Document for Alande Breazault Plaintiff vs. BMW of North America LLC Defendant

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

						
                                
Preview
                                Filing # 106070443 E-Filed 04/09/2020 01:13:59 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17!#
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: CACE-19-025622
ALANDE BREZAULT,

Plaintiff,
v.
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,

Defendant.
/

DEFENDANT BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Now comes the Defendant, BMW of North America, LLC, (“BMW NA”), in the above-
captioned matter, who respectfully submits the within Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint,
(“Complaint”) and incorporated Memorandum of Law, pursuant to 1.140(b)(1), 1.140(b)(3) and
1.140(b)(6) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and in support thereof states as follows:

L PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On November 23, 2018, subsequent to opting out of a multi-state class action litigation
which claimed excessive oil consumption in BMW vehicles equipped with N63 engines, Plaintiff
improperly filed an action jointly with 36 opt-out plaintiffs in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. See Cheryl Walters et al. v. BMW of N. America, LLC, No. 8:18-
cv-02875-EAK-CPT (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2018) and Bang v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 15-

6945, 2016 WL 7042071, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2016) (“Bang Class Action”).

In response to the improper joinder, BMW NA filed a motion to dismiss or in the

alternative, to sever plaintiffs’ claims. Dkt. 34.

*** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 04/09/2020 01:13:59 PM.****On November 22, 2019, BMW NA’s motion was granted and all claims, other than the
first-named plaintiff’s, Cheryl Walters, were severed and dismissed without prejudice. The statute
of limitations for the claims asserted, therein, was deemed tolled during the pendency of the action

and for a period of thirty (30) days from the November 22, 2019 Court Order. Dkt. 77.

On December 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint alleging excessive oil
consumption in his BMW vehicle. Complaint § 1.

He asserts three causes of action as follows: breach of express warranty pursuant to the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, ef. seq., (‘“Mag-Moss”) (“Count I’); breach of
express warranty pursuant to § 627.313, Fla. Stat. (“Count II’); and deceptive trade practices
pursuant to Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, § 501.201, ef seq., Fla. Stat.
(“FDUTPA”) (“Count III”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the subject vehicle came equipped
with BMW’s N63 engine, which he claims to be defective inasmuch as it consumes an “excessive”
amount of oil (“Oil Consumption Defect”).

As discussed at length, herein, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rules
1.140(b)(1), 1.140(b)(3) and 1.140(b)(6) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
+ Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. § 1.140(b)(1), Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction as the amount in controversy is below the jurisdictional threshold
of the Circuit Court;

¢ Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P § 1.140(b)(3), Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for improper
venue or transferred to the appropriate court;

* Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. § 1.140(b)(6), Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for failure
to state a cause of action; and

¢ Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. § 1.140(b)(6), Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed as they are
time barred and not otherwise preserved by any doctrine of tolling.I. THEPARTIES

BMW NA is a foreign limited liability company with its principal place of business in
Woodcliff Lakes, New Jersey. BMW NA is the wholesale distributor of BMW vehicles in North
America and does not sell or lease vehicles directly to consumers. All new BMW vehicles are
covered by a limited warranty, which covers repairs related to defects in materials and

workmanship.

Nearly eleven (11) years ago, on or about July 13, 2009, Plaintiff purchased a new 2013
BMW 7 series 750i, Vehicle Identification Number WBAKA83599C Y34921 (“subject vehicle”)
from Braman Motorcars Palm Beach, in West Palm Beach, Florida (“selling dealership”).

Complaint { 7.

After purchasing the subject vehicle, Plaintiff observed that it consumed an excessive
amount of engine oil and made multiple complaints to the Lauderdale BMW of Pembroke Pines.
Complaint ff 9-10. Plaintiff was required to add one quart of oil every 1,000 miles to prevent the
vehicle’s engine from failing. Complaint 9. However, the selling dealership advised Plaintiff that

the vehicle’s consumption of oil did not warrant any repairs. Complaint 411.

The Plaintiff alleges that his vehicle was warranted against “defects of workmanship.”
Complaint § 14. And that it was equipped with BMW’s N63 engine, which “consume[d] engine
oil at an extremely rapid rate.” Complaint at § 22. He further alleges that the rate of engine oil
consumption is “excessive” and constitutes “manufacturing defects.” Complaint §{] 27 and 47. In
support of her allegation regarding the Oil Consumption Defect, Plaintiff cites the following:

* Quotation from a single, anonymous person made in an online forum for BMW
owners at bimmerfest.com. Complaint J 34;* Technical Service Bulletins, (“TSBs”), or Service Information Bulletins, (“SIBs”),!
issued to BMW service technicians in connection with the N63. Complaint {J 38-43;
and

* Opinions about the N63 engine found on ConsumerReport.org. Complaint at J] 30.

Ill. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. PURSUANT TO FLA. R. CIV. P. § 1.140(b)(1) PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION AS THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY IS BELOW THE
JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLD OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

Subject matter jurisdiction is “the power of a court to adjudicate the type of case before
it.” Bell v. Kornblatt, 705 So.2d 113, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred on a court by the state constitution and applicable statutes. See §§ 26.012, 34.01, Fla.
Stat. (2016).

County courts “have original jurisdiction” in “all actions at law in which the matter in
controversy does not exceed the sum of $15,000.” §34.01, Fla. Stat. Circuit courts, in turn, “have
exclusive original jurisdiction” in “all actions at law not cognizable by the county courts” and “all
cases in equity.” §26.012(2)(a), (c), Fla. Stat. Thus, circuit courts do not have jurisdiction to hear
and decide a damages claim not exceeding $15,000. See Rappa v. Island Club W. Dev., Inc., 890
So.2d 477, 479-80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Swearingen v. Villa, 277 So. 3d 778, 781 (Fla. 5th DCA
2019).

In determining whether the jurisdictional amount for circuit court is met, valuation fixed
by the pleadings is to be accepted as true if made in good faith and not for the illusory purpose of
conferring jurisdiction. §§ 26.012(2)(a), 34.01(1)(c) 1, Fla. Stat.; Neumann v. Brigman, 475 So.

2d 1247 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985).

) TSBs/SIBs are issued by auto manufacturers to automotive dealers in connection with service requirements for
their respective vehicles.However, bare allegations of an amount in controversy exceeding the jurisdictional
threshold is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a circuit court and dismissal is appropriate. §§
26.012(2)(a), 34.01, Fla. Stat.; Sullivan v. Nova Univ., 613 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Sth DCA 1993).

Further, “Damages cannot (emphasis added) be based on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.”

 

See Swindell v. Crowson, 712 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

While the Magnuson—Moss Warranty Act “creates a federal private cause of action for
consumers damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with any obligation under a written
warranty”, the Act is “virtually silent” when it comes to regulating limited express warranties,
which is the type of warranty involved in this case. Ocana v. Ford Motor Co., 992 So.2d 319, 323
(Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). Accordingly, the parameters of the cause of
action granted by the federal statute are generally defined by state law, including appropriate
damages. Id.; see also Mesa v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 904 So.2d 450, 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Kia
Motors Am., Inc. v. Doughty, 242 So. 3d 1172, 1175 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2018).

Under Florida law, a claimant in an action for breach of warranty may recover damages for
the diminished value of the warranted goods, as well as incidental and consequential damages
resulting from the breach. See § 672.714(2), (3), Fla. Stat. (2014); Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Redmond, 378 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The diminished value is specifically
determined by (1) the value of the car at the time and place of acceptance if the car had been as
warranted and (2) the value of the car they actually received at the time and place of acceptance.
See, e.g., Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Conley, 372 So.2d 965, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

In this matter, the Plaintiff's alleged damages constitute bare allegations within the
meaning of Florida’s decisional authority. Specifically, his alleged damages are based entirely on

a hypothetical scenario of “engine failure” which has never actually occurred. Although thePlaintiff alleges that the Oil Consumption Defect necessitated “additional service visits and
increased maintenance costs” Complaint 58, the out of pocket costs would be significantly below
the jurisdictional threshold. For instance, assuming arguendo that the Plaintiff added oil at the rates
alleged, the cost of BMW oil ($9-10 per quart), to a legal (and mathematical) certainty would not
amount to $15,000 out of pocket. Similarly, any reliance by Plaintiff on the cost paid for his vehicle
is not the correct measure of damages; only the costs of repair or diminution in value, neither of
which has been alleged by Plaintiff, should be considered. Finally, Plaintiff's allegation that he
will “suffer significant loss when he sells the subject vehicle” is entirely hypothetical, and
unsupported by any allegations of Plaintiff's actual damages. Complaint { 58.

Because the jurisdictional amount is not met in this case, the circuit court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kendall 8.

Med. Ctr., 54 So.3d 543, 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).?

B. PURSUANT TO FLA. R. CIV. P. § 1.140(b)(3) PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR IMPROPER VENUE OR TRANSFERRED
TO THE APPROPRIATE VENUE

Under Florida law, a defendant may contest the venue selected by a plaintiff by filing a
motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Nat'l Bank of Melbourne & Tr. Co., 238 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). While a motion to
dismiss for improper venue generally raises issues of fact that must be resolved by an evidentiary
hearing, a hearing is unnecessary where the complaint shows on its face that venue was improper.

Id.

? Any claim for revocation that is asserted to satisfy the jurisdictional threshold is barred under Florida law, because
Plaintiff lacks privity with BMW NA. Powers v. Lazy Days RV Center, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-1542T17EAJ, 2006 WL
373011, *2 (M.D. Fla. February 16, 2006); Mesa v. BMW of North America, LLC, 904 So.2d 450, 459 (Fla. 3d DCA
2005); Gilbert v. Monaco Coach Corp., 352 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1334-35 (N.D.Ga.2004); Tolliver v. Monaco Coach
Corp., No. 8:06-CV-856-T-30TGW, 2006 WL 1678842, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2006).A plaintiff bears the initial burden of alleging facts in the complaint sufficient to show that
the action was filed in a proper venue. Drucker v. Duvall, 61 So.3d 468, 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
If a defendant contests the plaintiff's choice of venue, then the defendant has the burden
of proving that the plaintiff's venue selection is improper and must also demonstrate where venue
is proper. McDaniel Reserve, 39 So.3d at 508; Woodson Elec. Sols., Inc. v. Port Royal Prop., LLC,
271 So. 3d 111, 113-14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

In deciding a motion to dismiss for improper venue, if the movant successfully carries his
or her burden of proving that the venue selected by plaintiff was improper and where proper venue
is, the trial court should make an affirmative finding as to proper venue and, absent a compelling
reason to the contrary, transfer the case to that venue with the costs to be paid by plaintiff. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of Melbourne & Tr. Co., 238 So. 2d 665 (Fla.
Ath DCA 1970); Chase v. Jowdy Indus., Inc., 913 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); §
47.091, Fla. Stat.

Actions against foreign corporations doing business in Florida shall be brought in a county
where such corporation has an agent or other representative, where the cause of action accrued, or
where the property in litigation is located. § 47.051, Fla. Stat.

In this case, Plaintiff has alleged both breach of express warranty and deceptive practices
under FDUTPA. Given that a breach of warranty claim is essentially a breach of contract matter,
the proper venue would be the location where the contract was allegedly breached. See Suncoast
Home Improvements, Inc. v. Robichaud, 106 So. 3d 969 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2013) (“A cause of action
for breach of contract accrues for venue purposes where the contract is breached.”); Jacobs &
Goodman, P.A. v. McLin, Burnsed, Morrison, Johnson & Robuck, P.A., 582 So.2d 98 (Fla. Sth

DCA 1991) (finding that if the breach occurred, it was in the location of delivery of the goods andnot where the defect was discovered); Forms & Surfaces, Inc. v. Welbro Constructors, Inc., 627
So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. Sth DCA 1993).

Florida case law also provides that with claims involving fraud, misrepresentation and
breach of contract, the proper venue may be in the location where the contract was signed. For
instance, in Woodson Elec. Sols., Inc. v. Port Royal Prop., LLC, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant made false representations regarding their design, installation, and implementation of
an audiovisual system, which was relied upon by plaintiff and damages were incurred. 271 So. 3d
111, 113-14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). The Woodson Court subsequently held that the proper venue
was where the contract was signed as that was when the cause of action accrued. /d.

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the vehicle from Braman Motorcars Palm
Beach, in West Palm Beach, Florida. Complaint § 7. He additionally asserts that “After purchasing
the Vehicle, Plaintiff observed that it consumed an excessive amount of engine oil...” Complaint
49. Therefore, in accordance with the aforementioned case law, the location where the cause of
action occurred was Palm Beach County, where the subject vehicle was purchased and the contract
was signed. Moreover, aside from stating that the Plaintiffresides in Broward Florida, the Plaintiff
has not raised any allegations that the subject property of the litigation is located there. BMW NA
has no way of knowing, given the location where the subject vehicle was purchased, whether the
subject vehicle would be at the Plaintiff’s alleged residence in Broward County or in Palm Beach
County.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs claim should be dismissed for filing his claim in an
improper venue or his case transferred to the appropriate venue of Palm Beach County, with the

transfer initiated and paid for by Plaintiff.Cc. PURSUANT TO FLA. R. CIV. P. § 1.140(B)(6) PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILING TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

fi) Standard of Review on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of
Action Pursuant to Fla, R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6)

Rule 1.140(b)(6) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to file a motion
to dismiss raising the defense of failure to state a cause of action at any time before a responsive
pleading is served. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action tests whether a cause of action has been sufficiently pled. Albert Properties, Inc. v.
Vizcaya at Palm-Aire Ass’n, 841 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.140(b)(6).

In order to state a cause of action, a complaint “must allege sufficient ultimate facts to show
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan v. Lago, 867 So.2d 1184, 1186
(Fla. 4th DCA 2004); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2). This requires a litigant to “state their
pleadings with sufficient particularity for a defense to be prepared.” Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So.
2d. 169, 173 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) citing Arky, Freed, Stearns et al. v. Bowmar Instrument Corp.,
537 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1988).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must
accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Locker v. United Pharm. Grp., Inc., 46 So. 3d
1126, 1128 (Fla. Ist DCA 2010). However, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action, the complaint must allege a cause of action recognized under law against the
defendant, otherwise it fails to inform the defendant of the nature of the cause against him or her.

See Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1957).Where the allegations within the Complaint are nothing more than mere conclusions, such
allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action and dismissal is appropriate. See Woodcock v.
Wilcox, 95 Fla. 14, 122 So. 79 (Fla. 1929).

(ii) —_ Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action For Breach of Express

Warranty Under § 627.313, Fla. Stat. and Mag-Moss Because The Limited
Warranty Does Not Cover The Design Defects Alleged, Plaintiff Lacks

Privity of Contract with BMW NA and Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege Actual
Injury*

Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for relief because the express warranty by Plaintiff's
own admission, only covers repairs needed to correct “defects of workmanship,” Complaint § 14,
whereas the Complaint only alleges a design defect. See Cali v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 10 CIV.
7606 JSR, 2011 WL 383952, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011), aff'd, 426 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. 2011)
(in pertinent part, dismissing the plaintiff's claims under Mag-Moss and for breach of express
warranty, with prejudice, where the complaint alleged a design defect, but the warranty covered
only “materials, workmanship and/or factory preparation”). While Florida courts have not directly
defined the terms, several persuasive authorities outside of Florida recognize that “materials and
workmanship” is a specialized warranty term that refers to manufacturing and not design defects.
Vazquez v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 17-22209-CIV, 2018 WL 447644, at 3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2018)
citing Blue Martin Const., Inc. v. CTB, Inc., 735 F.3d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 2013) (“... [WJhere a
product is manufactured correctly but designed inappropriately, the defect is one of design and not
‘material or workmanship.’ ”); Rice v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc., No. 12-cv-7923, 2013 WL 146270,
*12 (C.D. Cal.) (“[T]he phrase ‘free from defects in material and workmanship’ in defendant’s

limited warranty refers only to manufacturing defects, not design defects.”).

> To the extent that Plaintiff argues that agency exists between BMW NA and third-party dealerships to establish
privity, we note that the allegations in the Complaint do not support this position in accordance with Florida law. See
Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 325-327.Particularly instructive on this point is Judge Rakoff’s opinion in Cali, which the Second
Circuit affirmed, “for substantially the same reasons stated in [his] careful and comprehensive
opinion.” See Cali v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 426 F. App'x 38 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2011). With respect
to its breach of express warranty and Mag-Moss claims, Cali involved nearly identical pleadings
to the case at bar.‘ The limited warranty in Cali, similar to the one at issue here, was limited to
repairs needed to correct defects in “materials, workmanship and/or factory preparation.” /d. at 2.
In reasoning that the defendant’s express warranty did not cover design defects, the court
distinguishes a “design” defect from a “workmanship” defect, stating that, “the terms ‘material,’
‘workmanship,’ or ‘factory preparation,’ refer to the mechanical process of implementing [the
vehicle’s] design,” whereas design defects implicate “the arrangement of elements that make
up a machine, and the process of selecting the means and contriving the elements, steps, and
procedures for producing what will adequately satisfy some need.” /d. at 2 (internal quotations
marks and citation omitted).

In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to plead a defect in “workmanship” covered under the
express warranty. Rather, on the one hand, Plaintiff alleges that the “underlying cause of the
excessive oil consumption” was never addressed, Complaint { 41, that the Plaintiff was told that his
engine “did not warrant any repairs,” Complaint { 11 and that “[s]ome owners and enthusiasts
blame the oil consumption on BMW’s decision to place the N63’s twin-turbochargers between the
cylinder heads, and inside the engine V, rather than outside of the engine V, away from sensitive
components, where turbochargers are typically located.” Complaint §] 28. Moreover, in support of

his argument that BMW NA owed an affirmative duty to disclose the Oil Consumption Defect, the

4 We note that the complaint in Cali was also filed by Plaintiffs Counsel, which explains the striking similarities
between the design defect allegations raised in Cali and the instant Complaint and supports the applicability
of the Cali Court’s holding to this matter.Plaintiff alleges that the engine was “unreasonably dangerous,” which further echoes the language
of strict liability in tort.> See Complaint ff 54, 57, 65, 103 (“defect is unreasonably dangerous”),
and {ff 37, 56 (“defect poses an unreasonable safety hazard”).

On the other hand, the Plaintiff alleges that the Oil Consumption Defect represents a
“manufacturing defect,” Complaint J] 22, and that the subject vehicle was warranted as being ‘free
from defects in workmanship.” Complaint § 14.

First, by alleging the “underlying” issue was never remedied, that Plaintiff was never
offered a repair, and that the Oil Consumption Defect was a symptom of poor design choices, the
Plaintiff necessarily construes the Oil Consumption Defect as one which was not actually
remediable, i.e., no number of warranty-covered repairs could have fixed the engine’s faulty
design. In juxtaposing these allegations, the Plaintiff has nonsensically pled that BMW NA
breached the warranty because the defect should have been fixed, despite the fact that the defect
could never have been fixed given its design specifications.

Second, Plaintiffs allegation that the Oil Consumption Defect reflects a “manufacturing
defect” is disingenuous insofar as the Plaintiff must plead an actual manufacturing defect in order
to maintain a claim for breach of a written warranty that only covers “defects of workmanship.” See
Complaint { 14; see also, Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. v. Hai Yun Musical Instruments
Manufacture Co., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

Based on similar allegations in Cali, the court pointed out that, despite counsel’s,
(Plaintiffs Counsel, herein), attempt at oral argument to downplay his use of the word “design” in

order to put the claims within the scope of the warranty, “the Court finds that [counsel] in fact

$ See Hartman v. Opelika Mach. & Welding Co., 414 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (noting the standard
instruction presently provided to juries in strict liability actions “[a] product is defective if it is in a condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user...)attached the appropriate word to the concept he was attempting to explain.” Cali, at 3.

Likewise, a fair reading of the Complaint in this case, reveals Plaintiff's actual concer is
not that the Plaintiffs engine suffered from a defect in workmanship or that it was manufactured
defectively, but that the N63 was designed poorly. In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiff has failed
to state a claim for breach of express warranty and Counts I and II must be dismissed.

Additionally, in order to plead a cause of action for breach of express warranty under
Florida law, Plaintiff must in pertinent part plead the following:

(1) Facts in respect to the sale of the goods;

(2) Identification of the types of warranties created, i.e. express warranty (672.313, Fla.
Stat.);

(3) Facts in respect to the creation of the particular warranty...

(4) Facts in respect to the breach of the warranty;

(5) Notice to seller of breach. 672.607(3)(a), Fla. Stat.;

(6) The injuries sustained by the buyer as a result of the breach of warranty. Sparger v.
Newmar Corp., 2014 WL 3928556, *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2014) (citing Davis v. Ford Motor Co.,
63 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 445 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Dunham—Bush, Inc. v. Thermo—Air Service, Inc.,
351 So.2d 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)).

Florida law also requires that a plaintiff be in privity of contract to maintain a claim for
breach of express warranty. In pertinent part, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida provided in Hill v. Hoover Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2012):

Chapter 672, Florida Statutes, represents Florida's version of
Article 2 (Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code. Pursuant to
this chapter, express warranties are created under the
guidance of Florida Statutes § 672.313. In interpreting this

section, Florida courts have required a plaintiff to be in privity
with a defendant in order to recover for breach of express orimplied warranty (emphasis added).

The Hill Court continued by citing 7. W.M. v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 886 F. Supp.
842 (N.D. Fla. 1995), as follows:

The law of Florida is that to recover for the breach of a warranty,
either express or implied, the plaintiff must be in privity of contract
with the defendant. Kramer v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 520 So.2d 37
(Fla.1988); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80
(Fla.1976). “Privity is required in order to recover damages from
the seller of a product for breach of express or implied warranties.”
Intergraph Corp. v. Stearman, 555 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA
1990). “A warranty, whether express or implied, is
fundamentally a contract. A contract cause of action requires
privity.” Elizabeth N. v. Riverside Group, Inc., 585 $0.24 376, 378
(Fla. Ist DCA 1991). 7. W.M., 886 F.Supp. at 844. A plaintiff who
purchases a product, but does not buy it directly from the
defendant, is not considered to be in privity with that
defendant (emphasis added). /d.

Based on Hill’s inability to sufficiently allege that she was in privity of contract with
defendant-manufacturer, the Hil/ Court dismissed her breach of express warranty claim, with
prejudice. Id.

Moreover, “Under this state's law, there can be no cause of action for breach of an express
limited warranty unless the consumer can allege and prove that the manufacturer did not comply
with the limited express warranty's terms.” Ocana v. Ford Motor Co., 992 So.2d 319, 324 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2008) (citing § 672.313, Fla. Stat.); Sanchez-Knutson v. Ford Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d
1223, 1230-31 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

Similar to Hill, Plaintiff in the instant matter has not alleged that he was in privity of
contract to support his breach of express warranty, nor is he able to make such allegation, as he
did not purchase the subject vehicle from BMW NA. See Complaint 4 7.

Finally, Plaintiff is required to plead the injuries sustained as a result of any alleged breach

of warranty. And, the alleged damages cannot be speculative. See Swindell v. Crowson, 712 So.2d1162, 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any injury other than adding engine oil in between
BMW NA’s recommended oil change intervals, which would have been reimbursable, and
speculated that the subject vehicle may have lost value due to the claimed defects or that he may
incur out-of-pocket expenses in the future. Such allegations are insufficient to satisfy alleged
injuries under Florida law.

For the above-discussed reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for breach of

express warranty and Count I and Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed.

(iii) Counts I and I for Breach of Express Warranty under Mag-Moss and
Breach of Express Warranty Under Florida Statute 672.313 Should be
Dismissed as Pled as They Are Time Barred

The claims for breach of express warranty brought pursuant to Mag-Moss and Florida state
law, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Since Mag-Moss is silent as to limitations
on time to file suit, the five-year statute of limitations supplied by § 95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. controls.

A claim for breach of warranty accrues when the defect that gives rise to the cause of action
is discovered or should have been discovered. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Wisconsin v. Dade
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 So. 2d 1097, 1101 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16640, at 14 (S.D. Fla. March 21, 1989).

Based on the alleged date(s) and period of time when the Plaintiff first experienced the Oil
Consumption Defect, see Complaint, the statutes of limitations on Counts I and II have expired.
However, the Plaintiff appears not to argue against the applicability of the five-year statute of
limitation. Rather, he argues that his claims are not time barred insofar as BMW NA breached its
affirmative duty to disclose the alleged Oil Consumption Defect and that BMW NA fraudulently

concealed the defect from Plaintiff.a. Plaintiff's Fraudulent Concealment Claim Fails Because BMW NA Did
Not Owe a Duty to Disclose the Alleged Defect and the Claim is Barred

by the Economic Loss Rule

 

 

In order to maintain a claim that the statute of limitations was tolled by Defendant’s
fraudulent concealment of facts, Plaintiff must demonstrate 1) BMW NA concealed or failed to
disclose a material fact; 2) BMW NA knew or should have known the material fact should be
disclosed; 3) BMW NA knew its concealment of or failure to disclose the material fact would
induce the Plaintiff to act; 4) Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the concealment or failure to
disclose; and 5) BMW NA had a duty to disclose the material fact. Hess v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc., 175 So. 3d 687, 691 (Fla. 2015).

An affirmative duty to disclose may arise where there is a fiduciary relationship or where
one party has “superior knowledge” not readily available to the other and knows that the other is
acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge. Jn re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 138976, 179. The latter typically occurs in arm-length transactions where the
defendant knows that the other party is relying on its statements in furtherance of the transaction.
Persaud v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120307,33, 2014 WL 4260853. Courts hold
that generic allegations of knowledge, devoid of factual support, provide no basis for a failure to
disclose claim. See, e.g., Grodzitsky v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 2013 WL 690822, at 2, 6 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 19, 2013).

In this case, the Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to give rise to an inference that a
fiduciary relationship existed, or that he was involved in direct negotiations with BMW NA for
the purchase/lease of his vehicle. He alleges only that BMW NA had a duty to disclose the
existence of the alleged Oil Consumption Defect because it was “unreasonably dangerous” and

because BMW NA had exclusive knowledge or access to material facts. Complaint § 54.Assuming, arguendo, for the purposes of this motion only, that the alleged defect was
“unreasonably dangerous,” the Plaintiff failed to allege the source of any legally cognizable duty
to disclose “unreasonably dangerous” defects, or even what constitutes such a defect.

Additionally, the Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim is barred by the economic loss
tule, which “is a judicially created doctrine that sets forth the circumstances under which a tort
action is prohibited if the only damages suffered are economic losses.” Tiara Condo. Ass'n v.
Marsh & McLennan Co., 110 So. 3d 399, 401 (Fla. 2013). Florida courts have specifically
dismissed a plaintiff's claim of fraudulent concealment where the claim, as is the case, herein,
excluded non-economic damage. Vazquez v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 17-22209-CIV, 2018 WL
447644, at 5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2018).

b. Plaintiff's Claim for Fraudulent Concealment Fails Because he has Failed to
Plead Fraud With the Specificity Required by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120

 

Moreover, the factual basis for claim of fraud must be pled with particularity and must
specifically identify misrepresentations or omissions of fact, as well as the time, place, or manner
in which they were made. Fla. R. Civ. P. Rule 1.120(b); Cedars Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. Mehta,
16 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); see also, Robertson v. PHF Life Ins. Co., 702 So.2d 555, 556
(Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (finding that “allegations of fraud [were not] pled with specificity [and] ...
complaint fails to specifically identify misrepresentations or omissions of fact, the time, place or
manner in which they were made, and how the representations were false and misleading.”)
Florida courts have dismissed claims for fraudulent misrepresentation that merely state the time
period of the alleged misrepresentations and omit the specific fraudulent statements. Burgess v.
Religious Tech. Ctr., Inc., 600 F. App’x 657, 662-664.

The factual allegations, herein, similarly warrant dismissal as majority of the Plaintiff's

claims fail to identify employees and dates for any servicing or representations regarding hisvehicle. Complaint ¥ 10.

Similarly, BMW NA did not manufacture the vehicles at issue and even assuming for only
argument sake that it did, Plaintiff's allegations are circular: equating design choices with
knowledge, concealment, or omission of an alleged design defect. This type of logic, without
further proof, has been expressly rejected by other courts:

Plaintiff contends that BMW “had knowledge of the defect
from the outset” because “the defect [pled] in the SAC is an
engineering decision by BMW _ ” This argument is advanced
without legal support. Moreover, it is a circular argument that
could be used to impute knowledge for purposes of the CFA
to any manufacturer who designs and markets a product that
is later alleged to be defective—‘“I (consumer) believe this
item to be defective; you (manufacturer) designed the item
and sold it; ergo, you knew it was defective, and thus you
defrauded me when you elected not to tell me about the
defect.” Plaintiff cannot equate design choices with
fraudulent conduct simply by saying so and without pleading
facts supporting a plausible inference of knowledge on
BMW’s part. If Rule 8(a), /gbal, and Twombly are to have
any force whatsoever, a FAC cannot state a CFA claim that
tequires the plaintiff plead knowledge by merely alleging that
the defendant designed a defective product.

McQueen v. BMW of North America, LLC,
2014 WL 656619, at 5 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014).

Additionally, Plaintiff relies on “evidence” of consumer complaints posted in online BMW
forums and on ConsumerReports.org, all third-party websites, to demonstrate that BMW NA had
knowledge of the alleged defect. Courts routinely reject this type of “vague summaries of hearsay
statements by unidentified consumers” when used in support of a claim. Bobak Sausage Co. v. A &
J Seven Bridges, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 503, 520 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Courts have also found defective
pleadings where the plaintiff merely points to “data” and “field reports” within the exclusive
control of the defendant. Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that BMW NA knew of the alleged defect based on the existence of“pre-release testing data,” “durability testing,” “early consumer complaints,” and “other internal
sources.” Complaint { 55. Plaintiff makes no allegation whatsoever as to the content of the data,
or as to how it is alleged that such data or “other internal sources” were intended to defraud them.
Moreover, courts have also held that “[a]wareness of a few customer complaints . . . does not
establish knowledge of an alleged defect.” Baba v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2011 WL 317650 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2011).

Finally, Plaintiff’s reliance on technical service bulletins (Complaint {J 38-43) and related
customer loyalty programs (Complaint Jj 50) as “evidence” of BMW NA’s “knowledge” of the
alleged “defect” is insufficient to plead fraudulent concealment. Courts have reasoned that “[s]uch
advisories are generally the result of consumer complaints that cause a manufacturer to investigate,
diagnose, and remedy a defect in one of its products. Accepting these advisories as a basis for
consumer fraud claims may discourage manufacturers from responding to their customers in the
first place.” Alban v. BMW of North America, LLC (“Alban IT”), 2011 WL 900114, at 12
(D.N.J. March 15, 2011). Such bulletins are a legally recognized method of communicating to
dealers “instructions for making . . . diagnoses and repairs,” a supplement to a service manual. 40
C.E.R. § 86.096- 38(g)(2)(i). They provide instructions on how to repair different parts of a vehicle
—because parts sometimes break, not because they are “known” to be “defective.” See Cali v.
Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 10 CIV. 7606 JSR, 2011 WL 383952, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011), aff'd,

426 F. App'x 38.

6 Indeed, the use of such information is largely prohibited by the Florida Rules of Evidence. See, § 90.407, Fla. Stat.

(“Evidence of measures taken after an injury or harm caused by an event, which measures if taken before the event
would have made injury or harm less likely to occur, is not admissible to prove negligence, the existence of a product
defect, or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or the feasibility
of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.”)Plaintiff has further not sufficiently pled that BMW NA’s alleged misrepresentations were
unknown or could not have been known within the limitations period. In fact, the Plaintiff
conceded that she knew of the oil consumption defect “soon after purchasing the vehicle”. See
Complaint { 9.

As such, the Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to find that BMW NA was under an
affirmative duty to disclose the alleged defect or that BMW NA fraudulently concealed said defect
from Plaintiff and he otherwise fails to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements under Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.120.

(iv) Plaintiff’s Request for Discovery Rule Tolling Should Be Denied As It Lacks
Legal and Factual Merit

In Florida, the “delayed discovery” doctrine generally provides that a cause of action does
not accrue until the plaintiff either knows or reasonably should know of the act giving rise to the
cause of action. That said, the delayed discovery doctrine may only be applied to the accrual ofa
cause of action and not to toll the statute of limitations. Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.
2000).

In this case, the discovery rule is inapplicable, as the Plaintiff concedes that the defect was
not inherently undiscoverable. Rather, he discovered the alleged Oil Consumption Defect, “After
purchasing the vehicle". See Complaint { 9. Accordingly, Plaintiff's own admissions establish the
accrual of his claims shortly after purchasing his vehicle and his attempt to reframe his claims as
accruing when BMW NA allegedly failed to repair his vehicle is without merit. As such, the
discovery rule does not apply to save his otherwise time barred claims.

) Plaintiff's Request for Estoppel Should Be Denied As It Lacks Legal and
Factual Merit

In order to assert equitable estoppel, a defendant must have engaged in wrongful conductthat “induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.” John Doe No.
23 v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 965 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Where a plaintiff
fails to allege any wrongful conduct or specific acts of fraud or fraudulent concealment by
defendant, the theory of equitable estoppel should not be applied. Jd. For the same reasons the
Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment tolling argument fails, his equitable estoppel argument also
fails, as Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting a reasonable inference that BMW NA
intentionally misled the Plaintiff with respect to the subject vehicle.

(vi) Plaintiffs Request for Class Action Tolling Should Be Denied As It Lacks
Legal and Factual Merit

In addition to the above tolling arguments, Plaintiffs seek a toll of the statute of limitations
based on “class action tolling.” See Complaint { 78. In this regard, Plaintiff argues that the Bang
Class Action provides a toll for the period between filing of the initial complaint (September 18,
2015) and final approval of the settlement (September 11, 2018). Again, Plaintiff's reliance on this
doctrine is misplaced. The class action tolling rule, enunciated in Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538, 552-53 (1974) provides:

where class action status has been denied solely because of failure
to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable,’ the commencement of the original class
suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the
class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found
the suit inappropriate for class action status.

In other words, under American Pipe, members of a failed class may file otherwise
untimely individual claims after the class action court denies class certification. See, China
Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (2018) (noting that American Pipe ... addressed only

putative class members who wish to sue individually after a class-certification denial” (emphasis

added). No provision is made for situations in which a class action settlement is reached andputative class members op/ out of that settlement. In such situations, the rationale behind American
Pipe tolling (that putative class members could only protect their rights by filing individual actions
during the class certification phase to hedge against denial of certification) is inapplicable. Because
the purported class in the Bang class action was not denied certification, the American Pipe
doctrine is inapposite and class action tolling should not apply.

Moreover, even if class action tolling was appropriate, Plaintiff does not identify
essential dates such as the date on which they opted out of the Bang settlement in order to establish
how such a toll would affect the timeliness of their claims. Accordingly, the assertion that class
action tolling would render his claim timely is mere speculation.

Because Plaintiff fails to establish a valid basis for tolling the statute of limitations on his
warranty claims, his claim for breach of express warranty are time barred and should be dismissed.

(vii) Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State Cause of Action for Violation of FDUTPA
And Is Otherwise Time Barred and Should be Dismissed

FDUTPA bans “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” § 501.204, Fla. Stat.
“The elements comprising a consumer claim for damages under FDUTPA are: (1) a deceptive act
or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.” Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d
977, 983 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing City First Mortg. Corp. v. Barton, 988 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2008)). To be deceptive or unfair, FDUTPA requires more than merely distributing a product
with alleged defects. Jovine v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(explaining that, “[o]stensibly, it would not be a violation of FDUTPA to sell a broken-down car
or an inoperable computer provided the seller did not misrepresent the items’ qualities”).

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(b) also requires that “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with such particularity as thecircumstances may permit...” Moreover, the Plaintiff's underlying breach of warranty claims
alone will not suffice to give rise to a violation of FDUTPA. Rebman v. Follett Higher Educ.
Grp., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2008).

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges the same set of facts with respect to his FDUTPA claim and
breach of warranty claims. Thus, for the same reasons that Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment
claim fails, as discussed above, his FDUTPA claim also fails. To wit, conclusory allegations that
his vehicle suffered from a safety-related “defect,” Complaint { 54, without factual allegations as
to what, if any, legally cognizable duty existed, or how BMW NA concealed the alleged “defects”
from the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also does not allege sufficient facts to make it plausible that the BMW NA knew
of the alleged defect prior to the time his vehicle was originally sold. In cases involving failure to
disclose alleged product defects, courts in Florida and elsewhere, have insisted upon adequate
allegations regarding the defendants' knowledge at the time of sale. See Williams v. Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1112 & n.14 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (concluding that “presale
knowledge of a product defect is also a required element of claims brought
under” FDUTPA), aff'd, 851 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2017); Aprgliano, 979 F. Supp. 2d at
1343 (dismissing fraudulent concealment claim under Florida law because the plaintiffs “fail to
plead facts sufficient to establish [the defendant's] knowledge and concealment of the
defect”); McCabe v. Daimler AG, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (dismissing fraud
claim under Florida law because the plaintiff “purchased his vehicle in April 2004” but “failed to
plausibly allege that Defendants knew of the defect earlier than 2008.”); Matthews v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., No. 12-60630-CIV, 2012 WL 2520675, at 3 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2012) (recognizing that

“a FDUTPA claim is stated where the defendant knowingly fails to disclose a material defect thatdiminishes a product's value.”) (citation omitted).

Additionally, §501.976, Fla. Stat. provides in pertinent part that it is an unfair or deceptive
act or practice, actionable under FDUTPA for a dealer to: (7) Provide an express or implied
warranty and fail to honor such warranty unless properly disclaimed pursuant to subsection (6).
Dealer is defined by §501.975(2) as a motor vehicle dealer pursuant to §320.27, Fla. Stat.

Under §320.27(c), Fla. Stat., a “Motor vehicle dealer” is any person engaged in the business
of buying, selling or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale at
wholesale or retail, or who may service and repair motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement.

BMW NA is the distributor of BMW vehicles in North America and does not sell, service
or repair vehicles, including the subject vehicle. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s claim
under FDUTPA fails, as BMW NA is not a dealer.

Moreover, even assuming that Plaintiff's Complaint alleges a cause of action under
FDUTPA, which is denied based on the foregoing, his claim is otherwise time barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. A claim under FDUTPA has a four-year statute of limitations,
which accrues at the time purchase or lease of a product, not upon discovery of an alleged
defect. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f); Speier-Roche v. Volkswagen Grp. Of Am., No. 14-20107-CIV,
2014 WL 1745050, at 6-7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2014); Matthews v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90802, at 11 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2012). Moreover, Florida law is well-settled that
there is no “delayed discovery rule” applicable to FDUTPA claims. Speier-Roche 2014 WL
1745050, at 5-6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2014); citing Marlborough Holdings Group, Ltd. v. Azimut—
Benetti, 505 Fed. Appx. 899, 906 (11th Cir.2013); Matthews, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90802 at 9—
11; Point Blank Solutions, Inc. v. Toyobo Am., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51457, at 18 (S.D. Fla.

May 13, 2011).In this instant case, Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle on July 13, 2009. Given that fact
that it has been nearly eleven years since date of purchase, the four-year statutes of limitations has
definitively expired. Moreover, and as previously mentioned, discovery rule rolling does not apply
in FUDTPA cases. As such, Plaintiffs claim under FDUTPA should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, Defendant, BMW of North America, LLC, respectfully asks this
Honorable Court to enter an Order dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint, with prejudice, pursuant to
Rules 1.140(b)(1), 1.140(b)(3) and 1.140(b)(6) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; and to the
extent that Plaintiff's claims are not dismissed or transferred, requiring that Plaintiff provide a
more definite statement, as to Count I, Count II and Count II] in compliance with applicable Florida

law; and for such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by e-mail
via the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal system on this 9th day of April, 2020, upon: Matthew

Formaro, Esq., and Vlad Hirnyk, Attomeys for Plaintiff at mfornaro@fornarolegal.com and

filings@lemberglaw.com.

BIEDERMANN HOENIG SEMPREVIVO, P.A.
601 Brickell Key Drive, Suite 700

Miami, Florida 33131

(646) 218-7541 Ext. 541— Telephone

(646) 218-7510— Fascimile

E-mail: suzanne.valles@lawbhs.com

By: /s/ Suzanne M. Valles
SUZANNE M. VALLES
Florida Bar No. 124546