Preview
1 XAVIER BECERRA
Attorney General of California
2 PETER D. HALLORAN
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
3 JERRY J. DESCHLER
Deputy Attorney General 11/22/2019
4 State Bar No. 215691
1300 I Street, Suite 125
5 P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
.6 Telephone: (916) 210-7871
Fax: (916) 324-5567
7 E-mail: Jerry.Deschler@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys for Defendants
8 Board of Trustees of the California State University,
which is the State of California acting in its higher
9 education capacity (erroneously sued as "Trustees
of the California State University, State of
10 Caltfornia "), Cynthia Daley, and Debra Larson
11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12 COUNTY OF BUTTE
13 CIVIL DIVISION
14
15
TERESA RANDOLPH, Case No. 19CV01226
16
Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO
17 PLAINTIFF'S LATE-FILED
v. OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
18 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S
19 TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
STATE UNIVERSITY, STATE OF
20 CALIFORNIA, AND CYNTHIA DALEY, Date: December 4, 2019
AN INDIVIDUAL, AND DEBRA LARSON, Time: 9:00 a.m.
21 AN INDIVIDUAL, Dept: 10
Judge: Honorable Robert A. Glusman
22
________________ Defendant. Trial Date: none
___, · Action Filed: April 24, 2019
23
24 INTRODUCTION
25 Plaintiff Teresa Randolph ("Randolph") did not timely file or serve an opposition to
26 Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.
27 Rather, she filed and served her opposition only after Defendants filed a reply informing the
28 Court that the motion was unopposed. Even if Randolph's opposition had not been
1
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226)
1 impermissibly filed and served well past the mandatory statutory deadline, Randolph fails to rebut
2 the arguments in favor of granting Defendants' motion.
3 ARGUMENT
4 I.. RANDOLPH'S OPPOSITION WAS UNTIMELY FILED AND SERVED.
5 Randolph violated the Code of Civil Procedure by filing her opposition three days late (only
6 six court days prior to the hearing) and failing to serve the motion. Randolph's opposition was
7 due November 18, 2019 (nine court days before the December 4, 2019 hearing). Randolph filed
8 the opposition at 10:59 p.m. on November 21, 2019-which meant Defendants would not see it
9 until the next business day at the earliest,which is the day Defendants' reply was due ..
10 Randolph's proof of service states that Randolph served the opposition by U.S. mail on
11 November 19, 2019. Even if it were possible for Randolph to have somehow served the
12 document two days before she even drafted and filed it, she was required to have served it no later
13 than November 18, 2019, and by means "reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other
14 party or parties not later than the close of the next business day .... " (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 1005,
15 subd. (c).) Randolph's serv_ice is defective in every respect.
16 Perhaps most importantly, Randolph's late-filed opposition directly contradicts her
17 assertion that she attempted to timely file the opposition on November 18, 2019, but encountered
18 an error in electronically submitting the document to the court. First, Randolph's proof of service
19 is not dated November 18, 2019, but is actually dated the following day. Randolph offers no
20 explanation for why she would have timely attempted to file her document, but did not timely
21 drop a copy into the mail box (which, as set forth above, would still constitute improper service).
22 Second, the opposition contains several arguments that could not have existed in a November 18,
23 2019 document. Rather, it contains arguments directly in response to Defendants' reply, which
24 was served November 21, 2019-three days after Randolph purportedly attempted to file her
25 opposition. Tellingly, Randolph did not submit any original opposition to the Court (if one ever.
26 existed) or submit any proof to the Court of the e~istence of such a document, or any proof that
27 she attempted to file the document on November 19, 2019. If Randolph e-filed the document
28 correctly, she would have received the usual immediate notification from
2
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226)
1 efi1ingmail@tylerhost.net. Randolph fails to offer any explanation for why she did not realize.her
2 "error" when she did not receive such a confirmation. Moreover, if Randolph incorrectly e-filed,
3 she would have received an error message, which she could have submitted to the Court to prove
4 that she simply made an error. Randolph also fails to explain.why she did not follow her usual
5 custom of emailing a courtesy copy to Defendants the day of filing. Lastly, the content of
6 Randolph's motion indicates that it was hastily thrown together only after receiving Defendants'
7 reply. Again, the arguments in Randolph's opposition directly respond to Defendants' November
8 21, 2019 reply, and the date on the proof of service matches.neither the date Randolph purports to
9 have originally attempted to file her opposition nor the date of her late-filed opposition. The
~
10 brevity of the opposition, lack of research to address the authorities in Defendants' motion, and
11 errors (such as, for example, erroneously referring to the motion as a "demurrer") also seem to
12 indicate that it was prepared in a few hours after receiving Defendants' reply.
13 Because Randolph failed to timely file or serve her opposition, the Court has discretion to
14 disregard it. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1300? subd. (d); see also Sexton v. Sup.Ct. (Mullikin Med.
15 Ctr.) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 [rule that failure to timely file opposition creates an
16 inference that motion or demurrer is meritorious was "intended to prevent the introduction of
17 legal theories without prior notice to opposing counsel and the court"].)
18 II. THE EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "WRONGFUL TERMINATION/CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE" SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE SUCH CLAIM MAY NOT BE
19 MAINTAINED AGAINST A PUBLIC ENTITY As A MATTER OF LAW.
20 Randolph fails to offer any legal support for stating a claim for wrongful termination
21 against a public entity. As a matter of law, a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public
22 policy is barred by the state's sovereign immunity, and may never be alleged against a public
23 entity as a matter of law. (Gov. Code,§ 815; see also, e.g., Miklosy v. Regents of the University
24 of Calif (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [affirming judgment sustaining demurrer]; see also Gov.
25 Code,§ 815.) Therefore, Randolph's eighth cause of action should be dismissed without leave to
26 amend.
27 III
28 ///
3
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
Plaintiffs Second Amended ~omplaint (19CV01226)
1 III. THE NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE CLAIM LACKS SUFFICIENT
2 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS.
3 Randolph's ninth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails to state
4 facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action.
5 Randolph's argument and conclusions about what the facts allegedly show on pages 6 and 7
6 of her brief does not relieve her of her obligation to actually plead·facts in her Complaint that
7 establish the elements of her cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc.,§ 438, subd. (c); see also
8 Jones v. Oxnard Sch. Dist. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 587, 593-94 [affirming trial-court's sustaining
9 9f general demurrer where complaint relied on "conclusions of law" and pleaded insufficient facts
10 to state a claim].)
11 This Court already ruled on September 11, 2019, that:
12 [T]he conduct alleged in the First Amended Complaint does not rise to
the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to plead a cause
13 of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
14 (Order, dated September 11, 2019 [emphasis added].) Randolph's failure to plead any additional
15 facts is fatal to her claim. The facts pleaded fall far short of the facts in the cases Randolph cites
16 for support. This is not a case where a supervisor stalked her employee at home and physically
17 assaulted her. (See Light v. Dept. of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75.) This is also
18 not a case of a supervisor suddenly firing an employee in violation of policy for "off job
19 behavior" in her relationship with another employee outside of work., (See Rulon-Miller v. Intl.
20 Business Machines Corp. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 241 [disapproved by Guz v. Bechtel Nat., Inc.
21 (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317].)
22 As set forth in Defendants' opening papers, Randolph failed to plead any additional facts
23 after this Court ruled that Randolph's pleaded facts do not rise to the level of extreme and
24 outrageous conduct necessary to plead a cause of action. Therefore, Defendants' motion should
25 be granted.
26· I II
27 Ill
28 III
4
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226)
1 IV. THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE RANDOLPH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS
2 ACT AND THE FACTS PLEADED DO NOT STATE AVALID CAUSE OF ACTION.
3 Randolph's opposition does not even address whether she failed to plead sufficient facts to
4 constitute defamation against Larson. Therefore, Defendants' motion should be granted as to
5 Larson on that ground alone.
6 Additionally, Randolph fails to demonstrate that she complied with the Government Tort
7 Claims Act. Nowhere in her claim form does Randolph assert defamation. As a matter of law,
8 "each cause of action must [be] reflected in a timely claim." (Gong'v. City of Rosemead (2014)
9 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376 [judicial notice of claim form showing noncompliance as to newly-
10 alleged causes of action was proper in sustaining demurrer].) It is not sufficient to set forth bare
11 allegations that do not appear on their face to allege a "cause of action." (See id.) Randolph's
12 assertions that Daley allegedly ''worked to diminish and disrespect [Randolph's] role," "[made]
13 the planning team and [Randolph] look inefficient," and "attempt[ed] to make [Randolph] look
14 inefficient" do not in any way state a claim for defamation as to Daley. Randolph does not
15 indicate any false statements, or any facts that would have placed Defendants on notice that she
16 was attempting to claim she was defamed. The allegations do not mention Larson whatsoever.
17 Lastly, Randolph's assertion that her completely separate complaint to the Department of
18 Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleges defamation is unavailing. The DFEH is a
19 completely separate agency, and presenting a discrimination complaint to the DFEH as a
20 prerequisite for proceeding on a discrimination claim under the Fair Employment and Housing
21 Act is a completely separate process and separate statutory scheme than the Government Tort
22 Claims Act. No California authority holds that a DFEH complaint satisfie~ the conditions of the
23 Government Tort Claims Act.
24 Because Randolph cannot demonstrate that she presented a claim for defamation in her
25 Government Tort Claims Act form, she cannot proceed on such a claim here. (Gov. Code,§§
26 905.2, 945.4; State of California v. Sup. Ct. (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.)
27 Ill
28 III
5
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
· Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226)
1 V. THE TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY SHOULD BE
DISMISSED BECAUSE RANDOLPH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT
2 TORT CLAIMS ACT.
3 Randolph similarly fails to establish that she complied with the Government Tort Claims
4 Act to state a claim for invasion of privacy. First, she does not state a "cause of action" for
5 invasion of privacy. (Gong, 226 Cal.App.4th, at 376.) Additionally, her bare assertion that her
6 "medical appointments were discussed in public forums and private meetings" does not constitute
7 an invasion of her privacy. (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 16, 37
8 [defendant must have intruded into the plaintiffs privacy by, for example, obtaining privacy
9 information].) The allegation does not establish that Defendants somehow unlawfully obtained
10 private information about her and are insufficient to place Defendants on notice that Randolph
11 was pursuing such a claim. (See Gov. Code,§§ 905.2, 945.4; see also Watson v. State of Calif
12 (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 844-45 [affirming order sustaining demurrer].) Because Randolph
13 . failed to comply with this threshold requirement, Defendants' motion should be granted.
14 CONCLUSION
15 Randolph failed to timely file and serve any opposition to Defendants' motion for judgment
16 on the pleadings. Moreover, her late-filed opposition fails to provide sufficient facts or law to
17 support a denial of Defendants' motion. Consequently, the motion should be granted.
18 Dated: November 22, 2019 Respectfully Submitted,
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SA2019102196
28 14280120.docx
6
Defendants ' Reply To Plaintifrs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
Plaintifrs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226)
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mail
Case Name: Teresa Randolph v. Trustees of the California State University, et al.
Case No.: 19CV01226
I declare:
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the
California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or
older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the
Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United
States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal
mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States
Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of
business.
On November 22, 2019, I served the attached DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
LATE-FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by
transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed
in a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system of the Office of the Attorney General,
addressed as follows:
Thomas Dimitre
PO Box 801
Ashland, OR 97520
E-mail Address: dimitre@mind.net
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true
and correct and that this declaration was executed on November 22, 19, at Sacramento,
California.
Jenny Thirakul
Declarant Signature
SA2019102196
14284043.docx
Preview
1 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California 2 PETER D. HALLORAN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 JERRY J. DESCHLER Deputy Attorney General 11/22/2019 4 State Bar No. 215691 1300 I Street, Suite 125 5 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 .6 Telephone: (916) 210-7871 Fax: (916) 324-5567 7 E-mail: Jerry.Deschler@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Defendants 8 Board of Trustees of the California State University, which is the State of California acting in its higher 9 education capacity (erroneously sued as "Trustees of the California State University, State of 10 Caltfornia "), Cynthia Daley, and Debra Larson 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 COUNTY OF BUTTE 13 CIVIL DIVISION 14 15 TERESA RANDOLPH, Case No. 19CV01226 16 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO 17 PLAINTIFF'S LATE-FILED v. OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 18 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S 19 TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT STATE UNIVERSITY, STATE OF 20 CALIFORNIA, AND CYNTHIA DALEY, Date: December 4, 2019 AN INDIVIDUAL, AND DEBRA LARSON, Time: 9:00 a.m. 21 AN INDIVIDUAL, Dept: 10 Judge: Honorable Robert A. Glusman 22 ________________ Defendant. Trial Date: none ___, · Action Filed: April 24, 2019 23 24 INTRODUCTION 25 Plaintiff Teresa Randolph ("Randolph") did not timely file or serve an opposition to 26 Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. 27 Rather, she filed and served her opposition only after Defendants filed a reply informing the 28 Court that the motion was unopposed. Even if Randolph's opposition had not been 1 Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226) 1 impermissibly filed and served well past the mandatory statutory deadline, Randolph fails to rebut 2 the arguments in favor of granting Defendants' motion. 3 ARGUMENT 4 I.. RANDOLPH'S OPPOSITION WAS UNTIMELY FILED AND SERVED. 5 Randolph violated the Code of Civil Procedure by filing her opposition three days late (only 6 six court days prior to the hearing) and failing to serve the motion. Randolph's opposition was 7 due November 18, 2019 (nine court days before the December 4, 2019 hearing). Randolph filed 8 the opposition at 10:59 p.m. on November 21, 2019-which meant Defendants would not see it 9 until the next business day at the earliest,which is the day Defendants' reply was due .. 10 Randolph's proof of service states that Randolph served the opposition by U.S. mail on 11 November 19, 2019. Even if it were possible for Randolph to have somehow served the 12 document two days before she even drafted and filed it, she was required to have served it no later 13 than November 18, 2019, and by means "reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other 14 party or parties not later than the close of the next business day .... " (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 1005, 15 subd. (c).) Randolph's serv_ice is defective in every respect. 16 Perhaps most importantly, Randolph's late-filed opposition directly contradicts her 17 assertion that she attempted to timely file the opposition on November 18, 2019, but encountered 18 an error in electronically submitting the document to the court. First, Randolph's proof of service 19 is not dated November 18, 2019, but is actually dated the following day. Randolph offers no 20 explanation for why she would have timely attempted to file her document, but did not timely 21 drop a copy into the mail box (which, as set forth above, would still constitute improper service). 22 Second, the opposition contains several arguments that could not have existed in a November 18, 23 2019 document. Rather, it contains arguments directly in response to Defendants' reply, which 24 was served November 21, 2019-three days after Randolph purportedly attempted to file her 25 opposition. Tellingly, Randolph did not submit any original opposition to the Court (if one ever. 26 existed) or submit any proof to the Court of the e~istence of such a document, or any proof that 27 she attempted to file the document on November 19, 2019. If Randolph e-filed the document 28 correctly, she would have received the usual immediate notification from 2 Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226) 1 efi1ingmail@tylerhost.net. Randolph fails to offer any explanation for why she did not realize.her 2 "error" when she did not receive such a confirmation. Moreover, if Randolph incorrectly e-filed, 3 she would have received an error message, which she could have submitted to the Court to prove 4 that she simply made an error. Randolph also fails to explain.why she did not follow her usual 5 custom of emailing a courtesy copy to Defendants the day of filing. Lastly, the content of 6 Randolph's motion indicates that it was hastily thrown together only after receiving Defendants' 7 reply. Again, the arguments in Randolph's opposition directly respond to Defendants' November 8 21, 2019 reply, and the date on the proof of service matches.neither the date Randolph purports to 9 have originally attempted to file her opposition nor the date of her late-filed opposition. The ~ 10 brevity of the opposition, lack of research to address the authorities in Defendants' motion, and 11 errors (such as, for example, erroneously referring to the motion as a "demurrer") also seem to 12 indicate that it was prepared in a few hours after receiving Defendants' reply. 13 Because Randolph failed to timely file or serve her opposition, the Court has discretion to 14 disregard it. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.1300? subd. (d); see also Sexton v. Sup.Ct. (Mullikin Med. 15 Ctr.) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 [rule that failure to timely file opposition creates an 16 inference that motion or demurrer is meritorious was "intended to prevent the introduction of 17 legal theories without prior notice to opposing counsel and the court"].) 18 II. THE EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "WRONGFUL TERMINATION/CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE" SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE SUCH CLAIM MAY NOT BE 19 MAINTAINED AGAINST A PUBLIC ENTITY As A MATTER OF LAW. 20 Randolph fails to offer any legal support for stating a claim for wrongful termination 21 against a public entity. As a matter of law, a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public 22 policy is barred by the state's sovereign immunity, and may never be alleged against a public 23 entity as a matter of law. (Gov. Code,§ 815; see also, e.g., Miklosy v. Regents of the University 24 of Calif (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [affirming judgment sustaining demurrer]; see also Gov. 25 Code,§ 815.) Therefore, Randolph's eighth cause of action should be dismissed without leave to 26 amend. 27 III 28 /// 3 Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second Amended ~omplaint (19CV01226) 1 III. THE NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE CLAIM LACKS SUFFICIENT 2 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS. 3 Randolph's ninth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails to state 4 facts sufficient to sustain a cause of action. 5 Randolph's argument and conclusions about what the facts allegedly show on pages 6 and 7 6 of her brief does not relieve her of her obligation to actually plead·facts in her Complaint that 7 establish the elements of her cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc.,§ 438, subd. (c); see also 8 Jones v. Oxnard Sch. Dist. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 587, 593-94 [affirming trial-court's sustaining 9 9f general demurrer where complaint relied on "conclusions of law" and pleaded insufficient facts 10 to state a claim].) 11 This Court already ruled on September 11, 2019, that: 12 [T]he conduct alleged in the First Amended Complaint does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to plead a cause 13 of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 14 (Order, dated September 11, 2019 [emphasis added].) Randolph's failure to plead any additional 15 facts is fatal to her claim. The facts pleaded fall far short of the facts in the cases Randolph cites 16 for support. This is not a case where a supervisor stalked her employee at home and physically 17 assaulted her. (See Light v. Dept. of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75.) This is also 18 not a case of a supervisor suddenly firing an employee in violation of policy for "off job 19 behavior" in her relationship with another employee outside of work., (See Rulon-Miller v. Intl. 20 Business Machines Corp. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 241 [disapproved by Guz v. Bechtel Nat., Inc. 21 (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317].) 22 As set forth in Defendants' opening papers, Randolph failed to plead any additional facts 23 after this Court ruled that Randolph's pleaded facts do not rise to the level of extreme and 24 outrageous conduct necessary to plead a cause of action. Therefore, Defendants' motion should 25 be granted. 26· I II 27 Ill 28 III 4 Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226) 1 IV. THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RANDOLPH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS 2 ACT AND THE FACTS PLEADED DO NOT STATE AVALID CAUSE OF ACTION. 3 Randolph's opposition does not even address whether she failed to plead sufficient facts to 4 constitute defamation against Larson. Therefore, Defendants' motion should be granted as to 5 Larson on that ground alone. 6 Additionally, Randolph fails to demonstrate that she complied with the Government Tort 7 Claims Act. Nowhere in her claim form does Randolph assert defamation. As a matter of law, 8 "each cause of action must [be] reflected in a timely claim." (Gong'v. City of Rosemead (2014) 9 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376 [judicial notice of claim form showing noncompliance as to newly- 10 alleged causes of action was proper in sustaining demurrer].) It is not sufficient to set forth bare 11 allegations that do not appear on their face to allege a "cause of action." (See id.) Randolph's 12 assertions that Daley allegedly ''worked to diminish and disrespect [Randolph's] role," "[made] 13 the planning team and [Randolph] look inefficient," and "attempt[ed] to make [Randolph] look 14 inefficient" do not in any way state a claim for defamation as to Daley. Randolph does not 15 indicate any false statements, or any facts that would have placed Defendants on notice that she 16 was attempting to claim she was defamed. The allegations do not mention Larson whatsoever. 17 Lastly, Randolph's assertion that her completely separate complaint to the Department of 18 Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleges defamation is unavailing. The DFEH is a 19 completely separate agency, and presenting a discrimination complaint to the DFEH as a 20 prerequisite for proceeding on a discrimination claim under the Fair Employment and Housing 21 Act is a completely separate process and separate statutory scheme than the Government Tort 22 Claims Act. No California authority holds that a DFEH complaint satisfie~ the conditions of the 23 Government Tort Claims Act. 24 Because Randolph cannot demonstrate that she presented a claim for defamation in her 25 Government Tort Claims Act form, she cannot proceed on such a claim here. (Gov. Code,§§ 26 905.2, 945.4; State of California v. Sup. Ct. (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) 27 Ill 28 III 5 Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to · Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226) 1 V. THE TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RANDOLPH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT 2 TORT CLAIMS ACT. 3 Randolph similarly fails to establish that she complied with the Government Tort Claims 4 Act to state a claim for invasion of privacy. First, she does not state a "cause of action" for 5 invasion of privacy. (Gong, 226 Cal.App.4th, at 376.) Additionally, her bare assertion that her 6 "medical appointments were discussed in public forums and private meetings" does not constitute 7 an invasion of her privacy. (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 16, 37 8 [defendant must have intruded into the plaintiffs privacy by, for example, obtaining privacy 9 information].) The allegation does not establish that Defendants somehow unlawfully obtained 10 private information about her and are insufficient to place Defendants on notice that Randolph 11 was pursuing such a claim. (See Gov. Code,§§ 905.2, 945.4; see also Watson v. State of Calif 12 (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 844-45 [affirming order sustaining demurrer].) Because Randolph 13 . failed to comply with this threshold requirement, Defendants' motion should be granted. 14 CONCLUSION 15 Randolph failed to timely file and serve any opposition to Defendants' motion for judgment 16 on the pleadings. Moreover, her late-filed opposition fails to provide sufficient facts or law to 17 support a denial of Defendants' motion. Consequently, the motion should be granted. 18 Dated: November 22, 2019 Respectfully Submitted, 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 SA2019102196 28 14280120.docx 6 Defendants ' Reply To Plaintifrs Late-Filed Opposition To Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintifrs Second Amended Complaint (19CV01226) DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mail Case Name: Teresa Randolph v. Trustees of the California State University, et al. Case No.: 19CV01226 I declare: I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business. On November 22, 2019, I served the attached DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S LATE-FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system of the Office of the Attorney General, addressed as follows: Thomas Dimitre PO Box 801 Ashland, OR 97520 E-mail Address: dimitre@mind.net I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on November 22, 19, at Sacramento, California. Jenny Thirakul Declarant Signature SA2019102196 14284043.docx