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09/05/2013 10:52:32 AM 713-755-1451 Page 2/3
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» SeottPattorn
3039 Washington Avenue, Suite 203 Dan Patton
Hovston, T as T7C07 Ditcet (281) 377-3266
Main @1) 377-3311 dpatton @scottpattonian. com
Fax (B1) 377-3267 Board Cettified Ia J abor & Employment Law
By The Texas Boatd Of Legal Specialization
September 5, 2013
Honorable Judge Caroline E. Baker
295th Judicial District Court
201 Caroline Street, 14th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Rez Canse No, 2010-63292; Teri Ford v. San Jacinto Methodist Hospital; In the 295th Judicial
District, Harris County, Texas
Dear Judge Baker:
Please acecpt this letter as a supplement to Methodisi’s Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV”).
During yesterday’s hearing, Plaintiff rclicd heavily upon the United States Supreme Court
case, Cranford ». Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidvon County, Tennessee! to support her
atgument that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity,
In Cranford, the Court found that the protection of the Opposition Clause of the anti-
retaliation provision of the Title VII extended to an employee who spoke about sexual harassment,
not on her own initiative, but in answering questions posed during her employer’s investigation of a
co-worker’s complaints? Noteworthy is the fact that Methodist is not disputing that
Plaintiffs claim is solely premised on the “opposition clause.” Howevet, conspicuously
absent from Plainuff's argument is the requirement that in order to establish statutorily protected
' 129 S.Ct. $46 (2008). ‘This case is attached as Exhibit “A.”
24d
3 Core & Savith Inv, a, Conk, 974 }.2d 217, 225-226 (Vex. App—San Antonio 1998) citing Little » United ‘Vech., Carrier Vransicold
Dix, 103 F.3d 956, 960 ith Cir. 1997),
2 Td
Add
5 See Plaintiff's Response to Methodist’s NOV at pp. 6 and 11.
© See King v Pigely Wigghy Alukara Distribution Compeny, 2013 WL 839869, * 11 (VD. Ala, March 1, 2013) citing Larper 2.
Brockbuster Entes’t Corp. 139 F.3d 1385, 1388-1389 (U1eh Cir, 1998); see abe Weeks 2, Harden Myg, Comp, 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th
Cie FOND MTinalle the slaintiffe may ner med ann their inneraner af the snhetiariee law te arene that theie helinf wae eacanalle
09/05/2013 10:52:32 AM 713-755-1451 Page 3/3
conduct under Title VII's Opposition Clause, Plaintiff must show the she had a good faith,
reasonable belief that Methodist was cngaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Plaintiff must show both she “subjectively believed” that Methodist engaged in an unlawful
employment practice and that her belicf was “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and
reeord.t, Whether a report is objectively reasonable (.e., not just reasonable in Plaintiffs own eyes)
is judged by existizg substantive law regarding what is unlawful under Tide VII> Where binding
precedent holds that particular conduct is not an unlawful employment practice by the employer,
and no decision of this Court or the Supreme Court has called that precedent into question or
undermined its feasoning, an employee’s contrary belief that the practice is unlawful is
unreasonable.®
In Plaintiff's Response to Mcthodist’s JNOV and during atguinent yesterday, Plaintiff has
failed to provide any existing substantive law demonstrating that the alleged sexual harassment
report made by Plaintiff rises to a level of an unlawful employment practice. Methodist has
provided a plethora of legal authority conclusively stating that it docs not. On this basis alonc,
Methodist’s JNOV should be granted.
Sincerely,
SCOTT Parrom PC
aon
=
ane
Daniel Patton
ce: Ellen Sprovach
x! lm Swath Ine. 2 Caok, 2d 217, 225-226 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1998) citing Live » United Tech, Carrier Transicotd
Dix, 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11 th Cir, 1997),
Ad
5 See Plaintiff's Response to Methodist’s JNOV at pp. 6 and 101
© See King » Pigely Wight) Alabama Distribution Company, 2013 WL 839869, * 11 (VD. Ala, March 1, 2013) ching Marper ».
Blockbuster Enter’ Conp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388-1389 (ULth Cir, 1998); ve alo Weebs v, Harden Myo, Corp, 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th
Cir, 2002) (“Tinally, the plaintiffs may not stand on their ignorance of the substantive law to atgue that their belict was reasonable.
As we have stated previously, if the plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the reasonableness inquiry
becomes no more than speculation regarding cheir subjective knowledge.”)
Preview
09/05/2013 10:52:32 AM 713-755-1451 Page 2/3 " » SeottPattorn 3039 Washington Avenue, Suite 203 Dan Patton Hovston, T as T7C07 Ditcet (281) 377-3266 Main @1) 377-3311 dpatton @scottpattonian. com Fax (B1) 377-3267 Board Cettified Ia J abor & Employment Law By The Texas Boatd Of Legal Specialization September 5, 2013 Honorable Judge Caroline E. Baker 295th Judicial District Court 201 Caroline Street, 14th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Rez Canse No, 2010-63292; Teri Ford v. San Jacinto Methodist Hospital; In the 295th Judicial District, Harris County, Texas Dear Judge Baker: Please acecpt this letter as a supplement to Methodisi’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV”). During yesterday’s hearing, Plaintiff rclicd heavily upon the United States Supreme Court case, Cranford ». Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidvon County, Tennessee! to support her atgument that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, In Cranford, the Court found that the protection of the Opposition Clause of the anti- retaliation provision of the Title VII extended to an employee who spoke about sexual harassment, not on her own initiative, but in answering questions posed during her employer’s investigation of a co-worker’s complaints? Noteworthy is the fact that Methodist is not disputing that Plaintiffs claim is solely premised on the “opposition clause.” Howevet, conspicuously absent from Plainuff's argument is the requirement that in order to establish statutorily protected ' 129 S.Ct. $46 (2008). ‘This case is attached as Exhibit “A.” 24d 3 Core & Savith Inv, a, Conk, 974 }.2d 217, 225-226 (Vex. App—San Antonio 1998) citing Little » United ‘Vech., Carrier Vransicold Dix, 103 F.3d 956, 960 ith Cir. 1997), 2 Td Add 5 See Plaintiff's Response to Methodist’s NOV at pp. 6 and 11. © See King v Pigely Wigghy Alukara Distribution Compeny, 2013 WL 839869, * 11 (VD. Ala, March 1, 2013) citing Larper 2. Brockbuster Entes’t Corp. 139 F.3d 1385, 1388-1389 (U1eh Cir, 1998); see abe Weeks 2, Harden Myg, Comp, 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cie FOND MTinalle the slaintiffe may ner med ann their inneraner af the snhetiariee law te arene that theie helinf wae eacanalle 09/05/2013 10:52:32 AM 713-755-1451 Page 3/3 conduct under Title VII's Opposition Clause, Plaintiff must show the she had a good faith, reasonable belief that Methodist was cngaged in an unlawful employment practice. Plaintiff must show both she “subjectively believed” that Methodist engaged in an unlawful employment practice and that her belicf was “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and reeord.t, Whether a report is objectively reasonable (.e., not just reasonable in Plaintiffs own eyes) is judged by existizg substantive law regarding what is unlawful under Tide VII> Where binding precedent holds that particular conduct is not an unlawful employment practice by the employer, and no decision of this Court or the Supreme Court has called that precedent into question or undermined its feasoning, an employee’s contrary belief that the practice is unlawful is unreasonable.® In Plaintiff's Response to Mcthodist’s JNOV and during atguinent yesterday, Plaintiff has failed to provide any existing substantive law demonstrating that the alleged sexual harassment report made by Plaintiff rises to a level of an unlawful employment practice. Methodist has provided a plethora of legal authority conclusively stating that it docs not. On this basis alonc, Methodist’s JNOV should be granted. Sincerely, SCOTT Parrom PC aon = ane Daniel Patton ce: Ellen Sprovach x! lm Swath Ine. 2 Caok, 2d 217, 225-226 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1998) citing Live » United Tech, Carrier Transicotd Dix, 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11 th Cir, 1997), Ad 5 See Plaintiff's Response to Methodist’s JNOV at pp. 6 and 101 © See King » Pigely Wight) Alabama Distribution Company, 2013 WL 839869, * 11 (VD. Ala, March 1, 2013) ching Marper ». Blockbuster Enter’ Conp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388-1389 (ULth Cir, 1998); ve alo Weebs v, Harden Myo, Corp, 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir, 2002) (“Tinally, the plaintiffs may not stand on their ignorance of the substantive law to atgue that their belict was reasonable. As we have stated previously, if the plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding cheir subjective knowledge.”)