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Ruling
Michael Uribe-Elecciri vs Assured Audit Pest Prevention
Jul 10, 2024 |
20CV-03783
20CV-03783 Michael Urbie-Elecciri v. Assured Audit Pest Prevention
Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement
The Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement is GRANTED. In light of the $15,000
settlement amount for a 19 employee representative class, the 33% fee of $5,000 is
determined to be reasonable under the circumstances. The enhancement award to
Plaintiff of $1,500 is found to be reasonable under the circumstances. The $2,500 in
Settlement Costs are determined to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances. The
Court will sign the proposed order lodged with the Court on June 14, 2024. Since the
order provides for a joint status report to be filed in 210 days (seven months) a Status
Hearing is set for Friday, February 28, 2025, at 8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8.
Order to Show Cause re: Dismissal-Notice of Settlement
Dropped from Calendar. A Status hearing has been set for Friday, February 28, 2025, at
8:15 A.M. in Courtroom 8.
Ruling
MOIESHAI CARTER VS NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF LA COUNTY CORPORATION
Jul 10, 2024 |
23STCV16156
Case Number:
23STCV16156
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
73
07/10/24
Dept. 73
Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding
CARTER v. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF LOS ANGELES
(
23STCV16156
)
Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Orlando Cabanday (Cabanday Law Group)
Counsel for Defendant/moving party:
Nicole Sheth (Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP)
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE
(
filed 05/06/24)
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs further response to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide verified responses within 30 days.
The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of
$1,590
. Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2023, Plaintiff Moieshai Carter (Plaintiff) filed this employment action against Defendant Neighborhood Housing Services of Los Angeles County, a California Corporation, doing business as NHS LA County (NHS or Defendant).
Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action:
C/A 1: Disability Discrimination
C/A 2: Racial Discrimination
C/A 3: Sexual Discrimination
C/A 4: Retaliation
C/A 5: Wrongful Termination in violation of Public Policy
C/A 6: Hostile Work Environment Harassment
C/A 7: Failure to Provide Employment File
C/A 8: Unpaid Wages
C/A 9: Failure to Pay Overtime
C/A 10: Failure to Provide Rest Periods
C/A 11: Failure to Provide Off-Duty Meal Period
C/A 12: Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements
C/A 13: Waiting Time Penalties
The Complaint alleges that in October 2012, NHS hired Plaintiff as a lending specialist. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff worked under the management of its Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, JP Veen. (
Ibid
.) Plaintiff continuously worked for NHS until November 2022 when she was wrongfully terminated while on disability. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges multiple violations of Californias Labor Code and FEHA by NHS.
On May 6, 2024, Defendant NHS filed the instant Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and request for sanctions. No opposition was filed.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Meet and Confer Requirement
A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.)¿
Here, Defendants counsel declares that a meet and confer letter was sent to Plaintiffs counsel on April 29, 2023 explaining why the discovery responses were deficient and requesting supplemental responses. (Whang Decl.,
¶ 7.)
Defendant did not receive a response. (
Id.,
¶ 8.)
The Court finds that counsel has satisfied the meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2).
B.
Discussion
Defendant moves to compel Plaintiffs further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One.
Under CCP § 2017.010, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Section specifically provides that [d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action, and that discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.
CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that:
(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.
(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.
(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.
Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.
In the more specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court to compel production must show good cause for the requestbut unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (
TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court
(2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)
It is not necessary for the motion to show that the material sought will be admissible in evidence. Good cause may be found to justify discovery where specific facts show that the discovery is necessary for effective trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial. (See
Associated Brewers Dist. Co. v. Superior Court
(1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586-588; see also Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2017.010, 2019.030(a)(1) (Information is discoverable if it is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.);
Lipton v. Superior Court
(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 (noting a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence).)
If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer. (
Coy v. Superior Court
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also
Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)
Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, Californias liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.)
Here, Plaintiff responded to every Request for Production
with the same objection:
Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent that it seeks confidential, trade secret, proprietary, financial, and/or commercially sensitive information that is privileged and/or confidential and protected from disclosure by applicable law. Plaintiff objects to this request on the ground that the information sought is in the possession of, known to, or otherwise equally available to the propounding party. Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff objects to this request on the ground that it invades the right of privacy guaranteed to whom it seeks information. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney work-product rule. Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the Request is vague and ambiguous.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs boilerplate objections are too general and unmeritorious because they do not state how or why Plaintiff believes Defendants requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or in what way they are confidential, vague or ambiguous. The Court agrees, and notes that Plaintiff has failed to oppose the instant motion.
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to
Requests for Production of Documents, Set One.
C.
Sanctions
A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.)
Sanctions may be imposed for misuse of discovery process.
(Code Civ. Proc., section 2023.030, subd.
(a). ) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2023.010, subd. (d).) Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348 provides that a court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery even if no opposition was filed.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in the misuse of the discovery process by failing to make good faith efforts to respond to Defendants Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. Defendant requests $2,650 in sanctions for counsels work on this motion, including 5 hours spent on the instant motion and an anticipated 5 additional hours to review the opposition, prepare a reply and appear at the hearing. The Court finds sanctions are warranted. However,
since no opposition was filed, the Court awards sanctions in the reduced total amount of $1,590 (6 hours of attorney time at the billing rate of $265 an hour.)
III. DISPOSITION
Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs further response to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide verified responses within 30 days.
The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of
$1,590
. Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order.
Ruling
DAVID FRANKLIN VS. SEQUOIA LIVING, INC. ET AL
Jul 09, 2024 |
CGC23607426
Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Line 8. 1 - DEFENDANT SEQUOIA LIVING, INC.'s DEMURRER to 4TH Amended COMPLAINT. Defendant Sequoia Living, Inc.'s demurrer to the fourth amended complaint ("FAC") is sustained without leave to amend. (CCP 430.10(e).) The court grants defendant's request for judicial notice ("RJN") per Evidence Code section 452(c), (d), and (h). (The Court's complete tentative ruling has been emailed to the parties.) For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
CHRISTOPHER RASCON VS THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 |
22STCV06583
Case Number:
22STCV06583
Hearing Date:
July 11, 2024
Dept:
17
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
CHRISTOPHER RASCON
vs.
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Case No.:
22STCV06583
Hearing Date:
July 11, 2024
Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendant to produce a PMK on any of the nine (9) topics of examination is DENIED.
Defendant is to comply with Document Request No. 1 by producing the Appraisals of Promotability for 2020-2023 for those Battalion Chiefs that never had a 40-hour position before promoting to Battalion Chief.
On 2/23/2022, Plaintiff Christopher Rascon (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles, alleging: (1) racial discrimination; (2) racial harassment; (3) age discrimination; (4) age harassment; (5) retaliation; (6) failure to prevent.
On 5/28/2024, Plaintiff moved to compel Defendants Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) to appear for deposition. Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in connection with this motion.
Discussion
Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendants PMK to appear for deposition. Plaintiff argues that Defendant continues to improperly object to the deposition Notice for all 3 topics and the single document request.
Topic 1 concerns [t]he accuracy, authenticity, and foundation for documents produced by the County of Los Angeles as COLA_1187-COLA_1205. Defendant offered to stipulate to the authenticity and foundation of the records produced to avoid the deposition and unnecessary law and motion practice. However, Plaintiff argues that it was Plaintiffs position that he would like to further inquire about the documents that are to be produced with a person most knowledgeable. (Motion, 4: 25-26.) A vague assertion that he would like to further inquire about the documents, without more, is insufficient.
Topics 2 and 3 initially concerned the the accuracy, authenticity, and foundation for the data included in the Countys responses and supplemental responses, respectively, to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set One. Then, in an amended notice, these topics were broadened to include not merely the accuracy, authenticity, and foundation of the subject documents but also the identities of all persons who prepared the documents and/or compiled the data, how the documents/data were compiled, and the sources of information used to compile the documents/data.
The Amended Notice also set forth new topics 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 which were not part of the original notice. (Atkins Decl., ¶ 12, and Baisch Decl., Exh. 4.)
CCP section 2016.040 requires that parties meet and confer in a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the [discovery] motion.
To determine whether the moving party made a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer, courts will look at a variety of factors including the history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, and the prospects for success. (
See Obregon v. Superior Court
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)
After review of the records, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently engage in a good faith attempt to meet and confer regarding Countys objections to Plaintiffs notice and Amended Notice of the PMK deposition.
Moreover, after review, the Court finds that Defendant need not produce a PMK because the document requests are overbroad and unduly burdensome.
As for Topic 1, Plaintiff broadened the scope of the topic to include not only discovery about the authenticity, accuracy, and foundation of the records but also the identities of all persons who prepared the documents and/or compiled the data, how the documents were compiled, and the sources of information used to compile the documents. While Plaintiff may be entitled to know how these documents were prepared and the sources of information used to prepare them, the topic of examination as drafted is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and harassing. To the extent any of the information sought is discoverable, there are less burdensome and less intrusive means of seeking the information, such as propounding written interrogatories.
Similarly, as for Topics 2 and 3, Plaintiff broadened the scope of the topic to include not only discovery about the authenticity, accuracy, and foundation of the Countys responses and supplemental responses to the special interrogatories, but also the identities of all persons who prepared and/or compiled the data, how the data was compiled, and the sources of information used to compile the data. As such, the topic of examination as drafted is overly broad, unduly burdensome and harassing.
As with the documents produced by the County as COLA_1187 through COLA_1205, multiple people at the County assisted with preparing and compiling the data that was included in the Countys responses and supplemental responses to Plaintiffs special interrogatories, and therefore designating a person most knowledgeable about each data set is neither reasonable nor practicable. To the extent any of the information sought is discoverable, there are less burdensome and less intrusive means of seeking the information, such as propounding written interrogatories.
Topic No. 4 states: The IDENTITY of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief.
Topic No. 5 states: The IDENTITY of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had not worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief.
Topic No. 6 states: The age of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief.
Topic No. 7 states: The age of each Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had not worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief.
Topic No. 8 states: The race and ethnicity of each Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief.
Topic No. 9 states: The race and ethnicity of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had not worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief.
The Court agrees that:
Topics 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are harassing for several reasons. First, it is duplicative of information already provided in discovery. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the Countys wrongful conduct, Plaintiff was not accepted for a 40 hour position, which he argues is a critical component of his ability to be considered for a promotion. But even if that is so, Plaintiff fails to explain how knowing the identities of the Battalion Chiefs who worked in 40 hour positions will lead to discoverable information, when Plaintiff has already requestedand the County has providedextensive information about the relevant personnel in the Los Angeles County Fire Department. (See Atkins Decl., Exh. N, at Responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set Two, No. 19 [for each year from 2017 to 2023, the number of Battalion Chiefs who were promoted, who had not worked in 40- hour positions (as opposed to a short-term temporary detail assignment) as Captains prior to their promotions]; No. 20 [for each year from 2017 to 2023, the number of Battalion Chiefs who were promoted, who had not worked in 40-hour positions as Captains prior to their promotions, and who were Hispanic].) (See also Atkins Decl., Exhs. O and P.)
Moreover, even if Plaintiff were entitled to the information again, requiring the County to produce a person most knowledgeable to testify about the identities of the Departments Battalion Chiefs who previously worked in 40-hour positions is harassing and unduly burdensome. This information can just as easily be discovered through less intrusive means, such as a written interrogatory, or a request for production of documents, without requiring the County to incur the time, expense, and disruption of producing a PMK for deposition.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to compel is be denied, and Defendant is not required to produce a PMK on any of the nine (9) topics of examination.
As for the document request, Plaintiff seeks The Appraisals of Promotability for all candidates for Battalion Chief between 2020 and the present. Defendant argues that [t]here is no justification to provide five (5) years (2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024) all of the Appraisal and Promotability evaluations for every firefighter personnel who applied for Battalion Chief back to 2020, when the Plaintiff never applied for a Battalion Chief position, and Plaintiff has not articulated any reason why going back so far and to the present is relevant. (Opp., 19-22.) The Court agrees, and limits the request as suchDefendant is to provide for 2020-2023 those BCs that have never had a 40-hour position before promoting to Battalion Chief, as this would be relevant to Plaintiff showing that one can promote to Battalion Chief without having worked a permanent 40-hour position. Defendant is to redact the Appraisals of Promotability as is necessary to preserve the confidentiality of the applicants.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendant to produce a PMK on any of the nine (9) topics of examination is denied. Defendant is to comply with the Document Request No.1 by producing The Appraisals of Promotability for 2020-2023 for those Battalion Chiefs that had never had a 40-hour position before promoting to Battalion Chief.
It is so ordered.
Dated:
July
, 2024
Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at
smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at
www.lacourt.org
. If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.
If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.
If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar
.
For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.
Ruling
STEPHANIE D. GONZALEZ VS THE LEGACY LAWYERS, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
Jul 10, 2024 |
23STCV14103
Case Number:
23STCV14103
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
32
STEPHANIE D. GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE LEGACY LAWYERS, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Case No.:
23STCV14103
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
[
TENTATIVE] order RE:
plaintiffs motion to compel compliance
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff Stephanie D. Gonzalez filed this action against Defendant The Legacy Lawyers, A Professional Law Corporation, asserting causes of action for: (1) Labor Code retaliation; (2) FEHA retaliation; (3) discrimination; (4) harassment; (5) failure to prevent; (6) violation of equal pay; and (7) constructive discharge.
The action stems from Plaintiffs assertion that she was paid less than her male coworkers. Plaintiff alleges that after she complained about the disparity, Defendant began retaliating against her. Plaintiff alleges that the working conditions became so intolerable that she was forced to resign.
On June 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel compliance with requests for production. Defendant filed its opposition on June 26, 2024. Plaintiff filed her reply on July 2, 2024.
LEGAL STANDARD
If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling . . . thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that partys statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320(a).)
DISCUSSION
The instant motion concerns RFP Nos. 83, 90, and 93, which sought production of metadata related to certain key documents in the case: a coaching memo issued to Plaintiff; and two policies regarding job requirements and pay structure. (Demerjian Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendant responded to these requests by agreeing to produce responsive documents. (
Id.
, ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) The discovery was propounded back in August 2023, and Defendant served its responses in October 2023. (
Id.
, ¶¶ 4-5.) To date, Defendant has not produced the metadata requested by RFP Nos. 83, 90, and 93. (
Id.
, ¶ 10.)
It is undisputed that Defendant agreed in its responses to produce the subject metadata. It is further undisputed that Defendant has not in fact produced the subject metadata in the eight months since it served its responses. Thus, Defendant has fail[ed] to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with [its] statement of compliance. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320(a).) Accordingly, an order compelling production is warranted.
Defendant avers that it has not typically used metadata in its documents and therefore is unfamiliar with how to secure, save, and produce metadata. (Underwood Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant believes that it will have to engage an IT expert in order to properly extract the metadata. (
Id.
, ¶ 13.) Defendant also had to focus its efforts on an insurance coverage issue related to the case that recently arose. (
Id.
, ¶¶ 9-11.)
However, this does not justify the eight-month delay since Defendant first served its responses promising to produce the metadata. It is unclear why Defendant only realized now that it needs to retain an IT expert to assist with extracting the metadata, when the discovery was served back in August 2023. Furthermore, Plaintiff offered to accept the original native files and then have her own expert extract the metadata, thus obviating the need for Defendant to retain an IT expert. (Demerjian Reply Decl., Ex. 2.) Defendants compliance and cooperation on other discovery matters does not excuse its conduct with regards to the RFPs at issue in this motion. The insurance issue has no bearing on Plaintiffs right to obtain discovery. Thus, Defendant has failed to articulate substantial justification for its failure to produce documents.
Sanctions are warranted, albeit in a reduced amount. An hourly rate of $750 is not warranted for this type of motion, nor are the 7 hours claimed. (See Demerjian Decl. ¶ 12.) The Court instead awards $1,600 for 4 hours at a rate of $400.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs motion to compel compliance is GRANTED. Defendant shall produce documents responsive to RFP Nos. 83, 90, and 93 within 15 days of this order. The Court sanctions Defendant and its counsel in the total amount of $1,600, to be paid within 30 days of this order.
Ruling
RAMIREZ vs GOLDEN FELICITY, INC.
Jul 11, 2024 |
CVRI2307023
Demurrer on 2nd Amended Complaint for
RAMIREZ vs GOLDEN
CVRI2307023 Wrongful Termination (Over $35,000) of
FELICITY, INC.
ASHLEY RAMIREZ
Tentative Ruling:
Hearing on this motion was vacated per stipulation of the parties.
The CMC is continued to 9/11/2024 at 8:30 in Department 6.
Ruling
ENRIQUE MARTINEZ VS MARATHON INDUSTRIES, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 |
22STCV15370
Case Number:
22STCV15370
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
55
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
: Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement.
BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination case filed by Plaintiff Enrique Martinez (Plaintiff) against his former employers, Defendants Marathon Industries, Inc. and Marathon Fleet Repair Services, Inc. (Defendants).
Plaintiff brings a motion to enforce Defendants signed acceptance of a Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 offer. Defendants oppose the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 (Section 998) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial or arbitration (as provided in Section 1281 or 1295) of a dispute to be resolved by arbitration, any party may serve an offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken or an award to be entered in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time. The written offer shall include a statement of the offer, containing the terms and conditions of the judgment or award, and a provision that allows the accepting party to indicate acceptance of the offer by signing a statement that the offer is accepted. Any acceptance of the offer, whether made on the document containing the offer or on a separate document of acceptance, shall be in writing and shall be signed by counsel for the accepting party or, if not represented by counsel, by the accepting party.
(1) If the offer is accepted, the offer with proof of acceptance shall be filed and the clerk or the judge shall enter judgment accordingly.
A Section 998 offer must be written and sufficiently clear to result in the entry of judgment or another final disposition of the action.
Berg v. Darden
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 721, 731-732.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks to enforce the signed Section 998 offer, which is attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of Armond M. Jackson. Relevant here, the Section 998 offer states that Defendants will pay Plaintiff in exchange for the execution and transmittal of a release of all current claims in this underlying litigation by Plaintiff in favor of all the Defendants in this action in full settlement of this action. Jackson Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 2. While Defendants signed the offer, the parties remain unable to agree on the terms of the release. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that they have not settled their case.
Notably, the Court previously found that the parties did not settle and set the case for trial. Minutes entered 1/31/24. Plaintiff did not raise an objection to the Court setting the case for trial. Indeed, after Plaintiff received the signed Section 998 offer and the parties exchanged emails about the release, the parties entered into a stipulation to continue the trial to enable the parties to resolve their dispute regarding the scope of a release in this action that would constitute a complete settlement of this action. Stipulation filed 11/27/2023. Thus, the parties clearly have not settled the issue of the scope of the release and therefore the case.
The Court further finds that the parties expressly invoked Section 998 as the settlement procedure, and not Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. The settlement has failed because the parties have not agreed to the material terms of a release or attorneys fees, which means that the accepted offer lacks all the content needed to form a final judgment under either statutory section.
Hence, the Court finds that the parties have not mutually agreed to settle upon fully finalized terms.
CONCLUSION
The motion is denied.