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HACKLER DAGHIGHIAN MARTINO & NOVAK, P.C.
Sepehr Daghighian (SBN 239349)
10250 Constellation Blvd., Suite 2500 FILED
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Los Angeles, CA 90067 Superior Court of Cal
Telephone: (310) 887-1333
County of Placer rm®
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Facsimile: (310) 887-1334 DEC 27 2019
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Email: sd@hdmnlaw.com Jake
tone
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Officer
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& Clerk
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Attorneys for Plaintiff, Deputy
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ANNA P. KING
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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COUNTY OF PLACER
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ANNA P. KING, Case No.: SCV0038637
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Plaintiff, PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY TO
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO
vs. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
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AND COSTS AND EXPENSES
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HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, INC., a Date: January 3, 2020
California Corporation; and DOES 1 through Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept. 31
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10, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiffs’
Reply BriefIn Support of Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
I. INTRODUCTION
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Instead of repurchasing Ms. King’s defective 2010 Hyundai Tucson knowing that Plaintiff
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had presented the vehicle to an HMA authorized dealership at least four (4) times for electrical
issues that could not be fixed, HMA hoped to fleece even more California consumers
BF
out of her
hard-earned money by denying her request and forcing her to seek legal action. As a matter of
DW
fact, every dollar in attorney’s fees incurred in this matter — including the Defendant’s attorney’s
fees — could and should have been avoided by HMA. Instead HMA steadfastly held firm and
ON
continued to double-down on itstactic of bullying Ms. King into submission, after HMA had
knowingly violated the Song-Beverly Act. HMA’s calculations were proven wrong.
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HMA contends that just because it served an offer to compromise early in the litigation,
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Plaintiff should have been happy with the offer and accepted it. However, its logic is misplaced
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and contrary to caselaw. As in every case they defend, HMA’s attorneys strung this litigation
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out.
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Finally, while HMA spends pages hurling ad hominem attacks at Plaintiff's counsel, HMA
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only specifically identifies only a handful of time entries that it challenges. (Opp. Brief 9:3-
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11.) HMA’s silence with respect to the hundreds of other time entries speaks volumes.
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Furthermore, HMA’s failure to address these entries is tantamount to a concession — HMA
mOHeNI
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concedes that the bulk of counsel’s time entries are fair and legitimate. (See, e.g., Tiernan v.
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Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4 (issues not raised
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HK
are deemed waived)).
CO
NO
Now, HMA must be ordered to compensate Plaintiff's counsel for the fees and costs
KY
NN
incurred in securing a victory for them over a multi-national corporation and righting a wrong
ND
WN
that occurred when HMA knowingly violated the Song-Beverly Act. Furthermore, HMA’s
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continued obstinate actions demonstrate why a Lodestar multiplier is warranted.
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Plaintiffs’
Reply Brief InSupport of Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
II. ARGUMENT
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A. Without Presenting Any Evidence, Defendant Fails to Rebut the Presumption of
Credibility Given to Plaintiffs’ Fee Bill
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A verified fee bill is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed
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were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) A declaration
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attesting to the accuracy of the fee bill is presumption
entitled to a of credibility. (Horsford v.
no
Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 (holding that
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the “time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the
absence of a clear indication that the records are erroneous”)). Under California law, ifa
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prevailing party presents an itemized fee bill, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make
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specific objections to particular time entries. (McGrath v. County of Nevada (1995) 67 F.3d 248,
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255 (a fee opponent “bears the burden of providing specific evidence to challenge the accuracy
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and reasonableness of the hours charged”).) Defendant has the burden of showing that the
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requested hours are duplicative, excessive or unnecessary. (See Gates v. Rowland, (9th Cir.
F&F
Ee
1994) 39 F.3d 1439, 1449.) Failure to submit evidence on any specific aspect of a fee claim
no
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results in waiver of any objection. (Blum v.Stenson (1984) 465 U.S. 886, 892, fn. 5 [emphasis
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added].) Here, Plaintiffs submitted itemized fee bills and declarations attesting to their accuracy,
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with just a few exceptions listed below and discussed by Defendant. Those fee billsare entitled
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to_a
presumption of reasonableness, and the burden shifts to Defendant to rebut it with
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evidence. In response, rather than carry its burden and offer evidence disputing Plaintiffs’
TD
NO
showing, Defendant incorrectly triesto place the burden on Plaintiffs. Defendant has failed to
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submit any evidence that Plaintiffs’ fees were not incurred or were not reasonably.
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The facts undercut HMA’s argument that this was a “straightforward lemon law case” or
WN
NO
that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s staffing was at all unreasonable. With a few exceptions addressed
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NO
below, HMA fails to show any billing entry that was unnecessary or duplicative as a result
AN
NY
of Plaintiffs’ administration and staffing.
DO
NO
As to the specific entries that Defendant addresses:
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oN
NO
2
Plaintiffs’
Reply Brief InSupport of Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs
1. $6,875 billed by Kevin Jacobson relating to the time entries between June 10-12, 2019 for
Plaintiff's Motions in Limine and trial related documents. Plaintiff concedes that as a result of
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system error, these entries were inadvertently included twice in Plaintiff's fee bill. Plaintiff was
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not attempting to “get one over HMA and thisCourt.”
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2. $26,950 billed by Kevin Jacobson relating to the time entries between June 30-July 7,
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2019 for trialattendance and travel. Plaintiff concedes that as a result of system error, these entries
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were inadvertently included twice in Plaintiff's fee bill. Again, Plaintiff was not attempting to
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“get one over HMA and this Court.”
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3. All time associated with trialattendance (113.5 hours, $31,212.5) Defendant HMA spends
a bulk of itsmotion attacking Mr. Jacobson’s work on this case and knowingly liesto this Court
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by claiming that his work was limited to “operating acomputer for visual representations and aids
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during the trial.”(Defendant’s Opposition at 10:1-8.) First, Mr. Jacobson was involved in allof
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the pretrial litigation aspects of this case and his presence was necessary to provide insights as
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the facts of this case. Second, Mr. Jacobson’s trialtime was spent preparing exam questions and
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preparing trialgraphics. Furthermore, Mr. Jacobson defended the deposition of Ms. King during
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A
the trial.All of the time expended by Mr. Jacobson at trialwas necessary
DBD
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4. $7,975.00 for the time spent preparing Plaintiff's motion for Attorneys fees, reviewing the
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Opposition Brief, drafting this reply, and attending the hearing on this Motion. First, HMA falsely
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appears to believe that Plaintiff's counsel’s time spent replying to itsOpposition and attending
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the associated hearing is neither reasonable nor necessary. This is the extent to which HMA will
NO
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go intrying tocut down Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, and the Court should conclude otherwise. With
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NO
respect to SD’s presence at the hearing on this motion, itwould be impossible for Plaintiff's
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NO
counsel to account for the time spent attending the hearing without labelling itas “anticipated.”
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5. Quarter- BillingHour
Increments
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HMA also takes issue with HDMN’s practice of billing in quarter-hour increments.
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NO
However, while quarter-hour billing might not be the industry standard, it is by no means
DB
NO
impermissible, as HMA seems to imply. In fact, Courts have held charging for time in quarter-
NO
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hour increments excessive.
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Plaintiffs’
Reply Brief In Supportof Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs
Courts have held that a reduction for billing in quarter-hour increments should only occur
when there is evidence the practice “pose(s) a threat of over-billing.” Foundation v. Office of
monn NO
Director of Nat. Intelligence, 2008 WL 2331959 *6 (ND. Cal. 2008). Courts have also held the
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practice should be rejected only where there isa showing that the billed time was not an accurate
F&F
reflection of the time actually expended. Davis v. Perry, 991 F.Supp.2d 809, 838 (W.D. Tex.
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2014). If the practice is not “widespread and excessive”, no reduction or a small, five percent
reduction is appropriate. Foundation, supra at *6 (no reduction required); O'Bannon, supra, at
833 (small five percent reduction upheld).
Further, the California State Bar has issued an advisory opinion on the topic, stating that
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the Court may consider “the terms of the written fee agreement, the frequency with which
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apparent minimum billing entries appeared on the bill, and whether the lawyer was judicious in
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not employing the high minimum billing entries for brief activities either by (1) not recording
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such activities, (2) aggregating them with other related activities, or (3) “no charged” the entry.
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Arbitration Advisory 2016-02, p. 8.
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C. Defendant Fails to Rebut the Reasonableness Plaintiff's Hourly Rates
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True to form, Defendant has not provided any actualevidence suggesting the requested hourly
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rates are improper, and instead requests the Court to arbitrarily lower Plaintiff's counsel’s rates
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without any analysis whatsoever. Once again, Defendant’s counsel simply opines that they feel
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the rates are too high. However, Defendant fails to present this Court with any evidentiary
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basis upon which make any reductions to the rates or the billing entries. Plaintiffs have provided
OD
NO
ample evidence to support the rates. Indeed, in a published opinion from late 2016, a rate of
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NO
$575/hour was deemed reasonable for a 15-year lemon law attorney in San Diego. (Goglin, supra,
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NO
4 Cal.App.5th at 473-474.)
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NO
HMA also argues Plaintiffs’ other evidence, such as the summary of rates charged by other
F&F
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California lemon law attorneys and the various prior orders confirming Plaintiffs’ counsels’ rates
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HN
are reasonable, are not probative evidence. The United States Supreme Court, however, disagrees
Aa
NH
with HMA, and has stated “awards in similar cases” is one of twelve possible factors to be
NO
on
considered when determining an appropriate hourly rate. (Hensley v.Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S.
NO
4
Plaintiffs’
Reply Brief InSupport of Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs
424, 429-430.) “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees
in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the
NO
plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.’” (United Steelworkers
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of Am. v.Phelps Dodge Corp. (1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Likewise, in both Goglin and Graciano,
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declarations from counsel were probative of the prevailing hourly rates. (Goglin, supra, 4
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Cal.App.5th at 473-74; Graciano, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at 156.) Here, Defendant does not
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provide itsown billing rates,let alone actual contrary evidence to establish the reasonable billing
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rate. In the absence of such evidence, itsarguments should be afforded no weight by the Court.
While HMA challenges the propriety of the hourly rates charged by Plaintiff's counsel,
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HMA offers no evidence whatsoever that the hourly rates are excessive or fall outside of the
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industry standard. Notwithstanding HMA hyperbolic arguments, the evidence
lack of supplied
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by HMA should be viewed by the Court as a concession that Plaintiff's counsel’s rates are
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appropriate and should be paid.
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D. Plaintiff's Attorneys’ Time isReasonable and Necessary
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HMA rather audaciously claims that this litigation was unnecessary and unproductive;
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despite the excellent result in the end. Plaintiff's counsel’s fees were reasonably and necessarily
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incurred to achieve that result. HMA’s conduct was in fact the very reason Plaintiff was forced to
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prepare this matter for trial.
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E. A Lodestar Multiplier isWarranted.
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A contingent fee contract, since it involves a gamble on the result, may properly provide
ODO
N
for a larger compensation than would otherwise be reasonable. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
NN
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Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for contingent
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risk is to bring the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important rights into line with
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incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-services basis. (/bid.)
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The contingent nature of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s representation is reason enough to grant a
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lodestar multiplier. A \odestar multiplier is intended to take into account the delay in
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compensation and to “compensate the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the
NO
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loan of those services.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk
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Plaintiffs’
Reply Brief InSupport of Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs
of not being paid and provides legal services isnot receiving the fair market value of his work if
he ispaid only for the second of these functions.” (/d. at 1133.)
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As far as delay, nearly three years have passed since the filing of this action, and
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Plaintiff's counsel has not been compensated anything, while having paid out tens of
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thousands of dollars on Ms. King’s behalf. By not awarding a multiplier, the regular lodestar
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rate fails totake into account the loan of Plaintiffs attorneys’ time to this
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case.
Plaintiff's counsel shouldered the risk of litigating against a multi-billon dollar company
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that was represented by an international law firm. Yet, remarkably, Defendant issuggesting that
Plaintiffs’ counsel should have accepted
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a vague low-ball settlement in order to secure attorney’s
fees for themselves. Defendant’s suggestion istroubling, as recommending acceptance of a bad
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settlement offer for such self-serving reasons could be construed as a breach of Plaintiffs’
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counsel’s fiduciary duty.
NO
F. Court Orders Provide A Sampling of Similarly Reasonable Fee Awards
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HMA takes issue with Plaintiff’s references to court orders that show when this Court and
BP
other courts have deemed Plaintiffs’ fees reasonable. While Plaintiffs recognize this Court is
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under no specific obligation, these orders provide a sampling of instances when similar fees have
DB
been awarded as reasonable. Additionally, they are indicative of the various courts’
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determinations of similarly reasonable fees over a longer arc of time, which further places
Plaintiffs’ request in context. Despite HMA’s claims, Plaintiffs have not violated his duty of
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candor to the court—including every court order in an exhaustive listwould be highly impractical
OD
NO
and unnecessary.
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Ill. CONCLUSION
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In summary, HMA’s Opposition Brief fails to specifically challenge all but a few of
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counsel’s billing entries, some of which Plaintiff has withdrawn in the amount of $33,825.00.
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Thus, HMA essentially concedes the reasonableness of counsel’s bill.Here, HMA could and
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should have avoided all of the fees incurred in this case. Instead, time and time again, HMA
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NO
doubled down on itsbullying litigation tactics. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this
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orn
Honorable Court award attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, including a 1.5 lodestar multiplier,
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Plaintiffs’
Reply BriefIn Support ofMotion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs
as follows:
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Lodestar Fees Requested: $91,700.00
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—Less Duplicative Entries: ._——————s$33,825.00
Total Lodestar Fees: $57,875.00
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+Lodestar
Enhancement: S28, 937.50
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Total Fees Requested: $86,812.50
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Dated: December 27, 2019
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ANNA P. KING
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Plaintiffs’
Reply Brief In Support ofMotion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs
PROOF OF SERVICE
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
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and not a party to the within action. My business address is 10900 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 300, Los
Angeles 90024.
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On December 27, 2019, I served the foregoing document described as:
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS AND EXPENSES
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That document was served on parties herein in thisproceeding by placing true copies of the original
in enclosed, sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows:
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THETA LAW FIRM, LLP
Sohey] Tahsildoost, Esq.
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15901 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 270
Lawndale, CA 90260
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PFelhUh
[](BY MAIL) Iam “readily familiar” with the practices of HACKLER DAGHIGHIAN
NY
MARTINO & NOVAK, P.C., in collecting and processing correspondence and documents for
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mailing. Under that practice, documents for mailing would be deposited with the US Postal
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OF
Service on that same day this affidavit issigned with postage fully prepaid at Los Angeles,
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California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served,
HF
service ispresumed invalid ifthe postal cancellation date is more than 1-day after the day of
deposit for mailing the affidavit. [CCP § 1013]
KF
DA
HF
[X] (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am “readily familiar” with the practices of the HACKLER
DAGHIGHIAN MARTINO & NOVAK, P.C., for collection and processing of documents for
HF
DWN
mailing via overnight delivery. Icaused such document(s) to be placed in a sealed envelope
designated by the overnight service carrier, addressed to the person(s) on whom it isto be served
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pursuant to the attached service list,and deposited said envelope in a box or other facility
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regularly maintained by the overnight service carrier with delivery fees paid or provided for.
HF
[CCP § 1013(c)]
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NO
[X] (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) I caused the document(s) to be transmitted by electronic mail
to the e-mail addresses for each party indicated on the attached service list.
NO
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[] (BY PERSONAL DELIVERY) I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand to the
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addressee at the address indicated on the attached service list.
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NH
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
true and correct.
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Executed on December 27, 2019.
Bo
HNO
/s/\jeoma Chima
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Ijeoma Chima
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SERVICE LIST
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PROOF OF SERVICE
Counsel for Plaintiff
KNIGHT LAW GROouP LLP
NYO
Steve Mikhov, Esq.
10250 Constellation Blvd., Suite 23500
WY
Los Angeles, CA 90036
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THETA LAW FIRM, LLP Counsel for Defendant:
Soheyl Tahsildoost, Esq.
Dn
15901 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 270
Lawndale, CA 90260
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PROOF OF SERVICE
Preview
HACKLER DAGHIGHIAN MARTINO & NOVAK, P.C. Sepehr Daghighian (SBN 239349) 10250 Constellation Blvd., Suite 2500 FILED NYO Los Angeles, CA 90067 Superior Court of Cal Telephone: (310) 887-1333 County of Placer rm® WY Facsimile: (310) 887-1334 DEC 27 2019 FF Email: sd@hdmnlaw.com Jake tone Chatters Officer Un & Clerk oO. Lucatuorto, Attorneys for Plaintiff, Deputy Dn ANNA P. KING nNnN SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA mH COUNTY OF PLACER Co CO ANNA P. KING, Case No.: SCV0038637 KF me Plaintiff, PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY TO NYO DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO vs. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES mm W AND COSTS AND EXPENSES FP HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, INC., a Date: January 3, 2020 California Corporation; and DOES 1 through Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 31 Dn 10, inclusive, NI Defendants. OH ee DOD NO KF& NH Ne NO Ww NO fF NO nA NO Dn NO NO on BO Plaintiffs’ Reply BriefIn Support of Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs I. INTRODUCTION we Instead of repurchasing Ms. King’s defective 2010 Hyundai Tucson knowing that Plaintiff Ww had presented the vehicle to an HMA authorized dealership at least four (4) times for electrical issues that could not be fixed, HMA hoped to fleece even more California consumers BF out of her hard-earned money by denying her request and forcing her to seek legal action. As a matter of DW fact, every dollar in attorney’s fees incurred in this matter — including the Defendant’s attorney’s fees — could and should have been avoided by HMA. Instead HMA steadfastly held firm and ON continued to double-down on itstactic of bullying Ms. King into submission, after HMA had knowingly violated the Song-Beverly Act. HMA’s calculations were proven wrong. C0 HMA contends that just because it served an offer to compromise early in the litigation, OC Plaintiff should have been happy with the offer and accepted it. However, its logic is misplaced =| KF and contrary to caselaw. As in every case they defend, HMA’s attorneys strung this litigation NYO SF out. WYO KF Finally, while HMA spends pages hurling ad hominem attacks at Plaintiff's counsel, HMA FF HF only specifically identifies only a handful of time entries that it challenges. (Opp. Brief 9:3- KF a 11.) HMA’s silence with respect to the hundreds of other time entries speaks volumes. Dn HF Furthermore, HMA’s failure to address these entries is tantamount to a concession — HMA mOHeNI HF concedes that the bulk of counsel’s time entries are fair and legitimate. (See, e.g., Tiernan v. HH Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4 (issues not raised UO HK are deemed waived)). CO NO Now, HMA must be ordered to compensate Plaintiff's counsel for the fees and costs KY NN incurred in securing a victory for them over a multi-national corporation and righting a wrong ND WN that occurred when HMA knowingly violated the Song-Beverly Act. Furthermore, HMA’s NH continued obstinate actions demonstrate why a Lodestar multiplier is warranted. SF ND // NW NH M1 DBO HN /// NO oN Mf ON 1 Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief InSupport of Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs II. ARGUMENT NO A. Without Presenting Any Evidence, Defendant Fails to Rebut the Presumption of Credibility Given to Plaintiffs’ Fee Bill W A verified fee bill is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed F&- were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) A declaration nA attesting to the accuracy of the fee bill is presumption entitled to a of credibility. (Horsford v. no Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 (holding that mon the “time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication that the records are erroneous”)). Under California law, ifa Co prevailing party presents an itemized fee bill, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make CO specific objections to particular time entries. (McGrath v. County of Nevada (1995) 67 F.3d 248, | | 255 (a fee opponent “bears the burden of providing specific evidence to challenge the accuracy NY Eee and reasonableness of the hours charged”).) Defendant has the burden of showing that the Ww requested hours are duplicative, excessive or unnecessary. (See Gates v. Rowland, (9th Cir. F&F Ee 1994) 39 F.3d 1439, 1449.) Failure to submit evidence on any specific aspect of a fee claim no Fe results in waiver of any objection. (Blum v.Stenson (1984) 465 U.S. 886, 892, fn. 5 [emphasis Dn He added].) Here, Plaintiffs submitted itemized fee bills and declarations attesting to their accuracy, wOoONH He with just a few exceptions listed below and discussed by Defendant. Those fee billsare entitled He to_a presumption of reasonableness, and the burden shifts to Defendant to rebut it with Oo HH evidence. In response, rather than carry its burden and offer evidence disputing Plaintiffs’ TD NO showing, Defendant incorrectly triesto place the burden on Plaintiffs. Defendant has failed to K§ NN submit any evidence that Plaintiffs’ fees were not incurred or were not reasonably. NN The facts undercut HMA’s argument that this was a “straightforward lemon law case” or WN NO that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s staffing was at all unreasonable. With a few exceptions addressed FP NO below, HMA fails to show any billing entry that was unnecessary or duplicative as a result AN NY of Plaintiffs’ administration and staffing. DO NO As to the specific entries that Defendant addresses: NO oN NO 2 Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief InSupport of Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs 1. $6,875 billed by Kevin Jacobson relating to the time entries between June 10-12, 2019 for Plaintiff's Motions in Limine and trial related documents. Plaintiff concedes that as a result of NYO system error, these entries were inadvertently included twice in Plaintiff's fee bill. Plaintiff was WY not attempting to “get one over HMA and thisCourt.” -&- 2. $26,950 billed by Kevin Jacobson relating to the time entries between June 30-July 7, nA 2019 for trialattendance and travel. Plaintiff concedes that as a result of system error, these entries Dn were inadvertently included twice in Plaintiff's fee bill. Again, Plaintiff was not attempting to n “get one over HMA and this Court.” own 3. All time associated with trialattendance (113.5 hours, $31,212.5) Defendant HMA spends a bulk of itsmotion attacking Mr. Jacobson’s work on this case and knowingly liesto this Court O&O hl by claiming that his work was limited to “operating acomputer for visual representations and aids ES FF during the trial.”(Defendant’s Opposition at 10:1-8.) First, Mr. Jacobson was involved in allof NY Pr the pretrial litigation aspects of this case and his presence was necessary to provide insights as FO Ww the facts of this case. Second, Mr. Jacobson’s trialtime was spent preparing exam questions and F&F KF preparing trialgraphics. Furthermore, Mr. Jacobson defended the deposition of Ms. King during KF A the trial.All of the time expended by Mr. Jacobson at trialwas necessary DBD KF 4. $7,975.00 for the time spent preparing Plaintiff's motion for Attorneys fees, reviewing the KF HN Opposition Brief, drafting this reply, and attending the hearing on this Motion. First, HMA falsely HF appears to believe that Plaintiff's counsel’s time spent replying to itsOpposition and attending BO KF the associated hearing is neither reasonable nor necessary. This is the extent to which HMA will NO CO go intrying tocut down Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, and the Court should conclude otherwise. With KF NO respect to SD’s presence at the hearing on this motion, itwould be impossible for Plaintiff's Ne NO counsel to account for the time spent attending the hearing without labelling itas “anticipated.” Ww NY 5. Quarter- BillingHour Increments F&F NHN HMA also takes issue with HDMN’s practice of billing in quarter-hour increments. nA NO However, while quarter-hour billing might not be the industry standard, it is by no means DB NO impermissible, as HMA seems to imply. In fact, Courts have held charging for time in quarter- NO oN hour increments excessive. isnot wo 3 Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief In Supportof Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs Courts have held that a reduction for billing in quarter-hour increments should only occur when there is evidence the practice “pose(s) a threat of over-billing.” Foundation v. Office of monn NO Director of Nat. Intelligence, 2008 WL 2331959 *6 (ND. Cal. 2008). Courts have also held the WY practice should be rejected only where there isa showing that the billed time was not an accurate F&F reflection of the time actually expended. Davis v. Perry, 991 F.Supp.2d 809, 838 (W.D. Tex. nA 2014). If the practice is not “widespread and excessive”, no reduction or a small, five percent reduction is appropriate. Foundation, supra at *6 (no reduction required); O'Bannon, supra, at 833 (small five percent reduction upheld). Further, the California State Bar has issued an advisory opinion on the topic, stating that Co the Court may consider “the terms of the written fee agreement, the frequency with which CO hl apparent minimum billing entries appeared on the bill, and whether the lawyer was judicious in | OES not employing the high minimum billing entries for brief activities either by (1) not recording NY OSE such activities, (2) aggregating them with other related activities, or (3) “no charged” the entry. W OOF Arbitration Advisory 2016-02, p. 8. FF FE C. Defendant Fails to Rebut the Reasonableness Plaintiff's Hourly Rates A KF True to form, Defendant has not provided any actualevidence suggesting the requested hourly DBD KF rates are improper, and instead requests the Court to arbitrarily lower Plaintiff's counsel’s rates NI KF without any analysis whatsoever. Once again, Defendant’s counsel simply opines that they feel fH KF the rates are too high. However, Defendant fails to present this Court with any evidentiary Oo Fe basis upon which make any reductions to the rates or the billing entries. Plaintiffs have provided OD NO ample evidence to support the rates. Indeed, in a published opinion from late 2016, a rate of KF NO $575/hour was deemed reasonable for a 15-year lemon law attorney in San Diego. (Goglin, supra, NY NO 4 Cal.App.5th at 473-474.) WY NO HMA also argues Plaintiffs’ other evidence, such as the summary of rates charged by other F&F NO California lemon law attorneys and the various prior orders confirming Plaintiffs’ counsels’ rates nA HN are reasonable, are not probative evidence. The United States Supreme Court, however, disagrees Aa NH with HMA, and has stated “awards in similar cases” is one of twelve possible factors to be NO on considered when determining an appropriate hourly rate. (Hensley v.Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. NO 4 Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief InSupport of Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs 424, 429-430.) “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the NO plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.’” (United Steelworkers WY of Am. v.Phelps Dodge Corp. (1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Likewise, in both Goglin and Graciano, FF declarations from counsel were probative of the prevailing hourly rates. (Goglin, supra, 4 nO Cal.App.5th at 473-74; Graciano, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at 156.) Here, Defendant does not Dn provide itsown billing rates,let alone actual contrary evidence to establish the reasonable billing ON rate. In the absence of such evidence, itsarguments should be afforded no weight by the Court. While HMA challenges the propriety of the hourly rates charged by Plaintiff's counsel, So HMA offers no evidence whatsoever that the hourly rates are excessive or fall outside of the O&O lS industry standard. Notwithstanding HMA hyperbolic arguments, the evidence lack of supplied Sh FF by HMA should be viewed by the Court as a concession that Plaintiff's counsel’s rates are NY PF appropriate and should be paid. WY KF D. Plaintiff's Attorneys’ Time isReasonable and Necessary FF FSF HMA rather audaciously claims that this litigation was unnecessary and unproductive; FF DH despite the excellent result in the end. Plaintiff's counsel’s fees were reasonably and necessarily YF incurred to achieve that result. HMA’s conduct was in fact the very reason Plaintiff was forced to FF OWN prepare this matter for trial. FY E. A Lodestar Multiplier isWarranted. KF A contingent fee contract, since it involves a gamble on the result, may properly provide ODO N for a larger compensation than would otherwise be reasonable. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 NN KF Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for contingent N WN risk is to bring the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important rights into line with N incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-services basis. (/bid.) ek NO The contingent nature of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s representation is reason enough to grant a AN NO lodestar multiplier. A \odestar multiplier is intended to take into account the delay in DOD NO compensation and to “compensate the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the NO oN loan of those services.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk NO 5 Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief InSupport of Motion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs of not being paid and provides legal services isnot receiving the fair market value of his work if he ispaid only for the second of these functions.” (/d. at 1133.) YP As far as delay, nearly three years have passed since the filing of this action, and WY Plaintiff's counsel has not been compensated anything, while having paid out tens of FF thousands of dollars on Ms. King’s behalf. By not awarding a multiplier, the regular lodestar OH rate fails totake into account the loan of Plaintiffs attorneys’ time to this Dn case. Plaintiff's counsel shouldered the risk of litigating against a multi-billon dollar company ON that was represented by an international law firm. Yet, remarkably, Defendant issuggesting that Plaintiffs’ counsel should have accepted So a vague low-ball settlement in order to secure attorney’s fees for themselves. Defendant’s suggestion istroubling, as recommending acceptance of a bad CO ee settlement offer for such self-serving reasons could be construed as a breach of Plaintiffs’ KF ee counsel’s fiduciary duty. NO F. Court Orders Provide A Sampling of Similarly Reasonable Fee Awards WO eRe HMA takes issue with Plaintiff’s references to court orders that show when this Court and BP other courts have deemed Plaintiffs’ fees reasonable. While Plaintiffs recognize this Court is Un under no specific obligation, these orders provide a sampling of instances when similar fees have DB been awarded as reasonable. Additionally, they are indicative of the various courts’ NI eee OH determinations of similarly reasonable fees over a longer arc of time, which further places Plaintiffs’ request in context. Despite HMA’s claims, Plaintiffs have not violated his duty of DO candor to the court—including every court order in an exhaustive listwould be highly impractical OD NO and unnecessary. KF& NN Ill. CONCLUSION Ne N In summary, HMA’s Opposition Brief fails to specifically challenge all but a few of Ww NY F&F counsel’s billing entries, some of which Plaintiff has withdrawn in the amount of $33,825.00. NY Thus, HMA essentially concedes the reasonableness of counsel’s bill.Here, HMA could and On NY should have avoided all of the fees incurred in this case. Instead, time and time again, HMA Dn NO doubled down on itsbullying litigation tactics. Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this NY orn Honorable Court award attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, including a 1.5 lodestar multiplier, NO 6 Plaintiffs’ Reply BriefIn Support ofMotion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs as follows: NO Lodestar Fees Requested: $91,700.00 WY —Less Duplicative Entries: ._——————s$33,825.00 Total Lodestar Fees: $57,875.00 F&- +Lodestar Enhancement: S28, 937.50 oO Total Fees Requested: $86,812.50 Dn woman Dated: December 27, 2019 oO OC S| KF NY OF ANNA P. KING WY OF FF KF On KF DBD KF KF WON KF OO HF Oo NO KF NO Ne NO WD NH FF NH UN HNO DO NO NO oN NO 7 Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief In Support ofMotion forAttorney’s Fees and Costs PROOF OF SERVICE I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 HNO and not a party to the within action. My business address is 10900 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 300, Los Angeles 90024. WY On December 27, 2019, I served the foregoing document described as: F- Hn PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS AND EXPENSES Dn many That document was served on parties herein in thisproceeding by placing true copies of the original in enclosed, sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: oO THETA LAW FIRM, LLP Sohey] Tahsildoost, Esq. OC 15901 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 270 Lawndale, CA 90260 EES KF PFelhUh [](BY MAIL) Iam “readily familiar” with the practices of HACKLER DAGHIGHIAN NY MARTINO & NOVAK, P.C., in collecting and processing correspondence and documents for OO mailing. Under that practice, documents for mailing would be deposited with the US Postal WY OF Service on that same day this affidavit issigned with postage fully prepaid at Los Angeles, fF California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, HF service ispresumed invalid ifthe postal cancellation date is more than 1-day after the day of deposit for mailing the affidavit. [CCP § 1013] KF DA HF [X] (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am “readily familiar” with the practices of the HACKLER DAGHIGHIAN MARTINO & NOVAK, P.C., for collection and processing of documents for HF DWN mailing via overnight delivery. Icaused such document(s) to be placed in a sealed envelope designated by the overnight service carrier, addressed to the person(s) on whom it isto be served Fe pursuant to the attached service list,and deposited said envelope in a box or other facility BO regularly maintained by the overnight service carrier with delivery fees paid or provided for. HF [CCP § 1013(c)] CO NO [X] (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) I caused the document(s) to be transmitted by electronic mail to the e-mail addresses for each party indicated on the attached service list. NO KF Ne [] (BY PERSONAL DELIVERY) I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand to the ND addressee at the address indicated on the attached service list. WY NH fF NH I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. nA NH Executed on December 27, 2019. Bo HNO /s/\jeoma Chima NY Ijeoma Chima NO ~o NO SERVICE LIST - PROOF OF SERVICE Counsel for Plaintiff KNIGHT LAW GROouP LLP NYO Steve Mikhov, Esq. 10250 Constellation Blvd., Suite 23500 WY Los Angeles, CA 90036 FF nA THETA LAW FIRM, LLP Counsel for Defendant: Soheyl Tahsildoost, Esq. Dn 15901 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 270 Lawndale, CA 90260 NN Oo oo CO he KF OE NY Or WY Kr FF KF KH KF DH HF HF HN He Oo KR OD NO NN KF Ne NY Ww ND FF NO WN NO DN NO NO oN NO -9- PROOF OF SERVICE