Preview
INDEX NO. 150083/2014
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/07/2014
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 25 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/07/2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
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ROSENBAUM, ROSENFELD & SONNENBLICK, LLP Index No. 150083/2014
R&R PROPERTIES LLC AND COMPUTERIZED
DIAGNOSTIC SCANNING ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Plaintiff, AFFIRMATION
IN SUPPORT
vs.
EXCALIBUR GROUP NA, LLC, A SUPERIOR SERVICE
AND REPAIR CO. INC., HOME SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING, INC., PHILIPS HEALTHCARE, PHILIPS
MEDICAL SYSTEMS NORTH AMERICA COMPANY,
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA
CORPORATION, PHILIPS MEDICAL SYSTEMS NORTH
AMERICA, INC., PHILIPS HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS,
INC. and ESTATE OF MERLE H. EISENSTEIN
Defendants.
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RICHARD B. CAMARDA, an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of
the State of New York, affirms the following to be true under the penalties of perjury:
1 I am associated with the law firm of FARBER BROCKS & ZANE L.L.P., attorneys
for defendant A SUPERIOR SERVICE and REPAIR CO. INC. (“Superior”), in the above-entitled
matter and am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances at issue herein.
2. This affirmation is submitted in support of the instant motion which seeks an Order,
(1) pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(1) & (7), dismissing the plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety with
prejudice on the grounds that based upon documentary evidence the Complaint fails to state a cause
of action; and/or (2), pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(4), dismissing the plaintiffs’ Complaint in its
entirety with prejudice on the grounds that the instant action is duplicative of two earlier filed actions
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involving the same parties for the same causes of action; and/or (3), treating the motion as one for
summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3211(c) and dismissing plaintiffs’ Complaint, and any and
all cross-claims with prejudice on the grounds that no triable issues of fact exist as a matter of law.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1 Dismissal of this action is appropriate in that this action is duplicative of two earlier
filed actions involving the same parties and same dispute.
2 In May 2011, prior to the filing of the instant action, The Travelers Indemnity
Company of Connecticut (“Travelers”), as subrogee of ROSENBAUM, ROSENFELD,
SONNENBLICK, LLP (“RRS”), commenced a subrogation lawsuit against EXCALIBUR GROUP
NA LLC (“Excalibur”), a general contractor retained by PHILIPS MEDICAL SYSTEMS NORTH
AMERICA COMPANY to renovate space leased by RRS at the premises located at 1421 Third
Avenue, New York, New York (“the Premises”), to recover benefits paid to RRS for alleged
property damage. Travelers also asserted identical claims against Superior, a New York City
Licensed Master Plumber subcontracted by Excalibur to perform limited plumbing services at the
Premises; and HOME SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INC. (“Home Systems”), which allegedly
provided engineering services at the Premises. Travelers filed the lawsuit in Supreme Court, New
York County, and that action is captioned The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut a/s/o
Rosenbaum, Rosenfeld, Sonnenblick, LLP v. A Superior Service and Repair Co. Inc., Excalibur
Group NA, L.L.C., and Home Systems Engineering, Inc., Index No. 150153/2011 (“the Travelers
Action”). (Exhibit A).
3 In December 2012, Federal Insurance Company (“Federal”), as subrogee of RRS,
commenced a separate, but nearly identical, subrogation lawsuit against Excalibur, Superior, and
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Home Systems, to recover benefits paid to RRS for alleged property damage. Federal filed the
lawsuit in Supreme Court, New York County, and that action is captioned Federal Insurance
Company a/s/o Rosenbaum, Rosenfeld & Sonnenblick, LLP v. A Superior Service and Repair Co.
Inc., Excalibur Group NA, L.L.C., and Home Systems Engineering, Inc., Index No. 150405/2013
(“the Federal Action”). (Exhibit B).
4 The Travelers Action was joined with the Federal Action for purposes of discovery
and trial, and those actions are currently pending before the Honorable Ellen M. Coin. (Exhibit E).
The Note of Issue has been filed in both the Travelers Action and the Federal Action. (Exhibit F).
5 In January 2014, RRS, R&R PROPERTIES LLC (“R&R”), and COMPUTERIZED
DIAGNOSTIC SCANNING ASSOCIATES, P.C. (“CDSA”) (collectively herein “the RRS
Plaintiffs”) commenced a lawsuit against Excalibur, Superior, and Home Systems to recover for the
same property damage alleged in the Travelers Action and the Federal Action. However, the RRS
Plaintiffs also named as defendants the ESTATE OF MERLE H. EISENSTEIN (“Eisenstein”),
which allegedly provided architectural services at the Premises; and PHILIPS HEALTHCARE,
PHILIPS MEDICAL SYSTEMS NORTH AMERICA COMPANY, PHILIPS ELECTRONICS
NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, PHILIPS MEDICAL SYSTEMS NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
and PHILIPS HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, INC. (collectively herein “Philips Medical”), which
allegedly retained Excalibur to perform the renovations, leased medical equipment to RRS,
attempted to repair said equipment, and/or supervised the renovations performed at the Premises.
(Exhibit G).
6 RRS is a plaintiff in all three actions, and Excalibur, Superior and Home Systems are
defendants in all three actions. In each of these actions, the plaintiffs claim RRS sustained property
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damage when a third floor toilet overflowed water and/or waste into RRS’s leased space; and that the
overflow was proximately caused by the defendants’ improper connection of a 3-inch sanitary branch
(a horizontal pipe) to a 4-inch cast iron stack (a primary vertical pipe) that plaintiffs allege is part of
the building storm water drainage system. Therefore, the instant lawsuit involves the same parties
and the same causes of action as the earlier filed lawsuits, is duplicative of the earlier filed lawsuits,
and must be dismissed.
7 However, to the extent that the Court finds that the instant lawsuit is proper, which
Superior denies, it is respectfully requested that this motion be treated as one for summary judgment,
and the Complaint be dismissed as there is no question of material fact present.
8 It is uncontroverted that Superior did not connect the 3-inch sanitary branch to the 4-
inch cast iron stack. It is uncontroverted that Superior did not contract to perform services with
respect to the 4-inch cast iron stack; and neither created nor modified the allegedly improper
connection. It is uncontroverted that Superior’s work was limited to extending and relocating
preexisting sanitary pipes that were upstream from the allegedly improper connection, and installing
new and additional sanitary fixtures to pipes where sanitary fixtures previously existed.
9. Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that the plumbing plans furnished by Excalibur
identified the 4-inch cast iron stack as a sanitary stack; neither Excalibur, nor any other party,
contracted with Superior to verify that the existing connection of the 3-inch sanitary branch to the 4-
inch cast iron stack was proper, or that the 4-inch cast iron stack was in fact a sanitary stack as
indicated by the plumbing plans; and, in accordance with the law of this State, Superior was entitled
to and did reasonably rely on the sealed engineering plans provided by Excalibur, which were
developed by Eisenstein from as-built plans provided by RRS.
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10. The evidence establishes that Superior’s work was performed properly and did not
violate the applicable New York City codes. The evidence also makes clear that Superior performed
plumbing work at the Premises three years prior to the overflows, and thus the overflows occurred
too remotely to be actionable against Superior. Furthermore, the evidence makes clear that Superior
did not contract to perform ongoing plumbing maintenance at the Premises; was not asked to return
to the Premises in the three years since performing plumbing work at the Premises; and was not told
of any problems with the work or the plumbing system following the completion of the work.
11. Itis undisputed that the overflow was caused by a clog in the building drain located in
the basement. The evidence establishes that Superior did not perform work in the basement. The
Record further establishes that plumbing clogs are commonly the result of improper or infrequent
maintenance, and that RRS failed to maintain the plumbing system at the Premises. In contrast, there
is no evidence that the resultant damages were proximately caused by the installation of a toilet on
the third floor of the Premises or that Superior’s installation of a toilet and relocation of an existing
3-inch sanitary riser proximately caused the backup. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims and all claims
for common-law indemnification and contribution must be dismissed as against Superior.
12. Lastly, the RRS Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed since Superior did not perform
work pursuant to a contract with the RRS Plaintiffs, and, thus, had no duty to the RRS Plaintiffs.
Further, all claims for contractual indemnification or for breach of contract for failure to obtain
insurance must be dismissed since no such agreements exist.
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SCHEDULE OF EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT A Travelers Summons and Complaint dated May 16, 2011
EXHIBIT B: Federal’s Summons and Complaint dated December 10, 2012
EXHIBIT C Stipulation to Amend Travelers Complaint dated March 14, 2013
EXHIBIT D Travelers Supplemental Summons and Amended Complaint dated
October 7, 2013
EXHIBIT E: Order Joining Travelers and Federal Actions dated October 18, 2013
EXHIBIT F: Note of Issues dated October 30, 2013
EXHIBIT G RRS Plaintiffs Summons and Complaint dated January 6, 2014
EXHIBIT Ht Philips Medical Answer to Complaint dated February 21, 2014
EXHIBIT I: Excalibur Answer to Complaint dated March 11, 2014
EXHIBIT J: Defective Request for Judicial Intervention dated March 17, 2014
EXHIBIT K: Deposition transcript of Geoffrey Pierini
EXHIBIT L Deposition transcript of Joseph Kerrigan
EXHIBIT M Deposition transcript of Dr. Stanley Rosenfeld
EXHIBIT N Department of State Record for CDSA
EXHIBIT O RRS Subrogation Receipts
EXHIBIT P: Affidavit of Joseph Kerrigan
EXHIBIT Q: Affidavit of Leonard Williams
EXHIBIT R Eisenstein Plans, drawings P-1 thru P-7, dated July 24, 2007
EXHIBIT S: Superior’s Proposal and Amendments
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
13. On or about May 16, 2011, Travelers commenced an action by filing a Summons and
Complaint. (Exhibit A).
14. On or about December 10, 2012, Federal commenced an identical action by filing a
Summons and Complaint. (Exhibit B).
15. By stipulation dated March 3, 2013 (Exhibit C), Travelers filed a Supplemental
Summons and Amended Complaint dated October 7, 2013. (Exhibit D).
16. Geoffrey Pierini, testifying on behalf of defendant, Excalibur, and Joseph Kerrigan,
testifying on behalf of defendant, Superior, each testified at an Examination Before Trial on
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September 11, 2014. (Exhibit K & Exhibit L). Dr. Stanley Rosenfeld, testifying on behalf of RRS,
testified at an Examination Before Trial on October 17, 2013. (Exhibit M). Attorneys for the RRS
Plaintiffs were present for the Examinations Before Trial of Geoffrey Pierini, Joseph Kerrigan, and
Dr. Rosenfeld, and were provided an opportunity to examine Geoffrey Pierini and Joseph Kerrigan
under oath. (Exhibit K & Exhibit L).
17. The Travelers and Federal actions were joined for purposes of discovery and trial in
an Order dated October 18, 2013 (Exhibit E)
18. Travelers and Federal each filed a Note of Issue on October 30, 2013. (Exhibit F).
19. On or about January 6, 2014, the RRS Plaintiffs commenced an action by filing a
Summons and Complaint. (Exhibit G). Philips Medical served its Answer to the RRS Plaintiffs’
Complaint with Cross-Claims on or about February 21, 2014. (Exhibit H). Excalibur served its
Answer to the RRS Plaintiffs’ Complaint with Cross-Claims on or about March 11, 2014. (Exhibit
I). Upon information and belief, to date, Home Systems and Eisenstein have not served an Answer
to the RRS Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
20. On or about March 17, 2014, Philips Medical filed a defective Request for Judicial
Intervention in the instant lawsuit, which failed to identify the Travelers and Federal Actions as
related cases. (Exhibit J).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Claims
21. There are commonalities in the ownership and management of RRS, CDSA, and
R&R. (Exhibit M, p. 11, Ins. 17-15, p.12, Ins. 2-10, p. 34, Ins. 3-10). RRS is a medical imaging
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practice that was owned and operated by three partners: Dr. Alfred Rosenbaum, Dr. Stanley
Rosenfeld, and Dr. Emily Sonnenblick. Dr. Sonnenblick left the practice in January 2013. (Exhibit
M, p. 11, Ins. 17-25; p. 12, Ins. 2-10). RRS leases and occupies the first three floors and basement of
the Premises. (Exhibit G).
22. CDSA is also a medical imaging practice that leases space at the Premises. (Exhibit
M, p. 48, Ins. 2-12; Exhibit G). Dr. Alfred Rosenbaum is the chief executive officer of CDSA.
(Exhibit N).
23. The Premises is a six story building owned by R&R, a partnership formed by Dr.
Alfred Rosenbaum and Dr. Stanley Rosenfeld. (Exhibit M, p. 19-20).
24. RRS received insurance benefit proceeds from Travelers and Federal, and accordingly
RRS subrogated its right to recover for the alleged property damage to Travelers and Federal. The
subrogation receipts are annexed hereto as Exhibit O.
25. Travelers, Federal, and the RRS Plaintiffs each allege that Superior negligently
performed plumbing work at the Premises, resulting in two overflows of water and/or waste from the
subject toilet and resultant water damage. (Exhibit M, p. 81, Ins. 16-25; Exhibit G, {J 58, 64;
Exhibit A; Exhibit B). Plaintiffs allege that the initial overflow occurred on April 18, 2011, and that
a subsequent overflow on April 23, 2011 was caused by the negligent management, design,
installation, construction, inspection, maintenance, repair and/or renovation of the plumbing system.
(Exhibit G, {J 58, 64, Exhibit A, Exhibit B).
26. Philips Medical asserted cross-claims for common-law and contractual
indemnification, contribution, and breach of contract for failure to procure insurance. (Exhibit H).
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Excalibur asserted cross-claims against Superior for common-law and contractual indemnification,
as well as contribution. (Exhibit I).
27. Upon information and belief, to date, Home Systems and Eisenstein have not
answered the RRS Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and thus, there are no cross-claims asserted by Home
Systems or Eisenstein against Superior.
B. The Project
28. In 2006, RRS was interested in acquiring new medical equipment for its practice,
including MRI and CT/PET scan equipment, and eventually agreed to lease equipment from Philips
Medical. (Exhibit M, p. 54, Ins 1225, p 55 Ins 2-11).
29. In addition to the medical equipment leases, RRS and Philips Medical also entered
into a “Turnkey Construction Agreement”, whereby Philips Medical would supervise a general
contractor who would renovate the first three floors of the premises occupied by RRS to
accommodate the new medical imaging equipment (“the Project”). (Exhibit M, p. 55, Ins 21-25, p
56, Ins 2-4). RRS paid for the Project with a capital improvement loan from Philips Medical, which
RRS subsequently paid in full. (Exhibit M pp. 56-59).
30. Philips hired Excalibur to be the general contractor for the Project, and Philips
supervised the Project. (Exhibit K, p. 27, Ins. 7-22).
31, Dr. Rosenfeld testified that it was his understanding that the Turnkey Construction
Agreement was a full service agreement, and relied on the expertise of Philips Medical and Excalibur
to develop the scope of the project. (Exhibit M p 61, Ins 5-17). This included determining how
many bathrooms were needed on each floor, which Dr. Rosenfeld described as follows:
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So someone from Rosenbaum must have told someone from
Philips that they wanted six bathrooms; correct? Otherwise
they wouldn’t have put bathrooms in.
Somebody from Excalibur went over what we were planning
to do with the space and what the space was going to be used
for and said these toilets are existing. And they may remain.
Given what you want to use the space for and what the center
was going to be used for, you need two toilets here. And this
is where they should go.
(Exhibit M, p. 61, Ins. 21-25; p. 62, Ins. 2-13; see also, Exhibit K, p. 37, Ins. 21-25, p. 38, Ins. 2-22).
32. Prior to the commencement of the Project, RRS provided Excalibur with as-built
drawings that were developed by Arthur Minner (deceased) for a prior owner of the Premises.
(Exhibit M, p. 44, Ins. 24-25; p. 45 Ins 2-5; Exhibit K, p. 97, Ins. 15-2). Excalibur relied upon the
as-built plans in drafting its proposal to Philips Medical. (Exhibit K, p. 37, Ins. 9-20).
33. Excalibur retained Merle Eisenstein, AIA, (deceased) to act as the architect and
licensed design professional for the Project. Excalibur and Philips Medical had both previously
worked with Mr. Eisenstein on several similar projects. (Exhibit K, p. 93, Ins. 16-25; p. 94, Ins 2-9).
RRS provided Mr. Eisenstein with the as-built plans, and Mr. Eisenstein prepared plans for the
Project (“the Eisenstein Plans”). (Exhibit K, p. 94, Ins. 16-20; p. 97, Ins. 15-23). The Eisenstein
Plans are attached hereto as Exhibit R.
34, Excalibur subcontracted the plumbing work for the Project to Superior. (Exhibit K, p.
42, Ins. 2-9). To protect its reputation, Excalibur took care in selecting subcontractors to work on its
projects. Excalibur ultimately hired Superior because Superior had worked with Excalibur in the
past or came highly recommended. (Exhibit K, p. 44, Ins. 6-25; p. 45, Ins. 2-15). Excalibur also
verified that Superior was licensed and insured. (Exhibit K, p. 43, Ins. 18-25; p. 44, Ins. 2-5).
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35. Excalibur provided the Eisenstein Plans to Superior. (Exhibit K, p. 56, Ins 7-12).
Proposal #10224, dated November 7, 2007, was prepared by Superior based upon the Eisenstein
Plans (“the Proposal”). (Exhibit L, p. 23, Ins 12-21). Excalibur hired Superior
to perform plumbing
work at the Premises pursuant to the Proposal. (Exhibit K, p. 46, Ins 7-8, p. 86, Ins 15-18).
C. Superior did not connect the 3-inch sanitary branch to the 4-inch cast iron stack and did not
perform work in the basement where the clog occurred.
36. As a preliminary matter, to explain the services performed by Superior certain
technical terms must be defined. A “stack” or “riser” is any pipe that runs vertically up and down. A
“branch” is a pipe that runs horizontally. (Exhibit P, 4).
37. Pursuant to the Proposal, Superior was hired to remove a pre-existing sink from the
third floor bathroom and relocate an existing 3-inch sanitary riser; install a new sink; and install a
toilet that was designed by Eisenstein to drain to the relocated 3-inch sanitary riser. (Exhibit L, p. 41-
42).
38. Mr. Kerrigan, president/owner of Superior and a New York City Licensed Master
Plumber, explained that the plumbing plans provided by Excalibur indicated that a 3-inch sanitary
riser ran from the third floor bathroom down through a wall on the second floor to the ceiling of the
first floor, where it connected to a 3-inch sanitary branch. The 3-inch sanitary branch then ran
horizontally across the drop-ceiling of the first floor to a 4-inch cast iron stack in the wall of the
Premises. (Exhibit L, p. 66, Ins. 7-25, p. 67, Ins. 2-14; Exhibit P, {ff 12-13; Exhibit Q, {| 7-8).
39. The negligence claimed by plaintiffs is the allegedly improper connection of the 3-
inch sanitary branch to the 4-inch cast iron stack, which plaintiffs claim was a storm water drainage
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stack and not a sanitary stack as depicted on the plans. (Exhibit G; Exhibit B; Exhibit D). However,
this connection was pre-existing, and the new work performed by Superior did not include the
connection or modification of the 3-inch sanitary branch to the 4-inch cast iron stack. (Exhibit P, §6).
40. Per the plans, Excalibur was moving the second floor wall through which the 3-inch
sanitary riser ran as part of the renovations on that floor, necessitating the relocation of the 3-inch
sanitary riser. (Exhibit L, p. 62, Ins. 5-13).
41. Mr. Kerrigan testified that prior to installing the sanitary fixtures and relocating the 3-
inch sanitary riser, he referred to the plans, noted that sanitary fixtures were already connected to the
3-inch sanitary riser, visually traced the 3-inch sanitary riser to the 3-inch sanitary branch, and the 3-
inch sanitary branch to the 4-inch cast iron stack. (Exhibit L, p. 81, Ins 15-25; p. 82, Ins. 2-4). This
in field observation was consistent with what was depicted on the plumbing plans. (Exhibit P, { 14-
15).
42. Superior relocated the 3-inch sanitary riser to the new second floor wall, and extended
the 3-inch branch to reach the relocated 3-inch sanitary riser. (Exhibit L, p. 66, Ins. 7-25, p 67, Ins.
2-14). Superior’s contract with Excalibur and the plans provided by Excalibur did not entail making
any alterations or modifications to the connection of the 3-inch sanitary branch to the 4-inch sanitary
stack, which was located in a wall of the Premises two rooms away from where Superior tied into the
3-inch sanitary branch. (Exhibit P, § 17; Exhibit S).
43. Mr. Kerrigan, referring to the Eisenstein Plans, testified as follows:
Q Now, we are talking about the third floor bathroom that we
circled earlier on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2. And I am referring to
the upper left-hand circle. Where there is a bathroom and
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there was a water closet or toilet installed. The sanitary line
for that specific toilet, did you install that sanitary line for that
toilet?
Yes.
And what did you tie that specific sanitary line into?
I extended an existing sanitary line that was already there that
was removed during when the fixtures were removed and the
riser was relocated during the course of this job.
ook
1 am not sure how you want to designate it. There was a 3-
inch sanitary up-and-down line that they call it on the drawing
right in the same general area of where the toilet is. There
had been a wall in one place on the second floor where it
came up and it had to be -- the wall was no longer going to be
there, so the line had to be removed.
sR
The connection here. You can see where we removed it. It
was existing up over here. We removed the existing up and
relocated to where it says "new up”. This here is the branch
(indicating).
RR
This is actually on the first floor. The stack went -- or the
branch went up through the second floor and into the floor of
the third floor. The connection was in the ceiling of the first
floor.
Fok
And you can see it here as having removed the existing 3-inch
sanitary up. And this here says "new 3-inch S up" is the new
sanitary up. And this here was the existing branch line
because it came over to here (indicating). And this here in the
center is the stack, the sanitary stack [colloquy omitted].
(Exhibit L, pp. 60-67).
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44, Importantly, Superior did not alter the preexisting 4-inch cast iron stack in any
manner during the course of the work, and did not remove or alter the pre-existing 3-inch branch
connection to the 4-inch cast iron stack (Exhibit P, 6, 17). In this regard, Mr. Kerrigan testified as
follows:
Sure. Isn't it true that there was a sanitary line that tied into a
storm riser at this building?
Yes.
Okay. Did you make that connection?
No.
Q Who did?
A Ihave no idea.
(Exhibit L, p. 70, Ins.24-25; p. 71, Ins. 2-8).
45. With regard to the inspections Superior performed during the course of its work under
the proposal, Mr. Kerrigan testified as follows:
Q In terms of your protocol regarding inspecting your job,
making sure that it’s done properly, you said that you would
inspect the job every day. Is that correct?
A I believe I inspected it every day. That would be protocol.
(Exhibit L, p. 126, Ins. 16-23).
46. Following Superior’s completion of work under the proposal, Superior did not
perform any additional plumbing work at the Premises until after the April 11, 2011 overflows and
received no complaints regarding the plumbing work performed by Superior during that time.
(Exhibit P, 49 20-21).
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D. The Incident
47. On the morning of Monday, April 18, 2011, three years after Superior completed its
work at the Premises, RRS staff discovered water overflowing from the third floor toilet. (Exhibit M,
p. 81, Ins. 16-25),
48. RRS contacted Excalibur to complain that a third floor toilet was overflowing.
(Exhibit K, p. 107, Ins. 4-10). Upon arrival Mr. Pierini contacted Serv Pro to clean up the water.
(Exhibit K, p. 107, Ins 12-15; p. 108, Ins 3-7). Noting that the water was overflowing from a toilet
on the third floor, Mr. Pierini assumed the drain was clogged and called a plumber to investigate the
cause of the backup. Mr. Pierini testified that the plumber determined that “an enormous clog
somewhere down in the basement” was causing water to backup and overflow from the third floor
toilet. (Exhibit K, pp. 59-61).
49. The plumber cleared the clog, and the water drained. (Exhibit K, p. 74, 2-5).
Excalibur did not instruct the plumber to trace the lines to determine if there was an issue with the
configuration of the plumbing. (Exhibit K, p. 75, Ins. 7-12).
50. A second overflow occurred on April 23, 2011. (Exhibit K, p. 14-17). Excalibur
again contacted the plumber who cleared the clog on April 18, 2011, and again asked him to snake
the line and clear the clog. Excalibur did not instruct the plumber to trace the lines to determine if
there was an issue with the configuration of the plumbing. (Exhibit K, p. 76-77).
Sl. After the plumber cleared the clog, Excalibur contacted Superior to further investigate
the cause of the overflows. (Exhibit K, p. 77, Ins. 9-18). Superior then worked with Excalibur to
trace the lines. (Exhibit L, p. 107, Ins. 17-25; p. 108 Ins. 2-3).
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52. Superior performed a visual trace of any exposed piping, but was unable to reach a
conclusion. (Exhibit L, p 109, Ins 6-8). Superior then used a colored dye to trace the piping and it
was determined that the 4-inch cast iron stack also drained storm water from the roof. (Exhibit L, p
109, Ins. 15-25; p. 110, Ins 2-4). Tracing a plumbing system can take a considerable amount of time
and manpower and is not normally, and was not, included in the cost of work performed by Superior
at the Premises. (Exhibit P, { 25; Exhibit Q, { 12).
E. Superior’s Work Was Performed in Accordance with its Contract with Excalibur, the
Eisenstein Plans, and Applicable Codes.
53. According to Mr. Leonard Williams, a New York City Licensed Master Plumber with
forty years of plumbing experience, including experience in the drafting and practical application of
New York City Plumbing Codes, the work performed by Superior was performed correctly and in
accordance with applicable New York City building codes. (Exhibit Q, § 3).
54. It is the opinion of Mr. Williams that Superior reasonably relied on the plumbing
plans prepared by Merle Eisenstein, the licensed design professional, and that Superior’s visual
verification of the infield conditions were reasonable under the circumstances and in accordance with
the custom and practice of the plumbing industry. (Exhibit Q, § 22). There was no reason for
Superior to question whether the pre-existing connection of the 3-inch sanitary branch to the 4-inch
cast iron stack was proper based on the plans and Superior’s infield observations. (Exhibit Q, ff 13).
55. The Proposal specified the limited scope of work that Superior was hired to perform
and explicitly states that all work included in the Proposal is limited to the Eisenstein Plans dated
July 24, 2007, except as otherwise indicated, and did not provide for the inspection of the entire
plumbing system in the 6-story building. (Exhibit P, §§ 9-10, 17, 25; Exhibit S). The Proposal does
{00180103.DOC /} 16
not contain any indemnification agreement or warranties. (Exhibit K, p 87 11-25, p. 88, In. 2, Exhibit
S, Exhibit P, 911). Moreover, the scope of work in the proposal does not include any maintenance
services whatsoever. (Exhibit P, § 11; Exhibit S). Any changes to the work that Superior was to
perform under the Proposal were memorialized in subsequent amendments to the Proposal. (Exhibit
K, p. 88, Ins. 23-25; p 89, Ins. 2-3).
56. Superior did not have the authority to make any changes to the plumbing system or
work on areas that were not specified in the plumbing designs. (Exhibit L, p. 81; Ins 11-13). In this
regard, Mr. Pierini testified as follows:
Q Mr. Pierini, if Superior ran into an issue on the job site and
needed to make a change to the work they were performing,
who would they have to speak to perform those changes?
If they were to change the design, I would assume they would
file some kind of RFI with a design professional and get some
kind of approval in writing.
Would they have to clear that issue with Excalibur or anyone
else at the building first?
Yes. I would assume it would be discussed with the project
supervisor, notify the architect or engineer.
(Exhibit K, p. 91, Ins. 11-25; p. 92, In. 2; see also, Exhibit L, p. 50, In. 25; p. 51, Ins 2-6).
357. Superior did not enter into any agreements with any party or non-party with
respect to the Premises outside of the aforementioned Proposal between Excalibur and Superior.
(Exhibit P, {J 7, 11). Dr. Rosenfeld testified that R&R did not have any maintenance agreement
with respect to the Premises. With regards to maintenance agreements, Dr. Rosenfeld testified as
follows:
{00180103.DOC /} 17
A The only maintenance agreement we had with the building is
with the heating and air-conditioning people which up until
very recently was a subsidiary of Excalibur.
(Exhibit M, p. 191, 2-9).
58. Importantly, RRS did not enter into any maintenance agreements with anyone for the
plumbing or roof drains, storm water system, or plumbing system. (Exhibit M p. 191, Ins 23-25; p.
192, Ins. 2-14). Dr. Rosenfeld testified as follows:
Q Do you have any service contracts outside the elevator and
HVAC contracts?
A Not that I know of.
(Exhibit M, p. 192, Ins. 15-18).
59. According to Mr. Williams, the failure to maintain building plumbing systems
commonly results in overflows such as those that occurred at the Premises in April 2011. (Exhibit
Q, 4 15). Furthermore, the clog in the basement and resultant overflow could have occurred even if
Superior had performed no work at the Premises since sanitary fixtures were already connected to the
3-inch sanitary riser and the 3-inch sanitary branch was previously connected to the 4-inch cast iron
stack. (Exhibit Q, § 21).
F. Conclusion
60. The instant lawsuit involves the same parties and the same causes of action as the
earlier filed lawsuits, is duplicative of the earlier filed lawsuits, and must be dismissed.
61. Further, the allegedly improper connection of the sanitary system to the storm water
system was a pre-existing condition. Superior did not make the alleged improper connection. At
{00180103.DOC /} 18
most, Superior extended a pre-existing sanitary branch line and relocated a sanitary riser which
already had a sink installed, and installed a toilet on said line. Superior had no duty or obligation to
inspect the entire plumbing system in the Premises or trace out pre-existing lines already connected
to sanitary fixtures, and certainly had no duty to conduct dye testing as asserted by plaintiffs.
62. Excalibur retained Superior to perform plumbing work at the Premises specified in
the Proposal prepared by Superior and accepted by Excalibur in accordance with the plans developed
by Merle Eisenstein. This work included the relocation of an existing sanitary line, and the
connection of a new third floor toilet to the relocated sanitary line. Nearly three years after Superior
completed its work, the toilet overflowed, causing damage to the Premises. However, there is no
indication that Superior’s installation of the toilet or relocation of the sanitary pipe were deficient in
any way. Moreover, it was reasonable for Superior to rely on the plans provided by Excalibur and
prepared by Merle Eisenstein in the performance of its work.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the within Motion be granted in its entirety
and the plaintiffs’ Complaint and any cross-claims be dismissed, together with such other and further
relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
Dated: Garden City, New York
April 4, 2014
— Cl
HARD B. CAMARDA
{00180103.DOC /} 19
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Y.P. VS. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, ET AL
Jul 10, 2024 |
CGC24613065
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 12. DEFENDANT EARL IGNACIO AND WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'s Motion To Compel Arbitration. Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Earl Ignacio's motion to compel arbitration and stay is denied. (The Court's complete tentative ruling has been emailed to the parties.) For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
ADAM AMER VS RITA NORIEGA, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 |
23STCV10432
Case Number:
23STCV10432
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
54
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Adam Amer,
Plaintiff,
Case No.:
23STCV10432
vs.
Tentative Ruling
Rita Noriega, et al.,
Defendants.
Hearing Date: July 9, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion to Determine Good Faith Settlement
Moving Party
: Defendants On Central Realty Inc. dba Coldwell Banker Hallmark Realty, Sevada Mkrdichian, Redfin Corporation, and Alin Glogovicean
Responding Party
: None
T/R
:
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO FOR APPROVAL OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT IS GRANTED.
DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿
SMCdept54@lacourt.org
¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers.
No opposition was filed.
Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors upon giving notice in the manner provided in Code of Civil Procedure, section 1005(b).
(CCP § 877.6(a)(1).)
A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
(CCP § 877.6 (c).)
The party contesting the settlement bears the burden of proving that the settlement is in bad faith.
(CCP § 877.6 (d).)
Defendants On Central Realty Inc. dba Coldwell Banker Hallmark Realty, Sevada Mkrdichian, Redfin Corporation, and Alin Glogovicean apply for approval of their good faith settlement with Plaintiffs. After extensive negotiations Defendants agreed to settle with Plaintiffs for $30,000. Defendants admit no fault, and state the settlement is proportionate to their potential share of liability. Only one cause of action was brought against them. There is no challenge to the settlement, and the non-settling defendants have defaulted. The Court finds that the settlement is in good faith.
The application is GRANTED.
Ruling
JONATHAN NEIL & ASSOCIATES, INC. VS HEALING HANDS CARE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 |
23STCV20520
Case Number:
23STCV20520
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
40
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 40
Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Healing Hands Care, Inc., a California Corporation; Ara Tovmassian aka Ara Mesrop Tovmassian and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.:
23STCV20520
Hearing Date:
7/9/24
Trial Date:
12/6/24
[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:
Plaintiff
Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc.s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted and for Monetary Sanctions (Attorney Fees and Costs) Against Defendant Ara Tovmassian in the Amount of $850.00 [Res ID # 0191].
I.
Background
On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff purportedly served Requests for Admission (RFAs), Set One, on Defendant Tovmassian. Responses to RFAs, Set One, were purportedly due on February 6, 2024, 35 days after purported service by mail on January 2, 2024.
Defendant Tovmassian allegedly failed to serve responses to RFAs, Set One, by February 6, 2024.
On March 20, 2024, based on Defendant Tovmassians alleged non-response to RFAs, Set One, Plaintiff filed a motion to deem the truth of RFAs, Set One, admitted as against Defendant Tovmassian. Plaintiffs motion also requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $850 against Defendant Tovmassian. Plaintiff served the motion on Defendant Tovmassian by mail that same day.
Defendant Tovmassian has failed to oppose Plaintiffs motion despite service.
Plaintiffs motion is now before the Court.
II.
Motion to Deem Truth of RFAs Admitted and Request for Sanctions
A.
Motion to Deem Truth of RFAs Admitted
:
GRANTED.
1.
Legal Standard
The discovering party can make a motion to deem as admitted any unanswered requests for admission or any requests answered in a late or unverified response. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.240, subd. (a) [RFA responses must be signed by responding party under oath]; see
Appleton v. Superior Court
(1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636 [unsworn response to RFAs is treated like no response].) These requests are not automatically deemed admitted; the discovery party must make the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).)
To establish this ground, a movant must show:
(1) Proper service (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.070);
(2) Expiration of the deadline for the initial response 30 days after service or on date agreed to by parties (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subds. (a), (b)); and
(3) That (a) the responding party served no response (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b)), (b) the propounding party served a late response (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b)); or (3) the responding party served an unsworn response (see
Appleton v. Superior Court
,
supra
, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 636 [unsworn response to RFAs is treated like no response]).
A court must deny a motion to compel initial discovery where the discovery sought is outside the scope of discovery. (See
CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19; see also Code. Civ. Proc., § 2017.010 [scope of discovery].)
2.
Courts Determination
The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff.
The moving papers points and authorities contend that RFAs, Set One, was served on Defendant Tovmassian on January 2, 2024. (Mot., pp. 3 [service], 5 [signature, not sworn].) However, the points and authorities are unsworn and not entitled to evidentiary credence. (
In re Zeth S.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413 [the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence];
South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P.
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 668, fn. 14 [unsworn arguments of counsel in a legal memorandum are not evidence].)
The original Natalia A. Minassian counsel declaration filed on March 20, 2024 did not support service on January 2, 2024, as to RFAs, Set One. However, at the initial hearing on July 2, 2024, the Court pointed out what appeared to
be an inadvertent failure to include substance in that declaration. The Court continued the hearing to July 9, 2024 to allow Plaintiffs counsel to address the error.
On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a notice of errata and a revised Declaration of Natalia Minassian. It included both averments by counsel as well as attaching the Requests for Admission, along with the Proof of Service, showing service by mail on the Defendant on January 2, 2024. For this reason, the Court finds that service has been shown. Moreover, the evidence supports the fact that the discovery was served on the date alleged in the motion, and thus the Court finds no prejudice from the initial failure to attach the proof of service to the motion.
Second, Defendant has failed to oppose this motion, and did not appear at the initial hearing on July 2, 2024. The evidence in the moving papers sets forth that the Defendant did not respond, and this evidence is thus unrebutted.
Third, the court finds that the 17 RFAs are relevant to the facts involved in this case and are otherwise appropriate, clear and unambiguous.
Given these findings, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion.
B.
Request for Sanctions
:
GRANTED.
1.
Legal Standard
The Court must award sanctions when a partys response is untimely, and the discovering party makes a motion to deem the requests admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c); see
Stover v. Bruntz
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31-32; see e.g.,
Appleton v. Superior Court
,
supra
, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 635-636 [sanctions are mandatory].)
The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).)
2.
Courts Determination
The motion to deem admitted has been denied without prejudice, and Defendant has failed to respond or oppose this motion in any way. The requested sanctions of $850 for legal fees of $790 at an hourly rate of $395 and the $60 filing fee for the motion are eminently reasonable. Accordingly, the Court grants sanctions in the amount of $850.
III.
Conclusion
Plaintiff
Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc.s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted and for Monetary Sanctions (Attorney Fees and Costs) Against Defendant Ara Tovmassian in the Amount of $850.00 [Res ID # 0191] is GRANTED.
Sanctions in the amount of $850 are ordered to be paid to Hatkoff & Minassian within 30 days of this Order. Failure to do so could result in further sanctions as ordered by the Court.
Ruling
TALAL ALTAMIMI, ET AL. VS LIEF ORGANICS, LLC
Jul 10, 2024 |
23CHCV02417
Case Number:
23CHCV02417
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
F47 Dept. F47
Date: 7/10/24
Case #23CHCV02417
MOTION TO STRIKE
Motion filed on 5/28/24.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Lief Organics, LLC
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Mankind Essentials, Inc.
NOTICE: ok
RELIEF REQUESTED
: An order
striking the Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Mankind Essentials, Inc. and for sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $4,042.50 pursuant to CCP 128.5.
RULING
: The motion is denied.
SUMMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of an agreement entered into by former plaintiffs Talal Altamimi, III (Altamimi) and Plaintiff Mankind Essentials, Inc. (Mankind/Plaintiff) and Defendant Lief Organics, LLC (Defendant) for the manufacture of fertility and dietary products for Mankind.
Based on three orders, Altamimi and Plaintiff paid Defendant deposits totaling $22,787.50.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to perform under the agreement.
On 8/11/23, Altamimi and Mankind filed this action against Defendant for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Fraudulent Deceit, (3) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (4) Promissory Fraud and (5) Negligence.
After attempts to meet and confer regarding the issues Defendant had with the complaint were unsuccessful, on 11/20/23, Defendant filed and served a demurrer to the
original complaint.
On 12/28/23, 9 court days before the 1/11/24 hearing date on the demurrer, Plaintiff Mankind Essentials, Inc. (Plaintiff), alone, filed and served a First Amended Complaint which rendered the demurrer moot.
(
See
1/11/24 Minute Order citing CCP 472(a); CCP 1005(b)).
After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues Defendant had with the First Amended Complaint, pursuant to an extension of time to respond to the First Amended Complaint, on 2/9/24, Defendant filed and served a demurrer to the 2
nd
, 4
th
and 5
th
causes of action in the First Amended Complaint.
On 3/7/24, the date a reply was due to be filed and served, Defendant filed and served a Notice of Non-Opposition to the demurrer.
See
CCP 1005(b)
On that same date and without any explanation, Plaintiff filed and served a late opposition to the demurrer.
On 3/8/24, Defendant filed and served a reply to the opposition.
On 3/14/24, the Court sustained the demurrer with 30 days leave to amend making a Second Amended Complaint due on or before 4/15/24.
(
See
3/14/24 Minute Order).
Plaintiff filed and served its Second Amended Complaint on 5/2/24.
Thereafter, Defendant contacted Plaintiff regarding the impropriety of filing the Second Amended Complaint beyond the deadline set by the Court and asked Plaintiffs counsel to withdraw the Second Amended Complaint.
(Bamford Decl. ¶¶6-7, Ex.C).
Plaintiff did not directly respond to the request to withdraw the Second Amended Complaint and has not withdrawn the pleading.
(Bamford Decl. ¶¶6-7).
On 5/28/24, Defendant filed and served the instant motion seeking an order striking the Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff and for sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of $4,042.50 pursuant to CCP 128.5.
At the 5/29/24 Case Management Conference, former plaintiff Talal Altamimi represented that Plaintiff was no longer represented by counsel, although a substitution of attorney had not been filed.
(
See
5/29/24 Minute Order).
On 6/14/24, at the hearing on Defendants Motion to Compel Arbitration, Plaintiffs counsel represented that Plaintiffs counsel had substituted out; however, a substitution of attorney had still not been filed.
(
See
6/14/24 Minute Order).
At the same hearing, defense counsel represented to be in contact with Plaintiff; the parties had entered into a settlement agreement and requested the hearing on the motion be continued.
Id
.
Therefore, the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration was continued to 8/14/24.
Id
.
Despite the foregoing, on 7/2/24, Defendant filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the instant motion to strike.
Also, on 7/2/24, Plaintiff filed a substitution of attorney indicating that former plaintiff, Talal Altamimi, is substituted in as counsel for Plaintiff.
As noted on the Substitution of Attorney form itself, unless Altamimi is an attorney, Altamimi cannot represent the corporate Plaintiff in court.
ANALYSIS
Defendant seeks to strike the Second Amended Complaint on the ground that it was not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court because it was filed beyond the 30-day deadline set forth in the Courts 3/14/24 order sustaining Defendants demurrer with 30 days leave to amend.
See
CCP 436(b).
Defendant also seeks sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs (former) counsel on the ground that the filing of the Second Amended Complaint beyond the court ordered deadline constitutes frivolous conduct.
See
CCP 128.5.
While the Second Amended Complaint was filed and served beyond the court-ordered deadline, Defendant has not shown that it has suffered any prejudice as a result of the late filing and service.
Similarly, the Court does not find the late filing and service of the Second Amended Complaint constitutes frivolous conduct which warrants the imposition of sanctions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the motion is denied.
As noted above, unless Talal Altamimi is an attorney, Altamimi cannot represent Plaintiff Mankind Essentials, Inc. in court.
Therefore, Altamimi cannot appear on behalf of Plaintiff at this hearing or any future hearing.
If Altamimi is not an attorney, Plaintiff
must obtain counsel before the next scheduled court hearing or the Court will set an Order to Show Cause as to why the action should not be dismissed.
Ruling
Edwards, et al. vs. General Motors LLC
Jul 10, 2024 |
22CV-0200334
EDWARDS, ET AL. VS. GENERAL MOTORS LLC
Case Number: 22CV-0200334
Tentative Ruling on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs: Plaintiffs David and Stephanie
Edwards filed this action alleging violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Act”)
against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) and Taylor Motors, Inc. (“TMI”) on August 4, 2022.
Following extensive motion practice, primarily concerning discovery issues, the parties settled the
matter on May 7, 2024. Pursuant to the Act, and the terms of the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs
are the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs seek a total
of $319,464.80 in attorney fees and costs. This request consists of $149,773.50 in attorney fees
for 269.3 hours of work litigating this matter from August 5, 2022 to the present, a 2.0 multiplier,
and $19,917.80 in costs.
Objections to Evidence: Plaintiffs have raised 10 Objections to portions of the Declaration of
Cameron Major on the grounds that certain statements and supporting exhibits are improper
argument, lack foundation, are conclusory, and lack personal knowledge. The Objections are
OVERRULED.
Song-Beverly: The Song-Beverly Act contains a cost-shifting provision that specifically allows
prevailing buyers to recover their costs, including attorney’s fees. Civ. C. § 1794(d). The
attorney’s fee award is limited to the amount the court determines was reasonably incurred by the
buyer in commencing and prosecuting the action, based on actual time expended. The prevailing
buyer has the burden of proving the fees were both reasonably necessary to conduct the litigation
and reasonable in amount. Civil Code § 1794(d); Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of
California, Inc., (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 785. The lodestar method applies to determining
attorney’s fees under the Song-Beverly Act. Id. at 817. When determining a reasonable attorney's
fee award, using the lodestar method, the judge begins by deciding the reasonable hours the
prevailing party's attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the prevailing hourly
rate for private attorneys in the community who conduct non-contingent litigation of the same
type. Doppes v Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 CA4th 967, 998. Plaintiff is entitled to be
compensated at rates that reflect the reasonable market value of their services in the community.
Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 643. In determining the amount of attorney's fees to
which a litigant is entitled, an experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional
services rendered in his or her court. Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 738, 752.
Reasonableness of Hours: The court has discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the
attorneys were reasonably spent on litigation. Hammond v. Agran (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 115,
133. The predicate of any attorney fee award is the necessity and usefulness of the conduct for
which compensation is sought. Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819,
846. The court’s focus in evaluating the fee request should be to provide a fee award reasonably
designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided. The starting point for this
determination is the attorney’s time records. Absent clear indication they are erroneous, verified
time records are entitled to credence. Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397.
Plaintiffs seek a total of $149,773.50 in attorney’s fees associated with 269.3 hours of work
performed by four attorneys and one unknown individual. Plaintiffs have submitted detailed time
records to support their request. Defendant challenges numerous specific entries. (Opposition pp.
8 – 11.) The Court has reviewed the billing records in detail, as well as Defendant’s objections.
Counsel billed a total of 269.3 hours to this litigation, which commenced August 4, 2022. The
parties engaged in extensive law and motion practice over 22 months of litigation. The matter
settled on the eve of trial for the maximum possible recovery under the law. The Court finds the
time spent was reasonably expended, with the following exceptions: 1) time billed by Erika
Kavicky – no information regarding this attorney’s qualifications and experience has been
provided, a total of 0.6 hours will be stricken for Ms. Kavicky’s time, and 2) time billed by Angela
Mason – no information regarding this individual’s position, qualifications or experience has been
provided, a total of 1.7 hours will be stricken for Ms. Mason’s time. The billing records Plaintiffs
provided show the following hours were reasonably expended: 133.9 by Deborah Horowitz, 115.4
by Joseph Kaufman and Associates, and 18.4 for the Kaufman and Kavicky firm. The total hours
reasonably expended on this matter are therefore 267.7.
Reasonableness of Rates: A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the prevailing rate charged
to attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. See PLCM Group, Inc. v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. However, the court may also consider the attorney’s skill
and expertise, the nature of the work performed, the relevant area of expertise and the attorney’s
customary billing rates. Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 632.
A plaintiff seeking to recover hourly rates for out-of-town counsel that are higher than the local
rates must show (1) a good faith effort to find local counsel, and (2) demonstrate that hiring local
counsel was impracticable. Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1243.
The Court is the best judge of the value of professional services provided and may use its discretion
to apply rates in line with the market rates for the services provided. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1132. This Court has extensive experience in presiding over Song Beverly actions
including motions for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses under Song Beverly. As such this Court
is aware of the reasonable hourly rates charged in actions of this nature. It is also aware of the
prior hourly rates found to be reasonable. Based on the Court’s extensive knowledge and
experience, it finds that reasonable hourly rates are $400 per hour for the partners, and $350 per
hour for the associate (Isaac Agyeman - 10 years of experience). The Court notes that Plaintiff
Anthony Edwards has submitted a Declaration indicating that he made a good faith effort to find
local counsel but was unable to do so. The Court has reviewed this voluminous case file, which
contains numerous discovery motions supported by attorney declarations regarding fees. It
appears that Plaintiff has not previously submitted a declaration regarding inability to find local
counsel in support of hourly rates above reasonable local rates. The Court has previously,
consistently, found a rate of $400 per hour a reasonable rate for partners in this matter. In the
interest of consistency within this case, and fairness to Defendants who have previously been
ordered to pay sanctions at the rate of $400 per hour, the Court will again find that $400 per hour
is a reasonable rate for partners in this matter. The Court finds that $350 per hour is a reasonable
rate for the associate in this matter. The Court notes that the billing records submitted do not break
out total hours billed by each individual partner and associate. Considering the large number of
billing entries, it is impractical for the Court to recalculate the correct billing at the approved rates.
Plaintiffs are ordered to submit recalculated totals using the Court’s approved rates.
Multiplier: Plaintiffs seek a 2.0 multiplier based on the results obtained and the contingent risks.
Adjustment factors that may be considered in awarding a multiplier include: 1) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, 2) the skill displayed in presenting them, 3) the extent to which
the litigation precluded other employment, 4) the contingent nature of the fee award. Komarova
v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 348. Plaintiff has not
demonstrated a multiplier is warranted in this case. The issues involved in this litigation were
neither novel nor difficult. Counsel have demonstrated they are specialists, who are experienced
and skilled in this area of law, but this case involved routine issues under Song-Beverly. This
litigation precluded other employment to the extent any litigation would. The matter was taken on
a contingent fee basis as is all Song-Beverly litigation. The Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’
Counsel obtained the maximum award for the client. However, simply obtaining a positive result
in a factually and legally standard Song-Beverly case does not warrant a multiplier.
Costs and Expenses: The Song-Beverly Act provides that the court will award a successful
plaintiff a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, which have been determined
to have been reasonably incurred. Civil Code § 1794(d). Plaintiffs have requested an award of
costs and expenses in the amount of $19,917.80. However, the declarations submitted in support
of the moving papers only include itemized costs for a total of $16,247.81. The discrepancy is
addressed only in the Reply materials. (Plaintiffs submitted a Supplemental Declaration of Isaac
Agyeman which attaches a record of costs of $3,730 as Exhibit 6.) GM did not have the
opportunity to review and oppose those costs, as they were raised for the first time in the Reply
brief. Therefore, they will not be awarded. The remaining amount of $16,247.81 appears
reasonably incurred with the following exceptions, which will be stricken: 1) $602.26 for
Plaintiff’s mistakenly filing the Complaint twice, 2) $304.99 for Plaintiff’s “Re-Filing” Motion for
Leave to Amend, as it is a duplicate entry without explanation, 3) $180.16 and $592.73 for
Plaintiff’s Notice of Association of Counsel and Substitution of Attorney, respectively, as they are
business expenses of Counsel, not proper litigation expenses.
As for costs related to Taylor Motors, the Court notes the parties’ settlement agreement is between
and among David Edwards and Stephanie Edwards (“Plaintiffs”) and General Motors LLC and
Taylor Motors, Inc (“Defendants”). The agreement provides “Defendants shall pay Plaintiffs
attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in an amount determined by the Court, by way of a single
noticed motion…” (Decl. Kaufman Ex. 1.) The Court finds the parties’ agreement contemplates
that Plaintiffs’ costs related to Taylor Motors would be included in the instant motion for fees and
costs. The total costs and expenses reasonably incurred are $14,567.67.
The Motion for Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part, as detailed above. Plaintiff is ordered to
prepare a proposed order consistent with the Court’s ruling. Plaintiff is also ordered to file and
serve a declaration which includes the recalculated totals for attorney fees using the Court-
approved rates detailed above. This matter is set for Monday August 12, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in
Department 64 for review regarding the supplemental declaration and proposed order. If a
satisfactory supplemental declaration and proposed order are submitted at least five court days
prior to the continued date, the hearing may be vacated.
P.J. MCAULIFFE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, L.P. VS. THE
TESTATE OR INTESTATE SUCCESSORS OF NORA
Ruling
BILLY SNOW VS DLK CONTRACTING, INC., ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 |
6/18/2022 |
23SMCV00120
Case Number:
23SMCV00120
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
I Code of Civil Procedure requires that a party suing a licensed architect for malpractice must obtain a certificate of merit (with certain exceptions not relevant here) before bringing suit.
The moving party, Fenske, contends that cross-complainant does not have such a certificate and brought a motion to dismiss on that basis.
Cross-complainant has filed no opposition, presumably because there is no such certificate.
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.
The cross-complaint against Fenske is DISMISSED.
Fenske to recover his costs.
Because Fenske is no longer a party, any motion involving him is MOOT and the stay, having served its purpose, is lifted.
Fenske is to prepare the written order of dismissal and lodge it with the court within 20 days.
Ruling
Miguel Aguilar vs General Motors, LLC.
Jul 10, 2024 |
23CV-03969
23CV-03969 Michael Aguilar v. General Motors, LLC
Demurrer by General Motors, LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action
for Fraudulent Inducement (Concealment) because (1) It is barred by the statute of limitations,
(2) Fails to state facts sufficient to establish a cause of action, and (3) Fails to allege a
transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose.
The Demurrer by General Motors, LLC to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint’s Fifth
Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement (Concealment) because (1) It is barred by the
statute of limitations, (2) Fails to state facts sufficient to establish a cause of action, and
(3) Fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose is
SUSTAINED ON ALL GROUNDS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to provide Plaintiff with an
opportunity to (1) Plead around the statute of limitations, (2) Plead fraudulent inducement
with specificity, and (3) Establish a relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. The
Second Amended Complaint will be filed by November 29, 2024, to give Plaintiff sufficient
time to conduct discovery to obtain the facts necessary for Plaintiff to amend.
Motion by Defendant General Motors, LLC too Strike Punitive Damages Claim
The Motion by Defendant General Motors, LLC too Strike Punitive Damages Claim is
SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state a cause of action that supports a claim for
punitive damages and to allege the facts necessary to establish a punitive damages
claim. The Second Amended Complaint will be filed by November 29, 2024, to give
Plaintiff sufficient time to conduct discovery to obtain the facts necessary for Plaintiff to
amend.
Ruling
PHILLIP PHARELL MCGOWAN, ET AL. VS FAME GARDENS, LP
Jul 15, 2024 |
23STCV24498
Case Number:
23STCV24498
Hearing Date:
July 15, 2024
Dept:
20
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kevin C. Brazile
Department 20
Hearing Date:
July 15, 2024
Case Name:
McGowan, et al. v. Fame Gardens LP
Case No.:
23STCV24498
Matter:
OSC re: Default Judgment
Ruling:
The Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice.
Plaintiffs to give notice.
This is a habitability matter. Plaintiffs
Phillip Pharell Mcgowan, Devon Monique Martinez, Joseph Manuel Eddins, and Cereniti Claire Martinez Mcgowan
seek a default judgment against Defendant Fame Gardens LP.
While Plaintiffs request $540,000 in damages, the Complaint fails to make any
specific
request for damages against Defendant.
This is problematic as [t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint . . . . (Code Civ. Proc. § 580.) Further, phrases such as in an amount not less than do not give notice for the purposes of Code Civ. Proc. § 580. (
Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4
th
1161, 1173-1174.) Code Civ. Proc. § 580 applies even when a defendant has defaulted after having filed an answer and having participated in discovery. (See
Greenup v. Rodman
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 828;
Elec. Funds Sols., LLC v. Murphy
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1175.) That a statement of damages was served is irrelevant as this is not a personal injury or wrongful death action.
Thus, Plaintiffs can either accept the jurisdictional minimum of $25,001
in damages or else amend the Complaints allegations as to damages, which would be a material change opening Defendants default. (
Cole v. Roebling Const. Co.
(1909) 156 Cal. 443;
Leo v. Dunlap
(1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 27-28.)
Accordingly
, the Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice.
Plaintiffs to give notice.