Preview
I
MARCIEISOM FITZSIMMONS (SBN: 226906) -
FILED
.
AMBER A. EKLOF (SBN: 305750)
GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP SAN MAT ED COUNTY
I
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 .
‘
San Francisco, CA 94111 SEP 1 0 2018
Telephone: (415) 875—4 1 31
Facsimile: (415) 986-805 4
misom@grsm.com
aeklof@grsm.com
Attorneys for Defendant
TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND
STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, erroneously sued as
THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
11 ALI TAGHAVI, an individual, ) CASE NO. 17CIV045 70
LLP
) ,
2000
12 Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT STANFORD’S
94111
)
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S
Mansnkhani,
Suite 13 vs.
)
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
CA ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION
14 THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR ) TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
Street,
UNIVERSITY, a California nonprofit )
Scully Francisco,
15 corporation, doing business as STANFORD ) Date: September 21, 2018
Battery UNIVERSITY; ALTICOR, INC, a Michigan ) Time: 9:00 am.
Rees
San
16 corporation; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Dept: Law and Motion
275
3
Gordon
17 Defendants. -) @g'""°‘57°
'
Memorandum 01 Points and Authorlties in Opp:
18 1371201
19 I. INTRODUCTION
20 Plaintiffs designation of his entire three—day deposition and corresponding documents as
21 “confidential” is improper under the parties’ protective order, and unwarranted by the content of
22 Plaintiff’s deposition. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion is overbroad and indiscriminate in scope in
23 that his designation captures content that is obviously not confidential, including information and
24 documents that are not confidential and in fact are already public. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not
25 and cannot meet his burden to show good cause to maintain the confidential designation
26 attributed to his deposition.
27 'II.' RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
28 On July 20 and July 23, 2018, all parties to this lawsuit signed a stipulated and proposed
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DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR '
PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
r‘r8888
'3‘-
38911] d m c133 8131‘
protective order to allow the parties to designate certain information or documents as
confidential during the course of litigation. (Declaration of Amber A. Eklof in Support of
Opposition to Motion for Protective Order, [“Eklof Decl.”], 11 6.) On July 27, 2018, Judge Susan
Greenberg granted the proposed order and on July 30, 2018, the court entered the order. (See
Stipulated Protective Order, attached as Exhibit 3 to Eklof Decl.)
Pursuant to the protective order, a party may designate information or documents as
confidential that the party in good faith believes to include information regarding: “trade secrets,
\DOO\]O\
or confidential business or financial information, including personal financial information about
any party to this lawsuit, putative class'members or employee of any party to this lawsuit,
10 information regarding any individual’s banking relationship with any banking institution,
11 including information regarding the individual’s financial transactions or financial accounts, and
LLP
2000
12 any information regarding any party not otherwise available to the public.” (Stipulated Protective
Mansukhani,
Suite
94111
13 Order, 11 2.) Additionally, a party “may designate in Mg, within thirty (30) days after receipt
CA
Street,
14 of said responses or of the deposition transcript for which the designation is proposed, that
specific pages of the transcript and/ofipecific responses be treated
Scully Francisco,
15 as “Confidential
Battery
Rees
San
16 Information.” (Id, emphasis added.) If a party objects to any designation as “Confidential” in
275
Gordon
17 writing or on the record, the designating party has 20 days from receipt of the notice to seek a
18 court order designating the material as confidential. (Id. at 11 8.)
19 On July 30, July 31 and August 8, 2018, Defendants deposed Plaintiff. (Eklof Decl., 11 8.)
20 At 10:14 pm. on July 31, after the second day of Plaintiff’ s deposition, Plaintiff s counsel,
21 Fredrick Hagen emailed counsel for Alticor and counsel for Stanford to broadly designate
22 Plaintiff s entire deposition transcript, Video and exhibits as confidential, without explanation
23 and without selecting “specific pages of the transcript” or exhibits to be marked confidential.
24 (Hagen Decl. at Ex. A; Stipulated Protective Order, 11 2; Eklof Decl., 1T 9.) On August 7, 2018,
25 counsel for Stanford sent a letter to Mr. Hagen formally objecting to his designation of Plaintiff s
26, deposition as confidential. (Eklof Decl., fl 10; Hagen Decl. at Ex. C.) On August 15, 2018, Mr.
27 Hagen sent a meet and confer email responding to Stanford’s objection, claiming the deposition
28 should be designated as confidential based on Plaintiff’s testimony regarding “personnel and
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DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
'
employment related matters, including Mr. Taghavi’s confidential information and the
confidential information of third parties.” (Eklof Decl., 11 11; Hagen Decl. at Ex. B.) Mr. Hagen
did not provide any specific information to support the broad'designation for all three days of
deposition and .did not identify any specific deposition topics, pages or exhibits as confidential.
(Id) That same day, on August 15, 2018, counsel for Stanford emailed Mr. Hagen stating the
blanket designation of Plaintiff’s entire deposition was unwarranted because the broad rationale
identified in his August 15 email did not fall within the scope of the materials the parties agreed
\DOO\IO\
to designate as “Confidential” under the protective order. fEklof Decl., 11 12; Hagen Decl. at Ex.
D.) Mr. Hagen did not provide any additional information to support the designation, and filed
10 the instant motion for protective order on August 20, 2018. (Eklof Decl., 11 13.)
11 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT
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2000
12 A. Plaintiff Failed to Demonstrate Good Cause to Designate his Deposition as Confidential
94111 Because The Information Plaintiff Seeks To Protect Is Not Covered By the Protective
Mansukhani,
Suite 13 Order or is Already Public
CA
Street,
14 The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any
Scully
party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance,
Francisco,
15
Battery
Rees
16 embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (See Civ. Proc. § 2025 (b).) The
San
275
Gordon
17 granting of a motion for protective order “in the absence of any facts tending to prove
18 annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression [is] an abuse of discretion.” (Goodman v. Citizens
19 Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Ca1'.App.2d 807, 820 [reversing trial court’s granting of motion
20 for protective order where the declaration set forth no facts whatsoever in support of the
21 motion].) “[T]he burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for
22 whatever order is sought.” (Fqirmom‘ Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245,
23 255.) This must be based on “factual basis or articulated reasoning” and not “conclusory
24 statements.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.)
25 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to satisfy his burden under the Code of
26 Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s assertion that 566 pages of testimony and all 30 corresponding
27 exhibits should be covered by the protective order based on the vague assertion that he testified
28 regarding finances, his personnel files, work history and medical records is unsubstantiated and
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DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
improper. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated protective order, the following may appropriately be
designated as confidential:
any document or response to discovery which that party or non—party considers in
good faith to contain information involving trade secrets, or confidential business
or financial information, including personal financial information about any party
to this lawsuit, putative class members or employee of any party to this lawsuit,
information regarding any individual’s banking relationship with any banking
institution, including information regarding the individual’s financial tranSactions
or financial accounts, and any information regarding any party not otherwise
available to the public, subject to protection under Rules 2.550, 2.551, 2.580,
2.585, 8.160, and 8.490 of the California Rules of Court or under other provisions
\DOO\]O\
of California law.
(Stipulated Protective Order, 11 l, Eklof Decl., 11 7.)
.10 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s motion does not reference any testimony or
11 documents covered by the materials the parties agreed to designate as confidential in order to
LLP
2000
12 justify the request. Plaintiff seeks to protect information regarding “personnel files, 9’ “work
94111
Mansukhani,
Suite 13 history” and “medical records,” which are noticeably absent from the stipulated protective order.
CA
Street,
14 (Plaintiff’s Memorandum at p. 2; Protective Order, 11 1.) Further, Plaintiff’s request to designate
Scully Francisco,
15 his entire transcript and all corresponding documents as confidential under the pretext that the
Battery
Rees
16 testimony covers “financial information,” is unduly overbroad in comparison to the few
San
275
Gordon
17 references to Plaintiff’s “salary” included in the 566_ pages of testimony. Additionally, neither
18 Plaintiff’s deposition exhibits nOr his deposition testimony reference any medical records, and as
'19 such, a deSignation on that basis is unwarranted. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to
20 demonstrate his entire deposition or any deposition exhibits are entitled to protection. (Protective
21 Order, 1l 8.)
22 Moreover, Plaintiff seeks to designate as confidential information which Plaintiff himself
23 has already publicized. Plaintiff identifies his “work history,” specifically his subsequent
24 employers and job titles, as “good cause” to substantiate his motion despite the fact that Plaintiff
25 has already publically exhibited such information on his LinkedIn profile. (See Eklof Decl., fl 15,
26 Ex. 4; Plaintiffs Memorandum at p. 2.) Plaintiff’s attempt to seal his deposition testimony from
27 public exposure based on information which Plaintiff himself openly shares on a public, web-
28
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DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
based networking platform is a frivolous waste of judicial resources and an abusive of the
litigation process.
Plaintiffs citation to Moskowitz v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 313 is
misplaced and insufficient to justify designating the entirety of Plaintiff’s deposition as
confidential. In Moskowitz, the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim regarding punitive
damages and sought to prevent disclosure of deposition testimony related to “m -
information regarding his financial affairs for the past M, including his salaries, (fees,
charitable contributions, purchases of securities, real estate holdings, bank accounts, partnership
interests, and sales and purchases of businesses.” (Id. at 315, emphasis added.) Unlike the vast
10 depth of detailed banking, real estate and considerable purchase records sought in Moskowz'tz, the
11 only “financial information” Plaintiff cites to justify a confidential designation is a vague
LLP
2000
12 reference to Plaintiffs “salary,” without articulating any facts to satisfy his burden for a ,
94111
Mansukhani,
Suite 13 protective order, and Without narrowing'the designation to just that information. (Nativi, supra,
CA
Street,
14 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) As such, Plaintiff’ s motion must be denied.
Scully Francisco,
15 B. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Not in Good Faith
Battery
Rees ‘16 Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order is frivolous because he now seeks to designate as
San
275
Gordon
17 confidential, information and documents which he previously produced, and accepted without
18 any confidential designation. (Eklof Deal. 11‘“ 2-5, 14.) Indeed, in May 2018, Plaintiff produced
19 documents without a confidential designation, which included his application, offer of
20 employment and job description for his employment at Stanford. Furthermore, in response to
21 Plaintiff’s request for production of documents, on ’July 11, 2018, more than a month before
22 Plaintiff filed this motion, Stanford produced records from Plaintiff’s personnel file, including
23 his offer letter listing his salary, the terms and conditions of employment, his job application and
'
24 related records. (Eklof Decl., 1[ 5.) These Stanford did not designate these records as
25 “Confidential” under the protective order, nor did Plaintiff respond to designate these records as
26 confidential. (Eklof Decl. at 11 14.) Plaintiff’s attempt to retroactively designate documents
27 produced regarding Plaintiff’s personnel file as confidential based on Plaintiffs deposition
28 testimony is improper under the protective order and is outSide the scope of the 30—day
'
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DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF-’8 MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
limitations period to designate such discovery responses as confidential,‘as identified in the.
protective order. (Protective Order, 11 2; Eklof Decl., 1111 3,4, Exs. 1, 2.) Furthermore, Stanford
questioned Plaintiff about these personnel records during the first day of his deposition on July
30, 2018. Plaintiff did not object to the use of the records, nor did Plaintiff concurrently request
to designate that portion of the transcript as confidential based on the subject matter of Plaintiffs
testimony or the nature of the ddcuments used. Indeed, Plaintiff made no attempt to designate
any information regarding his salary or personnel file as confidential in advance of his
deposition, or when the information came to light in his first day of deposition. Plaintiff did not
seek to designate his deposition, or any portion thereof, as confidential until day two, when
10 Plaintiff admitted he had not truthfully represented the nature of his termination from Stanford to
11 several subsequent employers and potential employers. (Hagen Decl. at Ex. A.)
2000
12 In reality, Plaintiff s motion is based on and motivated by Plaintiff” s deposition testimony
Mansukhani,‘LLP
94111
Suite 13 that he lied on his job applications and on his resume. Plaintiff has not and cannot identify
CA
Street,
14 adequate support to justify his motion to designate the Plaintiff’s 566 pages of testimony and 30
Scully Francisco,
15 deposition exhibits as confidential. As such, Stanford respectfully request this court deny
Battery
Rees
16 Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety. In the alternative, Stanford request the court require Plaintiff to
San
275
Gordon
17 identify specific documents and/or pages to be identified as confidential for further review by the
18 parties.
19 IV. CONCLUSION
20 Accordingly, Stanford respectfully requests this Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for protective
21 order.
22 Dated: September 10, 2018 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI,
LLP.
23
24
'
By,
flv//”V
MARCIE ISOM FITZSIMMONS
25 AMBER A. EKLOF
TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND
26 STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY,
erroneously sued as THE LELAND
27 STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY
28
.
—6—
DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
PROOF OF SERVICE
Ali Taghavi v. The Leland Stanford University
San Mateo Superior Court Case No. 1 7C] V045 70
I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party
to the within action. My business address 1s: Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery,
Suite 2000, San Francisco served the Within documents.
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF ’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
DECLARATION OF AMBER A. EKLOF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
\oooucxfl
STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
by placing a true copy thereof enclosed 1n a sealed envelope, at a station designated
for collection and processing of envelopes and packages for overnight delivery by
10 FedEx as part of the ordinary business practices of Gordon & Rees LLP described
below, addressed as follows:
11
.
LLP
.12
2000
Fredrick A. Hagen, California Bar No. 196220
Mansukhani,
Suite
94111
13 BERDING & WEIL LLP
2175 N. California Blvd, Suite 500
CA
14 Walnut Creek, California 94596
Street,
Telephone: 925/838-2090
Scully Francisco,
15
Facsimile: 925/820—5 592
fhagen(a)berdingweil.com
Battery
Rees
16
San Plaintiffs Counsel
275 -
17
Gordon
David P. Zins '
Karen J. Kubin
18
Morrison & F oerster LLP Morrison & Foerster LLP
707 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 6000 425 Market Street
.19 Los Angeles, CA 94105 San Francisco, CA 94105
Tele No.: 213-892—5200 Tele No.: 415-268-7000
20 Fax No.: 213-892-5454 Fax No.: 415—268—7522
dzins mofo.com kkubin@mofo.com
21
Counsel for Defendant Alticor, Inc. Counsel for Defendant Alticor, Inc.
22
I am readily familiar with the firm’ s practice of collection and processing correspondence
23 for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U. S. Postal Service on that same
day with postage thereon fully prepaid 1n the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on
24 motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage
meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under
25 penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.
Executed on September 10, 2018 at San Francisco, California.
26
27
94%”
28 Vanessa Santellan
1 121340/39992674v.1
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DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI
Preview
I MARCIEISOM FITZSIMMONS (SBN: 226906) - FILED . AMBER A. EKLOF (SBN: 305750) GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP SAN MAT ED COUNTY I 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 . ‘ San Francisco, CA 94111 SEP 1 0 2018 Telephone: (415) 875—4 1 31 Facsimile: (415) 986-805 4 misom@grsm.com aeklof@grsm.com Attorneys for Defendant TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, erroneously sued as THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 11 ALI TAGHAVI, an individual, ) CASE NO. 17CIV045 70 LLP ) , 2000 12 Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT STANFORD’S 94111 ) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S Mansnkhani, Suite 13 vs. ) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE CA ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION 14 THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR ) TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI Street, UNIVERSITY, a California nonprofit ) Scully Francisco, 15 corporation, doing business as STANFORD ) Date: September 21, 2018 Battery UNIVERSITY; ALTICOR, INC, a Michigan ) Time: 9:00 am. Rees San 16 corporation; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Dept: Law and Motion 275 3 Gordon 17 Defendants. -) @g'""°‘57° ' Memorandum 01 Points and Authorlties in Opp: 18 1371201 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Plaintiffs designation of his entire three—day deposition and corresponding documents as 21 “confidential” is improper under the parties’ protective order, and unwarranted by the content of 22 Plaintiff’s deposition. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion is overbroad and indiscriminate in scope in 23 that his designation captures content that is obviously not confidential, including information and 24 documents that are not confidential and in fact are already public. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not 25 and cannot meet his burden to show good cause to maintain the confidential designation 26 attributed to his deposition. 27 'II.' RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 28 On July 20 and July 23, 2018, all parties to this lawsuit signed a stipulated and proposed -1- DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ' PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI r‘r8888 '3‘- 38911] d m c133 8131‘ protective order to allow the parties to designate certain information or documents as confidential during the course of litigation. (Declaration of Amber A. Eklof in Support of Opposition to Motion for Protective Order, [“Eklof Decl.”], 11 6.) On July 27, 2018, Judge Susan Greenberg granted the proposed order and on July 30, 2018, the court entered the order. (See Stipulated Protective Order, attached as Exhibit 3 to Eklof Decl.) Pursuant to the protective order, a party may designate information or documents as confidential that the party in good faith believes to include information regarding: “trade secrets, \DOO\]O\ or confidential business or financial information, including personal financial information about any party to this lawsuit, putative class'members or employee of any party to this lawsuit, 10 information regarding any individual’s banking relationship with any banking institution, 11 including information regarding the individual’s financial transactions or financial accounts, and LLP 2000 12 any information regarding any party not otherwise available to the public.” (Stipulated Protective Mansukhani, Suite 94111 13 Order, 11 2.) Additionally, a party “may designate in Mg, within thirty (30) days after receipt CA Street, 14 of said responses or of the deposition transcript for which the designation is proposed, that specific pages of the transcript and/ofipecific responses be treated Scully Francisco, 15 as “Confidential Battery Rees San 16 Information.” (Id, emphasis added.) If a party objects to any designation as “Confidential” in 275 Gordon 17 writing or on the record, the designating party has 20 days from receipt of the notice to seek a 18 court order designating the material as confidential. (Id. at 11 8.) 19 On July 30, July 31 and August 8, 2018, Defendants deposed Plaintiff. (Eklof Decl., 11 8.) 20 At 10:14 pm. on July 31, after the second day of Plaintiff’ s deposition, Plaintiff s counsel, 21 Fredrick Hagen emailed counsel for Alticor and counsel for Stanford to broadly designate 22 Plaintiff s entire deposition transcript, Video and exhibits as confidential, without explanation 23 and without selecting “specific pages of the transcript” or exhibits to be marked confidential. 24 (Hagen Decl. at Ex. A; Stipulated Protective Order, 11 2; Eklof Decl., 1T 9.) On August 7, 2018, 25 counsel for Stanford sent a letter to Mr. Hagen formally objecting to his designation of Plaintiff s 26, deposition as confidential. (Eklof Decl., fl 10; Hagen Decl. at Ex. C.) On August 15, 2018, Mr. 27 Hagen sent a meet and confer email responding to Stanford’s objection, claiming the deposition 28 should be designated as confidential based on Plaintiff’s testimony regarding “personnel and -2- DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI ' employment related matters, including Mr. Taghavi’s confidential information and the confidential information of third parties.” (Eklof Decl., 11 11; Hagen Decl. at Ex. B.) Mr. Hagen did not provide any specific information to support the broad'designation for all three days of deposition and .did not identify any specific deposition topics, pages or exhibits as confidential. (Id) That same day, on August 15, 2018, counsel for Stanford emailed Mr. Hagen stating the blanket designation of Plaintiff’s entire deposition was unwarranted because the broad rationale identified in his August 15 email did not fall within the scope of the materials the parties agreed \DOO\IO\ to designate as “Confidential” under the protective order. fEklof Decl., 11 12; Hagen Decl. at Ex. D.) Mr. Hagen did not provide any additional information to support the designation, and filed 10 the instant motion for protective order on August 20, 2018. (Eklof Decl., 11 13.) 11 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT LLP 2000 12 A. Plaintiff Failed to Demonstrate Good Cause to Designate his Deposition as Confidential 94111 Because The Information Plaintiff Seeks To Protect Is Not Covered By the Protective Mansukhani, Suite 13 Order or is Already Public CA Street, 14 The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any Scully party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, Francisco, 15 Battery Rees 16 embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (See Civ. Proc. § 2025 (b).) The San 275 Gordon 17 granting of a motion for protective order “in the absence of any facts tending to prove 18 annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression [is] an abuse of discretion.” (Goodman v. Citizens 19 Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Ca1'.App.2d 807, 820 [reversing trial court’s granting of motion 20 for protective order where the declaration set forth no facts whatsoever in support of the 21 motion].) “[T]he burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for 22 whatever order is sought.” (Fqirmom‘ Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 23 255.) This must be based on “factual basis or articulated reasoning” and not “conclusory 24 statements.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) 25 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to satisfy his burden under the Code of 26 Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s assertion that 566 pages of testimony and all 30 corresponding 27 exhibits should be covered by the protective order based on the vague assertion that he testified 28 regarding finances, his personnel files, work history and medical records is unsubstantiated and -3- DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI improper. Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated protective order, the following may appropriately be designated as confidential: any document or response to discovery which that party or non—party considers in good faith to contain information involving trade secrets, or confidential business or financial information, including personal financial information about any party to this lawsuit, putative class members or employee of any party to this lawsuit, information regarding any individual’s banking relationship with any banking institution, including information regarding the individual’s financial tranSactions or financial accounts, and any information regarding any party not otherwise available to the public, subject to protection under Rules 2.550, 2.551, 2.580, 2.585, 8.160, and 8.490 of the California Rules of Court or under other provisions \DOO\]O\ of California law. (Stipulated Protective Order, 11 l, Eklof Decl., 11 7.) .10 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s motion does not reference any testimony or 11 documents covered by the materials the parties agreed to designate as confidential in order to LLP 2000 12 justify the request. Plaintiff seeks to protect information regarding “personnel files, 9’ “work 94111 Mansukhani, Suite 13 history” and “medical records,” which are noticeably absent from the stipulated protective order. CA Street, 14 (Plaintiff’s Memorandum at p. 2; Protective Order, 11 1.) Further, Plaintiff’s request to designate Scully Francisco, 15 his entire transcript and all corresponding documents as confidential under the pretext that the Battery Rees 16 testimony covers “financial information,” is unduly overbroad in comparison to the few San 275 Gordon 17 references to Plaintiff’s “salary” included in the 566_ pages of testimony. Additionally, neither 18 Plaintiff’s deposition exhibits nOr his deposition testimony reference any medical records, and as '19 such, a deSignation on that basis is unwarranted. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to 20 demonstrate his entire deposition or any deposition exhibits are entitled to protection. (Protective 21 Order, 1l 8.) 22 Moreover, Plaintiff seeks to designate as confidential information which Plaintiff himself 23 has already publicized. Plaintiff identifies his “work history,” specifically his subsequent 24 employers and job titles, as “good cause” to substantiate his motion despite the fact that Plaintiff 25 has already publically exhibited such information on his LinkedIn profile. (See Eklof Decl., fl 15, 26 Ex. 4; Plaintiffs Memorandum at p. 2.) Plaintiff’s attempt to seal his deposition testimony from 27 public exposure based on information which Plaintiff himself openly shares on a public, web- 28 -4- DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI based networking platform is a frivolous waste of judicial resources and an abusive of the litigation process. Plaintiffs citation to Moskowitz v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 313 is misplaced and insufficient to justify designating the entirety of Plaintiff’s deposition as confidential. In Moskowitz, the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim regarding punitive damages and sought to prevent disclosure of deposition testimony related to “m - information regarding his financial affairs for the past M, including his salaries, (fees, charitable contributions, purchases of securities, real estate holdings, bank accounts, partnership interests, and sales and purchases of businesses.” (Id. at 315, emphasis added.) Unlike the vast 10 depth of detailed banking, real estate and considerable purchase records sought in Moskowz'tz, the 11 only “financial information” Plaintiff cites to justify a confidential designation is a vague LLP 2000 12 reference to Plaintiffs “salary,” without articulating any facts to satisfy his burden for a , 94111 Mansukhani, Suite 13 protective order, and Without narrowing'the designation to just that information. (Nativi, supra, CA Street, 14 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) As such, Plaintiff’ s motion must be denied. Scully Francisco, 15 B. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Not in Good Faith Battery Rees ‘16 Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order is frivolous because he now seeks to designate as San 275 Gordon 17 confidential, information and documents which he previously produced, and accepted without 18 any confidential designation. (Eklof Deal. 11‘“ 2-5, 14.) Indeed, in May 2018, Plaintiff produced 19 documents without a confidential designation, which included his application, offer of 20 employment and job description for his employment at Stanford. Furthermore, in response to 21 Plaintiff’s request for production of documents, on ’July 11, 2018, more than a month before 22 Plaintiff filed this motion, Stanford produced records from Plaintiff’s personnel file, including 23 his offer letter listing his salary, the terms and conditions of employment, his job application and ' 24 related records. (Eklof Decl., 1[ 5.) These Stanford did not designate these records as 25 “Confidential” under the protective order, nor did Plaintiff respond to designate these records as 26 confidential. (Eklof Decl. at 11 14.) Plaintiff’s attempt to retroactively designate documents 27 produced regarding Plaintiff’s personnel file as confidential based on Plaintiffs deposition 28 testimony is improper under the protective order and is outSide the scope of the 30—day ' -5- DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF-’8 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI limitations period to designate such discovery responses as confidential,‘as identified in the. protective order. (Protective Order, 11 2; Eklof Decl., 1111 3,4, Exs. 1, 2.) Furthermore, Stanford questioned Plaintiff about these personnel records during the first day of his deposition on July 30, 2018. Plaintiff did not object to the use of the records, nor did Plaintiff concurrently request to designate that portion of the transcript as confidential based on the subject matter of Plaintiffs testimony or the nature of the ddcuments used. Indeed, Plaintiff made no attempt to designate any information regarding his salary or personnel file as confidential in advance of his deposition, or when the information came to light in his first day of deposition. Plaintiff did not seek to designate his deposition, or any portion thereof, as confidential until day two, when 10 Plaintiff admitted he had not truthfully represented the nature of his termination from Stanford to 11 several subsequent employers and potential employers. (Hagen Decl. at Ex. A.) 2000 12 In reality, Plaintiff s motion is based on and motivated by Plaintiff” s deposition testimony Mansukhani,‘LLP 94111 Suite 13 that he lied on his job applications and on his resume. Plaintiff has not and cannot identify CA Street, 14 adequate support to justify his motion to designate the Plaintiff’s 566 pages of testimony and 30 Scully Francisco, 15 deposition exhibits as confidential. As such, Stanford respectfully request this court deny Battery Rees 16 Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety. In the alternative, Stanford request the court require Plaintiff to San 275 Gordon 17 identify specific documents and/or pages to be identified as confidential for further review by the 18 parties. 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 Accordingly, Stanford respectfully requests this Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for protective 21 order. 22 Dated: September 10, 2018 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP. 23 24 ' By, flv//”V MARCIE ISOM FITZSIMMONS 25 AMBER A. EKLOF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND 26 STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, erroneously sued as THE LELAND 27 STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY 28 . —6— DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI PROOF OF SERVICE Ali Taghavi v. The Leland Stanford University San Mateo Superior Court Case No. 1 7C] V045 70 I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address 1s: Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery, Suite 2000, San Francisco served the Within documents. DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF ’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI DECLARATION OF AMBER A. EKLOF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT \oooucxfl STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI by placing a true copy thereof enclosed 1n a sealed envelope, at a station designated for collection and processing of envelopes and packages for overnight delivery by 10 FedEx as part of the ordinary business practices of Gordon & Rees LLP described below, addressed as follows: 11 . LLP .12 2000 Fredrick A. Hagen, California Bar No. 196220 Mansukhani, Suite 94111 13 BERDING & WEIL LLP 2175 N. California Blvd, Suite 500 CA 14 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Street, Telephone: 925/838-2090 Scully Francisco, 15 Facsimile: 925/820—5 592 fhagen(a)berdingweil.com Battery Rees 16 San Plaintiffs Counsel 275 - 17 Gordon David P. Zins ' Karen J. Kubin 18 Morrison & F oerster LLP Morrison & Foerster LLP 707 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 6000 425 Market Street .19 Los Angeles, CA 94105 San Francisco, CA 94105 Tele No.: 213-892—5200 Tele No.: 415-268-7000 20 Fax No.: 213-892-5454 Fax No.: 415—268—7522 dzins mofo.com kkubin@mofo.com 21 Counsel for Defendant Alticor, Inc. Counsel for Defendant Alticor, Inc. 22 I am readily familiar with the firm’ s practice of collection and processing correspondence 23 for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U. S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid 1n the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on 24 motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under 25 penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on September 10, 2018 at San Francisco, California. 26 27 94%” 28 Vanessa Santellan 1 121340/39992674v.1 -7- DEFENDANT STANFORD’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF ALI TAGHAVI