additional time to complete the settlement. The court may take such other actions as may be appropriate for the proper management and disposition of the case.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1385, subds. (b), (d), (e).)
DISCUSSION
As noted, on June 14, 2023, Cross-Complainant Chantra Sun filed a notice of unconditional settlement of the entire case.
On August 28, 2023, Plaintiffs counsel confirmed the settlement by asking the Court for additional time to submit petitions to approve minors compromises.
The Court granted the continuance request and granted counsels subsequent continuance requests on November 28, 2023, April 24, 2024, and May 28, 2024.
It is now more than one year after the parties settled the case.
Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(b), except as provided in subdivisions (c) or (d), the Court must dismiss the entire case 45 days after it receives notice of settlement unless good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(b).)
Subdivision (c) of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385, applies only to conditional settlements.
The notice of settlement here states the settlement was unconditional.
Therefore, subdivision (c) does not apply here.
Subdivision (d) of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385, states that [i]f the settlement of the case involves the compromise of the claim of a minor or person with a disability, the court must not hold an order to show cause hearing under (b) before the court has held a hearing to approve the settlement,
provided the parties have filed appropriate papers to seek court approval of the settlement
.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(d), emphasis added.)
Here, Plaintiffs have not filed appropriate papers to seek Court approval of the settlement.
Therefore, subdivision (d) does not prevent the Court from holding an order to show cause hearing.
The Court set the July 10, 2024 order to show cause hearing on May 28, 2024.
Plaintiffs have submitted no papers since May 28, 2024 demonstrating good cause why the case should not be dismissed.
The Court dismisses the case
under
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(b).
CONCLUSION
Having issued an order to show cause re: dismissal (settlement) on May 28, 2024, and no good cause having been shown, the Court dismisses the case without prejudice
under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(b).
The Court will give notice of this ruling.
Ruling
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY VS OLUTOYIN OLA TOMAKILI, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 |
Echo Dawn Ryan |
19STLC05734
Case Number:
19STLC05734
Hearing Date:
July 11, 2024
Dept:
26
State Farm v. Tomakili, et al.
MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL AND ENTER JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO STIPULATION
(CCP § 664.6)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR AND AGAINST DEFENDANT OLUTOYIN OLA TOMAKILI IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,300.00 PRINCIPAL, PLUS $500.00 IN COSTS.
ANALYSIS:
On June 14, 2019, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed this subrogation action against Defendant Olutoyin Ola Tomakili (Defendant). Defendant filed an answer on August 16, 2019. On October 26, 2022,
Plaintiff filed a copy of the parties settlement agreement with a request for dismissal and retention of jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. The Court dismissed the action pursuant to the stipulation on November 15, 2022. (Order for Dismissal, 11/15/22.)
On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Vacate Dismissal, Enforce Settlement, and Enter Judgment. To date, no opposition has been filed.
Legal Standard
The instant motion is brought under Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6, which states in relevant part:
If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).) Prior to January 1, 2021, parties under section 664.6 meant the litigants themselves, not their attorneys.
(
Levy v. Superior Court
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586.) The current statute provides that parties includes an attorney who represents the party and an insurers agent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (b).) The settlement must include the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement, and against whom enforcement is sought. (
J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.) The settlement agreement complies with the statutory requirements set forth above because it was signed by both parties and their attorneys. (Motion, Reese Decl., Exh. A, pp. 2-3.)
Furthermore, the request for retention of jurisdiction must be made in writing, by the parties, before the action is dismissed for the Courts retention of jurisdiction to conform to the statutory language. (
Wackeen v. Malis
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 433 [If, after a suit has been dismissed, a party brings a section 664.6 motion for a judgment on a settlement agreement but cannot present to the court a request for retention of jurisdiction that meets all of these requirements, then enforcement of the agreement must be left to a separate lawsuit.].)
The parties request for retention of jurisdiction complies with these requirements because it was made in writing to the Court before the action was dismissed. (Motion, Reese Decl., Exh. A, ¶3.)
The settlement provides that Defendant would pay Plaintiff $12,400.00 through an initial payment from Defendants insurer of $10,000.0, followed by Defendants monthly payments starting on September 1, 2022. (
Id
. at Exh. A, ¶2.) The settlement agreement also provides that upon Defendants default, Plaintiff may seek judgment in the settlement amount, plus costs not to exceed $500.00, less any monies paid. (
Id
. at ¶3.) Payments of $11,100.00 were made towards the settlement, after which Defendant defaulted. (
Id
. at ¶¶4-5 and Exh. C.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment against Defendant in the amount of $1,300.00 principal ($12,400.00 - $11,100.00) plus costs of $500.00. (
Id
. at ¶8.)
Conclusion
Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR AND AGAINST DEFENDANT OLUTOYIN OLA TOMAKILI IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,300.00 PRINCIPAL, PLUS $500.00 IN COSTS.
Moving party to give notice.