arrow left
arrow right
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
  • IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al PERSONAL INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE - VEHICLE RELATED document preview
						
                                

Preview

A SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Document Scanning Lead Sheet Jun-23-2017 1:30 pm Case Number: CGC-11-515542 Filing Date: Jun-21-2017 1:30 Filed by: MELISSA DONG Image: 05919002 REMITTITUR IDA CHRISTINA FUA CRUZ VS. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al 001005919002 Instructions: Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 350 MCALLISTER STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102 DIVISION 2 Office of the County Clerk Lo San Francisco County Superior Court - Main Attention: Civil Appeals 400 McAllister Street, Ist Floor San Francisco County Superior Court San Francisco, CA 94102 / JUN 21.2017 IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA, CLERK E COURT Plaintiff and Appellant, By: Deputy Clark v. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al., Defendants and Appellants. A147477 San Francisco County No. CGC11515542 * * REMITTITUR * * I, Diana Herbert, Clerk of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, for the First Appellate District, do hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of the original opinion or decision entered in the above-entitled cause on June 20, 2017 and that this opinion has now become final. pellant _ Respondent to recover costs _WEach party to bear own costs ___Costs are not awarded in this proceeding ___See decision for costs determination Witness my hand and the Seal of the Court affixed at my office this JUN 20 2017 Very truly yours, Diana Herbert P.O. Report: Marsden Transcript: Boxed Transcripts: Exhibits: _ None of the above: v rem1COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 350 MCALLISTER STREET ef. SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102 DIVISION 2 Court of Appeal First Appellate District IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JUN 20 2017 JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ et al., a Defendants and Appellants. Diana Herbert, Clerk by. Deputy Clerk A147477 San Francisco County No. CGC11515542 BY THE COURT: Counsel having so stipulated, the appeal lodged in this court on February 11, 2016 (filed in the trial court on January 14, 2016), and cross-appeals lodged in this court on February 18, 2016 (filed in the trial court on January 21, 2016 and January 22, 2016), are dismissed, with each party to bear its own costs on appeal. The remittitur is to issue forthwith. JUN 20 2017 Date: Acting P.J. orffJay Court of Appeal, First Appellate District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District Diana Herbert. Clerk/Administrator Diana Herbert. ClerkjAdministrator Electronically RECEIVED on 6/14/2017 at 11.43.12 AM Electronically FILED on 6/14/2017 by S. Wheeler, Deputy Cler! Case No. A147477 COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT - DIVISION TWO IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Respondent, v. JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ and YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC., Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants. On Appeal from a Judgment After Jury Verdict San Francisco Superior Court — Hon. Garrett Wong — Case No.: CGC-11-515542 JOINT NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL COLIN C. MUNRO (SBN: 195520) D. DOUGLAS SHUREEN CARLSON, CALLADINE & MCMILLAN & SHUREEN LLP PETERSON LLP 50 Santa Rosa Avenue, Suite 300 353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor Santa Rosa, CA 95404-4901 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (707) 525-5400 Telephone: (415) 391-3911 Facsimile: (707) 576-7955 Facsimile: (415) 391-3898 doug.shureen@memillanshureen.com cmunro@ccplaw.com Attorneys for Cross-Appellant and Cross Respondent Attorneys for Cross-Appellant and JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ Cross-Respondent YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC.TODD P. EMANUEL (SBN 169031) DEIRDRE O’REILLY MARBLESTONE (SBN 88008) GARY L. SIMMS (SBN 96239) EMMANUEL LAW GROUP 702 Marshall Street, Suite 400 Redwood City, CA 94063-1825 Telephone: (650) 369-8900 Facsimile: (650) 369-4228 gary@teinjurylaw.com Attorneys for Appellant and Cross- Respondent IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUAte JOINT NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL Pursuant to rule 8.244(a) of the California Rules of Court, Appellant and Cross-Respondent Ida Cristina Cruz Fua (“Fua”), Respondent and Cross-Appellant Joel Enrique Andino Sanchez (“Sanchez”), and Respondent and Cross-Appellant Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. (“Yellow Cab”) (collectively, the “Parties”) hereby give notice that the appeals in the above captioned matter have been settled. Further, the Parties hereby request that the appeals filed on February 11, 2016, and February 18, 2016, by the Parties in the above caption matter be dismissed. Dated: June 14, 2017 CARLSON, CALLADINE & PETERSON LLP By: /s/ Colin C. Munro COLIN C. MUNRO . 353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor San Francisco, California 94111 Telephone: (415) 391-3911 Attorneys for Respondent and Cross- Appellant, YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC. Dated: June 14, 2017 MCMILLAN & SHUREEN LLP By: /s/ D. Douglas Shureen D. Douglas Shureen 50 Santa Rosa Avenue, Suite 300 Santa Rosa, CA 95404-4901 Telephone: (707) 525-5400 Attorneys for Appellant and Cross- Respondent, JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZDated: June 14, 2017 EMANUEL LAW GROUP By: /s/ Gary L. Simms GARY L. SIMMS 702 Marshall Street, Suite 400 Redwood City, California 94063-1825 Telephone: (650) 369-8900 Attorneys for Appellant and Cross- Respondent, IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA4 anon Wa EU ll | i (ae SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Document Scanning Lead Sheet Jun-23-2017 1:29 pm Case Number: FDI-10-773737 Filing Date: Jun-21-2017 1:27 Filed by: MELISSA DONG Image: 05918999 REMITTITUR ANN DARSKY VS. AARON DARSKY *403 CASE* (FLORES RECUSAL)(CONS W/FDV-10-808259)[LMTD SCPE REP] 001F05918999 Instructions: Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 350 MCALLISTER STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102 DIVISION 2 Office of the County Clerk San Francisco County Superior Court - Main Attention: Civil Appeals 400 McAllister Street, 1st Floor San Francisco, CA 94102 FIL E D San Francisco County Superior Cour ANN DROBNER (DARSKY), JUN 21.2017 Plaintiff and Appellant, Pl CLERK QE JHE COURT AARON DARSKY, By: Clark Defendant and Respondent. A143413 San Francisco County No. FDI10773737 * * REMITTITUR * * I, Diana Herbert, Clerk of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, for the First Appellate District, do hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of the original opinion or decision entered in the above-entitled cause on April 20, 2017 and that this opinion has now become final. ___ Appellant _hespondent to recover costs ___Each party to bear own costs ___ Costs are not awarded in this proceeding ___See decision for costs determination Witness my hand and the Seal of the Court affixed at my office this JUN 20 2017 Very truly yours, Diana Herbert P.O. Report: Marsden Transcript: Boxed Transcripts: Exhibits: __ None of the above: iv rem1COPY Filed 4/20/17 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS lifornia Rules of Court, ue 81 a 15( 15), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not Certified for publication or ordered ublisheg, Except as spe ified by rule 8.1115(b). Ths 0 ‘opinion has not been cerfified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT Court of Appeal First Appellate District DIVISION TWO APR 20 201/ ANN DROBNER DARSKY, Diana Herbert, Clerk ge by. De, 1 f—__Deputy Clerk Plaintiff and Appellant, A143413 v. AARON DARSKY, (San Francisco City and County Si . Ct. No. FDI107737. Defendant and Respondent. uper. Ct. No. FD) 37) Ann Drobner Darsky (Drobner) and Aaron Darsky were married in 2005 and separated in 2010. They have two children, who were five and three years old when the couple separated. In December 2010, Drobner petitioned for dissolution of their marriage. Over three years of litigation in San Francisco County family court followed. On August 29, 2014, the court issued findings and an order regarding certain financial disputes between Drobner and Darsky, ruling mostly in Darsky’s favor. Drobner appeals from these findings and order, contending the family court had previously and finally resolved certain issues in an August 1, 2011 order, and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from modifying this previous order except prospectively and even then only by proper notice of motion or order to show cause. Drobner further argues that the parties agreed to bear their own attorney fees and costs as of the date of the August 1, 2011 order and the trial court lacked authority to award such fees and costs in violation of this “court approved settlement agreement.” Darsky contends Drobner forfeited these appellate claims by not objecting to the August 29, 2014 findings and order on any of the grounds raised in her appeal and,<- 0} pojejar suonsonb jeuonrppe Aue 1940 uoNoIpsimf urejer pnom yoo ayy (Z) ‘{swOY Jioy} useq pey Apuoredde yet Ayodosd enuopisos & UO soUBINSUT JO soxe} ‘oSeS OU oun Aed 0} payediyqo 9q pnom Ayred Joyjiou (7) :384} parapso ynoo ay} pue pooide soled oy], ‘sioyeUr [eloueULy UIe}IO9 BuIpsedoI OUI} sty} ‘“Jopso pue uoHe|Ndys Joyjoue ‘T10Z ‘I isndny uo poy ynoo oy} ‘UoNeSII] or0UI SuLMOT[OJ ‘19}e] SYJUOU [eISAIS « Leuqoiq] 0} %OOT Poeoo]]e UleWAI sooJ UONEIISIA pastAsodns,, soye]s JY} JOpIO € [QZ ‘TZ JOQUIDAON, ® Ul SB YoNs ‘Os Op JaUqOIC] Jey} JopIO 0} ponuTUOD yN0d 9Y} ‘AIUD dU} 0} ‘s}s09 UOHePSIA pastalodns ay} Jo []@ Joy Aed 0} sem JouqoIQ Jey} UOTeUTULIO}Op st pasuryo Jo 4sonbar soay Kowloye s,Aysreq UO pans yN0d oy] Jey} 9}e9IpUT jou Op sored oy], “SS°S6T‘ST$ BUI[eI0} S}sOo puke saay poLNoUT pey AysIEC[ Jey} porepoap AouIONe s_Ayseq. “YorRyA] OUeS Jey} J9}eT “USIP]IYO oY} YIIM S}ISIA pastAlodnsun poysonbai pur ,,‘s}s0o asay} Jo JUoUed oy} Ul oreYs 0} poopso aq ysnut,, Ay¥sIeC Jey) poyasse ,,s}]SOO UOTE}ISIA pastalodns pur sjsoo orvopyiyp,, [fe Surded sem oys yey} payeys os[e yg *s}soo pue soay AouoYe Joy ysonbos s,Aysseq Auep 0} NO ay} poyse JoUqoI ‘*[ [0Z yore! UT «3809 Jey} Jo [Uor}eo0]]e2 JOA UONOIpsunt SAIASAI 0} LINOD dy], ‘SioyeW JeIouRUY pue yoddns uo Suresy JoyyNy Surpued S}soo UOHeYSIA d9e[g [s]}UaIe ** * Jo yuourKed Suroueape Joy a[qrsuodsos 9q,, JauqoIq yey} “JoypIng “pue soe] q sjuoreg Je ONUT}UOS JoUqoOIC] PUR UdIPTIYo oy} UseMjoq SUOTEYISIA pastasodns yey) posopso jno9 oy) pue poosse sored ayy ‘1 107 *Z Aeniqs,j uD “soay AouJOye sty Sed rauqoiq yey} SuIpnjour ‘sioyeuL ureyoo SuIpsesos uoHow v payy Aysseq ‘See ay) JO UONNIOssIp Joy pouonned sougosq Joye Apsoys ‘1107 ‘Z] Arenuer uD Sduipaa20dg Apo I aNnNOYD MOVE “Ayorjua Joy} Ul Japso pue ssurpuy 7107 “67 IsNSNYy sy) ULJe pue AysIeq YM doxe aA “NOD ay} Aq apeut Joa Aue poyAul sys osneoaq sue] osoy) SuIster Wo poddojso st “soupyfinancial issues about the property; (3) pursuant to a post-nuptial agreement, Darsky would repay $190,500 of law school student loan debt he owed to Drobner at a rate of $300 a month without interest, with the full amount to be paid in twelve years; (4) on the basis of the property settlement, each party would bear his or her attorney fees incurred to date; (5) “[iJn recognition of the relative resources, including earning capacity and trust funds, available to each party and the needs of the children,” the parties did not owe child or spousal support to each other, each would be deemed to be supporting the children sufficiently when they were in his or her care, and each would waive any right to spousal support; (6) the parties would “equally share all unreimbursed medical, dental, psychotherapy, educational, extra curricular, health insurance and agreed expenses and activities including summer camps dating from June 1, 2011 forward” and including certain medical and tuition expenses already incurred; (7) “[eJach will pay the cost of their own child care providers,” and (8) “[a]ll motions currently on calendar shall be dismissed.” On January 26, 2012, the court filed a limited judgment which dissolved the marriage and reserved jurisdiction over all other matters. The court ordered that all other existing orders remained in effect. Il. Proceedings Between 2012 and 2014 Between 2012 and 2014, the parties continued to litigate various issues, particularly regarding custody and visitation. In January 2013, the parties stipulated to and the court ordered the implementation of a visitation regimen between Drobner and the children that required her to complete four “phases” of conduct in order to gain further access and physical custody of the children. Phase I called for supervised visits with the aid of a “supervisor” and “Parenting Coordinator,” and mother’s compliance with certain requirements regarding her conduct and participation in a psychological treatment and recovery program. In a separate stipulation and order also filed in January 2013, the parties agreed to and the court ordered the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator who was authorized topur ,.qnjo jod,, & ye saseyoind sejnZor apeul ays pur ‘ausoour Jo saomnos Joy ][e Zuyeys you Sem oYs ‘poaoidum pey sJouqoiq ory posueyoun sea UONIpUOD [eTOURUTy sTY ‘poumTe[o Aysieq ‘ospy ‘Aauoul puny isn. Ut QQ0‘OOP$ 01 Ssod08 peY oYs Udy SUIPNOUT ‘syISTA pastaradns Jo ys09 34} pslojye JOU Pjnos sys poultE]o pey UoTEsNI ou} noYsnomM) Jouqoiq yey} SUIT p1O7 “OZ Ouns e UI poyiosse Ayseq “JeL SuTWOOdN May} Joy uoTeIedaid UI Woy} UsaMJoq SONS! [eIOURUTY oY) JO SaleUUINS poyUgns UsY) soned Mog jou sof SUOISSIUIQNSY, ,SIYIDg IY] TH *SIOPIO UONP}ISIA JO SolIos B ponssl HI YOIyM ye “p{OZ *L] SUNG Joy SuLIvoY JoyNY e pa[npayos I] “UsZOY JUNODOR OY} Palopso }NOD SY], “SUOTRIISIA PastAJodns pure Jojseus [eloods v puny 0} psn spung oy} pue udZOY JUNOIIR oY} DALY 0} TYSNos AYsIEC] STIYMA VIF MBS Ys Se spuNg asoy) osn prnod ays POISISUI JOUqOIG] “USIP|IYO MY} JO dUO Joy JUNODOR SBUIARS OB9T[O9 ..6Z5,, B Ul OOOTIS JOAO sored ay} useMjoq oyndsip e Ul JorfoI ayred xo JYBnos AysIe “pI OZ ouNe Uy “PLOT ‘TT Afng Jog ‘stoyew jeroueury Surpnyour ‘sonsst Uley90 SuIpresor SuLesY JoYIINJ pue [eI v poynpoyos pue snpayos Burjorsg kv yas ‘poster JoUQOIC SANSSI 9Y} JO 9WOS passorppe 1NOd oy} YoryM UT sored oy} Us9MJOq UOTeINdNs Joyjoue uo paseq Jopso ue pay 11N09 oy} “yp QZ Arenuer ul “AysIeq Aq Ajsou pred aq 0} JoyeUIpioo| Sunuareg ev Jo uoUNUTOddeal oy) pur [OAR] S,UdIP|IYd oY} UO SUOT]OLNSOI “UOIP[TYO 94} JO sosueyoxe soy} ‘JOLARYaq s Ayre ‘Adesoy} s ,Uasp[TYo ou} “UsIp]Yyo oy} PIM SUOTBOTUNUAUIOS pUL SUOTIRIISIA JOY JO SULIO} oY) SUIPNTOUT ‘sioyeUT Joyo SuIpseFor SJ9pIO JYBNOS Os[e Joye] SYS “000'R$ JO SWOoUT ATYJUOUT e YM AowJONe ue sem AysIEq pue ‘A1aA00sip jeIoueuly s,Aysreq] 0} puodsal 0} sourjsisse [edo] popoou ays ‘payo[dep Aja,9[du109 sem aUIODUT Joy UO paryol Apeud pey sys yUNODOe YSN] & Po}e}S I9UqOIC] ‘uoneuasaidal [edo] psOJJv JOU Pnoo ays Jey) Supudquod ‘QQZ‘Tg JO JUNOUE oY} UT Say Agusoye Joy Aed 0} A¥sIEC] JOpIO 0} JN0d ay} poyse JoUqoIC “€10Z JoquIs00q Uy “IOWUIPIOOD BuIusIeg sy) JO 1s09 oy} Ur ATjenbo areys A[]eJoUST 0} porapso o1oM sored OUL ., UoreISIA pue Apojsno Jo sonsst [ejuoWepuNg suTULJO}ap 0} UOToIpstnf sAIsN[Oxo $.JINOd oY} JOaTJe JOU Op YOIyM squared sy} UseMJOq S}OT]JUOD SUTAIOSO SIOPJO OYCUL,,liquor stores and had made other large expenditures while refusing to contribute to expenses for the children. Further, she had not paid anything to support the children other than to pay half of an insurance premium until November 2013, and did not make the minimum contribution required by their 2011 stipulation and agreement for summer camps, after school programs, and medical, dental and psychological/psychiatric expenses (which the parties later apparently referred to as “add ons”), putting her in arrears in the amount of $15,000 to $20,000. She also had not paid “stipulated child support” for two years. Darsky asked the court to order that Drobner’s arrearage and her part of the costs for supervised visitations and the Parenting Coordinator be deducted from his student loan debt, and for an accounting of the “529” account funds. Drobner indicated in a statement filed on June 20, 2014, that she intended at trial to address custody and visitation issues; payment or reallocation of certain fees; enforcement of orders concerning the Parenting Coordinator; Darsky’s requests for child support; and her own request for attorney fees and costs. Ina subsequent trial brief filed on July 3, 2014, Darsky argued, among other things, that Drobner’s motion before the court regarding visitations was unreasonable. He contended Drobner had not yet complied with certain Phase I visitation requirements and had “squander[ed] her resources, [Darsky’s] resources and the resources of this Court by bringing this motion prematurely.” She needed supervised visitation, was not paying child support, had caused Darsky to incur otherwise unnecessary fees, and “continued to buy luxury goods, drugs and alcohol while claiming that she does not have sufficient funds to pay for the needs of the children or her own need for fees.” Drobner submitted a trial brief on July 3, 2014, in which she requested, among other things, a change in the visitation regimen, that Darsky’s requests for child support be denied and that he be ordered to pay her $1,600 in attorney fees and costs. Her contentions included that Darsky had been trustee of her trust, of which about $600,000 was spent during their marriage, and that Darsky had “a history of aggression, anger, lack of impulse-control, and violence.” She asked the court to allocate child-related expenses proportionally based on each party’s income, asserting Darsky’s was far greater than‘Jesunoo s,Jouqosq ,,’sfelouruly pue Apojsno,, SuipreSar ,.J0A0 Surseys,, o19M Ady} yey) worsenb s,4Ja]9 & 0} ssuodsad UI PoyeoIpPU! Udy} 1INOD oY} ‘sjusUIaISe Joyo Aue oAey OU PIp sonjred oy} 1eI poyeorpurt cys “Iqep sm Jo OOE‘6S Pred pey oy yey poqweLEM AysIEq Ples osje oyg “JoUqOIC] 0} pomo ay Je 00S‘061$ JO IGep UeO] JUapNys oY} Woy AysIEq 0} POqPoId 9q P[NOAA JU} YYO‘LIG$ JO ..SUO ppe,, JO] aTeIeoLe ue pomo JoUqoIq 1ey} qUoUIOoISe UT o19M sored oY} JeU} poreys [asuNod s_,AysIeq “jUasoid 919M JasUNOD IY} pue Aysreq ‘ouqorq yoryM ye SuLesy eB payonpuod yn09 oy} “p10Z ‘97 IsN3NV UO ‘sBulreey p10 ‘97 isnBny pure “pO “LT Aine 9Y} Usemjoq Jouqoiq Aq BUI[y & UTeUOS JOU Soop P1001 OUT, “OLOZ “6Z JAQUISAON SOUS SISOD Ul Op PYG puw saoJ AOUIONL Ul 66'S H*LL$ JO SS9OXO UI paLMouT pey AysIeq yey} poyeys I] “UoTeIepSop say Aouroye ue payly AYsIe ‘pI OT ‘S| IsN3ny UO “sosuadxo UOIEJISIA JO UOLOOTIL 9} J0A0 OHoIpsinf poarosas pur “p{ QZ ‘S| snSny Aq uoreyUoUNdOp [euONIppe oT] 01 sonzed ay} pazepio tno ay, ., ‘sated yo Aq 1s09 pue saay AOWIOWY puke 1 10Z/Z/Z WO SUSIA pastAradns Jo 4s09 Joy [r9uqoIq] 0) [Aysreq] Aq opeut aq pynoys yuow[a]sinquitez JOU Jo JoyJoyM BuIpsesal sonsst jeloueur|j],, mnoge “p{ Oz ‘OZ IsNSNYy Uo SuLesy B JepUsTed OY} 0} Pappe NOD oy} SICOIPUL ,.SOINUTUT TUTUT,, $.1INOD oY, “2oUdIaTUOD P07 “LT Aine sity Jo ydtzosuen s,Joyr0dai v opnyout jou sop pso9er oul “suOISsTuqns snotAaad a19y} YIM JUaYSISUOD suOTIsod poyeys Kou} YOryM UT syUDWIOye}S soUaIayUOD JuoUETNas/smyE}s poy sored ayy “p1OZ ‘LT Aine Uo pyay sem aoudIEJUOD USUNETHOS Tetorpnf e pue panuruoo sem “p07 ‘TT Atne Joy paynpayos ATTeuISiJO ‘fern oy s8uipaa204g juanbasqngy ‘AI “sasuadxe sUsIpIyo ay) Jo uoriod paseasout ue Joy Aed 0} Joy MOTTE 1 16'7ZETS$ O01 YUOU & ODES Wo syuouXed ygQop UeO] JUOpNs sty aseorOUT KysIEq ey) « Povenosoual,, sem uonelndys [QZ sonzed oy Jt ‘IYBnos osye JoUqgoIq] “s0}eUIpI00D Suyjuoreg 9y} 10} pemo oy yey Ked 0} poyrey pey ‘ays uey} Joes ‘ay asneoaq Asie ysurese uorours & se Surpnjout ‘soay Aousoye Joy preme 10d oy) Jey) pue ‘19,Stephanie A. Leroux, indicated that she understood the hearing was to discuss “the issue of child support,” “add-ons going forward,” “how supervision costs will be paid going forward,” and “attorney’s fees which both parties have made arguments for.” The parties then discussed with the court their understanding of the scope of financial matters they had agreed at the July 17, 2014 conference to litigate before the court. Leroux stated that “it was initially my impression” they were not going to discuss expenses Drobner paid in 2011 and 2012, and “did not know we were going back until 2011 until just recently,” meaning in the last week or two from an email exchange, apparently between counsel. Darsky’s counsel said Leroux had missed the last hearing, “where her client [Drobner] demanded that we go back to the February 2nd, 2011 order. That was what hung us up on settlement last time. She wanted her supervision expenses back to the reservation date which was the February 2nd, 2011 stipulation that resolved everything but the financial issues that were pending from January 12th, 2011. So we’re back to child support for 2011 and attorney’s fees for 2011 when [Darsky] filed his request.” The court stated, “That’s my recollection as well.” Another counsel for Drobner, Javier Bastidas, who said he was attending the August 26, 2014 hearing only to observe, said Leroux had in fact left the previous conference early and that he was present for it. Leroux indicated that she understood Drobner’s supervision costs would be discussed as Darsky’s counsel indicated, but that she was not necessarily prepared to do so. The court then summarized the issues before it as “[c]hild support, add-ons going forward, supervision costs going forward, attorney’s fees, and the prior claims,” to which Leroux agreed. The court clarified that prior claims included claims for child support, reimbursement and arrearages. No counsel or party objected. The court took these matters under submission, as well as whether Darsky could send his student loan debt payments directly to the visitation supervisor as part of Drobner’s contribution.pey pure 4unosoe ..67ZS,, 9U} UI Spuny Joy yINOD ay} Aq pasepso A[snoraoid se yuNODIe 0} poytey pey ‘yyiey peq ur payoe pey ‘Aysseq posesedsip Ajiodosduit pey ‘soomosoai jeroueury Jotodns pey ‘ased oY} Ul JUSUIDTAS WeMY} 0} pojoe pey ‘sooj ur o10UI A[quiopisuod quods pey Jouqoig yey) punoj JoyVNy 1] “‘poLNoUT A[qvuOsval aJOM Saaj aSou} Jet} pue 0107 JOQUISAON UI SIopJO ZuTUTeISeI SOUD[OIA DISOWOp JoJ sonbod B polly ay sours SIP‘LL$ JO SoINyIpuadxo day AousJoye uMOYs pey AYsIEC yeY) puNoj yN0d oy) “YYL] “sasuodxe uorstAladns UOTRIISIA Jo yuddIEd QO] Aed 0} snUTQUOD 0} JaUQOIG poJapsO NOD ay} ‘YLNO.J “plOZ ‘I zequiajdag uo SuruUIZeq suo ppe oy} Jo JyeY snjd yuo e OL /$ JO squowXed yoddns pyiys AjyyuouI Aysseq Aed 0} JouqoIq] poJopio yN0d oy} “pIU,L, *1QOp UOT JUSPNYs s AysIe 0} Poi JoyjouR JO WLIOJ OY} UI ‘OZO‘LIG ‘UNOWe siI) Jo Jyey AysIeq Aed 0} JoUQoIC] posopso pur “Jopso S,4NOD dy} JO dJep dy} 0} ‘ZI OT “| Arenuer uo Surye}s pottod oy} 10} sosuadxa uo-ppe Jo} oSeIVSLIe s .JOUqOIG JO UOTJeJUSUINDOp s ,AysIeq poidaooe jN0D oy} ‘pucsag *JSOIOJUT JNOYJIM “JQap UO] JUOPNs sty 0} Wposo v JO ULIOJ ay} UT AYSIEC 0} ¥ZS‘SOg SIy} Aed 0} JOUgOIC] PoapsO NOD SY, “PZS‘*SO$ SuI[e10) oSeresLIe Ue Joy ‘suo ppe snd ‘QgI‘9g¢ Jo JUNOW oY} UT p07 JO SYJUOW IYySIO qsuJ 94} 10J yoOddns pyryo 0} popus sem oy yeY} pur ‘suo ppe snid ‘AJoANoodsar ZEC‘OT$ PUL OL5‘8I$ ‘9SZ‘OT$ JO SJUNOUE OUD UI ETOZ PU Z10Z ‘T10Z JO SAeOX J [NJ ay Joy yoddns PITYS 0} poyiUs sem oY Jey} poyns ‘suoryenoyeo $s Aysreq uo poseq {noo ou} ‘ysII, A ‘sored ay) UsaMjaq Sansst [eIouRUTT 94} UO JOARy s,AysIeC] Ul AJOSIE] popns usy} WY .."11/Z/Z ours Sulpuod useq sey sasuadxo UOISIAIJOdNS UOHe}ISIA oIBYs 0} sonbas [s JouqoIq] pue | [/Z]/] souls Surpuad useq sey sooy Aouroye pue yoddns pjryo soy ysonbas [s,Aysreq],, Jey} pajou }N0d oy} ‘sonsst Jeloueuyy Joy sy "]] aseyg 0} SurssosZosd asojaq | ase OJ CLI9}1IN oY} JOOU! JoUqoIG 3eU) quoulornbal ay} SuIpN]our “Jopso JoyINy [UN soe Ul UTeUIEI pjnomM USWTSoI UOTIERISIA 9Y} VY} por9plo 1] “PLOT ‘6Z ISNENY UO sIOpsO pue sBuIPUTZ UO}LIM party 1N0D oy], 4apsQ pun sSuipury $107 “67 INSNY S,jan0D ayy, “Aspent over $50,000 from the account for her own use. The court ordered that Drobner pay Darsky all of his attorney fees in the form of another credit to Darsky’s student loan debt. These credits, along with what Darsky had already repaid, reduced Darsky’s student loan debt from $190,500 to $21,181. The court further ordered that for any month that Drobner did not make her child support and add-on payment to Darsky, Darsky could deduct that amount from the remaining debt. Further, Darsky’s $300 monthly payment to Drobner would be applied directly to Drobner’s visitation supervision costs. Drobner filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s August 29, 2014 order. DISCUSSION Drobner argues that the court acted beyond its jurisdictional limits by retroactively modifying child support and attorney fees for obligations incurred before the date of the August 1, 2011 stipulation and order. She contends that stipulation and order provided “pendent lite” relief and, therefore, the court was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from modifying it except prospectively, and even then could do so only upon proper notice of motion or order to show cause. Further, she contends, the parties agreed to bear their own attorney fees and costs as of the date of their August 1, 2011 stipulation and the trial court lacked authority to award fees and costs in violation of this “court approved settlement agreement.” We need not discuss any of these issues at great length because it is obvious from the record that Drobner is estopped by the doctrine of invited error from pursuing her appellate claims by her conduct below, regardless of the nature and possible res judicata effect of the August 1, 2011 stipulation and order, or the parties’ purported previous “settlement” of any attorney fees and costs issues. “* “Under the doctrine of invited error, where a party, by his conduct, induces the commission of an error, he is estopped from asserting it as grounds for reversal. [Citations.] Similarly an appellant may waive his right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the ruling or procedure objected to on appeal.” ’ ” (Lockaway Storage v. County of Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 161, 181, quoting Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1685-1686.) This courtOr SBM 9SNed MOYS 0} JopsO JO UOTOUL JoyjNy Aue yey} pusyuod Jo Jopso pu uoHeTNdys ILOZ ‘1 Isn3ny oY} Jo JOaJo eyeorpnf sor poysodind oy) Surpsesor sansst Aue ostes JOU pIp ose sYS ‘so1desIp 30U PIP xnoIa’T ,,‘sferoueuly ** * pue Apoysno,, Surpsesor .9A0 Surpeys,, aJom AOU) JY) SULIVOY OY) Ul Poje}s INOS ay) USYM “JOYLIN IST] SjIN0d ot) YIM poorde Ajssoidxa ‘juosoid souqosq] WIM ‘xnoJe’] fosunod s Jouqoq “Jepso pue uonejndys 1102 ‘T sn3ny oy 4q pesodun uopeyuny Aue 01 Supayor nowpM (1107 Aenuer ut Aysieq Aq poysonbal se say Aouloye pure [107 Joy Woddns pytyo yuvour 7 yey} Suiesy OY} UI Jor[sea Suryeorput Joye) sooy Aouroye pue yoddns pyryo Surpnyour se Suresy PIOZ ‘97 IsNBNY oY} Je SaNssI asay} Pojst] NOs oy) USYA\ “1 107 JO Suruurseq oy} 07 yorq porep yey} Way) Usemjoq soyndsip sa} Aauoye pue yoddns pyryo Surpnjout ‘Jopso pue uonejndys [10Z ‘1 isn3ny oy} 0} JoLd pastes o9M AOU] SB SONSST [PIDAS JISTASI 0} posse ynoo oy} pue—douqoiq Surpnyour—soryed oy} ‘Jopio pue uoNeindys | [07 ‘Z Areniqgo,J dy} 0} youq Sur08 sosuadxo uorstAsodns uoreyIsIA Joy ayes] Ady} yey) 9OUD}STSUT s Jouqoiq Aq poyseds yey) ayeorput sousrayuos pT OZ ‘LI Ainge ay} JO SoNUTUN TUTUT 9Y} pue SuLesy p10 “97 ISNINY OU} 38 JNO AyIWEy 94} oJOJOq UOISsNosIpP sored oY], (‘[asuagap eyeorpnf saz ayy Jo JoAtem o]qQIssod 0} SutLIAZOT] 1.6 “L96 PE TWO L (ZL61) PE soaddp ‘duoy S,uauysoy ‘A yorsng ose 298 ‘6g ‘78 Mpy'ddy Ted 9€1 (9007) aandsouapy P SJouUOD JUaBang ‘a sda8poy p1099" ‘39 ‘7L9 Wp ddw Ted 671 (S007) uuDuLaHy ‘a plang) C178 “4 ‘18z § Juewspne (L661 “Pe Wp) eINpasorg “TED “UPPIM L) "NOS [ely OU} UT FT asteI 0} oNpIey Aq poatem aq Avw pur ‘asuayop jeuoNorpstnf v jou st eyeorpn sofa], ,, “Jopso pue uoyelndys [107 ‘T IsnBnvy oy} Jo ommjeu eyeorpnf sor sy} Jo osneo9q uonorpstinf poxory unos ApTuey oy} JeY} UOTJJoSse s,JoUqoIC] 0} AreNUOO “IayYN C8L1 ‘ELI wyddy Teo SPI (L007) GID vom Jo AyD ‘a zounyy Burjonb “QOOT ‘’86 Wy'ddw Ted 720z (7102) 0D ‘SU DIL 4 ‘0D ‘suf jaodsuvaz) ., , .“VN0d oe[Jodde oy) ul Woyorsy) SuIoId voy} pue ynoo jel} ou) SuIpeajstur woy Ayed e yuaaaad 0} st yorum ‘opdroutad ayy Jo esodind dU} UO s}S91 SULNOOp oy} ‘Woyog ty *** [‘UONETD] ‘Teodde uo .JessoAal Joy punossd & se Wt Surpyosse wo poddojso st ay “1019 JO UOISSIWUOD ay} Ssonpul JonpuUOd sty Aq Ayed BaloyM, :,o[droutsd joddojso ayy Jo uoneordde, ur,, , ,, se oULDOp ot} paqhiosep seyrequired before that order could be modified. Nor did she argue that the parties’ previous settlement of any attorney fees and costs issues in the August 1, 2011 stipulation precluded reconsideration of these issues. In other words, the court and the parties, based on a unanimous agreement and a unanimous understanding, revisited issues extending to before the August 1, 2011 stipulation and order. We agree with Darsky that by these actions Drobner invited any error by the court and is, therefore, estopped from raising her appellate claims. DISPOSITION The findings and order appealed from are affirmed. 11