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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Document Scanning Lead Sheet
Jun-23-2017 1:30 pm
Case Number: CGC-11-515542
Filing Date: Jun-21-2017 1:30
Filed by: MELISSA DONG
Image: 05919002
REMITTITUR
IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al
001005919002
Instructions:
Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
350 MCALLISTER STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
DIVISION 2
Office of the County Clerk Lo
San Francisco County Superior Court - Main
Attention: Civil Appeals
400 McAllister Street, Ist Floor San Francisco County Superior Court
San Francisco, CA 94102 /
JUN 21.2017
IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA, CLERK E COURT
Plaintiff and Appellant, By: Deputy Clark
v.
JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
A147477
San Francisco County No. CGC11515542
* * REMITTITUR * *
I, Diana Herbert, Clerk of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, for the First Appellate
District, do hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of the original opinion or decision
entered in the above-entitled cause on June 20, 2017 and that this opinion has now become final.
pellant _ Respondent to recover costs
_WEach party to bear own costs
___Costs are not awarded in this proceeding
___See decision for costs determination
Witness my hand and the Seal of the Court affixed at my office this JUN 20 2017
Very truly yours,
Diana Herbert
P.O. Report:
Marsden Transcript:
Boxed Transcripts:
Exhibits: _
None of the above: v
rem1COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
350 MCALLISTER STREET ef.
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
DIVISION 2
Court of Appeal First Appellate District
IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. JUN 20 2017
JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al., a
Defendants and Appellants. Diana Herbert, Clerk
by. Deputy Clerk
A147477
San Francisco County No. CGC11515542
BY THE COURT:
Counsel having so stipulated, the appeal lodged in this court on February 11, 2016 (filed in the trial
court on January 14, 2016), and cross-appeals lodged in this court on February 18, 2016 (filed in the trial
court on January 21, 2016 and January 22, 2016), are dismissed, with each party to bear its own costs on
appeal. The remittitur is to issue forthwith.
JUN 20 2017
Date: Acting P.J.
orffJay
Court of Appeal, First Appellate District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District
Diana Herbert. Clerk/Administrator Diana Herbert. ClerkjAdministrator
Electronically RECEIVED on 6/14/2017 at 11.43.12 AM Electronically FILED on 6/14/2017 by S. Wheeler, Deputy Cler!
Case No. A147477
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT - DIVISION TWO
IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent,
v.
JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ and YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE,
INC.,
Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants.
On Appeal from a Judgment After Jury Verdict
San Francisco Superior Court — Hon. Garrett Wong — Case No.: CGC-11-515542
JOINT NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL
COLIN C. MUNRO (SBN: 195520) D. DOUGLAS SHUREEN
CARLSON, CALLADINE & MCMILLAN & SHUREEN LLP
PETERSON LLP 50 Santa Rosa Avenue, Suite 300
353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor Santa Rosa, CA 95404-4901
San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (707) 525-5400
Telephone: (415) 391-3911 Facsimile: (707) 576-7955
Facsimile: (415) 391-3898 doug.shureen@memillanshureen.com
cmunro@ccplaw.com Attorneys for Cross-Appellant and
Cross Respondent
Attorneys for Cross-Appellant and JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ
Cross-Respondent
YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC.TODD P. EMANUEL (SBN 169031)
DEIRDRE O’REILLY
MARBLESTONE (SBN 88008)
GARY L. SIMMS (SBN 96239)
EMMANUEL LAW GROUP
702 Marshall Street, Suite 400
Redwood City, CA 94063-1825
Telephone: (650) 369-8900
Facsimile: (650) 369-4228
gary@teinjurylaw.com
Attorneys for Appellant and Cross-
Respondent
IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUAte
JOINT NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL
Pursuant to rule 8.244(a) of the California Rules of Court, Appellant and
Cross-Respondent Ida Cristina Cruz Fua (“Fua”), Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Joel Enrique Andino Sanchez (“Sanchez”), and Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. (“Yellow Cab”) (collectively, the “Parties”) hereby
give notice that the appeals in the above captioned matter have been settled.
Further, the Parties hereby request that the appeals filed on February 11, 2016, and
February 18, 2016, by the Parties in the above caption matter be dismissed.
Dated: June 14, 2017 CARLSON, CALLADINE & PETERSON LLP
By: /s/ Colin C. Munro
COLIN C. MUNRO .
353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor
San Francisco, California 94111
Telephone: (415) 391-3911
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-
Appellant, YELLOW CAB
COOPERATIVE, INC.
Dated: June 14, 2017 MCMILLAN & SHUREEN LLP
By: /s/ D. Douglas Shureen
D. Douglas Shureen
50 Santa Rosa Avenue, Suite 300
Santa Rosa, CA 95404-4901
Telephone: (707) 525-5400
Attorneys for Appellant and Cross-
Respondent, JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO
SANCHEZDated: June 14, 2017 EMANUEL LAW GROUP
By:
/s/ Gary L. Simms
GARY L. SIMMS
702 Marshall Street, Suite 400
Redwood City, California 94063-1825
Telephone: (650) 369-8900
Attorneys for Appellant and Cross-
Respondent,
IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA4 anon
Wa EU
ll | i (ae
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Document Scanning Lead Sheet
Jun-23-2017 1:29 pm
Case Number: FDI-10-773737
Filing Date: Jun-21-2017 1:27
Filed by: MELISSA DONG
Image: 05918999
REMITTITUR
ANN DARSKY VS. AARON DARSKY *403 CASE* (FLORES RECUSAL)(CONS
W/FDV-10-808259)[LMTD SCPE REP]
001F05918999
Instructions:
Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
350 MCALLISTER STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
DIVISION 2
Office of the County Clerk
San Francisco County Superior Court - Main
Attention: Civil Appeals
400 McAllister Street, 1st Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102 FIL E D
San Francisco County Superior Cour
ANN DROBNER (DARSKY), JUN 21.2017
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Pl CLERK QE JHE COURT
AARON DARSKY, By: Clark
Defendant and Respondent.
A143413
San Francisco County No. FDI10773737
* * REMITTITUR * *
I, Diana Herbert, Clerk of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, for the First Appellate
District, do hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of the original opinion or decision
entered in the above-entitled cause on April 20, 2017 and that this opinion has now become final.
___ Appellant _hespondent to recover costs
___Each party to bear own costs
___ Costs are not awarded in this proceeding
___See decision for costs determination
Witness my hand and the Seal of the Court affixed at my office this JUN 20 2017
Very truly yours,
Diana Herbert
P.O. Report:
Marsden Transcript:
Boxed Transcripts:
Exhibits: __
None of the above: iv
rem1COPY
Filed 4/20/17
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
lifornia Rules of Court, ue 81 a 15( 15), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not Certified for publication or
ordered ublisheg, Except as spe ified by rule 8.1115(b). Ths 0 ‘opinion has not been cerfified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
Court of Appeal First Appellate District
DIVISION TWO
APR 20 201/
ANN DROBNER DARSKY, Diana Herbert, Clerk
ge by. De,
1 f—__Deputy Clerk
Plaintiff and Appellant, A143413
v.
AARON DARSKY, (San Francisco City and County
Si . Ct. No. FDI107737.
Defendant and Respondent. uper. Ct. No. FD) 37)
Ann Drobner Darsky (Drobner) and Aaron Darsky were married in 2005 and
separated in 2010. They have two children, who were five and three years old when the
couple separated. In December 2010, Drobner petitioned for dissolution of their
marriage. Over three years of litigation in San Francisco County family court followed.
On August 29, 2014, the court issued findings and an order regarding certain financial
disputes between Drobner and Darsky, ruling mostly in Darsky’s favor.
Drobner appeals from these findings and order, contending the family court had
previously and finally resolved certain issues in an August 1, 2011 order, and was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata from modifying this previous order except prospectively
and even then only by proper notice of motion or order to show cause. Drobner further
argues that the parties agreed to bear their own attorney fees and costs as of the date of
the August 1, 2011 order and the trial court lacked authority to award such fees and costs
in violation of this “court approved settlement agreement.”
Darsky contends Drobner forfeited these appellate claims by not objecting to the
August 29, 2014 findings and order on any of the grounds raised in her appeal and,<-
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would repay $190,500 of law school student loan debt he owed to Drobner at a rate of
$300 a month without interest, with the full amount to be paid in twelve years; (4) on the
basis of the property settlement, each party would bear his or her attorney fees incurred to
date; (5) “[iJn recognition of the relative resources, including earning capacity and trust
funds, available to each party and the needs of the children,” the parties did not owe child
or spousal support to each other, each would be deemed to be supporting the children
sufficiently when they were in his or her care, and each would waive any right to spousal
support; (6) the parties would “equally share all unreimbursed medical, dental,
psychotherapy, educational, extra curricular, health insurance and agreed expenses and
activities including summer camps dating from June 1, 2011 forward” and including
certain medical and tuition expenses already incurred; (7) “[eJach will pay the cost of
their own child care providers,” and (8) “[a]ll motions currently on calendar shall be
dismissed.”
On January 26, 2012, the court filed a limited judgment which dissolved the
marriage and reserved jurisdiction over all other matters. The court ordered that all other
existing orders remained in effect.
Il.
Proceedings Between 2012 and 2014
Between 2012 and 2014, the parties continued to litigate various issues,
particularly regarding custody and visitation. In January 2013, the parties stipulated to
and the court ordered the implementation of a visitation regimen between Drobner and
the children that required her to complete four “phases” of conduct in order to gain
further access and physical custody of the children. Phase I called for supervised visits
with the aid of a “supervisor” and “Parenting Coordinator,” and mother’s compliance
with certain requirements regarding her conduct and participation in a psychological
treatment and recovery program.
In a separate stipulation and order also filed in January 2013, the parties agreed to
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expenses for the children. Further, she had not paid anything to support the children
other than to pay half of an insurance premium until November 2013, and did not make
the minimum contribution required by their 2011 stipulation and agreement for summer
camps, after school programs, and medical, dental and psychological/psychiatric
expenses (which the parties later apparently referred to as “add ons”), putting her in
arrears in the amount of $15,000 to $20,000. She also had not paid “stipulated child
support” for two years. Darsky asked the court to order that Drobner’s arrearage and her
part of the costs for supervised visitations and the Parenting Coordinator be deducted
from his student loan debt, and for an accounting of the “529” account funds.
Drobner indicated in a statement filed on June 20, 2014, that she intended at trial
to address custody and visitation issues; payment or reallocation of certain fees;
enforcement of orders concerning the Parenting Coordinator; Darsky’s requests for child
support; and her own request for attorney fees and costs.
Ina subsequent trial brief filed on July 3, 2014, Darsky argued, among other
things, that Drobner’s motion before the court regarding visitations was unreasonable.
He contended Drobner had not yet complied with certain Phase I visitation requirements
and had “squander[ed] her resources, [Darsky’s] resources and the resources of this Court
by bringing this motion prematurely.” She needed supervised visitation, was not paying
child support, had caused Darsky to incur otherwise unnecessary fees, and “continued to
buy luxury goods, drugs and alcohol while claiming that she does not have sufficient
funds to pay for the needs of the children or her own need for fees.”
Drobner submitted a trial brief on July 3, 2014, in which she requested, among
other things, a change in the visitation regimen, that Darsky’s requests for child support
be denied and that he be ordered to pay her $1,600 in attorney fees and costs. Her
contentions included that Darsky had been trustee of her trust, of which about $600,000
was spent during their marriage, and that Darsky had “a history of aggression, anger, lack
of impulse-control, and violence.” She asked the court to allocate child-related expenses
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Asie ysurese uorours & se Surpnjout ‘soay Aousoye Joy preme 10d oy) Jey) pue ‘19,Stephanie A. Leroux, indicated that she understood the hearing was to discuss “the issue
of child support,” “add-ons going forward,” “how supervision costs will be paid going
forward,” and “attorney’s fees which both parties have made arguments for.”
The parties then discussed with the court their understanding of the scope of
financial matters they had agreed at the July 17, 2014 conference to litigate before the
court. Leroux stated that “it was initially my impression” they were not going to discuss
expenses Drobner paid in 2011 and 2012, and “did not know we were going back until
2011 until just recently,” meaning in the last week or two from an email exchange,
apparently between counsel. Darsky’s counsel said Leroux had missed the last hearing,
“where her client [Drobner] demanded that we go back to the February 2nd, 2011 order.
That was what hung us up on settlement last time. She wanted her supervision expenses
back to the reservation date which was the February 2nd, 2011 stipulation that resolved
everything but the financial issues that were pending from January 12th, 2011. So we’re
back to child support for 2011 and attorney’s fees for 2011 when [Darsky] filed his
request.” The court stated, “That’s my recollection as well.”
Another counsel for Drobner, Javier Bastidas, who said he was attending the
August 26, 2014 hearing only to observe, said Leroux had in fact left the previous
conference early and that he was present for it. Leroux indicated that she understood
Drobner’s supervision costs would be discussed as Darsky’s counsel indicated, but that
she was not necessarily prepared to do so. The court then summarized the issues before it
as “[c]hild support, add-ons going forward, supervision costs going forward, attorney’s
fees, and the prior claims,” to which Leroux agreed. The court clarified that prior claims
included claims for child support, reimbursement and arrearages. No counsel or party
objected. The court took these matters under submission, as well as whether Darsky
could send his student loan debt payments directly to the visitation supervisor as part of
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“Aspent over $50,000 from the account for her own use. The court ordered that Drobner
pay Darsky all of his attorney fees in the form of another credit to Darsky’s student loan
debt. These credits, along with what Darsky had already repaid, reduced Darsky’s
student loan debt from $190,500 to $21,181. The court further ordered that for any month
that Drobner did not make her child support and add-on payment to Darsky, Darsky
could deduct that amount from the remaining debt. Further, Darsky’s $300 monthly
payment to Drobner would be applied directly to Drobner’s visitation supervision costs.
Drobner filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s August 29, 2014 order.
DISCUSSION
Drobner argues that the court acted beyond its jurisdictional limits by retroactively
modifying child support and attorney fees for obligations incurred before the date of the
August 1, 2011 stipulation and order. She contends that stipulation and order provided
“pendent lite” relief and, therefore, the court was barred by the doctrine of res judicata
from modifying it except prospectively, and even then could do so only upon proper
notice of motion or order to show cause. Further, she contends, the parties agreed to bear
their own attorney fees and costs as of the date of their August 1, 2011 stipulation and the
trial court lacked authority to award fees and costs in violation of this “court approved
settlement agreement.”
We need not discuss any of these issues at great length because it is obvious from
the record that Drobner is estopped by the doctrine of invited error from pursuing her
appellate claims by her conduct below, regardless of the nature and possible res judicata
effect of the August 1, 2011 stipulation and order, or the parties’ purported previous
“settlement” of any attorney fees and costs issues.
“* “Under the doctrine of invited error, where a party, by his conduct, induces the
commission of an error, he is estopped from asserting it as grounds for reversal.
[Citations.] Similarly an appellant may waive his right to attack error by expressly or
impliedly agreeing at trial to the ruling or procedure objected to on appeal.” ’ ”
(Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 161, 181, quoting
Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1685-1686.) This courtOr
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pue ynoo jel} ou) SuIpeajstur woy Ayed e yuaaaad 0} st yorum ‘opdroutad ayy Jo esodind
dU} UO s}S91 SULNOOp oy} ‘Woyog ty *** [‘UONETD] ‘Teodde uo .JessoAal Joy punossd &
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BaloyM, :,o[droutsd joddojso ayy Jo uoneordde, ur,, , ,, se oULDOp ot} paqhiosep seyrequired before that order could be modified. Nor did she argue that the parties’ previous
settlement of any attorney fees and costs issues in the August 1, 2011 stipulation
precluded reconsideration of these issues.
In other words, the court and the parties, based on a unanimous agreement and a
unanimous understanding, revisited issues extending to before the August 1, 2011
stipulation and order. We agree with Darsky that by these actions Drobner invited any
error by the court and is, therefore, estopped from raising her appellate claims.
DISPOSITION
The findings and order appealed from are affirmed.
11