Preview
1 XAVIER BECERRA
Attorney General of California
2 PETER D. HALLORAN 11/19/2019
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
3 JERRY J. DESCHLER
Deputy Attorney General
4 State Bar No. 215691
1300 I Street, Suite 125
5 P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
6 Telephone: (916) 210-7871
Fax: (916) 324-5567
7 E-mail: Jerry.Deschler@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys for Defendants
8 Board of Trustees of the California State University,
which is the State of California acting in its higher
9 education capacity (erroneously sued as "Trustees
of the California State University, State of
10 Caltfornia ''), Cynthia Daley, and Debra Larson
11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12 COUNTY OF BUTTE
13 CIVIL DIVISION
14
15
TERESA RANDOLPH, Case No. 19CV01226
16
Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
17 PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE STATEMENT
v. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
18 MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS
19 TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA
STATE UNIVERSITY, STATE OF Date: November 26, 2019 (cont. from
20 CALIFORNIA, AND CYNTHIA DALEY, Oct. 2, 2019)
AN INDIVIDUAL, AND DEBRA LARSON, Time: 9:00 a.m.
21 AN INDIVIDUAL, Dept: 10
Judge: The Honorable Robert A.
22 Defendant. Glusman
Trial Date: none
23 Action Filed: April 24, 2019
24 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345, and this Court's ruling on November
25 13, 2019, Defendants Board of Trustees of the California State University, at the California State
26 University, Chico campus (collectively, the "CSU"), Cynthia Daley, and Debra Larson, provide
27 the following Response To Plaintiff's Separate Statement Regarding Motion To Compel
28 Production of Documents and Request for Attorney's Fees.
1
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 After Plaintiff Teresa Randolph ("Randolph") filed the instant motion, this Court ruled that
2 the motion was defective because Randolph failed to file a separate statement as required by Rule
3 3.1345 and Randolph failed to meet and confer prior to filing the motion. Subsequent to that,
4 Randolph partially met and conferred, and the parties agreed to compromise on most of the
5 requests at issue. Defendants agreed to voluntarily comply with 67 of Randolph's 88 requests.
6 Consequently, notwithstanding that Randolph's separate statement lists all 88 requests,
7 Defendants will include only the 21 requests herein that are actually still at issue-namely,
8 requests nos. 15, 18,23,33,37,43,55,58,63,64,67, 70,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88.
9 Additionally, subject to its objections, Defendants also agreed to comply with requests 15 and 58.
10 Lastly, Randolph omits any discussion of the fact that Defendants have agreed to produce
11 relevant documents responsive to several requests (e.g., Requests 33, 37, 55, and 63), but
12 Randolph has not met her obligations under electronic discovery rules to cooperate and limit the
13 scope of the hundreds of thousands of potentially responsive documents to be searched and
14 reviewed; as a result, Defendants are forced to spend extensive time attempting to formulate and
15 run its own search algorithms to limit the scope (which it is in the process of doing).
16 Defendants decline to address the improper legal arguments in the first 14 pages of
17 Randolph's separate statement because they are not proper subject matter for a separate
18 statement, and do not comply with Rule of Court 3.1345. Defendants address those issues more
19 fully in their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the motion.
20 As a preliminary matter, Randolph's separate statement is defective in that it does not set
21 forth any facts establishing good cause for even a single request for production of documents. A
22 separate statement "must include-for each discovery request ... [a] statement of the factual and
23 legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in
24 dispute." (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Randolph omits any
25 discussion whatsoever of the factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request.
26 Therefore, Randolph also has not met and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set
27 forth specific facts showing good cause" for each demand for which she now seeks to compel
28 production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95
2
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet this mandatory threshold requirement, her
2 motion should be denied on that basis alone.
3 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AT ISSUE
4 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:
5 All documents pertaining to the orientation or any training received by Plaintiff or other
6 employees (including managers and supervisors) during the course of employment that related to
7 the Defendant's employment practices, from January 1, 2010 to present.
8 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:
9 Defendan15 [sic] object to this re-quest to the extent it seeks production of ES! [sic}, except
10 as otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue
11 burden and expense or retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.ZlO(d)
.12 [sic}.) Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden of
13 producing such electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030,
14 2031.060(1), 2031.310(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the
15 production of such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined;
16 Defendants will further meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for
17 relevant documents and translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of
18 Civil Procedure section 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds
19 that Defendants Cynthia Daley and Debra Larson were. never at any time Plaintiffs employers
20 and, as such, do not have possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants
21 further object to this request on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object
22 to this request as compound, overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks
23 documents neither relevant to this action nor reaso:nably calculated to lead to the discovery or
24 admissible evidence. Defendants further object to this request to the extent it seeks information
25 protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.· Defendants further
26 object to this request to the extent it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by
27 the right to privacy of Defendants and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1
28 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other
3
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 state and federal rules and regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not
2 party to the action is mentioned therein.
3 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER
4 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:
5 None provided by Randolph.
6 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING
7 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:
8 Randolph Failed To Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response.
9 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request,
10 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal.
11 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met
12 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause"
13 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310,
14 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet
15 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone.
16 This Request Is Vague, Ambiguous, and Unintelligible, Overbroad, and Seeks
17 Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the Present Action.
18 This request is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible on its face such that Defendants could
19 not tell what records are being sought. During the meet and confer process, Defendants informed
20 Randolph that they could not ascertain what documents Randolph is seeking.
21 The request is overbroad if, as it purports on its face, it seeks training records for other
22 unspecified employees of the CSU. The CSU employs over 50,000 faculty and staff at 23
23 campuses and eight off-campus centers throughout the state of California. The CSU is not
24 required to search, much less produce, all records pertaining to training of any employee on any
25 subject throughout its entire system. Such a request is unreasonable on its face.
26 The records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to the
27 discovery of admissible evidence. Although the relevance standard under the Discovery Act is
28 broad, the information sought must be relevant to the "subject matter " of the pending litigation.
4
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.010.) The present action involves whether or not Randolph was
2 discriminated or retaliated against in her employment with the CSU. (See generally Complaint.)
3 Whether or not any particular employee received training has no bearing on any element of
4 Randolph's claims or any defense thereto. This request thus appears to be an overbroad fishing
5 expedition into irrelevant matters.
6 Moreover, because the request seeks personnel records of nonparty employees, such
7 information is protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such non-litigants pursuant to
8 Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
9 as well as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See Perez v. County of Santa Clara
10 (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 671, 678 [non-litigant employee records protected from disclosure.by
11 employees' right to privacy], disapproved on other grounds in Williams v. Chino Valley
12 Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97 .) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information
13 may be shielded from discovery in California if its disclosure would impair a person's
14 "inalienable right of privacy" under Calif. Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup. Ct. (San Diego Unified
15 Port Dist.) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 852-864.) To the extent private personnel information of
16 nonparties is discoverable at all, it must be sought through the "least intrusive means." (See
17 Perez, at 678 [emphasis added].) Here, to the extent Randolph is entitled to discover whether
18 some other specific employee received training during the course of his or her employment,
19 Randolph can simply ask that question during a deposition rather than attempting to obtain all
20 training records of all CSU employees.
21 Randolph has never indicated in any meet and confer correspondence or in her motion why
22 the records sought are relevant and discoverable over Defendants' objections. Consequently, her
23 motion should be denied.
24 CSU Agrees to Produce a Narrowed Scope of Relevant Records.
25 Randolph states in her Separate Statement that she is now agreeing to limit the scope of this
26 request to training documents "regarding reasonable accommodation/interactive
27 process/disability" for "Randolph, Daley, Larson, Saake, Neuhart, John Unruh, Jim Pushnik,
28 Gayle Hutchinson, Eileen Chavez, Mr. Grassian, Ms. Jennifer Mayes, and Pamela Hollis."
5
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
· Documents (19CV01226)
1 (Plaintiff's Separate Statement Regarding Motion To Compel Document Production, at p. 26, 11.
2 14-17.) Randolph has never articulated this limitation to Defendants. (Supp. Deschler Deel.,~
3 4.) CSU agrees to produce such documents, as now limited by Randolph. Therefore, this request
4 appears to be moot.
5 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:
6 All documents related to defendants ' efforts to prevent discrimination, harassment and
7 retaliation in the workplace, including those made by the defendants to comply with state and
8 federal laws or regulations relating to the maintenance of a discrimination, harassment and
9 retaliation free environment.
10 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:
11 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES/, except as
12 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue
13 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.210(d).)
14 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such
15 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060(1),
16 2031.310(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production of
17 such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further
18 meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and
19 translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section
20 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia
21 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiffs employers and, as such, do not have
22 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request
23 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compound,
24 overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this
25 action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants
26 further object to this request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client .
27 privilege and/or the work product doctrine. Defendants further object to this request to the extent
28 it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of Defendants
6
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the
2 Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal rules and
3 regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not party to the action is
4 mentioned therein.
5 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER
6 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:
7 None provided by Randolph.
8 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING
9 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18:
10 Randolph Failed to Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response.
11 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request,
12 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal.
13 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met
14 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause"
I
15 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310,
16 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet
17 this· mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone.
18 This Request Is Vague, Ambiguous, and Unintelligible, Overbroad, and Seeks
19 Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the Present Action.
20 This request is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible on its face such that Defendants could
21 not tell what records are being sought. During the meet and confer process, Defendants informed
22 Randolph that they could not ascertain what documents Randolph is seeking. Randolph has never
23 clarified. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3, 4, 7.)
24 The request appears to be overbroad, in that it seeks some unspecified records regarding the
25 CSU' s practices statewide. The CSU employs over 50,000 faculty and staff at 23 campuses and
26 eight off-campus centers throughout the state of California. The CSU is not required to search,
27 much less produce, all records pertaining to training of any employee on any subject throughout
28 its entire system. Such a request is unreasonable on its face.
7
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 To the extent this request is intended to seek records relating to individual employees other
2 than Randolph, the records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to
3 the discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, because the request seeks personnel records of
4 nonparty employees, such information is protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such
5 non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth
6 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See
7 Perez v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th, at 678 [non-litigant employee records
8 protected from disclosure by employees' right to privacy].) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged
9 information may be shielded from discovery in California if its disclosure would impair a
10 person's "inalienable right of privacy" under Calif. Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup. Ct., supra, 20
11 Cal.3d, at 852-864.)
12 Randolph has never indicated in any meet and confer correspondence or in her motion why
13 the records sought are relevant and discoverable over Defendants' objections. (Supp. Deschler
14 Deel., ,r 4.) Consequently, her motion should be denied.
15 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23:
16 Any and all documents relating to Defendants' disability compliance, training and
17 standards.
18 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23:
19 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES!, except as
20 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue
21 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.210(d).)
22 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such
23 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060(1),
24 2031.310(g).) Defendants have attempted 10 meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production or
25 such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further
26 meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and
27 translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section
28 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia
8
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have
2 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request
3 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compound,
4 overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this
5 action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants
6 further object to this request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-
7 clielll[sic] privilege and/or the work product doctrine. Defendants further object to this request
8 to the extent it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by the right to privacy
9 of Defendants and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the C.alifornia
10 Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal
11 rules and regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not party to the action
12 is mentioned therein.
13 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER
14 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23:
15 None provided by Randolph.
16 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING
17 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23:
18 Randolph Failed to Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response.
19 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request,
20 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal.
21 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met
22 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause"
23 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310,
24 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet
25 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone.
26 III
27 III
28 III
9
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 This Request Is Vague, Ambiguous, and Unintelligible, Overbroad, and Seeks
2 Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the Present Action.
3 This request is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible on its face such that Defendants could
4 not tell what records are being sought. During the meet and confer process, Defendants informed
5 Randolph that they could not ascertain what documents Randolph is seeking.
6 The request is overbroad if, as it purports on its face, it seeks training records for other
7 unspecified employees of the CSU. The CSU employs over 50,000 faculty and staff at 23
8 campuses and eight off-campus centers throughout the state of California. The CSU is not
9 required to search, much less produce, a:11 records pertaining to training of any employee on any
10 subject throughout its entire system. Such a request is unreasonable on its face.
11 The records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to the
12 discovery of admissible evidence. Although the relevance standard under the Discovery Act is
13 broad, the information sought must be relevant to the "subject matter " of the pending litigation.
14 (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.010.) The present action involves whether or not Randolph was
15 discriminated or retaliated against in her employment with the CSU. (See generally Complaint.)
16 Whether or not any particular employee received training has no bearing on any element of
17 Randolph's claims or any defense thereto. This request thus appears to be an overbroad fishing
18 expedition into irrelevant matters.
19 Moreover, because the request seeks personnel records of nonparty employees, such
20 information is protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such non-litigants pursuant to
21 Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
22 as well as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See Perez v. County of Santa Clara,
23 supra, 111 Cal.App.4th, at 678 [non-litigant employee records protec~ed from disclosure by
24 employees' right to privacy].) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded
25 from discovery in California if its disclosure would impair a person's "inalienable right of
26 privacy" under Calif. Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup.Ct., supra, 20 Cal.3d, at 852-864.) To the
27 extent private personnel information of nonparties is discoverable at all, it must be sought through
28 the "least intrusive means." (See Perez, at 678 [emphasis added].) Here, to the extent Randolph
10
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 is entitled to discover whether some other specific employee received training during the course
2 of his or her employment, Randolph can simply ask that question during a deposition rather than
3 attempting to obtain all training records of all CSU employees.
4 Randolph has never indicated in any meet and confer correspondence or in her motion why
5 the records sought are relevant and discoverable over Defendants' objections. (Supp. Deschler
6 Deel.,~ 4.) Moreover, despite that Randolph claims in her Separate Statement that she agreed to
7 limit the scope of this request (Plaintiff's Separate Statement Regarding Motion To Compel
8 Document Production, at p. 32, 11. 1-4), Defendants still cannot ascertain what documents are
9 being sought.
10 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:
11 All personal and University emails, texts, documentation, recordings or documentation of
12 phone calls and other communication of Ms. Daley, Ms. Larson, Mr. Saake, Ms. Neuhart, Mr.
13 Pushnik, Ms. Hutchinson, Mr. Grassian, Ms. Jennifer Mays, Ms. Pamela Hollis, Mr. Unruh, Ms.
14 Eileen Chavez related to Ms. Randolph.
15 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:
16 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES], except as
17 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue
18 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.210(d).)
19 Defendants further object 10 this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such
20 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060(!),
21 2031.JlO(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production of
22 such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further
23 meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and
24 translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section
25 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia
26 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have
27 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request
28 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compaund,
11
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
l overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this
2 action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants
"
3 farther object to this request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client
4 privilege and/or the work product doctrine. Defendants farther object lo this request to the extent
5 it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of Defendants
6 and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the
7 Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal rules and
8 regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not party to the action is
9 mentioned therein.
10 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER
11 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:
12 None provided by Randolph.
13 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING
14 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33:
15 Randolph Failed To Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response.
16 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request,
17 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal.
18 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met
19 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause"
20 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310,
21 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet
22 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone.
23 This Request Is Overbroad, and Seeks Documents Not Relevant in any Way to the
24 Present Action, and Randolph Refused to Comply with Electronic Discovery Rules.
25 The request is overbroad in that it seeks both work and private emails, texts, and other
26 documents, without limitation, for several individuals who are not parties to the present lawsuit.
27 Many of the records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to the
28 discovery of admissible evidence. Although the relevance standard under the Discovery Act is
12
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 broad, the information sought must be relevant to the "subject matter" of the pending litigation.
2 (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.010.) The present action involves whether or not Randolph was
3 discriminated or retaliated against in her employment with the CSU. (See generally Complaint.)
4 Emails, text messages, and other documents that have no bearing on the lawsuit allegations do not
5 pertain to the subject matter of this litigation. This request thus appears to be an overbroad
6 fishing expedition into irrelevant matters.
7 Moreover, because the request seeks records of nonparty employees, such information is
8 protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such non-litigants pursuant to Article I,
9 Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well
10 as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See Perez v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 111
11 Cal.App.4th, at 678 [non-litigant employee records protected from disclosure by employees' right
12 to privacy].) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded from discovery in
13 California if its disclosure would impair a person's "inalienable right of privacy" under Calif.
14 Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup.Ct., supra, 20 Cal.3d, at 852-864.)
15 .· Where, as here, a party seeks production of electronically stored information ("ESI"), the
16 California Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties to meet and confer to determine the scope
17 of ESI to be searched, the scope of ESI to be produced, the parameters and costs of such
18 searching and production, and other related issues. (Code Civ. Proc.,§§ 2016.040, 2031.310; see
19 also§ 2031.280, subd. (e) [requiring requesting party to pay reasonable costs associated with
20 production of ESI] and Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.724, subd. (8) [requiring the parties to meet and
21 confer regarding ESI].) Moreover, the burden is on the requesting party to demonstrate, not
22 merely that the requested ESI is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
23 evidence, but that the method of discovery is not unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into
24 account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and other factors. (Code Civ. Proc.,§
25 2019.030.) Courts shall limit the scope of discovery where the burden, expense, or intrusiveness
26 outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible
27 evidence. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.020.) This proportionality requirement is modeled after
28 Federal Rule 26(b)(l). As the written record of the parties' communications reflects, Randolph
13
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 did not substantively respond to any of Defendants' requests to meet and confer, as required by
2 the Code.
3 Defendants requested no less than nine times that the parties meet and confer regarding the
4 scope of discovery. (Deschler Deel., ,r,r 4-15, Exhs. A-I.) In several of those requests,
5 Defendants explained in detail that Randolph is required by the California Rules of Court and
6 Code of Civil Procedure to engage in that meet and confer process. (Exhs. A-E, H, I.) The
7 correspondence attached to Randolph's motion and Defendants' opposition shows that Randolph
8 never substantively addressed the requirements of the Code and Rules of Court in any way.
9 During subsequent meet and confer efforts, Randolph agreed to limit the scope of this
10 request to "personal and university emails, text, and phone records." (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r 6.)
11 The CSU does not have possession, custody, or control over any employee's personal emails,
12 texts, or other emails, and thus cannot and will not produce any such records. (Supp. Deschler
13 Deel., ,r 6.) With respect to emails and records within the CSU's possession, Defendants have
14 attempted several times to discuss relevant search terms with Randolph to narrow the scope of
15 documents to be searched and reviewed from the present database of over 500,000 documents and
16 several million pages. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3, 6.) Randolph has only agreed to the names of
17 relevant witnesses and has not agreed to any other search terms or limitations. (Supp. Deschler
18 Deel., ,r 6.) Without further limitations, it would take Defendants several months working full
19 time solely on this case to review all potentially-responsive documents. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r
20 3, 6.) This does not comport with the proportionality requirements of the Code of Civil
\
21 Procedure and Rules of Court. Consequently, Defendants are in the process of running various
22 search algorithms on its own to locate and produce the relevant documents. (Supp. Deschler
23 Deel., ,r 6.)
24 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:
25 Copies of all documentation, memos, emails, texts and any and all other documentation
I
26 regarding Mr. Saake, Ms. Larson, and Ms. Daley's communication related to the proposed
27 discipline of Ms. Randolph.
28 III
14
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:
2 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of electronically stored
3 data, documents or materials ("EST), except as otherwise produced, because such materials are
4 not reasonably accessible due to the undue burden and expense of retrieving them. Code Civ.
5 Proc.§§ 2031.280, 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that
6 the likely burden ofproducing such electronic data outweighs _any likely benefit. Code Civ. Proc.
7 §§ 2031.060(!), 2031.310(g). Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the
8 production of such materials, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further meet and confer if
9 Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and translating them into
10 reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210(d).
11 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia Daley and
12 Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have possession,
13 custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request to the
14 extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product
15 doctrine.
16 Subject to, and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant CSU responds as
17 follows: Defendant will produce all nonprivileged, responsive documents that do not constitute
18 ES/. To the extent Plaintiff engages in the meet-and-confer process to narrow the scope of
19 potential ES!, Defendant CSU may then produce additional documents.
20 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER
21 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:
22 None provided by Randolph.
23 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING
24 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37:
25 Randolph Failed To Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response.
26 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request,
27 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal.
28 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met
15
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause"
2 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310,
3 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet
4 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone.
5 This Request Is Overbroad, and Seeks Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the
6 Present Action, and Randolph Refused to Comply with Electronic Discovery Rules.
7 The request is overbroad in that it seeks both work and private emails, texts, and other
8 documents, without limitation, for several individuals who are not parties to the present lawsuit.
9 Defendants agreed during the meet and confer prqcess to produce all documents in pos~ession of
10 the CSU. The CSU does not have possession, custody, or control over any employee's personal
11 emails, texts, or other emails, and thus cannot and will not produce any such records. (Supp.
12 Deschler Deel., ~ 6.)
13 With regard to documents in possession of the CSU, Defendants have agreed to produce the
14 employment-related files for Randolph, including her personnel file, medical file, grievance files,
15 and other file locations. The only documents at issue are electronic records. Where, as here, a.
16 party seeks production of ESI, the California Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties to meet
.17 and confer to determine the scope of ESI to be searched, the scope of ESI to be produced, the
18 parameters and costs of such searching and production, and other related issues. (Code Civ.
19 Proc.,§§ 2016.040, 2031.310; see also§ 2031.280, subd. (e) [requiring requesting party to pay
20 reasonable costs associated with production of ESI] and Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.724, subd. (8)
21 [requiring the parties to meet and confer regarding ESI].) Moreover, the burden is on the
22 requesting party to demonstrate, not merely that the requested ESI is reasonably calculated to lead
23 to the discovery of admissible evidence, but that the method of discovery is not unduly
24 burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
25 and other factors. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2019.030.) Courts shall limit the scope of discovery where
26 the burden, expense, or intrusiveness outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will
27 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.020.) This proportionality
28 requirement is modeled after Federal Rule 26(b)(l). As the written record of the parties'
16
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
· Documents (19CV01226)
1 communications.reflects, Randolph did not substantively respond to any of Defendants' requests
2 ~o meet and confer, as required by the Code.
3 Defendants requested no less than nine times that the parties meet and confer regarding the
4 scope of discovery. (Deschler Deel., ,r,r 4-15, Exhs. A-I.) In several of those requests,
5 Defendants explained in detail that Randolph is required by the California Rules of Court and
6 Code of Civil Procedure to engage in that meet and confer process. (Exhs. A-E, H, I.) The
7 correspondence attached to Randolph's motion and Defendants' opposition shows that Randolph
8 never substantively addressed the requirements of the Code and Rules of Court in any way.
9 With respect to emails and records within the CSU' s possession, Defendants have
10 attempted several times to discuss relevant search terms with Randolph to narrow the scope of
11 documents to be searched and reviewed from the present database of over 500,000 documents and
12 several million pages. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3, 6.) Randolph has only agreed to the names of
13 relevant witness~s and has not agreed to any other search terms or limitations. (Supp. Deschler
14 Deel., ,r 6.) Without further limitatio_ns, it would take Defendants several months working full
15 time solely on this case to review all potentially-responsive documents. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r
16 6.) This does not'comport with the proportionality requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure
17 and Rules of Court. Consequently, Defendants are in the process of running various search
18 algorithms on its own to locate and produce the relevant documents. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3,
19 6.)
20 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 43:
21 All documents related to allegations of discrimination, harassment or retaliation by any of
22 the defendants, made by employees, customers, vendors, or others.
23 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 43:
24 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES!, except as
25 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue
26 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030; 2031.280, 203l.2JO(d).)
27 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such
28 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060([), 2031.3
17
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Documents (19CV01226)
1 IO(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production of such
2 materials, as required by Rule of Court 3.724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further meet
3 and confer if Plaintiff agrees lO pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and
4 translating them into reasonably usable foml in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section
5 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia
6 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have
7 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request
8 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compound,
9 overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this
10 action nor reasonably calculated to lead lO the discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover,
11 Defendant CSU has multiple facilities and thousands of employees throughout the state of
12 California, and is not required by law to compile a list of claims against the entire CSU system by
13 category. Defendants further objects on the grounds this interrogatory impermissibly seeks
14 inadmissible '-me too" evidence, which is prop
Preview
1 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California 2 PETER D. HALLORAN 11/19/2019 Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 JERRY J. DESCHLER Deputy Attorney General 4 State Bar No. 215691 1300 I Street, Suite 125 5 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 6 Telephone: (916) 210-7871 Fax: (916) 324-5567 7 E-mail: Jerry.Deschler@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Defendants 8 Board of Trustees of the California State University, which is the State of California acting in its higher 9 education capacity (erroneously sued as "Trustees of the California State University, State of 10 Caltfornia ''), Cynthia Daley, and Debra Larson 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 COUNTY OF BUTTE 13 CIVIL DIVISION 14 15 TERESA RANDOLPH, Case No. 19CV01226 16 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 17 PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE STATEMENT v. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 18 MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 19 TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, STATE OF Date: November 26, 2019 (cont. from 20 CALIFORNIA, AND CYNTHIA DALEY, Oct. 2, 2019) AN INDIVIDUAL, AND DEBRA LARSON, Time: 9:00 a.m. 21 AN INDIVIDUAL, Dept: 10 Judge: The Honorable Robert A. 22 Defendant. Glusman Trial Date: none 23 Action Filed: April 24, 2019 24 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345, and this Court's ruling on November 25 13, 2019, Defendants Board of Trustees of the California State University, at the California State 26 University, Chico campus (collectively, the "CSU"), Cynthia Daley, and Debra Larson, provide 27 the following Response To Plaintiff's Separate Statement Regarding Motion To Compel 28 Production of Documents and Request for Attorney's Fees. 1 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 After Plaintiff Teresa Randolph ("Randolph") filed the instant motion, this Court ruled that 2 the motion was defective because Randolph failed to file a separate statement as required by Rule 3 3.1345 and Randolph failed to meet and confer prior to filing the motion. Subsequent to that, 4 Randolph partially met and conferred, and the parties agreed to compromise on most of the 5 requests at issue. Defendants agreed to voluntarily comply with 67 of Randolph's 88 requests. 6 Consequently, notwithstanding that Randolph's separate statement lists all 88 requests, 7 Defendants will include only the 21 requests herein that are actually still at issue-namely, 8 requests nos. 15, 18,23,33,37,43,55,58,63,64,67, 70,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88. 9 Additionally, subject to its objections, Defendants also agreed to comply with requests 15 and 58. 10 Lastly, Randolph omits any discussion of the fact that Defendants have agreed to produce 11 relevant documents responsive to several requests (e.g., Requests 33, 37, 55, and 63), but 12 Randolph has not met her obligations under electronic discovery rules to cooperate and limit the 13 scope of the hundreds of thousands of potentially responsive documents to be searched and 14 reviewed; as a result, Defendants are forced to spend extensive time attempting to formulate and 15 run its own search algorithms to limit the scope (which it is in the process of doing). 16 Defendants decline to address the improper legal arguments in the first 14 pages of 17 Randolph's separate statement because they are not proper subject matter for a separate 18 statement, and do not comply with Rule of Court 3.1345. Defendants address those issues more 19 fully in their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the motion. 20 As a preliminary matter, Randolph's separate statement is defective in that it does not set 21 forth any facts establishing good cause for even a single request for production of documents. A 22 separate statement "must include-for each discovery request ... [a] statement of the factual and 23 legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in 24 dispute." (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Randolph omits any 25 discussion whatsoever of the factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request. 26 Therefore, Randolph also has not met and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set 27 forth specific facts showing good cause" for each demand for which she now seeks to compel 28 production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 2 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet this mandatory threshold requirement, her 2 motion should be denied on that basis alone. 3 REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AT ISSUE 4 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: 5 All documents pertaining to the orientation or any training received by Plaintiff or other 6 employees (including managers and supervisors) during the course of employment that related to 7 the Defendant's employment practices, from January 1, 2010 to present. 8 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: 9 Defendan15 [sic] object to this re-quest to the extent it seeks production of ES! [sic}, except 10 as otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue 11 burden and expense or retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.ZlO(d) .12 [sic}.) Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden of 13 producing such electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 14 2031.060(1), 2031.310(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the 15 production of such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined; 16 Defendants will further meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for 17 relevant documents and translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of 18 Civil Procedure section 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds 19 that Defendants Cynthia Daley and Debra Larson were. never at any time Plaintiffs employers 20 and, as such, do not have possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants 21 further object to this request on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object 22 to this request as compound, overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks 23 documents neither relevant to this action nor reaso:nably calculated to lead to the discovery or 24 admissible evidence. Defendants further object to this request to the extent it seeks information 25 protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine.· Defendants further 26 object to this request to the extent it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by 27 the right to privacy of Defendants and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 28 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other 3 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 state and federal rules and regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not 2 party to the action is mentioned therein. 3 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER 4 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: 5 None provided by Randolph. 6 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING 7 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: 8 Randolph Failed To Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response. 9 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request, 10 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal. 11 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met 12 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause" 13 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310, 14 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet 15 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone. 16 This Request Is Vague, Ambiguous, and Unintelligible, Overbroad, and Seeks 17 Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the Present Action. 18 This request is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible on its face such that Defendants could 19 not tell what records are being sought. During the meet and confer process, Defendants informed 20 Randolph that they could not ascertain what documents Randolph is seeking. 21 The request is overbroad if, as it purports on its face, it seeks training records for other 22 unspecified employees of the CSU. The CSU employs over 50,000 faculty and staff at 23 23 campuses and eight off-campus centers throughout the state of California. The CSU is not 24 required to search, much less produce, all records pertaining to training of any employee on any 25 subject throughout its entire system. Such a request is unreasonable on its face. 26 The records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to the 27 discovery of admissible evidence. Although the relevance standard under the Discovery Act is 28 broad, the information sought must be relevant to the "subject matter " of the pending litigation. 4 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.010.) The present action involves whether or not Randolph was 2 discriminated or retaliated against in her employment with the CSU. (See generally Complaint.) 3 Whether or not any particular employee received training has no bearing on any element of 4 Randolph's claims or any defense thereto. This request thus appears to be an overbroad fishing 5 expedition into irrelevant matters. 6 Moreover, because the request seeks personnel records of nonparty employees, such 7 information is protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such non-litigants pursuant to 8 Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 9 as well as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See Perez v. County of Santa Clara 10 (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 671, 678 [non-litigant employee records protected from disclosure.by 11 employees' right to privacy], disapproved on other grounds in Williams v. Chino Valley 12 Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97 .) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information 13 may be shielded from discovery in California if its disclosure would impair a person's 14 "inalienable right of privacy" under Calif. Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup. Ct. (San Diego Unified 15 Port Dist.) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 852-864.) To the extent private personnel information of 16 nonparties is discoverable at all, it must be sought through the "least intrusive means." (See 17 Perez, at 678 [emphasis added].) Here, to the extent Randolph is entitled to discover whether 18 some other specific employee received training during the course of his or her employment, 19 Randolph can simply ask that question during a deposition rather than attempting to obtain all 20 training records of all CSU employees. 21 Randolph has never indicated in any meet and confer correspondence or in her motion why 22 the records sought are relevant and discoverable over Defendants' objections. Consequently, her 23 motion should be denied. 24 CSU Agrees to Produce a Narrowed Scope of Relevant Records. 25 Randolph states in her Separate Statement that she is now agreeing to limit the scope of this 26 request to training documents "regarding reasonable accommodation/interactive 27 process/disability" for "Randolph, Daley, Larson, Saake, Neuhart, John Unruh, Jim Pushnik, 28 Gayle Hutchinson, Eileen Chavez, Mr. Grassian, Ms. Jennifer Mayes, and Pamela Hollis." 5 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of · Documents (19CV01226) 1 (Plaintiff's Separate Statement Regarding Motion To Compel Document Production, at p. 26, 11. 2 14-17.) Randolph has never articulated this limitation to Defendants. (Supp. Deschler Deel.,~ 3 4.) CSU agrees to produce such documents, as now limited by Randolph. Therefore, this request 4 appears to be moot. 5 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: 6 All documents related to defendants ' efforts to prevent discrimination, harassment and 7 retaliation in the workplace, including those made by the defendants to comply with state and 8 federal laws or regulations relating to the maintenance of a discrimination, harassment and 9 retaliation free environment. 10 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: 11 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES/, except as 12 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue 13 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.210(d).) 14 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such 15 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060(1), 16 2031.310(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production of 17 such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further 18 meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and 19 translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 20 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia 21 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiffs employers and, as such, do not have 22 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request 23 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compound, 24 overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this 25 action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants 26 further object to this request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client . 27 privilege and/or the work product doctrine. Defendants further object to this request to the extent 28 it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of Defendants 6 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the 2 Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal rules and 3 regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not party to the action is 4 mentioned therein. 5 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER 6 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: 7 None provided by Randolph. 8 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING 9 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: 10 Randolph Failed to Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response. 11 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request, 12 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal. 13 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met 14 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause" I 15 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310, 16 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet 17 this· mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone. 18 This Request Is Vague, Ambiguous, and Unintelligible, Overbroad, and Seeks 19 Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the Present Action. 20 This request is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible on its face such that Defendants could 21 not tell what records are being sought. During the meet and confer process, Defendants informed 22 Randolph that they could not ascertain what documents Randolph is seeking. Randolph has never 23 clarified. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3, 4, 7.) 24 The request appears to be overbroad, in that it seeks some unspecified records regarding the 25 CSU' s practices statewide. The CSU employs over 50,000 faculty and staff at 23 campuses and 26 eight off-campus centers throughout the state of California. The CSU is not required to search, 27 much less produce, all records pertaining to training of any employee on any subject throughout 28 its entire system. Such a request is unreasonable on its face. 7 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 To the extent this request is intended to seek records relating to individual employees other 2 than Randolph, the records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to 3 the discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, because the request seeks personnel records of 4 nonparty employees, such information is protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such 5 non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth 6 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See 7 Perez v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th, at 678 [non-litigant employee records 8 protected from disclosure by employees' right to privacy].) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged 9 information may be shielded from discovery in California if its disclosure would impair a 10 person's "inalienable right of privacy" under Calif. Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup. Ct., supra, 20 11 Cal.3d, at 852-864.) 12 Randolph has never indicated in any meet and confer correspondence or in her motion why 13 the records sought are relevant and discoverable over Defendants' objections. (Supp. Deschler 14 Deel., ,r 4.) Consequently, her motion should be denied. 15 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: 16 Any and all documents relating to Defendants' disability compliance, training and 17 standards. 18 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: 19 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES!, except as 20 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue 21 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.210(d).) 22 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such 23 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060(1), 24 2031.310(g).) Defendants have attempted 10 meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production or 25 such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further 26 meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and 27 translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 28 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia 8 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have 2 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request 3 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compound, 4 overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this 5 action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants 6 further object to this request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney- 7 clielll[sic] privilege and/or the work product doctrine. Defendants further object to this request 8 to the extent it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by the right to privacy 9 of Defendants and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the C.alifornia 10 Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal 11 rules and regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not party to the action 12 is mentioned therein. 13 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER 14 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: 15 None provided by Randolph. 16 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING 17 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: 18 Randolph Failed to Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response. 19 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request, 20 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal. 21 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met 22 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause" 23 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, 24 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet 25 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone. 26 III 27 III 28 III 9 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 This Request Is Vague, Ambiguous, and Unintelligible, Overbroad, and Seeks 2 Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the Present Action. 3 This request is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible on its face such that Defendants could 4 not tell what records are being sought. During the meet and confer process, Defendants informed 5 Randolph that they could not ascertain what documents Randolph is seeking. 6 The request is overbroad if, as it purports on its face, it seeks training records for other 7 unspecified employees of the CSU. The CSU employs over 50,000 faculty and staff at 23 8 campuses and eight off-campus centers throughout the state of California. The CSU is not 9 required to search, much less produce, a:11 records pertaining to training of any employee on any 10 subject throughout its entire system. Such a request is unreasonable on its face. 11 The records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to the 12 discovery of admissible evidence. Although the relevance standard under the Discovery Act is 13 broad, the information sought must be relevant to the "subject matter " of the pending litigation. 14 (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.010.) The present action involves whether or not Randolph was 15 discriminated or retaliated against in her employment with the CSU. (See generally Complaint.) 16 Whether or not any particular employee received training has no bearing on any element of 17 Randolph's claims or any defense thereto. This request thus appears to be an overbroad fishing 18 expedition into irrelevant matters. 19 Moreover, because the request seeks personnel records of nonparty employees, such 20 information is protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such non-litigants pursuant to 21 Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 22 as well as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See Perez v. County of Santa Clara, 23 supra, 111 Cal.App.4th, at 678 [non-litigant employee records protec~ed from disclosure by 24 employees' right to privacy].) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded 25 from discovery in California if its disclosure would impair a person's "inalienable right of 26 privacy" under Calif. Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup.Ct., supra, 20 Cal.3d, at 852-864.) To the 27 extent private personnel information of nonparties is discoverable at all, it must be sought through 28 the "least intrusive means." (See Perez, at 678 [emphasis added].) Here, to the extent Randolph 10 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 is entitled to discover whether some other specific employee received training during the course 2 of his or her employment, Randolph can simply ask that question during a deposition rather than 3 attempting to obtain all training records of all CSU employees. 4 Randolph has never indicated in any meet and confer correspondence or in her motion why 5 the records sought are relevant and discoverable over Defendants' objections. (Supp. Deschler 6 Deel.,~ 4.) Moreover, despite that Randolph claims in her Separate Statement that she agreed to 7 limit the scope of this request (Plaintiff's Separate Statement Regarding Motion To Compel 8 Document Production, at p. 32, 11. 1-4), Defendants still cannot ascertain what documents are 9 being sought. 10 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33: 11 All personal and University emails, texts, documentation, recordings or documentation of 12 phone calls and other communication of Ms. Daley, Ms. Larson, Mr. Saake, Ms. Neuhart, Mr. 13 Pushnik, Ms. Hutchinson, Mr. Grassian, Ms. Jennifer Mays, Ms. Pamela Hollis, Mr. Unruh, Ms. 14 Eileen Chavez related to Ms. Randolph. 15 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33: 16 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES], except as 17 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue 18 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.280, 2031.210(d).) 19 Defendants further object 10 this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such 20 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060(!), 21 2031.JlO(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production of 22 such materials, as required by Rule of Court 3. 724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further 23 meet and confer if Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and 24 translating them into reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 25 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia 26 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have 27 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request 28 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compaund, 11 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) l overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this 2 action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants " 3 farther object to this request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client 4 privilege and/or the work product doctrine. Defendants farther object lo this request to the extent 5 it seeks information and materials protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of Defendants 6 and/or third party non-litigants pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, the 7 Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as other state and federal rules and 8 regulations, as the private information of third party individuals not party to the action is 9 mentioned therein. 10 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER 11 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33: 12 None provided by Randolph. 13 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING 14 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33: 15 Randolph Failed To Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response. 16 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request, 17 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal. 18 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met 19 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause" 20 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310, 21 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet 22 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone. 23 This Request Is Overbroad, and Seeks Documents Not Relevant in any Way to the 24 Present Action, and Randolph Refused to Comply with Electronic Discovery Rules. 25 The request is overbroad in that it seeks both work and private emails, texts, and other 26 documents, without limitation, for several individuals who are not parties to the present lawsuit. 27 Many of the records sought by these request are not relevant or reasonably calculated to the 28 discovery of admissible evidence. Although the relevance standard under the Discovery Act is 12 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 broad, the information sought must be relevant to the "subject matter" of the pending litigation. 2 (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.010.) The present action involves whether or not Randolph was 3 discriminated or retaliated against in her employment with the CSU. (See generally Complaint.) 4 Emails, text messages, and other documents that have no bearing on the lawsuit allegations do not 5 pertain to the subject matter of this litigation. This request thus appears to be an overbroad 6 fishing expedition into irrelevant matters. 7 Moreover, because the request seeks records of nonparty employees, such information is 8 protected from disclosure by the right to privacy of such non-litigants pursuant to Article I, 9 Section 1 of the California Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well 10 as other state and federal rules and regulations. (See Perez v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 111 11 Cal.App.4th, at 678 [non-litigant employee records protected from disclosure by employees' right 12 to privacy].) Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded from discovery in 13 California if its disclosure would impair a person's "inalienable right of privacy" under Calif. 14 Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup.Ct., supra, 20 Cal.3d, at 852-864.) 15 .· Where, as here, a party seeks production of electronically stored information ("ESI"), the 16 California Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties to meet and confer to determine the scope 17 of ESI to be searched, the scope of ESI to be produced, the parameters and costs of such 18 searching and production, and other related issues. (Code Civ. Proc.,§§ 2016.040, 2031.310; see 19 also§ 2031.280, subd. (e) [requiring requesting party to pay reasonable costs associated with 20 production of ESI] and Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.724, subd. (8) [requiring the parties to meet and 21 confer regarding ESI].) Moreover, the burden is on the requesting party to demonstrate, not 22 merely that the requested ESI is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 23 evidence, but that the method of discovery is not unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into 24 account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and other factors. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 25 2019.030.) Courts shall limit the scope of discovery where the burden, expense, or intrusiveness 26 outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible 27 evidence. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.020.) This proportionality requirement is modeled after 28 Federal Rule 26(b)(l). As the written record of the parties' communications reflects, Randolph 13 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 did not substantively respond to any of Defendants' requests to meet and confer, as required by 2 the Code. 3 Defendants requested no less than nine times that the parties meet and confer regarding the 4 scope of discovery. (Deschler Deel., ,r,r 4-15, Exhs. A-I.) In several of those requests, 5 Defendants explained in detail that Randolph is required by the California Rules of Court and 6 Code of Civil Procedure to engage in that meet and confer process. (Exhs. A-E, H, I.) The 7 correspondence attached to Randolph's motion and Defendants' opposition shows that Randolph 8 never substantively addressed the requirements of the Code and Rules of Court in any way. 9 During subsequent meet and confer efforts, Randolph agreed to limit the scope of this 10 request to "personal and university emails, text, and phone records." (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r 6.) 11 The CSU does not have possession, custody, or control over any employee's personal emails, 12 texts, or other emails, and thus cannot and will not produce any such records. (Supp. Deschler 13 Deel., ,r 6.) With respect to emails and records within the CSU's possession, Defendants have 14 attempted several times to discuss relevant search terms with Randolph to narrow the scope of 15 documents to be searched and reviewed from the present database of over 500,000 documents and 16 several million pages. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3, 6.) Randolph has only agreed to the names of 17 relevant witnesses and has not agreed to any other search terms or limitations. (Supp. Deschler 18 Deel., ,r 6.) Without further limitations, it would take Defendants several months working full 19 time solely on this case to review all potentially-responsive documents. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 20 3, 6.) This does not comport with the proportionality requirements of the Code of Civil \ 21 Procedure and Rules of Court. Consequently, Defendants are in the process of running various 22 search algorithms on its own to locate and produce the relevant documents. (Supp. Deschler 23 Deel., ,r 6.) 24 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37: 25 Copies of all documentation, memos, emails, texts and any and all other documentation I 26 regarding Mr. Saake, Ms. Larson, and Ms. Daley's communication related to the proposed 27 discipline of Ms. Randolph. 28 III 14 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37: 2 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of electronically stored 3 data, documents or materials ("EST), except as otherwise produced, because such materials are 4 not reasonably accessible due to the undue burden and expense of retrieving them. Code Civ. 5 Proc.§§ 2031.280, 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that 6 the likely burden ofproducing such electronic data outweighs _any likely benefit. Code Civ. Proc. 7 §§ 2031.060(!), 2031.310(g). Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the 8 production of such materials, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further meet and confer if 9 Plaintiff agrees to pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and translating them into 10 reasonably usable form in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210(d). 11 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia Daley and 12 Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have possession, 13 custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request to the 14 extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product 15 doctrine. 16 Subject to, and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant CSU responds as 17 follows: Defendant will produce all nonprivileged, responsive documents that do not constitute 18 ES/. To the extent Plaintiff engages in the meet-and-confer process to narrow the scope of 19 potential ES!, Defendant CSU may then produce additional documents. 20 PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AND LEGAL REASONS FOR COMPELLING FURTHER 21 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37: 22 None provided by Randolph. 23 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REASONS FOR COMPELLING 24 FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 37: 25 Randolph Failed To Set Forth Good Cause for Compelling a Further Response. 26 Randolph omits any factual or legal basis for responses or production as to any request, 27 which is required for a motion to compel further responses or production of documents. (Cal. 28 Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1345, subd. (c)(3) [emphasis added].) Therefore, Randolph also has not met 15 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 and cannot meet her burden as the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause" 2 for each demand for which she now seeks to compel production. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2031.310, 3 subd. (b)(l); Kirkland v. Sup.Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th, at 98.) Because Randolph failed to meet 4 this mandatory threshold requirement, her motion should be denied on that basis alone. 5 This Request Is Overbroad, and Seeks Documents Not Relevant in Any Way to the 6 Present Action, and Randolph Refused to Comply with Electronic Discovery Rules. 7 The request is overbroad in that it seeks both work and private emails, texts, and other 8 documents, without limitation, for several individuals who are not parties to the present lawsuit. 9 Defendants agreed during the meet and confer prqcess to produce all documents in pos~ession of 10 the CSU. The CSU does not have possession, custody, or control over any employee's personal 11 emails, texts, or other emails, and thus cannot and will not produce any such records. (Supp. 12 Deschler Deel., ~ 6.) 13 With regard to documents in possession of the CSU, Defendants have agreed to produce the 14 employment-related files for Randolph, including her personnel file, medical file, grievance files, 15 and other file locations. The only documents at issue are electronic records. Where, as here, a. 16 party seeks production of ESI, the California Code of Civil Procedure requires the parties to meet .17 and confer to determine the scope of ESI to be searched, the scope of ESI to be produced, the 18 parameters and costs of such searching and production, and other related issues. (Code Civ. 19 Proc.,§§ 2016.040, 2031.310; see also§ 2031.280, subd. (e) [requiring requesting party to pay 20 reasonable costs associated with production of ESI] and Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.724, subd. (8) 21 [requiring the parties to meet and confer regarding ESI].) Moreover, the burden is on the 22 requesting party to demonstrate, not merely that the requested ESI is reasonably calculated to lead 23 to the discovery of admissible evidence, but that the method of discovery is not unduly 24 burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 25 and other factors. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2019.030.) Courts shall limit the scope of discovery where 26 the burden, expense, or intrusiveness outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will 27 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2017.020.) This proportionality 28 requirement is modeled after Federal Rule 26(b)(l). As the written record of the parties' 16 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of · Documents (19CV01226) 1 communications.reflects, Randolph did not substantively respond to any of Defendants' requests 2 ~o meet and confer, as required by the Code. 3 Defendants requested no less than nine times that the parties meet and confer regarding the 4 scope of discovery. (Deschler Deel., ,r,r 4-15, Exhs. A-I.) In several of those requests, 5 Defendants explained in detail that Randolph is required by the California Rules of Court and 6 Code of Civil Procedure to engage in that meet and confer process. (Exhs. A-E, H, I.) The 7 correspondence attached to Randolph's motion and Defendants' opposition shows that Randolph 8 never substantively addressed the requirements of the Code and Rules of Court in any way. 9 With respect to emails and records within the CSU' s possession, Defendants have 10 attempted several times to discuss relevant search terms with Randolph to narrow the scope of 11 documents to be searched and reviewed from the present database of over 500,000 documents and 12 several million pages. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3, 6.) Randolph has only agreed to the names of 13 relevant witness~s and has not agreed to any other search terms or limitations. (Supp. Deschler 14 Deel., ,r 6.) Without further limitatio_ns, it would take Defendants several months working full 15 time solely on this case to review all potentially-responsive documents. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r 16 6.) This does not'comport with the proportionality requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure 17 and Rules of Court. Consequently, Defendants are in the process of running various search 18 algorithms on its own to locate and produce the relevant documents. (Supp. Deschler Deel., ,r,r 3, 19 6.) 20 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 43: 21 All documents related to allegations of discrimination, harassment or retaliation by any of 22 the defendants, made by employees, customers, vendors, or others. 23 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 43: 24 Defendants object to this request to the extent it seeks production of ES!, except as 25 otherwise produced, because such materials are not reasonably accessible due to the undue 26 burden and expense of retrieving them. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030; 2031.280, 203l.2JO(d).) 27 Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that the likely burden ofproducing such 28 electronic data outweighs any likely benefit. (Code Civ. Proc.§§ 2019.030, 2031.060([), 2031.3 17 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents (19CV01226) 1 IO(g).) Defendants have attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on the production of such 2 materials, as required by Rule of Court 3.724, but Plaintiff declined; Defendants will further meet 3 and confer if Plaintiff agrees lO pay the expense of searching for relevant documents and 4 translating them into reasonably usable foml in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 5 2031.210(d). Defendants further object to this request on the grounds that Defendants Cynthia 6 Daley and Debra Larson were never at any time Plaintiff's employers and, as such, do not have 7 possession, custody, or control of the documents sought. Defendants further object to this request 8 on the grounds it is vague and ambiguous. Defendants further object to this request as compound, 9 overly broad, burdensome and oppressive because it seeks documents neither relevant to this 10 action nor reasonably calculated to lead lO the discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, 11 Defendant CSU has multiple facilities and thousands of employees throughout the state of 12 California, and is not required by law to compile a list of claims against the entire CSU system by 13 category. Defendants further objects on the grounds this interrogatory impermissibly seeks 14 inadmissible '-me too" evidence, which is prop