Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Randolph, Teresa vs Trustees of the California State University et al| Trellis.Law

On April 19, 2019 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Randolph, Teresa, and Daley, Cynthia, Larson, Debra, State Of California, Trustees Of The California State University, for (36) Unlimited Wrongful Termination in the District Court of Butte County.

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1 XAVIER BECERRA
Attorney General of California
2 PETER D. HALLORAN
9/1/2020
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
3 JERRY J. DESCHLER
Deputy Attorney General
4 State Bar No. 215691
1300 I Street, Suite 125
5 P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
6 Telephone: (916) 210-7871
Fax: (916) 324-5567
7 E-mail: Jerry.Deschler@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys fo r Defendants
8 Board of Trustees of the California State University,.
which is the State of California acting in its higher
9 education capacity (erroneously sued as "Trustees
ofthe California State University, State of
10 California"), Cynthia Daley, and Debra Larson

11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

12 COUNTY OF BUTTE

13 CIVIL DIVISION

15
TERESA RANDOLPH, Case No. l 9CV01226
16
Plaintiff,
17
v. DEFENDANTS'REPLYINSUPPORT
18 OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S
19 TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
STATE UNIVERSITY, STATE OF
20 CALIFORNIA, AND CYNTHIA DALEY, Date: September 9, 2020
AN INDIVIDUAL, AND DEBRA LARSON, Time: 9:00 a.m.
21 AN INDIVIDUAL, Dept: 10
Judge: Robert A. Glusman
22 Defendants. Trial Date: none
23

Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintifrs Second
Amended Complaint ( 19CVO 1226)
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
Page
3 Introduction ............................................... ........ ...................................... :....................................... 6

4 Argument ........................................................................................................................................ 6
I. Randolph Misstates the Facts and Law Regarding the Meet and Confer
5 Process ............................................................................................................... ..... 6
II. Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.4l(b) Has No App~ication ........................... 7
6
III. " Wrongful Termination/Constructive Discharge" May Not Be Maintained
7 Against a Public Entity As a Matter of Law................................... ........................ 7
IV. The Ninth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
8
Should Be Dismissed Because the SAC Lacks Sufficient Factual
9 Allegations to State a Claim .................................................................................... 8
v. The Eleventh Cause of Action for Defamation Should Be Dismissed
10 Because Randolph Failed to Comply with the Government Tort Claims Act
and the Facts Pleaded Do Not State a Valid Cause of Action .............................. 10
11
A. Randolph Failed to Comply with the Government Tort Claims Act ........ 10
12 B. Randolph Failed to " Substantially Comply" With the Government
Tort Claims Act. .................................................. :...... ..... ... ....................... 13
13
C. The SAC Fails to State a Claim Against to Larson ................................... 14
14 VI. The Twelfth Cause of Action for Invasion of Privacy Should Be Dismissed
Because Randolph Failed to Comply with the Government Tort Claims
15 Act. ....................................................................................... .... ...... .......................
14
16 Conclusion ........................................................................... ... .......... ............................................
15

17
18

22
23

24
25
26
27

28
2
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion. for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint (19CVO 1226)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
3 CASES

4 Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc.
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 493 ....................... .. ..................................................................................... 9,
10
5

6 Barot v. City ofBerkeley
(2020) WL 3529339 ...................................................... ....... ....................................................... 8
7
Buscemi v. McDonnel Douglas Corp.
8 (9th Cir. 1984) 736 F.2d 1348 .......................................................... ..... ..... ................................. 9

9 City ofSan Jose v. Sup. Ct.
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 ..................................................................... .... ....................................... 13
10
Connelly v. City of Fresno
11
(2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 29 ...................................................................................................... . 13
12
Dixon v. City ofLivermore
13 (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 32 ....................................................................................................... 12
.
14 Gong v. City ofRosemead
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363 .. ........ ........................................................................................... 14
15
Green v. Ralee Eng. Co.
16
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 66 ........................................................... ...... ........ i ......................................... 7
17
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n
18 (1994) 7 Cal.4th 16 ............................................. ,..................................................................... 15

19 Jones v. Oxnard Sch. Dist.
(1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 587 ............................................................... :......................................... 9
20
Lawler v. Mont blanc North America, LLC
21 (9th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 1235 ............................. :....................................................................... 9
22
Light v. Cal. Dep 't. ofParks & Recreation
23 (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75 ................................... ........... ................... :................................... 9,
10

24 McKinney v. City ofHawthorne
(E.D. Cal. 2008) 2008 WL 11338194 ................. :............................................................... 12, 15
25
Miklosy v. Regents of the University of Calif. .
26 (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876 .................................................................................................. ........... 7, 8
27 Pitman v. City of Oakland
28 (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037 ....................................................................................................... 9
3
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint (19CVO 1226)
l TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2

3 Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp. .
(1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 241 ............................................................... ..... ................................... l 0
4
Searcy v. Hemet Unified School District
5
(1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792 ......................................................................................................... 8
6
Shoemaker v. Myers
7 (1990) 52 CalJd 1 ................................................................................................. ...... ............... 8

8 Shoemaker v. Myers
(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1407 ............................................................................................. 8,
13, 14
9
Sparks v. Kern County Board ofSupervisors
10
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 794 ................................ .............................................................. .11,
13
11
Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint.Powers Ins. Authority
12 (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441 ......................................................................................................... 10,
12

13 Taus v. Loftus
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 683 .................................. ............................................................................. 11
14
Turner v. State of California
15 (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 883 ..................................................................... ...... ..... ....................... l l
16
STATUTES

17
Code of Civil Procedure
18 § 430.41 .................................. .. ....... ....... ........................................................................ .7,
14, 15
§ 438 .................................................................................................. ~ ......................................... 8
19 §439 ................................................................................................................................ .. ......6,7
20 Government Code
21
§ 815 ........................................................................................................................................ 7, 8
§ 900 .......................................................................................................................................... 14
22 § 910 ...................................................................................... .. ... ....... : ................................... 8,
10

23 Government Tort Claims Act .................................................................................................. passim

24 COURT RULES

25 California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115 .................................................. :......................................... 8
26
27

28
4
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
· Amended Complaint ( l 9CVO 1226)
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2

3 OTHER AUTHORITIES

4 Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedur~ Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 2009) 117:307, 7:308 ... .. ................................................................................................ .7
5
6

8
9

26
27

28
5
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion·for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint ( l 9CVO 1226)
1 INTRODUCTION
2 Randolph's opposition to Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings fails to refute

3 any of the arguments made in the opening papers. Among other things, the opposition misstates

4 both facts and law, contradicts documented evidence, cites statutes that do not apply to motions

5 for judgment on the pleadings, and even cites to unpublished cases where Randolph cannot

6 otherwise find persuasive authority. None of Randolph's arguments cure the fatal defects in the

7 pleadings. The Court should grant this motion without leave to amend because the deficiencies
8 cannot be cured by amendment.

9 ARGUMENT
10 I. RANDOLPH MISSTATES THE FACTS AND LAW REGARDING THE MEET AND CONFER PROCESS

11 Defendants fully satisfied the meet and confer obligations before.filing their motion for
12 judgment on the pleadings. Communications between counsel demonstrate that Defendants

13 attempted to meet and confer at least six times, but Randolph's counsel, Tom Dimitre, twice

14 refused to discuss the issues during telephone calls, and then failed to respond whatsoever to

15 Defendants' further attempts to meet and confer in writing. (Deschler Deel., ,i,i 5-8, Exhs. D, E,

I6 F.) As Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a)(3)(B) states, where a party fails to

17 respond to meet and confer efforts, the moving party's obligation is sattsfied. That is what

18 occurred here, and it is disingenuous for Randolph to now argue for the first time that there was
19 no meet and confer process.

20 Defendants sent a detailed letter describing the facts and law sup~orting the motion for
21 judgment on the pleadings. During a telephone call on October 10, 201 9, Mr. Dimitre stated

22 unequivocally that Defendants should "go ahead and file" because he was not willing to cure the

23 defects voluntarily. (Deschler Deel., ,i,i 5, 6, Exh. D.)

24 In a subsequent telephone call in late February 2020-after the Court ruled on Defendants'
25 prior motion for judgment on the pleadings on February 10, 2020-Mr. Dimitre again said he was

26 unwilling to discuss and that Defendants should simply file their motion. (Deschler Deel., ,i 8.)

27 Defendants sent two detailed letters and sent numerous emails to attempt to schedule a
28 further telephone call, many of which were after the.Court ruled on the prior motion. Mr. Dimitre
6
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint (19CVO 1226)
1 ignored Defendants' requests. (Deschler Deel.,~~ 5~8, Exhs. D, E, F.) ·Defendants' two

2 telephone calls and several written communications far exceed what is required by section 439.

3 To the extent a breakdown in communication occurred, it was caused by Mr. Dimitre refusing to

4 respond in good faith to Defendants' attempts to communicate.

5 II. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 430.41(B) HAS No APPLICATION

6 The present motion is a motion for judgment on the pleadings-not a demurrer, as Randolph

7 erroneously contends. Therefore, Code of Civil Procedure, section 43 Q.41 has no application.

8 Absent a change in law, a party generally may not raise an issue in a subsequent demurrer
9 that was not raised in an earlier demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 430.41, subd. (b).) However, no

10 rule prevents a party from raising new issues in a different type of moti.on, such as a motion for

11 judgment on the pleadings. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial

12 (The Rutter Group 2009) ,r,r 7:307, 7:308 [noting that section 430.41, subd. (b), has no application

13 to motions other than demurrers, and should not bar a party from raising different grounds not
14 raised in a prior demurrer].) Because the present motion is not a demurrer, section 431.41 has no
15 application. Therefore, Defendants cannot be in violation of section 431.41 , subdivision (b).

16 Ill. "WRONGFUL TERMINATION/CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE" MAY NOT BE
MAINTAINED AGAINST A PUBLIC ENTITY AS A MATTER OF LAW.
17

18 The common law claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy is barred by

19 the state's sovereign immunity, and may never be alleged against a public entity as a matter of
20 law. (Gov. Code,§ 815; see also, e.g., Miklosy v. Regents of the University of Calif. (2008) 44

21 Cal.4th 876. 899.) As the California Supreme Court explained in Miklosy, the state may be sued,

22 but only for violations of statutes that permit government liability. (Miklosy, at 899 [internal
23 citations omitted; emphasis in original].) Randolph has not ever cited any legal authority holding
24 to the contrary or providing any exception to this well-established rule.

25 Randolph fails to address the California Supreme Court precedent in Miklosy. Randolph' s
26 attempt to distinguish Tameny claims that are "attached to statutory violations" (Randolph Opp.,

27 at 6:21-25) misstates the law because Tameny claims must always be attached to violations of a
28 public policy that is tied to a statute. (See, e.g., Green v. Ralee Eng. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 79
7
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint ( 19CVO 1226)
1 [Tameny actions are limited to "those claims finding support in an important public policy based

2 on a statutory or constitutional provision."].) Randolph's eighth cause of action is no different in

3 that regard.

4 Randolph also misstates the holding in Shoemaker v. Myers, (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1407.

5 Shoemaker did not permit a Tameny claim against a public entity, as Randolph erroneously

6 asserts. (Randolph Opp., at 6:23-7:8.) The issue ofwhetber Government Code section 815 bars

7 such claims was not even before the Court of Appeal in Shoemaker. Randolph ignores that the

8 Shoemaker court held that the Tameny claim was barred by section 821.6 immunity. (Id. , at

9 1425.) Additionally, this earlier Court of Appeal decision did not even address the ultimate issue

10 decided by the California Supreme Court in Miklosy: that Tameny claims are barred as a matter

11 oflaw against public entities by virtue of Government Code section 815. (Miklosy, at 899.)

12 Randolph's citation to Barot v. City ofBerkeley, (2020) 2020 WL 3529339, is similarly

13 unavailing. As a preliminary matter, Barot is unpublished and may not be cited nor relied upon.

14 (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 8.1115.) Moreover, Baro!,~ negligence case, did not even address the

15 viability of Tameny claims against public entities. (See generally Barot, 2020 WL 3529339.)

16 Searcy v. Hemet Unified School District, (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d '792, and Wang v. City of

17 Clear Lake, (an unpublished federal decision) are al~o unavailing. As Randolph admits, both

18 cases dismissed Tameny claims against public entities. (Randolph Opp., at 7:22-8:6.)

19 Randolph ignores controlling California Supreme Court authority holding that Tameny

20 claims are barred by the state's sovereign immunity. (Gov. Code, § 815; see also, e.g., Miklosy,
21 at 899.) Consequently, Randolph's eighth cause of action should be dismissed.

22 IV. THE NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE SAC LACKS SUFFICIENT FACTUAL
23 ALLEGATIONS TO STATE A CLAIM

24 Randolph's intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action fails to "state facts

25 sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c).) Specifically,

26 Randolph fails to plead facts that demonstrate "extreme and outrageous" conduct.

27 A difficult work environment, conflicts with supervisors, and even being fired are

28 insufficient to state a claim. (See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 25 [supervisor' s
8
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants ' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint ( 19CVO 1226)
1 alleged statement that he wanted to cause plaintiff "~s much grief as possible" insufficient];

2 Lawler v. Montblanc North America, LLC (9th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 1235, 1245-1246 [CEO' s

3 gruff, abrupt and intimidating manner of communicating criticisms did not qualify as

4 "outrageous" where conduct and criticisms related t? store's business operations and employee' s

5 conduct as manager]; see also Buscemi v. McDonnel Douglas Corp. (9th Cir. 1984) 736 F.2d 1348,

6 1352.) In Pitman v. City ofOakland, (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, the'Court of Appeal

7 explained, " [b]eing dismissed from a job is not an uncommon occurrence in modern society."

8 (Id. , at 1047 [affirming demurrer].) Rather, "[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted
9 is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." (Id [emphasis added].)

10 This Court sustained the demurrer to the same cause of action in Randolph's FAC, but

11 allowed Randolph to attempt to amend and plead additional facts to salvage her claim:

12 [T]he conduct alleged in the First Amended Complaint does not rise to
the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to plead a cause
13 of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
14 (Order, dated September 11, 2019 [emphasis added].)

15 Randolph's SAC fails to plead any additional facts to support this cause of action.

16 Paragraphs 50 and 80 appear to be copied verbatim from the F AC and allege no new facts

17 whatsoever. (Deschler Deel., ~ 6; SAC,~~ 50, 80.) The "new" allegations in paragraph 90 are

18 largely argument of counsel (Defendants allegedly made Randolph's life a "living hell") or
19 summaries of other causes of action ( e.g., emotional distress was allegedly caused by the CSU' s

20 alleged failure to accommodate her disability), rather than additional facts. Legal contentions and

21 conclusions of law do not meet a plaintiffs burden to plead facts in the. complaint to state a cause
22 of action. (See, e.g. , Jones v. Oxnard Sch. Dist. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 587, 593-94.)

23 The cases in Randolph's opposition do not salvage her deficient cause of action. In Alcorn

24 v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493 , the plaintiffs supervisor yelled at the African-

25 American plaintiff and repeatedly used racial slurs in doing so, threatened him, fired him, and

26 threatened to fire all others of the plaintiff's race. (Id, at 496-97.)
27 In Light v. Cal. Dep 't. ofParks & Recreation, (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75 , the plaintiffs
28 supervisor pursued the plaintiff at home, and verbally and physically attacked her. (Id , at 102.)
9
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion·for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint (19CV01226)
1 In Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp. , (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 241 , the

2 plaintiff's supervisor threatened to fire her for dating another employee outside of work, which

3 did not appear to interfere with her work performance whatsoever, giving the plaintiff an

4 ultimatum to end the relationship, subsequently telling the plaintiff that "he had made up her

5 mind for her," and firing her when she refused to comply. (Id, at 245-46, 254-55.) One of two

6 factors that was crucial to the court's analysis was the fact that the plaintiff's supervisor punished

7 her for conduct occurring in her private life outside of the workplace and unrelated to her job in

8 any way. (Id. , at 255.)

9 In each of the above cases, the conduct at issue is far more severe than the facts alleged by

10 Randolph. There is no outburst of threats and racial slurs, as in Alcorn. There is no physical

11 assault, as in Light. There is no allegation that Randolph was harassed ,and punished at work for

12 conduct occurring outside of work in her private life, as in Rulon-Miller. The allegations in

13 Randolph' s SAC, although lengthy, involves only work-related conduct.

14 As this Court has already ruled, Randolph's complaint allegation~ are insufficient to state a

15 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

16 V. THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE RANDOLPH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS
17 ACT AND THE FACTS PLEADED DO NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION

18 Randolph' s defamation claims as a whole is barred as against all Defendants because she

19 failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act. Additionally, Randolph' s contention that

20 she "substantially complied" is not correct.

21 A. Randolph Failed to Comply with the Government Tort Claims Act
22 Government Code section 9 IO requires that a claim show all of six required items in the

23 plaintiffs Government Tort Claims Act form, including "(c) [t]he date, place, and other

24 circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted" and "(d) [a]

25 general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it

26 may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim." (Id.; see also Stockett v. Association

27 of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004)
.
34 Cal.4th 441 , 447. [citing Gov.

28 Code, §§ 919, 945.4].) Adding additional or differert claims in a subsequent civil lawsuit fails to
10
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Am~nded Complaint (l9CVOI226)
1 satisfy the substantial compliance exception, and is "an obvious subversion of the purposes of

2 [the Tort Claims Act]." (Turner v. State of California (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 883, 890-91.)

3 Here, Randolph failed to state the date, place, ru1d other circumstances giving rise to her

4 defamation claim. Although the claim presentation requirements of th~ Tort Claims Act are less

5 exacting than the pleading requirements for a civil complaint, a plaintiff must still state facts

6 satisfying every essential element of her claim. (See Sparks v. Kern County Board ofSupervisors

7 (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 794, 800.) To state a defamation claim, Randolph must allege facts

8 showing that Defendants made: (1) a publication about the plaintiff; (2) that is false; (3) that is

9 defamatory; and (4) that has a natural tendency to injute or that causes special damages. (Taus v.

10 Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) None of these elements appear in her CSU Claim Form. When

11 asked to describe her claims in box 17 of her claim fonn, Randolph stated: " Intentional and negligent

12 infliction of physical and emotional distress, loss of job, loss of wages, loss ofretirement earnings,

13 and public humiliation." (Deschler Deel., Yi 3; RJN, Exh. A.) Not only does Randolph fail to state

14 "defamation," she does not describe any false statements made to a third party whatsoever. Likewise,

15 when asked in box 19 to further explain why she believes the CSU is responsible for her alleged

16 damages, Randolph only referenced the CSU's alleged failure to accommodate her alleged disability

17 and to engage in an interactive process. (Ibid) Randolph's CSU Claim Form thus appears to only

18 allege claims for intentional and negligent infliction o( emotional distress, claims related to her

19 termination, and claims related to accommodation of her alleged disability.

20 Randolph erroneously claims that factual allegations buried in her 4-page "Claim Form

21 Attachment" are sufficient to aJlege a defamation claim. (Randolph Opp., at 15:18-16:3.)
22 Randolph's contention that listing "humiliation" supports her defamation claim (Randolph Opp.,

23 at 15: 18-19) ignores the fact that "humiliation" does not satisfy even a single element of

24 defamation. Randolph also claims that her allegations in the CSU Claim Form that Randolph' s

25 supervisor "worked to diminish and disrespect [Randolph's] role" and allegedly worked to make

26 Randolph "look inefficient," and that her supervisor may have told unnamed faculty members at

27 some indeterminate time or times that Randolph made some "mistakes" are sufficient. (Randolph
28 Opp., at 15:20-26, 16:1-3.) None of these allegations describe a "false statement" about
11
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint (19CV01226)
1 Randolph to a third party, sufficient to state a claim for defamation. Moreover, Randolph fails

2 whatsoever to state the date and place of any such false statement. The claims statute is designed

3 to give a public entity "notice sufficient for it to investigate and evaluate the claim ...."

4 (Stockett, 34 Cal.4th, at 446.) Without the date and place of any false statement, or a description

5 of the alleged false statement or its alleged recipient; there is no way for the CSU to investigate

6 and evaluate a claim. Indeed, it could not even determine which potential witnesses to interview

7 as part of an investigation. Tellingly, Randolph cites no authority permitting a defamation claim

8 to survive on such vague allegations in a Tort Claim form.

9 Additionally, Randolph failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act because the

10 facts alleged in the tort claim do not correspond to those in her Second Amended Complaint, and

11 are instead completely different. To satisfy the clairp presentation requirements, "the factual

12 circumstances set forth in the written claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the
'
13 complaint." (Dixon v. City ofLivermore (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 32, 40.) Randolph's defamation

14 cause of action in the SAC is based on two alleged s~atements: (1) Carl Pittman allegedly said in

15 a public meeting that the Institute for Sustainable Development was being dissolved because there

16 were personnel problems in the department, which he allegedly heard from individual defendant

I7 Debra Larson; and (2) individual defendant Daley allegedly told CSU employees that Randolph

18 was responsible for "shutting down the Conference." (SAC,~~ 42, 58, 146.) Neither statement

19 appears anywhere in Randolph's CSU Claim Form, generally or specifically. The allegations in

20 the Claim Form that Randolph now belatedly attempts to argue show defamation are different in

21 kind and character from those in the SAC. Consequently, Randolph cannot now argue that the

22 allegations in her written claim "correspond with the facts alleged in the complaint."

23 Lastly, Randolph cannot rely on additional allegations in her separate complaint to the

24 California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") to satisfy the claim

25 presentation requirements. "Service of a complaint on the EEOC or DFEH does not comply with

26 the presentation requirements" of the Tort Claims Act. (McKinney v. City ofHawthorne (E.D.
27 Cal. 2008) 2008 WL I 1338194, at *4 [citing California law].) Reference to extrinsic documents

28 filed with any other agency simply do not satisfy the claim presentatioq requirement of the
12
Defendants' Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second
Amended Complaint (19CVOJ226)
1 Government Tort Claims Act. (See Sparks v. Kern <;:aunty Board of Supervisors (2009) 173

2 Cal.App.4th 794, 800.) Consequently, Randolph's references to her DFEH complaint cannot save

3 her deficient defamation claim. (Randolph Opposition, at 16:6-15, Exli. 3.)

4 The Court should also note that Randolph attempts to confuse the issue by quoting from her

5 DFEH complaint, which is Exhibit 3, and then misattributing it to her CSU Claim Form by

6 incorrectly citing it as "Exhibit 2." (Randolph Opp., at 16:8-10.) Moreover, Randolph then

7 falsely states that the same allegations appearing in her DFEH complaint are repeated "in sections

8 15 and 17 of the Tort Notice." (Randolph Opp., at 16:15-16.) The CSU Claim Form, sections 15
9 and 17, state no such thing. Randolph's representation to the Court is false.

10 Nothing in Randolph's CSU Claim Form alleges the elements of a defamation claim, or

11 sufficiently describes the "date, place, and other circumstances" of such a claim. Moreover, the

12 allegations in Randolph's CSU Claim Form do not in any way correspond to the allegations in the

13 SAC. Consequently, Randolph's eleventh cause of action should be dismissed.
14 B. Randolph Failed to "Substantially Comply" With the Government Tort Claims Act
15 A plaintiff "substantially complies" with the Government Claims. Act only if there is some

16 compliance with all of the statutory requirements. (City ofSan Jose v. Sup. Ct. (1974) 12 Cal.3d

17 447, 456.) The "substantial compliance" exception inay only save a claim that is only "technically

18 deficient in one or more particulars." (Connelly v. City of Fresno (200?) 146 Cal.App.4th 29, 38.)

19 The exception does not cure the total omission of an essential element from the claim, or remedy a

20 plaintiffs failure to comply meaningfully with the statutory claim presentation requirements.

21 (Sparks v. Kern County Bd. ofSupervisors, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th, at 800.)

22 Here, Randolph's failure to allege defamation or set forth the same alleged defamatory

23 statements alleged in the SAC does not satisfy the sl:lbstantial compliance doctrine because it do

Case Info

Judge

Benson, Stephen E Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

September 01, 2020

Case Filing Date

April 19, 2019

County

Parties

Daley, Cynthia Defendant
Deschler, Jerry James Attorney for the Defendant
Dimitre, Thomas Nicholas Attorney for the Plaintiff
Larson, Debra Defendant
Randolph, Teresa Plaintiff
State of California Defendant
Trustees of the California State University Defendant
Matthew Jones Attorney
Brian Panish Attorney
Spencer Lucas Attorney
Matthew Freeman Attorney
James Thompson Attorney
William Goines Attorneys for Defendants
Cindy Hamilton Attorneys for Defendants
Shauna Imanaka Attorneys for Defendants
Caroline Cohen Attorney
Andrew Weaver Attorney
Philippe Gaudard Attorney
Edwin Aiwazian Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Arby Aiwazian Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Roman Shkodnik Attorneys for Plaintiffs
David Yeremian Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Barbara Blackburn Attorneys for Plaintiffs
John Adams Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Douglas Ropel Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Motion-Secondary: Randolph, Teresa vs Trustees of the California State University et al

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