Demurrer in PATRICK WHITE vs. SHR PALO ALTO, LLC, et al.| Trellis.Law

On July 14, 2017 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between White, Patrick, and Does 1 - 10, Inclusive, Dtrs Palo Alto, Llc, Four Seasons Hotels Limited, A Canada Corporation, Shr Palo Alto, Llc, Strategic Hotels & Resorts, Llc, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, for civil in the District Court of San Mateo County.

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BLANK ROME LLP
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Ana Tagvoryan (SBN 246536)
ATagvoryan@BlankRome.com
Safia G. Hussain (SBN 251123)
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SAN MATEO
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SHussain@BlankRome.com ,

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Harrison Brown (SBN 291503)

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\0 SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
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H PATRICK WHITE, individually and on behalf of all CASE NO. 17CIV03178
similarly situated individuals, '

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Assigned to the Honorable Judge Robert D.
Plaintiff, Foiles, Department 2]
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
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i. TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED
STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS, LLC, a '
COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT SHR
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Delaware limited liability company, FOUR PALO ALTO, LLC
SEASONS HOTELS LIMITED, a Canada
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corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Hearing Date: February 21, 2018
Time: 9:00 am.
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Defendants. Location: Department 21
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Complaint Filed: July 14, 2017
Remanded: November 8, 2017
H\o Trial Date: .Not Set
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151260.00201/106609857V.1 17CIV03178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER‘TO ‘PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COlVIPLAlNT

/
Defendant SHR Palo Alto (“SHR”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby ﬁles this

Reply in Support of its Demurrerl to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint by Plaintiff Patrick White

(“Plaintiff”).

I. INTRODUCTION; -

Plaintiff claims that SHR willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15
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U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (“FACTA”). Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support that claim, and it
1

must be dismissed as a matter of law.
Plaintiff argues in his opposition that “[m]ultiple theories support [SI-[R’s] liability under

FACTA based on the facts pled in the FAC.” (Opp. at 10.) HoWever, Plaintiff has merely lumped

SHR and Defendant Four Seasons Hotels Limited (“Four Seasons”) together through unsupported

conclusions, and does not delineate which of the “multiple theories” of liability he attributes to SHR.

If Plaintiff contends that SHR is directly liable to Plaintiff, his Amended Complaint contains no facts
suggesting that SHR could or did violate FACTA. The sole paragraph that even mentions SHR by

name alleges only that it “owns” the Hotel that “printed” the receipt at issue. Plaintiff does not

allege—and this bare allegation does not plausibly suggest—that SHR operates, manages, or

controls the operations of the Hotel or its point-of—Sale system, or that SHR played any role

whatsoever in the printing of the “receipt” at issue in this case:
And if Plaintiff contends that SHR is vicariously liable to Plaintiff, he fails to plead any facts
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demonstrating that Four Seasons has been vested with any authority by SHR to issue credit card

receipts, or that SHR authorized or ratiﬁed Four Seasons’ actions, or any speciﬁc facts to support the

claim that Four Seasons’ alleged actions should be imputed to SHR.

Even if a theory of liability and speciﬁc conduct isalleged as to SHR, Plaintiffs contention

that he has pled a claim against SHR for willful violation of FACTA under the standardintroduced

in his opposition brief fails. Plaintiffs extreme position that there isa per se willful violation any

,
1
The demurrer initially was ﬁled by both SHR and Strategic Hotels & Resorts LLC (“Strategic”).
However, Strategic was thereafter dismissed as a defendant pursuant to the January 18, 2018
Stipulation by Parties, which clariﬁed that Plaintiff’ 5 November 21, 2017 Amendment to Complaint
substituted SHR for Strategic. (See also Opp. at 1 n.1.) Accordingly, this Reply is made only by
SHR.

151260.00201/106609857V.1 l l7CIVO3178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COlVIPLAINT
time an unambiguous provision of FACTA is violated isnot the law. But even if it were, Plaintiff
has not pled that the statute is unambiguous, that his claim hinges on SHR’s’interpretation of it, or

that SHR acted knowingly or intentionally. Plaintiff thus has failed to state a claim against SHR,

and the case must be dismissed.
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II. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a Clai A ainst SHR.

i. The A ended C0 plaint Lacks Facts Supportin a Theory of Liability
As A ainst SHR.

On a demurrer, while courts must treat as true any properly pleaded factual allegations,

10 courts do not assume the truth of “contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.” Young v.

11 Gannon, 97 Cal. App. 4th 209, 220 (2002). Moreover, “facts not alleged are presumed not to exist.”

12 Kramer v. Intuit Inc., 121 Cal. App. 4th 574, 578 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

13 Stelmachers v. Verifone Sys., Inc., No. 14-04912, 2015 WL 8027902, at *3 (N .D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2015)

14 (dismissing FACTA claim where plaintiff did not provide factual allegations as to how defendant

15 served as a merchant during the transaction at issue). Plaintiff 5 Amended Complaint lumps SHR

16 and Four Seasons together but does not bother to explain which theory of liability he attributes to

17 SHR. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that SHR is directly liable to Plaintiff, the Amended

18 Complaint contains no facts suggesting that SHR violated FACTA, much less facts showing that

19 SHR willingly violated FACTA. Plaintiff offers no more than unsupported conclusions here, at best. -

20 The sole paragraph in the Amended Complaint that even mentions SHR alleges—without

21 more—that it “owns” the Hotel that printed the purportedly violative “receipt.” Although Plaintiff

22 now attempts to bolster this bald allegation Withspeculation about SHR’S revenues and proﬁts (see

23 Opp. at 10),2 mere passive ownership alone does not render SHR a “person” who may automatically
,

24 fall within the purview of the statute. Tellingly, Plaintiff does not cite a single authority for his

26
2
When ruling on a demurrer, a court may consider only those facts raised in the plaintiffs
complaint; it cannot consider new facts raised in the plaintiffs opposition brief. See Childs v.State
27 of California, 144 Cal. App. 3d 155, 159 (1983) (“It is well settled that in testing the validity of a
complaint against a demurrer, courts must look exclusively to facts alleged in the complaint[.]”).
28

151260.00201/106609857V.1 2 l7CIV03178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF ’8 FIRST AlVIENDED COMPLAINT
widely-cast attempted liability net. Plaintiff s allegations that SHR owns the Hotel is meaningless
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N absent some connection between that ownership and a theory of liability.
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Plaintiff s_argument that “SHR is a direct merchant liable for the violations alleged” is
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similarly unpersuasive. (Id.) The same case which Plaintiff cites for the proposition that “FACTA,
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by its terms, applies to ‘merchants 3” (id.), makes clear that a plaintiff must “provide factual
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allegations as to how [the defendant] served as merchant during the transaction at issue.”

Stelmachers, 2015 WL 8027902, at *3 (ﬁnding allegation that “Defendant is a ‘person that accepts
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credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business” within the meaning of FACTA” to be a

legal conclusion and dismissing the case for failure to state a claim). The Amended Complaint

1o contains‘ no allegation that SHR—as opposed to Four Seasons—is a merchant or a “direct
11 merchan ,” or any other “person that accept[ed] credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of
12 business” with Plaintiff within the meaning of the statute. See 15 U.S‘.C. § 168lc(g)(l).
13 To the extent that Plaintiff argues that SHR is vicariously liable to Plaintiff for violations of
14 FACTA, this theory -is not sufﬁciently pled. The Amended Complaint contains no factual

15 allegations of vicarious liability. Indeed, the terms “principal,” “agent,” and “vicarious liability” do

16 not appear anywhere in the Amended Complaint. But even if Plaintiff had pled Vicarious liability,
17 simply dropping those terms in passing would not satisfy the pleading standard for vicarious

1s liability. See Imageline, Inc. v. CafePresscom. Inc, No. 10-9794, 2011 WL 1322525, at *4 (CD.
19 Cal. Apr. 6, 2011) (holding. that allegations “that each defendant was the “agent, partner, servant,

20 supervisor, employee, successor and/or joint venturer of each 'of the remaining defendants and was at

21 all time acting within the course and scope, and purpose of said agency, employment, business

22 enterprise and joint venture: are nothing more than legal conclusions”); Biggins 12.Wells Fargo

23 & Co., 266 F.R.D. 399, 414 (N .D. Cal. 2009) (ﬁnding allegation that one defendant is the “agent,

24 subsidiary, parent, joint venturer or predecessor” of another insufﬁcient to state a claim based on

25 vicarious liability); cf Vasey v. California Dance C0,, 70 Cal. App. 3d 742, 749 (1977) (stating that a

26 complaint asserting “a bare conclusOry allegation” of alter ego was insufficient); Ankeny v. Lockheed

27 Missiles & Space C0,, 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 537 (1979) (“It is settled law that a pleading must allege
.
)

I
151260.00201/106609857V.1 3 —

17CIV03178
.REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
facts and not conclusions, and that material facts must be alleged directly and not 'by way of
N recital”).
‘

Plaintiff obfuscates the issue raised by SHR’s motion in order to overcome this shortcoming.

SHR does not deny that, in certain circumstances, vicarious liability can apply in- the FACTA
context. SHR contends that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to ﬁnd SHR vicariously liable, including

what
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speciﬁc role SHR played in “provid[ing] non—compliant credit card receipts through machines

that were provided to customers at the point of sale.” (Am. Compl. 11 10.) For this reason, Plaintiffs
reliance on Edwards v. Toys “R” Us, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 (CD. Cal. 2007)—where, among
I

other things, the defendant hired a third party to attend meetings and work full time with the

10‘ defendant to implement its point-of-sale system and computer upgrades—is misplaced. No such

11 facts exist here as between SHR and Four Seasons. Moreover, none of the other cases cited by
12 Plaintiff regarding the agency relationship involve claims under FACTA, or even the FCRA more.

13 broadly, and each sufﬁciently alleged a principal-agent relationship, which allegations are lacking

14 here. .

15 ii. Plaintiff Fails to Identify Any Action by‘ SHR, Speciﬁcally, and Instead
A

16 Relies on Haphazardlv-Pled Group Alle ations.

17 Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Amended Complaint should not be dismissed on the

18 basis of improper group pleading. The Amended Complaint does not “clearly delineate[]” the

19 “relationship between SHR and Four Seasons” (Opp. at 11); to the contrary, the sole allegation that

20 even arguably goes to this point‘ is Plaintiffs assertion that SHR “owns” the Hotel, while Four

21 Seasons “manages” the Hotel (Am. Compl. W 2-3). Nothing more is alleged with respect to the

22 relationship between these two defendants, and, for the reasons set forth above, this threadbare

231 allegation, standing alone, is insufﬁcient to support liability against SHR. The remaining allegations

24 refer only to “Defendants” collectively (including not only SHR and Four Seasons, but ten “Doe”
25’1

defendants), and none of these even plead the basic who, what, and when of SI-IRis supposed

26 wrongdoing. 3

28
3
In arguing that he has adequately alleged the elements of a FACTA claim against SHR, Plaintiff
nonsensically asserts that SHR has challenged the following elements: (2) Plaintiff was a credit or

151260.00201/106609857V.1 4 17CIV03178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF ’8 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT I
Plaintiff also fails to cite to authority to support his suggestion that a complaint that alleges

joint liability against multiple defendants for a single claim may ﬂout basic pleading requirements

#UJN and rely on improper “lumping.” Indeed, this would contravene the well-established rule that a

plaintiff “must identify what action each Defendant took that caused Plaintiffs’ harm, without resort

to generalized allegations as a whole.” In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11—02250, 2011 WL

4403963, at *8 (ND. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not do so here, instead

setting
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forth only impermissible “generalized allegations” against “Defendants” as a whole. This

improper group. pleading should be rejected, and the Amended Complaint dismissed.4

B. Plaintiff Fails To Plead That SHR Acted W'illfully.
10 Contrary to Plaintiff’ s assertion, SHR has not “mistaken and/or misstated the standard by

11 which willfulness is determined.” (Opp. at 4.) The FCRA permits a plaintiff to recover either

12 statutory or actual damages, as well as punitive damages, for willful violations of its requirements.

13 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). “The Supreme Court has clariﬁed that, under Section l681n, willfulness

14 reaches actions taken in ‘reckless disregard of statutory duty,’ in addition to actions ‘known to

15 violate the Act.’” Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 503 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of
16 Am. v. Burr, 551 US. 47, 56—57 (2007)). “[W]illfulness or recklessness is a higher standard” than

18 debit card holder, (3) Plaintiff paid for goods or services using that card; and (4) SHR printed a
paper receipt for that payment. (Opp. at 13.) This is incorrect. Rather, SHR has argued that
19 Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufﬁcient to allege the following elements with respect to it: (1) SHR
accepts credit or debit cards for the transaction of hotel business; (4) SHR printed a paper receipt for
20 Plaintiff’s alleged credit card receipt; and (5) the paper receipt was physically handed to Plaintiff by
21 SHR. (Dem. at 6-7.)
4
Plaintiff attempts to distance himself from SHR’s cited cases by claiming that they are
22 “inapposite.” (Opp. at 12.) But this too is wrong. It is unclear how Powell v. Residential Mortgage
Capital, No. 09—04928, 2010 WL 2133011 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2010), is distinguishable from the
23 instant case. And because Plaintiff offers no authority to support his erroneous contention that basic
pleading requirements are dependent upon whether the FACTA claim is asserted on behalf of a class
24 or an individual, or the number of claims at issue, his attempts to distinguish L ’Esperance v. HSBC
Consumer Lending, Inc., No. 11-555, 2012 WL 2122164, at *6 (D.N.H. June 12, 2012)," and
25 Bracamontes v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, No. 10-03888, 2011 WL 332527, at *3 (ND. Cal. Jan.
31, 2011), also fail. Finally, contrary to Plaintiff’ s assertion that the L’Esperance court did not
26 dismiss the FACTA claim for improper lumping, that court held: “In addition, Count[] VIII
(asserting a claim against ‘[t]he Defendants’ under the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
27 Act) . . . [is] dismissed for failure to sufﬁciently allege each defendant’s role in the allegedly
unlawful acts. . Given that L’ Esperance has already had two bites at this apple, the foregoing
28 dismissals are with prejudice.” 2012 WL 2122164, at *6. So too here.

151260.00201/106609857V.1 5 17CIV03178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
negligence. Collins v. Experian Info. Sols, Inc., 775 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015). “A party
does not act in reckless disregard of the FCRA ‘unless the action is not only a violation under a

reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law
substantially greater than the risk associated witha reading that was merely careless.” Syed, 853-

F.3d at 503. The law requires the defendant to have of mind
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some state when acting, and does not

excuse Plaintiff from pleading facts demonstrating that SHR intentionally acted based on an
I

incorrect, unreasonable, and reckless interpretation of FACTA.
Here, as a threshold matter,‘ Plaintiff has not alleged any action taken by SHR (or properly
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attributed to SHR), much less one that is willful. But, even assuming that some action is attributed

to SHR,'P1aintiff fails to demonstrate facts supporting recklessness. Plaintiff does not dispute that

two of the three generalized allegations on which he purports to hang a ﬁnding of willfulness say ~

nothing at all about SHR, but instead pertain to the statute’s enactment date and “Defendants’ peers

and competitors.” (See Opp. at 9.) And the third conclusory allegation merely contains Plaintiff’s
speculation about what some unidentified third parties may have told “Defendants” (collectively)
“about FACT ” at some unspeciﬁed point in time, and is again not even speciﬁc to SHR. Plaintiff
has not. (and cannot) point to single allegation in the Amended Complaint that purportedly shows

what SHR knew or should have known of FACTA’s truncation requirements.
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Nor does the cited case law support Plaintiff s argument. For one thing, Bouton v. Ocean

Properties, Ltd., 201
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F. Supp. 3d 1341 (SD. Fla. 2016), Bauer v. Shell Factory, LC, No. 08-68, 2008

WL 2261764 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2008), Steinberg v. Stitch & Craft, Inc, No. 09-60660, 2009 WL
2589142 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2009), and Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 547 F. Supp. 2d 463 (W.D.
Pa. 2007), involve allegations of alleged willfulness against a single named defendant, and thus are

not instructive to the determination of whether Plaintiff has pled sufﬁcient facts to demonstrate the

knowledge or intent of SHR—one of multiple defendants—speciﬁcally (he has not).
Second, the factual allegations in the cited cases are not at all “similar” to the three

conclusory allegations purporting to show SHR’s state of mind in this case. (Opp. at 9.) See, e.g..,

Deschaafv. Am. Valet & Limousine Inc., No. 16-03464 (D. Ariz.) (DE. 1 1111
39-43 (identifying the

151260.00201/106609857V.l 6 17C1V03178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COlVIPLAlNT
H speciﬁc businesses that allegedly notiﬁed defendants about FACTA’s truncation requirements,

including how and when, and alleging that defendants knew that their electronic receipt printing

equipment was conﬁgured to print the expiration date but defendants decided to forego the expense,

time, and other resources to being them into compliance)); Bouton,.201 F. Supp. 3d at 1350-51

programmed to display or not display certain information, and that defendant’s contracts with credit

card companies required FACTA compliance, and that defendant had been sued for similar

Violations in the past); Steinberg, 2009 WL 2589142,. at *2-3 (alleging, inter alia, that defendant

violated FACTA because it did not wish to incur the additional cost of reprogramming or updating

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its point of sale equipment); Ehrheart, 547 F. Supp. 3d at 464—65 (alleging, inter alia, that defendant

H H was contractually obligated to comply with FACTA’s truncation requirements). Far from supporting

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Plaintiff’ s position, these cases serve only to highlight the pleading deﬁciencies that mandate

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W dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against SHR.5 ,

-P Plaintiff’s reading of Safeco, 551 U.S. at 52, is also misguided. The issue before the
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Supreme Court in Safeco was whether willful failure under the FCRA covered reckless violations—

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i.e.,intentional conduct undertaken based upon an unreasonable interpretation of an unambiguous
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statute. Id The Supreme Court did not determine that the knowledge, intent, and actions of a

merchant irrelevant merely because a plaintiff alleged a violation of FACTA. Court
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are Indeed, the

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adopted the common law understanding of recklessness in applying the statute:
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The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard . . . of another if he does an act or
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intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not
N) N only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of [] harm to another, but also that
such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.
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ON.
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Plaintiff also cites Edwards, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1210, for the proposition that his Amended
Complaint should not be dismissed because “issue[s] surrounding willfulness” are reserved for the
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trier of fact. (Opp. at 9.) Edwards, however, involved a motion for summary judgment in federal
court, and thus says nothing about a state court’s ability and obligation to dismiss inadequate
N 00
pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure Sections 430.10(e) and (f).

151260.00201/106609857V.1 7 17CIV03178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AIVIENDED COIVIPLAINT
Id. at 69 (emphasis added); see also id. at 57 (stating that a FACTA violation is “willful” if itis

either knowing or reckless). For this same reason, Plaintiffs reliance on Syed, 853 F.3d at 503, in
#UJN
which the defendant admitted that its conduct was intentional such that the willfulness issue could be

resolved as a matter of law, is unavailing.

In sum, no reckless behavior can be attributed to SHR. What is more, Plaintiff’s argument

that all violations of an unambiguous provision of FACTA, whether or not they are based on a

mistake,
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are per se willful Violations, is a radical departure from precedent in the Ninth Circuit, and

should be rejected. (See Opp. at 5.)

C. Plaintiff’s Clai s Should Be Dis issed With Prejudice.

10 Plaintiff requests leave to amend his pleading “[t]o the extent the Court ﬁnds his [Amended

11 Complaint] insufﬁcient.” (Opp. at 13.) But Plaintiff does not and cannot identify how he would

12 cure the defects in his Amended Complaint6 as to SHR. See Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal.

13 App. 4th 1350, 1371 (2010) (ﬁnding leave to amend properly denied where plaintiff did not explain

14 how an amended complaint would cure defects identiﬁed in sustained demurrer); see also Blank v.

15 Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318 (1985) (burden of proving that complaint’s defects can be cured rests

16 squarely on the plaintiff). Indeed, Plaintiffs inability to do so is highlighted by the fact that his

17 counsel has ﬁled two other substantially similar complaints making nearly verbatim allegations

18 against two other alleged owners of two other Four Seasons hotels, asserting, as here, FACTA
19 liability solely on the basis of ownership. (See Dem. at 4 & n.2.) Having relied on an apparent cut-

2o and-paste job as a substitute for real facts against SHR, there is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff
21 can now—in what would be his third bite at the apple—plead sufﬁcient factual allegations to support

22 a cause of action for a FACTA Violation against SHR. Plaintiffs request for leave to amend thus

23 would be futile, and should be denied.

25
6
Plaintiff’s intimation that leave to amend should be granted because he has not already been given
26 “a fair opportunity to correct any defect,” and that he need not even request leave to amend “in the
case of an original complaint” (Opp. at 13 (emphasis in original», makes no sense. The operative
27 pleading here is not the original complaint. To the contrary, Plaintiff ﬁled the original complaint on
July 14, 2017; a First Amended Complaint on September 28, 2017; and an Amendment to Complaint
28
on November 21, 2017.
'
l51260.00201/106609857V.1 8 17CIV03 I78
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF ’S FIRST AMENDED COIVIPLAINT
III. CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated herein and in its opening memorandum, SHR respectﬁilly requests that

its demurrer to Plaintiﬁ’s First Amended Class Action Complaint, and the single cause of action
asserted against SHR, be sustained.

DATED:
\DOO\]O\UIJ>
February 13, 2018 BLANK ROME LLP

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Saﬁa G. Hussain
Harrison Brown
Attomevs for Defendant
10 SHR PALO ALTO, LLC
(Erroneously named as
11 STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS LLC)

l51260.00201/106609857V.l 9 '
l7CIV03 I78
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

'l
PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed 1n the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over thethage of 18
and not a party to the within action. My business address 15 2029 Century Park East, 6th Floor, Los
Angeles, California 90067.

On February 13,2018, I served the foregoing document entitled REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
DEMURRER T0 PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT SHR
ON
PALO ALTO, LLC on the interested parties in this action, addressed and sent as follows:

\]
(SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST)
00
[2] BY ENVELOPE: By placing El the original IZI true copies thereof
enclosed 1n sealed envelopes addressed as indicated and delivering such
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envelopes:
'10 IZI BY FEDEX: I deposited such envelopes in a box or other facility
regularly maintained by FedEx, an express service carrier, or
11 delivered to a courier or driver authorized by said express service
carrier to receive documents in an envelope designated by the said
12 express service carrier, addressed as indicated, with delivery fees
paid or provided for, to be transmitted by FedEx.
13
Executed on February 13, 2018, at Los Angeles, California.
14
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
15 true and correct.

18 , DIA s. ALEslsi
19

151260.00201/106609857V.1 10 17CIV03178
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’ S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
SERVICE LIST

Kenneth S. Gaines, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiﬁf
Daniel F. Gaines, Esq. PATRICK WHITE
Alex P. Katofsky, Esq.
Evan S. Gaines, Esq.
Miriam Leigh Schimmel, Esq.
GAINES & GAINES, APLC
27200 Agoura Road, Suite 101
Calabasas, CA 91367
Tel: (818) 703-8985
Fax: (818) 703-8984
Emails: ken@gaineslawﬁrm.com
daniel@gaineslawﬁrm.com
alex@gaineslawﬁrm.com
evan@gaineslawﬁrm.com

Steven A. Ellis, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant,
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP FOUR SEASONS HOTELS

Case Info

Judge

V. Raymond Swope Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

(Subscribe to View)

Document Filed Date

February 13, 2018

Case Filing Date

July 14, 2017

County

Parties

DOES 1 - 10, INCLUSIVE Defendant
DTRS PALO ALTO, LLC Defendant
ELLIS, STEVEN A. Attorney for the Defendant
FOUR SEASONS HOTELS LIMITED, A CANADA CORPORATION Defendant
KATOFSKY, ALEX P Attorney for the Plaintiff
SHR PALO ALTO, LLC Defendant
STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY Defendant
TAGVORYAN, ANA Attorney for the Defendant
WHITE, PATRICK Plaintiff
Anjali Moorthy Attorneys for Defendants
Harrison Brown Attorney
Kenneth Gaines Attorney
Daniel Gaines Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Motion-Secondary: PATRICK WHITE vs. SHR PALO ALTO, LLC, et al.

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