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Filing # 60176710 E-Filed 08/09/2017 02:29:10 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
17™ JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
BROWARD COUNTY FLORIDA
CASE NO.: CACE-14-001087(04)
PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
FLORIDA CHARTER FOUNDATION, INC.
D/B/A FRANKLIN ACADEMY CHARTER
SCHOOL, DISCOVERY SCHOOLS, _ INC.,
iUNIFORMS, INC., RICHARD SHELLOW, JON
THOMAS ROGERS, AND SCOTT SZNITKEN,
Defendants.
td
PLAINTIFF’S, PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC., RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS, IUNIFORMS, INC. AND RICHARD SHELLOW’S MOTION TO
DISMISS COUNTS 7-10 AND 19-20 OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
COMES NOW Plaintiff, PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC. (“PLANET T”) by and through
the undersigned law firm, and file this Response in Opposition to Defendants’, IUNIFORMS, INC.
(S{UNIFORMS”) and RICHARD SHELLOW (“SHELLOW”), (collectively referred to as
“DEFENDANTS”) Motion to Dismiss Counts 7-10 and 19-20 of the Second Amended Complain,
and in support of this motion would state:
I Background
1. On or about March 9, 2017, PLANET T filed its Second Amended tortious with
twenty-two counts against six Defendants. PLANET T filed Counts for Tortious Interference with
a Contractual Relationship, Tortious Interference with an Advantageous Relationship; and
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets against DEFENDANTS.
Page 1 of 9
*4* FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 8/9/2017 2:29:10 PM.****2. On or about April 19, 2017, FLORIDA CHARTER FOUNDATION, INC. D/B/A
FRANKLIN ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, DISCOVERY SCHOOLS, INC., JON
THOMAS ROGERS, and SCOTT SZNITKEN filed Motions to Dismiss numerous counts of the
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
3. On or about April 3, 2017, DEFENDANTS filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts 7-10
and 19-20 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.
4, On or about June 16, 2017, this Court heard FLORIDA CHARTER
FOUNDATION, INC. D/B/A FRANKLIN ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, DISCOVERY
SCHOOLS, INC., JON THOMAS ROGERS, and SCOTT SZNITKEN’s Motions to Dismiss,
denied all Motions to Dismiss and found that Plaintiff had properly pled the Counts.
5. DEFENDANTS’ Motions to Dismiss were scheduled to be heard on August 10,
2017.
6. DEFENDANTS argued some of the same arguments as the other Defendants did
on June 26, 2017; however, despite the Court’s ruling on the other Motions to Dismiss,
DEFENDANTS have requested to proceed with the duplicate arguments for the hearing scheduled
for August 10, 2017.
Legal Standard
7. “When determining the merits of a motion to dismiss, the trial court’s consideration
is limited to the four corners of the complaint, the allegations of which must be accepted as true
and considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” See Bell v. Indian River Mem.
Hosp., 778 So.2d 1030, 1032 (citing Gladstone v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA
1999).
Page 2 of 98. All inferences are to be made in favor of the complaint and against the movant.
Someplace New, Inc. v. Francois, 51 So. 3d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011.). Exhibits attached
to the complaint are considered as part of the complaint. Harry Pepper & Associates, Inc. v.
Lasseter, 247 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
COUNTS 19 AND 20 — MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
9. DEFENDANTS allege PLANET T failed to allege the existence of trade secrets
under Florida law.
10. On February 7, 2017, this Court permitted Plaintiff to amend its Amended
Complaint to add in certain facts to establish elements for Plaintiffs causes of action.
11. On March 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint and added in facts
to show that Plaintiff took steps to protect its trade secrets.
12. DEFENDANTS try and claim that Plaintiff has pled common law causes of action
for misappropriation instead of under Florida’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Fla. Stat. §668.001
(“FUTSA”) because Plaintiff failed to plead that the trade secrets are “not...generally known to,”
or “not ...readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use,” and that each of the alleged trade secrets “derives independent
economic value” from not being so generally known or ascertainable.
13. The Court did not specifically rule that Plaintiff pled the misappropriation
incorrectly; however, the Plaintiff did amend its Second Amended Complaint to add this element
in for the Counts relating to other Defendants. However, Plaintiff mistakenly did not add this in
for the Counts relating to these two DEFENDANTS, to which DEFENDANTS acknowledge in
their Motion to Dismiss that they did see the changes in other counts.
Page 3 of 914, Should the Court find that Plaintiff must plead the elements pursuant to FUTSA,
PLANET T requests leave to amend these counts. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 (a)
provides that leave to amend shall be granted “freely when justice so requires.” Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.190, In construing Rule 1.190, courts have consistently held that leave to amend should be
granted liberally to ensure that cases are decided on their merits. See e.g., In re: Grist’s Estate, 83
So.2d 860, 862 (Fla. 1956) (“The law of our state favors liberality in amendments to pleadings”);
Bill Williams Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Haymarket Cooperative Bank, 592 So.2d 302,
305 (Fla. Ist DCA 1992) (“all doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing amendments to
pleadings so that cases may be resolved upon their merits”).
15. To dismiss these counts for failure to include a sentence quoting the FUTSA
language, would gravely prejudice the Plaintiff and would not allow the case to be decided on
merits.
16. The rest of the allegations for dismissing the misappropriation counts are meritless.
17. DEFENDANTS argue that Plaintiff states no ultimate facts that support that
DEFENDANTS knew or should have known the trade secrets were acquired by improper means.
18. DEFENDANTS even admit in their Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff states that
Defendant, SHELLOW, knew “there was a previous uniform vendor with FRANKLIN”.
19. Plaintiff alleges that SHELLOW had a 20 year relationship with ROGERS and
SZNITKEN and that after taking his deposition, it was clear that i\UNIFORMS was incorporated
by DEFENDANTS, ROGERS, FRANKLIN, DISCOVERY SCHOOLS, and SZNITKEN. See
Paragraphs 59-60 of the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff further alleged that UNIFORMS’
website copied easy care wash instructions directly from Plaintiff's website. See Paragraph 63 of
the Second Amended Complaint.
Page 4 of 920. Plaintiff alleged that SHELLOW stated in his deposition that he did not know
anything about starting a uniform vendor business to which Plaintiff believes shows that
DEFENDANTS could not have started the uniform business without the misappropriated
information obtained improperly by Defendants.
21. Plaintiff clearly alleged facts that show DEFENDANTS knew or should have
known that the trade secrets were obtained by improper means.
22. ‘Plaintiff then argues that Plaintiff failed to allege factual allegations that
DEFENDANTS did anything to misappropriate the trade secrets. Plaintiff does not allege that
DEFENDANTS personally did anything to obtain the trade secrets, but rather that they
misappropriated the trade secrets by disclosing or using the trade secrets without consent of
Plaintiff and that DEFENDANTS knew or should have known that the trade secret improperly
obtained. See 688.002(2)(b), Fla. Stat. for the definition of “Misappropriation”.
23. | DEFENDANTS argue that Plaintiffs trade secrets could not be kept secret as a
matter of law because Plaintiff voluntarily disclosed them without taking legally mandatory steps
to exempt them and that they became public record when disclosed. The other Defendants
attempted to use these arguments at the hearing held previously on their Motions to Dismiss, and
this Court properly found that Plaintiff properly pled the misappropriation count and thereby
holding that Plaintiffs pleading of its attempt to mark the information as confidential, by
markings, email, and other manners, was proper to survive a Motion to Dismiss.
COUNTS 7 AND 9— TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP
24, DEFENDANTS next argue that Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a contract.
Page 5 of 925. | DEFENDANTS’ arguments were the same arguments used by the other Defendants
in the previous hearing on their Motions to Dismiss. This Court found that Plaintiff properly pled
the existence of a contract.
26. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged 3 separate contracts, and not an “agreement to agree,”
as DEFENDANTS argue.
27. In March of 2012, Plaintiff and FRANKLIN entered into an agreement whereby
Plaintiff would order specially manufactured uniforms and FRANKLIN would require its students
to order uniforms exclusively from Plaintiff.
28. The agreement was for the 2012-2013 school year. The school year began on or
about September of 2012 and ended at the end of the school year.
29. | FRANKLIN breached the agreement when it sent a letter to Plaintiff on February
25, 2013 advising that it could no longer sell uniforms to FRANKLIN’s students as of March 31,
2013.
30. FRANKLIN also breached the 2013-2014 school agreement by failing to advise
FRANKLIN’s students to purchase uniforms with Plaintiff.
31. These breaches by FRANKLIN were due to DEFENDANTS intentional and
unjustifiable interference with the contractual relationship, which was properly alleged in
Paragraphs 132-136 of the Second Amended Complaint.
32. | DEFENDANTS then argue that Plaintiff fails to allege that DEFENDANTS had
knowledge of the contractual relationship. However, Plaintiff specifically states that SHELLOW
admitted in his deposition that he knew there was a previous vendor, admits that ROGERS funded
iUNIFORMS, admits ROGERS had the idea to create the uniform business and admits that he had
known ROGERS for 20 years.
Page 6 of 933. If the Court finds that Plaintiff needs to add an allegation that “DEFENDANTS
knew of the existing relationship between Plaintiff and FRANKLIN”, Plaintiff requests leave to
amend to add this allegation.
34. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 (a) provides that leave to amend shall be
granted “freely when justice so requires.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190. In construing Rule 1.190, courts
have consistently held that leave to amend should be granted liberally to ensure that cases are
decided on their merits. See e.g., In re: Grist’s Estate, 83 So.2d 860, 862 (Fla. 1956) (“The law
of our state favors liberality in amendments to pleadings”); Bill Williams Air Conditioning &
Heating, Inc. v. Haymarket Cooperative Bank, 592 So.2d 302, 305 (Fla. lst DCA 1992) (“all
doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing amendments to pleadings so that cases may be
resolved upon their merits”).
35. To dismiss these counts for failure to include a sentence that can easily be stated,
would gravely prejudice the Plaintiff and would not allow the case to be decided on merits.
36. DEFENDANTS then allege that Plaintiff failed to plead facts to support the element
of intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship. However, Plaintiff pled numerous
facts throughout its complaint that support this allegation. Specifically, Plaintiff pled that
Defendants all incorporated UNIFORMS during the time of the relationship and this clearly would
be intentional.
COUNTS 8 and 10 - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH AN ADVANTAGEOUS
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP
37. DEFENDANTS argue that there is no allegation of “legal rights” which is required for
a claim for tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship.
Page 7 of 938. However, Plaintiff properly pled DEFENDANTS “had knowledge of the business
relationship and knew PLANET T had legal rights”. See Paragraphs 129 and 139 in the
Second Amended Complaint.
39, DEFENDANTS then argue that there is no allegation of an understanding or agreement
that would have been completed but for the interference.
40. Plaintiff alleges throughout its Second Amended Complaint the three agreements.
Further Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 131 and 141 that due to DEFENDANTS’
interference Plaintiff suffered damages. Plaintiff alleged throughout its Second
Amended Complaint that due to the interference and collusion of the DEFENDANTS,
that Plaintiff suffered substantial damages.
41. This Court was clear on June 16, 2017, that Plaintiff has properly pled the tortious
interference counts; however, DEFENDANTS still wanted to move forward on this
hearing. Plaintiff requests this Court deny the DEEFENDANTS’ Motions to Dismiss
for the same reasons as it did in the previous hearing on the other Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss, that Plaintiff has properly pled its counts.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC., requests this honorable Court
deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and order any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
Page 8 of 9CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was furnished e-
service through the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal to the Service List below on August 9, 2017.
DAVID DI PIETRO & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
Tower 101
101 NE 3™ Avenue, Suite 1410
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Primary: service@ddpalaw.com
Secondary: paralegal@ddpalaw.com
Telephone: (954) 712-3070
Facsimile: (954) 337-3824
/s/ Ashley T. Steffen
DAVID DI PIETRO, ESQ.
Florida Bar No.: 10370
david@ddpalaw.com
ASHLEY T. STEFFEN, ESQ.
Florida Bar No.: 111238
ashley@ddpalaw.com
SERVICE LIST
Christopher M. David, Esq.
Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, PL
1001 Brickell Bay Drive, 32" Floor
Miami, Florida 33131
Emails: cdavid@fuerstlaw.com; tdavid@fuerstlaw.com;
and dmuller@fuerstlaw.com
Richard Rosengarten, Esq.
Greenberg Traurig, P.A.
401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 2000
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Emails: rosengartenrich@gtlaw.com; rosr@gtlaw.com;
and horkyk@gtlaw.com
Page 9 of 9
Preview
Filing # 60176710 E-Filed 08/09/2017 02:29:10 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17™ JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY FLORIDA CASE NO.: CACE-14-001087(04) PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA CHARTER FOUNDATION, INC. D/B/A FRANKLIN ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, DISCOVERY SCHOOLS, _ INC., iUNIFORMS, INC., RICHARD SHELLOW, JON THOMAS ROGERS, AND SCOTT SZNITKEN, Defendants. td PLAINTIFF’S, PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC., RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS, IUNIFORMS, INC. AND RICHARD SHELLOW’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 7-10 AND 19-20 OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. COMES NOW Plaintiff, PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC. (“PLANET T”) by and through the undersigned law firm, and file this Response in Opposition to Defendants’, IUNIFORMS, INC. (S{UNIFORMS”) and RICHARD SHELLOW (“SHELLOW”), (collectively referred to as “DEFENDANTS”) Motion to Dismiss Counts 7-10 and 19-20 of the Second Amended Complain, and in support of this motion would state: I Background 1. On or about March 9, 2017, PLANET T filed its Second Amended tortious with twenty-two counts against six Defendants. PLANET T filed Counts for Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relationship, Tortious Interference with an Advantageous Relationship; and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets against DEFENDANTS. Page 1 of 9 *4* FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 8/9/2017 2:29:10 PM.****2. On or about April 19, 2017, FLORIDA CHARTER FOUNDATION, INC. D/B/A FRANKLIN ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, DISCOVERY SCHOOLS, INC., JON THOMAS ROGERS, and SCOTT SZNITKEN filed Motions to Dismiss numerous counts of the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. 3. On or about April 3, 2017, DEFENDANTS filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts 7-10 and 19-20 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. 4, On or about June 16, 2017, this Court heard FLORIDA CHARTER FOUNDATION, INC. D/B/A FRANKLIN ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, DISCOVERY SCHOOLS, INC., JON THOMAS ROGERS, and SCOTT SZNITKEN’s Motions to Dismiss, denied all Motions to Dismiss and found that Plaintiff had properly pled the Counts. 5. DEFENDANTS’ Motions to Dismiss were scheduled to be heard on August 10, 2017. 6. DEFENDANTS argued some of the same arguments as the other Defendants did on June 26, 2017; however, despite the Court’s ruling on the other Motions to Dismiss, DEFENDANTS have requested to proceed with the duplicate arguments for the hearing scheduled for August 10, 2017. Legal Standard 7. “When determining the merits of a motion to dismiss, the trial court’s consideration is limited to the four corners of the complaint, the allegations of which must be accepted as true and considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” See Bell v. Indian River Mem. Hosp., 778 So.2d 1030, 1032 (citing Gladstone v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Page 2 of 98. All inferences are to be made in favor of the complaint and against the movant. Someplace New, Inc. v. Francois, 51 So. 3d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011.). Exhibits attached to the complaint are considered as part of the complaint. Harry Pepper & Associates, Inc. v. Lasseter, 247 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). COUNTS 19 AND 20 — MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS 9. DEFENDANTS allege PLANET T failed to allege the existence of trade secrets under Florida law. 10. On February 7, 2017, this Court permitted Plaintiff to amend its Amended Complaint to add in certain facts to establish elements for Plaintiffs causes of action. 11. On March 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint and added in facts to show that Plaintiff took steps to protect its trade secrets. 12. DEFENDANTS try and claim that Plaintiff has pled common law causes of action for misappropriation instead of under Florida’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Fla. Stat. §668.001 (“FUTSA”) because Plaintiff failed to plead that the trade secrets are “not...generally known to,” or “not ...readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,” and that each of the alleged trade secrets “derives independent economic value” from not being so generally known or ascertainable. 13. The Court did not specifically rule that Plaintiff pled the misappropriation incorrectly; however, the Plaintiff did amend its Second Amended Complaint to add this element in for the Counts relating to other Defendants. However, Plaintiff mistakenly did not add this in for the Counts relating to these two DEFENDANTS, to which DEFENDANTS acknowledge in their Motion to Dismiss that they did see the changes in other counts. Page 3 of 914, Should the Court find that Plaintiff must plead the elements pursuant to FUTSA, PLANET T requests leave to amend these counts. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 (a) provides that leave to amend shall be granted “freely when justice so requires.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190, In construing Rule 1.190, courts have consistently held that leave to amend should be granted liberally to ensure that cases are decided on their merits. See e.g., In re: Grist’s Estate, 83 So.2d 860, 862 (Fla. 1956) (“The law of our state favors liberality in amendments to pleadings”); Bill Williams Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Haymarket Cooperative Bank, 592 So.2d 302, 305 (Fla. Ist DCA 1992) (“all doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing amendments to pleadings so that cases may be resolved upon their merits”). 15. To dismiss these counts for failure to include a sentence quoting the FUTSA language, would gravely prejudice the Plaintiff and would not allow the case to be decided on merits. 16. The rest of the allegations for dismissing the misappropriation counts are meritless. 17. DEFENDANTS argue that Plaintiff states no ultimate facts that support that DEFENDANTS knew or should have known the trade secrets were acquired by improper means. 18. DEFENDANTS even admit in their Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff states that Defendant, SHELLOW, knew “there was a previous uniform vendor with FRANKLIN”. 19. Plaintiff alleges that SHELLOW had a 20 year relationship with ROGERS and SZNITKEN and that after taking his deposition, it was clear that i\UNIFORMS was incorporated by DEFENDANTS, ROGERS, FRANKLIN, DISCOVERY SCHOOLS, and SZNITKEN. See Paragraphs 59-60 of the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff further alleged that UNIFORMS’ website copied easy care wash instructions directly from Plaintiff's website. See Paragraph 63 of the Second Amended Complaint. Page 4 of 920. Plaintiff alleged that SHELLOW stated in his deposition that he did not know anything about starting a uniform vendor business to which Plaintiff believes shows that DEFENDANTS could not have started the uniform business without the misappropriated information obtained improperly by Defendants. 21. Plaintiff clearly alleged facts that show DEFENDANTS knew or should have known that the trade secrets were obtained by improper means. 22. ‘Plaintiff then argues that Plaintiff failed to allege factual allegations that DEFENDANTS did anything to misappropriate the trade secrets. Plaintiff does not allege that DEFENDANTS personally did anything to obtain the trade secrets, but rather that they misappropriated the trade secrets by disclosing or using the trade secrets without consent of Plaintiff and that DEFENDANTS knew or should have known that the trade secret improperly obtained. See 688.002(2)(b), Fla. Stat. for the definition of “Misappropriation”. 23. | DEFENDANTS argue that Plaintiffs trade secrets could not be kept secret as a matter of law because Plaintiff voluntarily disclosed them without taking legally mandatory steps to exempt them and that they became public record when disclosed. The other Defendants attempted to use these arguments at the hearing held previously on their Motions to Dismiss, and this Court properly found that Plaintiff properly pled the misappropriation count and thereby holding that Plaintiffs pleading of its attempt to mark the information as confidential, by markings, email, and other manners, was proper to survive a Motion to Dismiss. COUNTS 7 AND 9— TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP 24, DEFENDANTS next argue that Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a contract. Page 5 of 925. | DEFENDANTS’ arguments were the same arguments used by the other Defendants in the previous hearing on their Motions to Dismiss. This Court found that Plaintiff properly pled the existence of a contract. 26. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged 3 separate contracts, and not an “agreement to agree,” as DEFENDANTS argue. 27. In March of 2012, Plaintiff and FRANKLIN entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiff would order specially manufactured uniforms and FRANKLIN would require its students to order uniforms exclusively from Plaintiff. 28. The agreement was for the 2012-2013 school year. The school year began on or about September of 2012 and ended at the end of the school year. 29. | FRANKLIN breached the agreement when it sent a letter to Plaintiff on February 25, 2013 advising that it could no longer sell uniforms to FRANKLIN’s students as of March 31, 2013. 30. FRANKLIN also breached the 2013-2014 school agreement by failing to advise FRANKLIN’s students to purchase uniforms with Plaintiff. 31. These breaches by FRANKLIN were due to DEFENDANTS intentional and unjustifiable interference with the contractual relationship, which was properly alleged in Paragraphs 132-136 of the Second Amended Complaint. 32. | DEFENDANTS then argue that Plaintiff fails to allege that DEFENDANTS had knowledge of the contractual relationship. However, Plaintiff specifically states that SHELLOW admitted in his deposition that he knew there was a previous vendor, admits that ROGERS funded iUNIFORMS, admits ROGERS had the idea to create the uniform business and admits that he had known ROGERS for 20 years. Page 6 of 933. If the Court finds that Plaintiff needs to add an allegation that “DEFENDANTS knew of the existing relationship between Plaintiff and FRANKLIN”, Plaintiff requests leave to amend to add this allegation. 34. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 (a) provides that leave to amend shall be granted “freely when justice so requires.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190. In construing Rule 1.190, courts have consistently held that leave to amend should be granted liberally to ensure that cases are decided on their merits. See e.g., In re: Grist’s Estate, 83 So.2d 860, 862 (Fla. 1956) (“The law of our state favors liberality in amendments to pleadings”); Bill Williams Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. Haymarket Cooperative Bank, 592 So.2d 302, 305 (Fla. lst DCA 1992) (“all doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing amendments to pleadings so that cases may be resolved upon their merits”). 35. To dismiss these counts for failure to include a sentence that can easily be stated, would gravely prejudice the Plaintiff and would not allow the case to be decided on merits. 36. DEFENDANTS then allege that Plaintiff failed to plead facts to support the element of intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship. However, Plaintiff pled numerous facts throughout its complaint that support this allegation. Specifically, Plaintiff pled that Defendants all incorporated UNIFORMS during the time of the relationship and this clearly would be intentional. COUNTS 8 and 10 - TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH AN ADVANTAGEOUS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 37. DEFENDANTS argue that there is no allegation of “legal rights” which is required for a claim for tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship. Page 7 of 938. However, Plaintiff properly pled DEFENDANTS “had knowledge of the business relationship and knew PLANET T had legal rights”. See Paragraphs 129 and 139 in the Second Amended Complaint. 39, DEFENDANTS then argue that there is no allegation of an understanding or agreement that would have been completed but for the interference. 40. Plaintiff alleges throughout its Second Amended Complaint the three agreements. Further Plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 131 and 141 that due to DEFENDANTS’ interference Plaintiff suffered damages. Plaintiff alleged throughout its Second Amended Complaint that due to the interference and collusion of the DEFENDANTS, that Plaintiff suffered substantial damages. 41. This Court was clear on June 16, 2017, that Plaintiff has properly pled the tortious interference counts; however, DEFENDANTS still wanted to move forward on this hearing. Plaintiff requests this Court deny the DEEFENDANTS’ Motions to Dismiss for the same reasons as it did in the previous hearing on the other Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, that Plaintiff has properly pled its counts. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PLANET T UNIFORMS, INC., requests this honorable Court deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and order any other relief this Court deems just and proper. Page 8 of 9CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was furnished e- service through the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal to the Service List below on August 9, 2017. DAVID DI PIETRO & ASSOCIATES, P.A. Tower 101 101 NE 3™ Avenue, Suite 1410 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Primary: service@ddpalaw.com Secondary: paralegal@ddpalaw.com Telephone: (954) 712-3070 Facsimile: (954) 337-3824 /s/ Ashley T. Steffen DAVID DI PIETRO, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 10370 david@ddpalaw.com ASHLEY T. STEFFEN, ESQ. Florida Bar No.: 111238 ashley@ddpalaw.com SERVICE LIST Christopher M. David, Esq. Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, PL 1001 Brickell Bay Drive, 32" Floor Miami, Florida 33131 Emails: cdavid@fuerstlaw.com; tdavid@fuerstlaw.com; and dmuller@fuerstlaw.com Richard Rosengarten, Esq. Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 2000 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Emails: rosengartenrich@gtlaw.com; rosr@gtlaw.com; and horkyk@gtlaw.com Page 9 of 9